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Summary 
Many scholars have perceived a contradiction between two pairs of verses in 1 
John. While the first pair (1: 8 and 10) states that those who claim that they do not 
'have sin' or 'have not sinned' are guilty of deceit, the second pair (3: 6 and 9) declares 
that those 'born or and 'abiding in' God 'cannot sin.' The apparent discrepancy, 
known as the 'sinlessness contradiction,' has been the subject of constant debate, an 
interpretive problem to which Johannine scholars have proposed varying solutions. 
This thesis does not propose a new exegetical solution to the debate; rather it 
analyses the typical hermeneutical moves that interpreters make in such a debate. It 
draws methodologically on the interplay between the perspectives of reader-response 
theorists Stanley Fish and Wolfgang Iser, with an emphasis on Fish's prioritization of 
the 'interpretive community.' By these lights, the thesis attempts to expose how 
readerly assumptions shape the perception of texts, accounting thus for the diversity of 
explications of 1 lohn 1: 8, 10 and 3: 6,9. 
The thesis explores how readers in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries have 
dealt with the 'sinlessness contradiction.' Given the degree to which John Wesley is 
identified with a concern for 'Christian perfectionism,' the exegetical debate 
surrounding Wesley's own treatment of the issues in debate with others, and the work 
of commentators on whom he drew, is a site of particular hermeneutical interest. Fish 
is used to question critically the ubiquitous claim simply to 'return to the text.' An 
excursus fills out the picture of Wesley's 'interpretive community.' Scholarly readers 
today typically view the debate surrounding Wesley from the perspective of 
contemporary historical-critical scholarship. The thesis thus finally analyses six recent 
treatments of the 'sinlessness contradiction,' which together offer more fertile ground 
for the interest in the readerly aspects of historical-theological reconstmction. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
PERFECTIONISM, READER.RESPONSE 
AND THE ISER • FISH CONTROVERSY 
1. 1. Reading Perfectionism 
'I was once on the point of committing murder. Once when I was in the north of 
Ireland, I went into a room, and found Mrs Wesley foaming with fury. Her husband 
was on the floor, where she had been trailing him by the hair of his head; and she 
herself was still holding in her hand venerable locks which she had plucked up by the 
roots. I felt as though I could have knocked the soul out of her.'l 
It is interesting that when many people of the late Georgian and Victorian 
periods read this anecdote that vividly portrays John Wesley's unhappy marriage to 
Mary Vazeille, they responded, says Stanley Ayling: 'in properly shocked tones of 
anguished outrage' against a woman who would dare violently to touch the 'venerable 
locks' of the highly respected evangelist.2 However, I think that various readers of 
this story in the early twenty-first century would question first what they may perceive 
as the observer's barely veiled misogyny. Such readers might also ask what it was 
about John's character and behaviour that had provoked this reaction from his partner. 
A further query could centre on a society so hypocritically imbalanced that (as Roy 
Porter has noted) it abhorred wifely 'shrewishness' while granting the judicial right of a 
husband 'to beat his wife ... provided the stick was no thicker than a man's thumb.'3 
1 From the private manuscripts of John Hampson and assembled in Hampson's life of Wesley, 
(3 Vols.; Sunderland: Unnamed Publisher, 1791), Volume II, p. 127. See also L Tyerman, The 
Life and Times of the Rev. John Wesley, M.A., Founder of the Methodists (3 Vols.; London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1870), Volume II, p. 110. 
2 S. Ayling, John Wesley (London: Collins, 1979), p. 220, footnote. Ayling notes the doubt that 
some historians have cast on Hampson's record of this incident; yet no one doubts that the union 
was disastrous. However, my point here does not concern the veracity of the story, but how later 
readers interpreted it, and might interpret it 
3 R. Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (rev. ed.; London: Penguin Books, 
1990), pp. 23 - 24. 
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We risk the adoption of a simplistic view of the act of reading if we try to 
explain the varieties of response to the story as a mere sensitivity to Zeitgeist, an 
inevitable progression of human social and moral discernment with the passage of time. 
Rather, I propose that we may view reading as a complex feat achieved by individuals4 
who are subject to plural internal and external influences. It is feasible to argue that a 
delicate balance of many factors affects our perception of the written word, and we 
might list these factors under broad headings such as: social; national; linguistic; 
historical; theological; political; gender- sexual; emotional; volitional; psychological; 
biological; educational; nurtural; and cultural. One could submit that the previous 
sentence is itself a theatre in which to accent the delicate balance that informs reading. 
Divers readers might interpret each of the word-symbols I have used in a number of 
different ways. We could suggest that each of the terms used to describe factors 
affecting reading has a manifest ductility when encountered by disparate people - a 
malleability induced by the factors the terms purport to describe. The entire string of 
symbols therefore represents a forum for volatile response. Readers might invest in the 
phrase 'a delicate balance,' for instance, a resonance of either equilibrium or instability. 
Moreover, as we will see later, theories exist that question the very existence of the text 
except as a function of interpretive models. Accordingly, we may say that the reception 
ofliterature apparently has an active and constructive element to it. Numerous scholars 
now assert that a text remains powerless until we engage with it We have, at the least, 
some role in the production of meaning, and our interpretations may influence us, alter 
our viewpoints, evoke our emotions, and incite us to action. Considering the effects of 
readers' engagement with texts, Margaret Davies has called reading 'a dangerous 
activity.'S In this thesis I wish to consider the process and outworking of this 
'dangerous activity' as applied to a composition in the New Testament canon. 
4 The question of whether an individual can read alone or must always read in a communal context is 
an issue we will discuss later. 
S M. Davies. 'Reader-Response Criticism,' in R.J. Coggins and J.L. Houlden (eds). 
A Dictionary of Biblicallllterpretatioll (London: SCM and Trinity. 1990), p. 578. 
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John Wesley had a reputation for being a voracious reader: he habitually read 
works concerning logic, philosophy, theology, medicine, and ethics.6 However, he 
declared himself 'a man of one book' in his adherence to the Bible.7 The leitmotif of 
this research concerns how the founder of Methodism, five of the commentators that he 
admired, and ultimately six scholars working in the late twentieth century, read what 
Ruth B. Edwards has called one of 'the most intriguing writings of the New 
Testament'S - the first Epistle of John. Particularly, I intend to examine their 
understanding of two brief passages that reveal 'perfection' as a notable, and 
controversial, facet of the letter. Scholars call the relationship between the two 
passages (that we will highlight in due course) the 'sinlessness contradiction,' and 
propose varying solutions to it. My focus is different from much exegetical work in 
that I do not intend to make my own intervention into the continuing controversy with 
the purpose of settling the particular point. Moreover, I do not intend to supply a 
comprehensive account of the twentieth century exegesis of 1 John. Rather, I propose 
to provide an analysis of the hermeneutical moves that interpreters make in such a 
contention. 
Taking into account the story of Wesley's less than perfect marriage, it may 
seem strange to some that he should advocate 'Christian Perfection' to the degree that 
he did; yet H.D. Rack well expresses John's theological emphasis when he writes of 
'Wesley'S favourite doctrine of perfection.'9 It was 1 John that formed one of the 
principal biblical bases of this emphasis. Regarding Wesley's main statement of the 
doctrine (A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, 1767), W.E. Sangster states that of 
all the biblical texts he used the Methodist founder quoted most from: 'the first Epistle 
6 W.E. Sangster, The Path to Perfection (1943; repr., London: Epworth, 1984), 
pp. 104 - 108. 
7 F. Baker et al., (eds.), The Complete Works of John Wesley (23 Vols.; Nashville: Abingdon, 
1980 - 1995), Sermons 1.1, preface p. 105. In this preface Wesley uses the Latin: 'homo 
unius libri.' The references that follow I have drawn mainly from the volumes of sermons edited by 
A.C. Outler, hereinafter cited as 'Sermons. ' 
8 R.B. Edwards, The Johannine Epistles (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), p. 11. 
9 H.D. Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast - John Wesley and the Rise of Methodism (London: Epworth, 
1989), p. 334. 
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of John, from which he culls twenty texts, some of which he repeats frequently ... a full 
third ofthe texts on which [he] chiefly relies ... [he] takers] from [this] Epistle.' 10 
Of course, John's reading of the letter, as outlined in his Plain Account (and 
elsewhere in letters, sermons, and hymns), itself became the subject of reading by other 
people. The bare mention of the word 'perfection' stirred strong responses in readers 
and hearers 1 1 - responses fashioned by individual and communal cognition of that 
word. It soon proved that there was no such thing as a 'plain account' of the doctrine, 
and understandings of it proliferated. Also, parallel to the divergent religious views of 
perfection generated by interpretations of 1 John and Wesley's work, we note that 
perfectionism as a moral theory has secular antecedents. Indeed, scholars have 
observed the multiform apprehensions of perfection in history. 
J.A. Montmarquet states that perfectionism is an ethical view: 'according to 
which individuals and their actions are judged by a maximal standard of achievement-
specifically the degree to which they approach ideals of aesthetic, intellectual, 
emotional, or physical "perfection.'" Hence, awareness might vary from a purely 
moral account, to an abandonment of 'conventional morality in favour of standards 
based on ... non-moral values ... [such as the] ... artistic.' He remarks that 'no fully 
worked-out system of "perfectionist philosophy" has been attempted,' yet he sees 
aspects of perfectionism in the teachings of various philosophers from Aristotle to 
Nietzsche,12 Further, T. Hurka traces the numerous 'narrow' and 'broad' reflections 
on perfectionism. He refers to the former as 'moral theor[ies] based on human nature,' 
and to the latter as 'more inclusive view[s] that [value] some development of capacities 
or some achievement of excellence.' Perfectionism, says Hurka, 'starts from an 
account of the good human life, or the intrinsically desirable life.' The good life 
develops certain human characteristics to a high degree, or 'realizes what is central to 
10 Sangster, Path to Perfection, pp. 36 and 48. However, for preaching purposes Wesley 
seems to have favoured the Gospel of Matthew. See Sermons 1.1. Introduction section V, 'Wesley 
and his Sources - Holy Scripture,' p. 69. 
11 Sangster, The Path to Perfection, p. 27. 
12 J.A. Montmarquet, 'Perfectionism' in R Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 573. 
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human nature.' Despite variations in opinion on which attributes one might develop, a 
common emphasis remains - that the ultimate good lies in the development of human 
nature. Hurka sees perfectionism in the stress on rationality in Aristotle and Aquinas, 
in the accent on productivity and sociality in Marx, in the identity with Spirit in Hegel 
and Bradley, and in the will to power in Nietzsche. 13 Thus, we see that reading the 
word 'perfection' generates a span of opinion on the enhancement of human nature. To 
illustrate this span of opinion, as a short excursus within this thesis I aim to present a 
secular form of perfectionism that was extant in the eighteenth century, so setting 
Wesley's ideas in a wider context. 14 
I, also, am a reader - in this instance reading other readers' readings of 
perfectionism in 1 John, as well as the letter itself. Inevitably, my understanding of 
these writings occurs within a matrix of the delicate balance of the numerous factors I 
mentioned earlier. Recognition of this balance of factors leads, I suggest, to a 
declaration of potential bias; so, I accept that critics from different disciplines could 
rightly explore my own biographical details for evidence of inclination. 1 5 These details 
- and many more subtle facets of them - although of no intrinsic interest, nevertheless 
13 T. Hurka, Perfectio1lism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 3 - 4. 
14 I will look at 'Perfectibilism,' a 'doctrine that man, individual and social, is capable of 
progressing indefinitely towards physical, mental, and moral perfection' - Margaret 
Drabble (ed.), The Oxford Compa1li01l10 E1lglish Literature (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1985; repr., Guild, 1989), p. 754. This movement, if such we may call it, had its roots in 
the eighteenth century. Early in the following century (1816) T.L. Peacock could write 
satirically in Headlong Hall of a character, Mr Foster, who was a 'perfcctibilian.' See H.F.B. 
Brett-Smith and C.E. Jones (eds.),The Halliford Edition o/the Works o/Thomas Love Peacock 
(London: Constable and Gabriel Wells, 1934), p. 8. 
15 To illustrate, feminist analysts could search for the creation of a male text. Scholars of ethnicity 
might look for a national disposition from a British reader, and, moreover, raise issues of skin 
colour: does my having white skin cause me to bring a certain perspective to reading since I have 
not suffered the evils of racism? Linguists could investigate my use of the English language to 
discover its influence. Examiners of historical factors in reading will note that I am a reader living 
at the start of the twenty-first century. Those interested in the effects of nurture will discern that 
through upbringing I have a sympathetic (but not unquestioning) interest in Christianity. Political 
students may wish to register that I regard myself as on the 'soft-left' of concern. At present I am a 
mature graduate student with aspirations to obtain a higher degree, to teach and research, and this 
factor may interest those who observe social trends. Savants of 'queer theology' would note that I 
happen to have a heterosexual orientation that has resulted in marriage and offspring, though, as is 
now common, I have numbered among my friends individuals who have declared themselves as 
homosexual: how does this factor influence my reading? My personal interests and friends WOUld, 
to some extent, mirror my mental and emotional make-up for those who research psychology. A 
sociologist's definition of my childhood social setting could locate me within the 'working c1a'ls.' 
Also such a scholar could describe me as simultaneously a member of several 'communities': a 
family; an academic department; an Anglican church; a group of friends from widely differing 
soCial, religious (or non-religious) and national backgrounds. 
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affect how I will read the material in question. Although a delineation of their potential 
affects might have limited accuracy, I wish openly to declare their potential to shape 
how I read. If I have an active and constructive role in my reading, surely these factors 
exercise their influence in this sphere. I acknowledge that another combination of 
factors could lead to a radically different reading of this literature. Furthennore, my 
successive readings might elicit divergent responses to it. The question of how we 
read, and how we might read, must now concern us, and to explore the issue we must 
move forward almost two centuries from the time of John Wesley. 
1. 2. Reader-Response Criticism· A Brief History 
'No tears in the writer, no tears in the reader'16 
When Robert Frost wrote these lines in the late 1930s, he wrote them in the 
shadow of an ascendant literary theory - New Criticism. Frost, as I read his words, 
appears to assert that poetry directly communicates an author's emotion (or lack of 
emotion as I could read it), and that readers may recover the pathos embedded by the 
author in his work - and thus experience, in tum, this emotion (or emotional 
barrenness). The proponents of New Criticism, however, railed against these 
perceived 'Affective and Intentional Fallacies': a 'confusion between ra] poem and its 
results .. .!t begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological 
effects of a poem and ends in impressionism and relativism.'17 For the New Critic. a 
poet's emotion when writing became an irrelevance, as did a reader's emotional 
response: 'the author's intentions in writing, even if [recoverable], were of no 
relevance to the interpretation of his or her text. .. [n]either were the emotional responses 
of particular readers to be confused with the poem's meaning: the poem meant what it 
16 R. Frost. Complete Poems (1951). (Originally published in Collected Poems. 1939; repr .• 
London: Jonathan Cape. 1951), 'The Figure a Poem Makes,' p. 18. 
17 W.K. Wimsatt, Jr .• and M. Beardsley, 'The Affective Fallacy' in The Verbal leon: Studies in 
the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. 1954). p. 21. 
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meant, regardless of the poet's intentions or the subjective feelings the reader derived 
from it.'18 Thus, the mere text of a literary work assumed primary importance. 
Interpretation became limited to the text, and close reading strategies emerged as the 
principal tools in the critical effort to discover meaning. The reader now looked 
carefully for linguistic and literary relationships within the text as indicators of its 
essence.19 
Against this background of New Critical formalism, the techniques of reader-
response critics evolved from the early 1950s.20 These critics 'reject the validity ofthe 
Affective Fallacy; they deny that texts make meaning; rather. they affirm that readers 
make meaning; what counts now is readers and the experience of reading.'21 Of the 
many attempts at a definition of this critical strategy, Jane P. Tompkins' comment 
appears apposite; she explains that: '[r]eader-response criticism is not a conceptually 
unified critical position, but a term that has [be]come ... associated with the work of 
critics who use the words reader, the reading process, and response to mark out an 
area for investigation.'22 Her statement lays the foundation for an understanding of 
this critical strategy. If reader-response is not 'a conceptually unified critical position' 
we might, nevertheless, view it as a spectrum of critical emphases on the reader. For 
the purpose of this thesis I intend to limit my observations of the spectrum to two 
Western male scholars: a German, Wolfgang Iser, and a North American, Stanley Fish. 
1. 3. Iser's (or Escher's) Machine 
In an aside during an acerbic critique of !ser's work, Fish refers to Iser's theory 
of reading as 'a marvellous machine whose very loose-jointedness makes it 
18 T. Eagleton, literary Theory - An Introduction (2d ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 41 - 42. 
Here Eagleton paraphrases Wimsatt and Beardsley's arguments. 
19 W. Randolf Tate, Biblical Interpretation - An Intergrated Approach (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1991), p. xviii. 
20 J. P. Tompkins, Reader-Response Criticism: From Fonnalism to Post-Structuralism 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. x. 
21 The Bible and Culture Collective, The Postmodern Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 25. 
22 Tompkins, Reader-Response Criticism, p. ix. 
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invulnerable to a frontal assault.'23 I think that the analogy is a useful one as Iser, I 
suggest, seemingly attempts to make his critical apparatus appear 'all things to all 
people.' It is a mechanism that seeks to chart a median course between the poles of text 
and reader in the debate concerning interpretative authority; it is a device that tries to 
avoid an unchanging determinate meaning on one side, and unchecked indeterminacy 
on the other. At this point I wish to look at this 'machine,' to discover its shape and 
how it works, to ascertain its 'loose-jointedness,' and to depict the nature of Fish's 
critical attack. 
We may begin to understand its frame and operation by means of Iser's 
declaration that a literary work: 
cannot be identical with the text or with the concretization [of a cohesive 
aesthetic object by the reader], but must be situated somewhere between 
the two. It must inevitably be virtual in character, as [one cannot 
reduce] it to the reality of the text or to the subjectivity of the reader, and 
it is from this virtuality that it derives its dynamism. [T]he reader 
pass[ing] through the various perspectives offered by the text and 
retat[ing] the different views and patterns to one another ... sets the work 
in motion, and so sets himself in motion too.24 
If we analyse this declaration we can see that it contains Iser's view of: i) the nature of 
the literary work; ii) the text; iii) the reader's role; iv) the interaction between text and 
reader, and the location of meaning; v) the dynamics of reading; and, vi) the effect of 
the act of reading on the reader. Let us look at each of these interconnected components 
as revealed in further citations from his work. 
The text in this theory is 'a structured indicator to guide the imagination of the 
reader';25 it 'designate[s] instructions for the production of the signified (the aesthetic 
object).'26 It is 'an array of sign impUlses (signifiers) which are received by the 
23 S. E. Fish, 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' Diacritics 11 (1981): p. 13. See also 
Doing What Comes Naturally - Change. Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in literary and Legal 
Studies (Oxford: Clarendon and Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 3, pp. 68 - 86. 
24 W. Iser, The Act of Reading - A Theory of Aesthetic Response (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 21. 
2S Ibid .• p. 9. 
26 Ibid .• p. 65. 
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reader.'27 So we discover it is the 'structure of the text' that guides comprehension.28 
Throughout his work Iser presents texts as having the status of determinate objects that 
contain definable points of instruction (or 'textual segments'): the 'stars' in a literary 
text, he states, remain 'fixed'; yet simultaneously he acknowledges a certain (limited) 
indeterminacy resulting from the reader's role: 'the lines that join them are variable' -
each reader will experience the text differently. 29 '[T]he structure of the text allows for 
different ways of fulfillment.'30 While acknowledging that all judgement on a text has 
its basis in 'private' comprehension, Iser emphasises that this comprehension is not 
'arbitrary' because it is 'guided' by the text.31 
Identifying the reader's role involves the realisation of an intercourse between 
two entities: a construct of the text known as 'the Implied Reader,' who 'embodies all 
those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise its effect,'32 and a real 
reader who engages in 'actualisation' of potential meaning during the reading 
process.33 So, the Implied Reader 'designates a network of response-inviting 
structures, which impel the reader to grasp the text.' The implied reader as a textual 
structure anticipates a real reader without characterising, or historically locating, her or 
him. Therefore, this notion 'pre structures the role' for any recipient of the text. 
Textual 'instructions' evoke 'mental images' in the recipient which evolve as reading 
progresses. This 'ideational activity' occurs in accord with 'the ... reader's own 
disposition': she or he will selectively interpret the text in the light of personal 
experience. Personal experience is 'responsible for the many different ways in which 
people fulfill the reader's role set out by the text'; furthermore, the new experience 
gained while reading merges into the reader's 'store of knowledge' and 
'consciousness.' Consequently, we see that the reader's collateral role as a textual 
27 Ibid., p. 67. 
28 Ibid., p. 21. 
29 Iser, The Implied Reader. Palternso/Commullication in Prose Fictionfrom BUllyalllo 
Beckett (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 282. 
30 Iser, Act 0/ Readillg, p. 37. 
31 Ibid., p. 24. 
32 Ibid., p. 34. 
33 Iser, ImpliedReader, p. xii. 
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structure and structured act become fused 'in [this] dynamic process.' The notion of 
the implied reader represents a description of a 'transmutation process': textual 
structures become personal experiences through the active formation of ideas in the 
mind.34 
Iser uses speech-act theory as a basis for the 'dyadic interaction' that he posits 
between text and reader.35 The literary work emerges through a complete process of 
such interaction, prompted by both the structures of the text and by strategic absences 
of determinacy. Literary texts are not entirely explicit and contain 'blanks,' 'gaps,' 
'places [or 'spots'] of indeterminacy' and 'vacancies.'36 The definable points of 
instruction mentioned earlier appear in the text without connective directions-
consequently 'blanks' emerge between them that the reader must fill. During the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries literary works have displayed an increasing degree of 
indeterminacy by the growing 'presence' of such spaces.3 7 It is these hiatuses that 
prompt the reader to seek 'coherence' (and to construct, dismantle, and reconstruct 
'Gestalts'); they represent 'the fundamental asymmetry between text and reader, that 
give rise to communication in the reading process.'38 Thus, we discover that reading 
is 'a two way relationship':39 the text has patterns implanted within it that generate the 
reader's response to 'build up' connections - 'the syntheses which eventually 
individualize the aesthetic object.'40 Also, we ascertain that 'the meaning of the literary 
work remains related to what the printed text says, but it requires the creative 
imagination of the reader to put it all together.'41 Hence, meaning emerges from this 
interaction 'not [as] a definable entity but ... [rather as] a dynamic happening.'42 All 
34 Iser, Act of Reading, pp. 34 - 38. 
35 Ibid., pp. 54 - 62. 
36 Ibid., pp. 165 - 178~ 201 - 203 and passim. 
37 Ibid., pp. 203 - 207. 
38 Ibid., pp. 167~ 127 - 130~ 185 - 186. 
39 Ibid., p. 173. 
40 Ibid., pp. 117 - 118. 
41 Ibid., p. 142. 
42 Ibid., p. 22. 
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literary texts induce 'petformances' of meaning - they do not themselves formulate 
meaning.43 
The latter remark, that meaning is a 'happening' or 'petformance' rather than a 
formulation within the text, receives some qualification from Iser, however. At one 
point he seems to indicate that meaning has some referential foundation within the text 
itself: 
Meaning is the referential totality which is implied by the aspects 
contained in the text and which must be assembled in the course of 
reading. Significance is the reader's absorption of the meaning into his 
own existence. Only the two together can guarantee the effectiveness of 
an experience which entails the reader constituting himself by 
constituting a reality hitherto unfamiliar to himself.44 
Both the referential aspects of the text and the self-constitution of the reader will occupy 
us in later paragraphs. 
In Iser's critical apparatus, reading progresses by meanS of an impulse he calls 
the 'wandering [or moving] viewpoint.'4S The reader cannot 'grasp the text' in its 
entirety, but rather: 'only as a series of changing viewpoints, each one restricted in 
itself and so necessitating further perspectives ... This is the process by which the reader 
"realizes" an overall situation.'46 During the reading of a narrative text, for instance, a 
reader's viewpoint 'travels' through various 'perspectives.' These perspectives are 
'references to the world incorporated into the text.' Iser lists them as narrator, 
characters, plot, 'and that marked out for the reader.' Interestingly, he fails to elucidate 
on the readerly perspective in his subsequent discussion, and the phrase does not 
appear again; I conclude, therefore, that he may be alluding to the textual construct 
known as the 'implied reader' that we considered earlier: thus, the perspective marked 
out for the reader is the response-inviting structures motivating the real reader's grasp 
of the text. 'The function of these different perspectives,' he tells us, 'is to initiate the 
43 Ibid., pp. 26 - 27. 
44 Ibid., p. 151. 
4S Ibid., pp. 108 -109; 196 - 199 and passim. 
46 Ibid., p. 68. 
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production of the aesthetic object (Le., the meaning of the text).' During the real 
reader's progress through the text the perspectives continually interweave and interact 
and the 'theme' (or 'foreground') emerges - the particular perspective 'in view' at any 
one moment. Iser says that behind this 'theme' lies what he terms the 'horizon' (or 
'background'). This represents those 'perspective segments' previously encountered 
and contains the themes of earlier phases of reading. He informs us that 'the structure 
of theme and horizon organises the attitudes of the reader and at the same time builds up 
the perspective system of the text.'47 
At this point we must look at the effect the act of reading has on the reader. We 
have already observed the 'transmutation process' - whereby textual structures, through 
an active formation of ideas in the mind, penetrate the reader's consciousness. The 
latter now becomes the location where 'the text begins to exist as a Gestalt. .. ,' says 
Iser.48 This process results in the 'original consciousness' of the reader undergoing a 
change. During reading, her or his 'original consciousness ... [cannot] remain 
unaffected ... as the incorporation of the new requires a re-formation of the 01d.'49 Iser 
boldly avers that '[r]eading removes the subject - object division, and so the reader 
becomes occupied by the author's thoughts' (albeit, against a 'background' of the 
reader's own 'orientations'). Assimilation of these 'alien' thoughts consequently 
produces 'retroactive effects on [the reader's] store of experience.' A new division, 
that of the 'subject against himself,' supersedes the former subject - object division. 
The reader makes her - or himself 'present to the text,' that is: 'temporarily [absent 
from] his own disposition' (or 'past experience', or 'self). In this state the subject 
becomes 'lifted out of time' and experiences the events in the text with an immediacy 
that renders 'the past. .. without influence, and the future ... unimaginable.' A state of 
self-forgetfulness ensues - and a 'transformation' takes place.SO 
47 Iser, Act of Reading, pp. 96 - 103. 
48 Ibid., p. 121. 
49 Ibid., p. 159. 
SO Ibid., pp. 155 - 156. 
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An analysis of this transformation seems to indicate that it has both temporary 
and permanent effects (although which are temporary and which are permanent we do 
not learn). The split between the subject and himself results in 'a contrapuntally 
structured personality in reading.' This indicates that a counterpoint, or dialogue, of 
understanding has started between the thoughts of the author and the subject, so 
enabling the subject's 'presence' to the text. 5 I A corresponding 'tension' arises that 
signals the extent to which the text has affected and transformed the subject: this tension 
is a desire for coherence through a 'reunion' with the self. However, for reunion to 
take place there must be an incorporation of the new experience into the existing 'store.' 
A new spontaneity in the reader's attitudes emerges due to the temporary division that 
has occurred in the reader. Unhindered now by past experience, these spontaneous 
attitudes occasion the flexibility to facilitate incorporation of any type of text; ultimately 
they aid the reading subject to 'reconcile' the 'experience of the present text with his 
own store of past experience.' Thus, the new experience merges into the store and the 
subject reunites with the self.52 
The 'significance of [a] work,' we learn, 'does not lie in the meaning sealed 
within the text, but in the fact that that meaning brings out what had previously been 
sealed within us.' Through the process in which texts 'guide' and 'shape' spontaneity 
we discover the permanent nature of the 'transformation' mentioned earlier: it is no less 
than the creation of a 'new and real consciousness.'53 Reading 'enables us to 
formulate ourselves and thus discover an inner world of which we had hitherto not 
been conscious.'54 We noted earlier that Iser affirms that: 'as the reader sets the work 
in motion, [she or he] sets [her - or himself] in motion too.' Regarding the effect of 
reading, we may deduce that in lser's critical elucidation this dual 'motion' initiated by 
the reader leads to a fuller self-knowledge and the recreation of the reader's 
consciousness. 
S I Ibid., p. 156. 
S2 Ibid., pp. 156 - 157. 
S3 Ibid., p. 157. 
S4 Ibid., p. 158. 
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Beneath Iser's initial declaration of his theory's construction and operation, we 
discover an underlying assumption that has governed its design. For Iser, the world is 
an absolute 'given' external reality, its 'objects, unlike imaginings, are highly 
detenninate.'55 Therefore, it is possible to comprehend the 'facts' of empirical 
existence 'in scientific texts, but not in literature, where the text does not reproduce 
facts but at best uses such facts to stimulate the imagination of the reader.'56 Scientific 
texts are exhausti ve and explicit in their descri ption of the world: they do not contain 
'places of indeterminacy' as do literary texts. Likewise, during real-life conversations 
people can refer routinely to the empirical, factual nature of objects 'so that [their] 
utterance may gain [the] intended precision';57 however, 'for the literary text there can 
be no such "facts" [but rather the text represents] a sequence of schemata ... which have 
the function of stimulating the reader himself into establishing the "facts'" (therefore, 
the 'schemata' themselves are determinate).58 So, we note from these statements that: 
a) the world is an objective entity; and, b) although the literary text does not express 
referential certainties, it nevertheless is intrinsically part of the world - as we have 
already seen, for Iser the text exists as a 'structure' containing definable points of 
instruction. 
So, it is this assumption of the objectivity of the world and the text-as-structure 
that provides Iser with the frame on which he constructs and operates his critical 
theory. From this basis he is able to speak of 'a significance which is to be supplied, 
and a significance which has been supplied.'59 Stanley Fish's critique of Iser's 
'machine' strikes at the dyadic nature of a determinate 'given' world and textual 
structure on the one hand, and a corresponding indeterminate aspect of literature on the 
other. Fish argues that 'the distinction between the determinate and the 
55 Ibid., p. 138. 
56 Ibid., p. 87. 
57 Ibid., p. 184. 
58 Ibid., p. 141. 
59 Iser. 'Interview,' Diacritics 10 (1980): p. 72. See also Prospecting: From Reader Response to 
literary Anthropology (Baltimore. MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 66-
67. 
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indeterminate ... will not hold.'60 This is because 'the distinction itself is an assumption 
which, when it informs an act of literary description, will produce the phenomena it 
purports to describe.' All the components of Iser's machinery are 'the products of an 
interpretive strategy that demands them, and therefore no one of those components can 
constitute the independent given which serves to ground the interpretive process.'61 
The result of the collapse of the distinction 'is that we know "real people" no more 
directly than we know the characters in a novel; that "real life" objects are no less 
"ideated" than fictional objects; that ordinary language is no more in touch with an 
unmediated reality than the language of literature.' Fish admits that his reasoning 
seemingly contradicts the 'differences we all feel' regarding the material world and the 
world of the text.62 To solve this contradiction Fish points to conventional categories 
that inform perception. 
In the critical review Diacritics, Iserexplicitly declares that: 
My interpretation of the world may well be as much a product of 
linguistic acts as my interpretation of a literary text, but I maintain that 
there are substantial differences between the things being interpreted. 
First, the real world is perceivable through the senses, whereas the 
literary text is perceivable only through the imagination - unless one 
believes that reading the words sunset, music, silk, wine, and scent is 
the same as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling the real 
things. Secondly, all known experience suggests that the real world 
(uninterpreted) lives and functions independently of the individual 
observer, whereas the literary text does not. Thirdly, our contact with 
the real world has immediate physical or social consequences, whereas 
our contact with the literary text need not, and indeed rarely does have 
any such consequences.63 
Commenting on this statement, Fish observes that Iser posits the world and the text as 
both 'things'; 'but they are different things and therefore they are interpreted 
differently.' However, this still upholds 'the objectivity of either the text or the 
world.'64 For Fish the crux is not whether there are differences between them. 
60 Fish. 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' p. 6. 
61 Ibid .• p. 7. 
62 Ibid., p. 10. 
63 Iser. 'Interview,' p. 72. 
64 Fish. 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' p. to. 
15 
Rather, he questions whether the differences are equivalent 'to the distinction between 
[the] given and [the] supplied': he contends that they are not. He concedes that seeing, 
tasting, and touching the world is not the same as reading about it; however, he argues 
that even our senses are 'conventional' rather than 'natural' activities: 'What can be 
seen will be a function of the categories of vision that already inform perception, and 
those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon us by an 
independent world.' Sensing and reading are both 'conventional and mediated, and. 
therefore, whatever differences [one might attribute to them], they would not be 
differences between an activity that was in touch with [and therefore constrained by] the 
"real world" and one that was not.'65 
A major implication follows from this line of reasoning - that Fish is 
consequently rendering everything as indeterminate: '[I]fthe world and the objects in it 
are no less the product of human invention than the world of literary experience, the 
brakes are off everywhere and communication - ordinary and literary - would seem to 
be deprived of its ground.' Fish denies this implication. He insists that, to the 
contrary, the result of his premise is that the 'breaks are on everywhere.' For 
indeterminacy to run unchecked, readers would require a position from which they 
could perceive independently of assumptions, and Fish maintains that no such position 
exists. Reading is an instance of perception, and perception 'always occurs within a set 
of assumptions that preconstrains what could possibly be perceived (or heard, or 
tasted, or touched).' These assumptions are 'public and communal rather than 
individual and unique.' Thus, he declares, 'perception can never be arbitrary ... [so the 
need to explain] how arbitrariness or sUbjectivity is ... controlled loses its urgency.'66 
Hence, Fish posits a scenario of reading where the distinction between the 
categories of 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' has collapsed; and further, where 
perception is never arbitrary as it is always preconstrained by public and communal 
assumptions. He suggests that under this scenario one could equally speak of 
6S Ibid .• pp. 10 - 11. 
66 Ibid., p. 11. 
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everything as 'given' or of everything as 'supplied.' The terms, he says, 'only make 
sense as fundamental categories of classification if the entities to which they refer are 
pure ... [that is] a text that is simply there ... [and] ... a reader who is ... wholly free.' This 
purity does not exist, however, since 'perception is always mediated (and therefore 
objects are never available directly), and ... [also] perception is always conventional (and 
therefore readers are never free).'67 
Replying to Fish's critique, Iser grants that it is not possible to have an 
unmediated given. However, he accuses Fish of coalescing 'interpretation and that 
which is to be interpreted into an indistinguishable whole.' He states that: 
'interpretation would be useless if it where not meant to open access to something we 
encounter.' This 'something,' he maintains, 'exists prior to interpretation,' it 'acts as a 
constraint on interpretation ... and thus contributes to a hermeneutical process, the result 
of which is both a mediated given and a reshuffling of the initial assumptions.'68 Iser 
justifies his maintenance of the existence of an object prior to interpretation by 
distinguishing between the 'given' and the 'determinate.' He affirms: 
Professor Fish's confusion is caused by the fact that he has telescoped 
three ideas into two. I draw a distinction between the gi ven, the 
determinate, and the indeterminate. I maintain that the literary world 
differs from the real world because it is only accessible to the 
imagination, whereas the real world is also accessible to the senses and 
exists outside any description of it. The words of a text are given, the 
interpretation of the words is determinate, and the gaps between given 
elements and/or interpretations are the indeterminacies. The real world 
is given, our interpretation of the world is determinate, the gaps between 
given elements and/or our interpretations are the indeterminacies. The 
difference is that with the literary text, it is the interpretation of the 
words that produces the literary world - i.e. its real-ness, unlike that of 
the outside world, is not given.69 
Elizabeth Freund, in her assessment of the Iser - Fish controversy, comments 
that Iser's reply appears to side-step the force of Fish's attack. She remarks that 
contrary to Iser's reply, Fish 'is not confused at all about the distinctions [between the 
67 Ibid., pp. 11 - 12. 
68 Iser, Talk Like Whales: A Reply to Stanley Fish,' Diacritics 11 (1981): p.84. 
69 Ibid., p. 83. 
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terms 'determinate' and 'indeterminate'] - he simply puts them in doubt.' Iser. 
however. simply repeats his original position and avoids 'the challenge to question the 
assumptions behind the assumptions.,70 This avoidance of the issue is for Fish typical 
of Iser's entire theory: 
Ask it a hard question - if one can argue about where the gaps are (or 
about whether or not there are any). how can they be distinguished from 
the givens? what authorizes the assumption that everyday life is 
characterised by continuity and determinacy? if gaps have increased in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. and if literature is defined by the 
presence (strange word) of gaps. does this mean that literature is 
becoming more literary or that pre-nineteenth century literature wasn't 
literature? - and it can only respond by rehearsing its basic 
distinctions.71 
There are issues arising from this controversy, notably the issue of possible change in 
readers' perceptions. that I shall expand on in chapter 2. 
After assaulting the assumptions undergirding Iser's machine. Fish turns his 
critique to dismantling every part of the superstructure: 'Iser is impressive in his ability 
to affirm both sides of a traditional opposition'; his theory 'seems able to accommodate 
emphases ... often ... perceived as contradictory in the writings of other theorists'; it 'has 
something for everyone. and denies legitimacy to no one.'72 Every point Iser makes 
about reading. says Fish. he balances with a counterpoint: 
His theory is mounted on behalf of the reader. but it honors the 
intentions of the authors; the aesthetic object is constructed in time, but 
the blueprint for its construction is spatially embodied; each realisation 
of the blueprint is historical and unique; but it itself is given once and for 
all; literature is freed from the tyranny of referential meaning. but 
nevertheless contains a meaning in the directions that trigger the reader's 
activities; those activities are determined by a reader's "stock of 
experience," but in the course of their unfolding, that stock is 
transformed. 73 
70 Elizabeth Freund. The Return oj the Reader - Reader-response Criticism (London: Methuen, 1987). 
pp. 149 - ISO. 
71 Fish, 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' pp. 12 - 13. 
72 Ibid., pp. 6; 5; 3. 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Fish declares: 'By defining his key terms in a number of ways, Iser provides himself in 
advance with a storehouse of defensive strategies.' Moreover he casts doubt upon the 
very definition of Iser's work as a 'theory'; rather he construes it as literary: it satisfies 
Iser's own criteria for an 'aesthetic object' - 'it is full of gaps, and the reader [has an 
invitation] to fill them in his own way.'74 
In spite of his attacks on Iser, Fish allows that his opponent's rationale may 
work 'as a consequence of an overarching interpretive assumption'; it will work 'if 
determinate and indeterminate (or given and supplied) are conventional categories 
within a system of intelligibility.' Under these circumstances all who are involved in 
this system will 'see' (or produce) determinacies and indeterminacies. However, 
everything they see is a construction, as opposed to something they have found. 
Furthermore, communal constraints will operate to hinder sheer invention. 7 5 
We can view an example of Iser's rationale at work (and Fish's critique of it) by 
looking at his treatment of a passage from Henry Fielding's novel Tom Jones. Bya 
happy coincidence for my purposes this passage deals with an instance of 
'perfectionism' in the eighteenth century. Concerning the character of All worthy, Iser 
says: 
Allworthy is introduced to us as the perfect man, but he is at once 
brought face to face with a hypocrite, Captain Blifil, and is completely 
taken in by the latter's feigned piety. Clearly, then, the signifiers are not 
meant solely to designate perfection. On the contrary, they denote 
instructions to the reader to build up the signified, which represents not 
a quality of perfection, but in fact a vital defect, namely, Allworthy's 
lack ofjudgement.76 
Using Iser's terminology, Fish explains77 that this is an illustration of the juxtaposition 
of perspecti ves that stimulate the reader to search for consistency. 7 8 The story exhi bi ts 
two 'character perspectives' that 'confront one another': Allworthy as homo perfectus 
74 Ibid., p. 13. 
75 Ibid., p. 12. 
76 Iser, Act of Reading, p. 65. 
77 Fish, 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' p. 7 .. 
78 Iser, Act of Reading, p. 114. 
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and the apparently pious Dr Blifit. 79 Iser says that in this case the reader redefines 
what she or he means by perfection during the process of reducing the indeterminacies. 
Looking also at the signifiers the reader discovers that they 'do not add up to the 
perfection they seem to denote.' Thus, a revised conception of Allworthy's character 
emerges.80 
Fish comments that an examination of the textual segments that frame the 
category of the 'given' in this story merely reveals Iser's particular interpretive strategy. 
In considering the portrayal of Allworthy as the perfect man, we must, for Iser's 
explication to work, understand human perfection as incompatible with any form of 
naivete. Only under these circumstances will the reader view the singular perspectives 
of Allworthy and Blifil as 'discontinuous' and so experience an 'intensification' of 'the 
acts of ideation.'81 However, if one imagines a reader who regards ingenuousness as 
a characteristic of perfection, such a reader would not see a disparity in Allworthy's 
behaviour; she or he would not perceive a 'gap' that required closure. Introducing the 
possibility of this sort of reader, Fish says: 
irreparably blurs the supposedly hard lines of [lser's] theory, for if the 
"textual signs" do not announce their shape but appear in a variety of 
shapes according to the differing expectations and assumptions of 
different readers, and if gaps are not built into the text, but appear ... as a 
consequence of particular interpretive strategies, then there is no 
distinction between what the text gives and what the reader supplies; he 
supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just 
as variable as the lines that join them.82 
Fish does not advocate his own reading, but he highlights its possibility. He 
emphasises that he is not discounting Iser's reading, he stresses that it is entirely 
possible to give an account of Tom Jones that relies on the distinctions we have 
79 Ibid., pp. 120 - 121. 
80 Ibid., pp. 65 - 67. 
81 Ibid., p. 189. 
82 See. Dote 29. 
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described. As we have said, however, Iser's work finally rests on an assumption that 
will produce the phenomena it claims to describe.83 
At the beginning of our discussion of lser I said I wished to look at his 
'machine' - to discover its shape and how it works, to ascertain its 'loose-jointedness,' 
and to depict the nature of Fish's critical attack. Having explored these matters we 
might visually represent Fish's mechanistic analogy of Iser's theory using a lithograph 
by the Dutch artist M.C. Escher. 'Tetrahedron - Cube with Magic Ribbon.' The virtual 
character of Iser's literary object resembles Escher's mechanical image: as we study the 
components in the artist's graphic design we discover a flexible articulation. If we gaze 
at the tetrahedron's frame we discover that is has 'inversion symmetry.' Should we 
'invert the entire structure through the centre of the cube, the cube would ... remain 
unaffected, but the tetrahedron would tum into its dual, identical to itself, but sharing 
the remaining four verticals with the cube.'84 An assumption of the possibility of such 
flexibility aids our understanding (or 'reading,' even 'creation') of the image. 
Similarly, the 'Magic Ribbon' that weaves through the tetrahedron, when followed by 
the observer's eye, can alter in appearance - the protuberances on its surface can 
'surreptitiously change from convex to concave.'85 Thus the image appears 'all things 
to all people,' and works by an assumption. Iser's 'machine,' likewise, works only 
because of an overarching interpretive assumption - an assumption that will produce the 
phenomena it claims to describe. Consequently, everything the reader 'sees' is a 
construction, as opposed to something found in the text. Iser's 'machine' also has 
'inversion symmetry': it can invert to accommodate emphases frequently perceived as 
contradictory in the writings of other theorists. I conclude that in both Iser's and 
Escher's machines the meaning achieved has an element of the illusory. 
83 Fish, 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' p. 7. 
84 A.L. Loeb, 'Polyhedra in the work of M.C. Escher,' in H.S.M. Coxetcr et aI., (cds.), 
M.C. Escher - Art and Science - Proceedings of the Illlernalional Congress 
on M.C. Escher - Rome, Italy, 26 - 28 March, 1985 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Sdence, 1986), 
pp. 195 - 199. 
85 M.C. Escher, The Graphic Work (Koln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, 1992. English Translation 
by J.E. Brigham. Originally Published in 1959 under the title: M.e. Esher - Grafiek 
en Tekeningen. Zwolle: Koninklijke Erven J.J. Tijl N.V.), p. 13, and illustration 55 originally 
entitled 'Kubus met banden,' 1957. 
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1. 4. Escher's Fish 
As we have already seen, Stanley Fish rejects the supposed determinate nature 
of the text. His theory renders 'seemingly objective and autonomous facts embedded in 
the text. .. [as simply] the result of our perceptual strategies or reading acts.'86 
However, as Stephen Moore points out, to reach this point Fish underwent an 
'intellectual conversion' that began during the period 1967 - 1970.87 His work since 
that time has (says Freund) evinced 'a characteristic, progressively self-revising 
structure of concerns' observable in the collection of his work Is there a text in this 
Class - The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980).88 At one time Fish 
belonged in the same arena of theoretical practice as Iser inasmuch as he viewed reading 
as an interaction between text and reader.89 Fish himself states: 'In 1970 I was asking 
the question "Is the reader or the text the source of meaning?" and the entities 
presupposed by the question were the text and the reader whose independence and 
stability were thus assumed.'90 Preceding an exploration of the implications 
surrounding Fish's more recent premise that 'texts never dictate to readers - readers 
always dictate to texts,'91 it is worthwhile to observe something of the progression of 
his thought from that early period. It is worthwhile also to look at examples of a 
'Fishian' reading of texts. 
Initially, therefore, I propose to look at two essays as representative of Fish's 
nascent post-modernism: 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics' (1970), and 
'Interpreting the Variorum' (1976). The first of these essays grew out of his 1967 
book Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise wst in which he proposes that John 
Milton's poem is 'about how its readers came to be the way they are.' In it (Fish 
86 Freund, Return of the Reader, p. 149. 
87 S.D. Moore, literary Criticism and the Gospels - The Theoretical Challenge, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 113. 
88 Freund, Return of the Reader, pp. 91 and 104 - 105. 
89 Bible and Culture Collective, Post modern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 27. 
90 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? - The Authority o/Interpretive Communities 
(Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Press, 1980), p. x. 
91 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 30. 
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suggests) the poet seeks to make 'the reader self-conscious about his own 
performance.'92 This work featured a reading methodology that Fish expanded in 
'Literature in the Reader' - the essay to which we now tum. It is 'a method of analysis 
which takes the reader, as an actively mediating presence, fully into account.'93 It is 
innovative in that it removes the literary text from the centre of critical attention and 
replaces it with an emphasis on the thought processes of an individual who is reading a 
text. In doing so it reveals Fish's trajectory towards the reader as the pertinent object of 
analysis. 
Fish describes the reading process as a moment-by-moment reaction to 
language.94 The basis of his method is 'simply the rigorous and disinterested asking 
of the question, what does this word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, chapter, novel, 
play, poem, do? And the execution involves an analysis of the developing responses of 
the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time.' Every word of 
a line or sentence is therefore noted for the response it produces. All types of response 
receive attention - '[A]ny and all of the activities provoked by a string of words: the 
projection of syntactical and/or lexical probabilities; their subsequent occurrence or 
nonoccurrence; attitudes toward persons, or things, or ideas referred to; the reversal or 
questioning of those attitudes; and much more.' Fish acknowledges the resultant 
burden on the analyst. She or he must, at every moment of reading, elucidate previous 
responses and aggregate them. Additionally, the analyst must draw in the effects of 
pre-reading issues such as genre and history. Thus, the 'temporal flow' of reading is 
the centre ofthe method 'and [the assumption is] that the reader responds in terms of 
that flow and not to the whole utterance.' From the first word to each of its successors, 
Fish's formula requires a report 'of what has happened to that point.' Also, he says in 
parenthesis: '(The report includes the reader's set [sic] toward future experiences, but 
92 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? p. 21. 
93 Ibid .• 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,' p. 23. This essay originally appeared in New 
literary History 2 (1970): pp. 123 - 162. 
94 Tompkins, Reader-Response Criticism, p. xvi. Tompkins uses the word 'reactions' advisedly in her 
description of the method, as in 1970 Fish still seemed to invest language with intrinsic meaning 
to which the reader reacts. As we will see below. this results in a contradiction in Fish's argument 
that he later sought to correct. 
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not those experiences).'95 He effectively 'slows down' reading to record the sequence 
of actions performed as a reader negotiates sentences and phrases: 'It is as if a slow 
motion camera with an automatic stop-action effect were recording our linguistic 
experiences and presenting them for our viewing.'96 
Fish uses ten examples to illustrate his method. Applying the technique, he 
claims, enlivens even supposedly 'neutral and styleless statements'; the question 'what 
does it do? .. assumes that something is always happening.'97 Furthermore, 
apparently obscure sequences of words that resist the New Critical search for 
'meaning,' with its presumption of the objectivity of texts, become fruitful as strategies 
to explore the response of readers. Such sequences we can regard as actions 'made 
upon a reader rather than ... container[s] from which a reader extracts a message.'98 
Presenting an example of a 'straightforward and non-deviant' sentence, Fish 
discusses a line from Walter Pater's 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance: 'That clear 
perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours.' The first word 'That' is not 
simply there, 'it is actively there, doing something.' It is a demonstrative word 
pointing to a sense of its (yet unidentified) referent outside the observer-reader. An 
expectation arises, impelling the reader to find out what 'that' is. The word and its 
effect form 'the basic data of the meaning experience' and guide descri ption of that 
experience 'because they direct the reader.' The adjective 'clear' has a dual function. 
First, it assures easy recognition of what 'that' is; second, it guarantees the 
unmistakable nature of the word itself. 'Perpetual' has a stabilising purpose regarding 
the prominence of 'that' before the reader sees it; 'outline' supplies a potential form, 
and generates a question: outline of what? The question receives its answer in the 
phrase 'of face and limb,' effectively filling in the outline. When the reader reaches the 
declarative verb 'is' - 'which sets the seal on the objective reality of what has preceded 
95 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,' pp. 26 • 27. 
By the word 'set,' I think Fish means the reader's anticipation of her or his experience of 
forthcoming words in the line or sentence. 
96 Ibid., p. 28. 
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it' - she or he becomes securely oriented 'in a world of perfectly discerned objects and 
perfectly discerning observers.' However, the sentence then turns on the reader by 
removing the world it has created; the appearance of the word 'but' impedes progress 
and causes a momentary hesitation before the realisation comes that 'but' has the force 
of 'only'; the declarative force of 'is' becomes weakened, and uncertainty clouds the 
previously firm outline 'the reader has been pressured to accept.' Then 'image' 
resolves uncertainty but in 'the direction of insubstantiality'; while 'of ours' both 
dispels the now clouded form, and collapses the distinction between the reader and the 
outside referent. Fish demonstrates the final response of the reader as simply viewing 
the referent as appearing and disappearing. So we see the description of the reader's 
experience equates to an analysis of the sentence's meaning. Any question concerning 
meaning as understood in a New Critical sense would simply generate a repetition of 
the description.99 
Furnishing an example of an 'utterance ... which says nothing,' Fish applies his 
method to a line from Book I of Milton's Paradise wst (335): 'Nor did they not 
perceive the evil plight.' The first word - a negative assertion - produces a precise, but 
abstract, expectation of a required subject and verb for its completion. This dual 
expectation becomes reinforced by the auxiliary 'did' and the pronoun 'they.' The 
reader presumes the verb will shortly follow, yet discovers a second negative 'not,' a 
negative that resists settlement within the reader's projection of the statement's form. 
At this stage progress through the line halts; the intrusive (because unexpected) negative 
forces a question as to whether the perception occurred. In pursuit of a solution the 
reader either re-reads - resulting in a repeat of the succession of mental operations; or, 
continues - ensuing in the discovery of the anticipated verb. However. taking either 
action fails to resolve the syntactical uncertainty. Invoking grammatical logic such as 
the 'rule of the double negative,' one cancelling the other and producing a 'correct' 
reading - 'they did perceive the evil plight' - has no bearing on the logic of the reading 
experience or on meaning. Reading, according to Fish, is a temporal experience in 
99 Ibid., pp. 30 - 31. 
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which the combination of two negatives work not to produce an affirmative but rather 
'to prevent the reader from making the simple (declarative) sense which would be the 
goal of a logical analysis.' Any attempt to rationalise the line removes 'its most 
prominent and important effect - the suspension of the reader between the alternatives 
its syntax momentarily offers.' Regarding the line as an occurrence rather than an 
object eliminates its supposed problematic nature. The 'fact' that the reader cannot tell 
if 'they' did perceive, and has involuntarily to interrogate the word sequence 'are events 
in [the] encounter with the line, and as events they are part of the line's meaning, even 
though they take place in the mind, not on the page.' Fish concludes that Milton has set 
a dilemma in the text by using two senses of the word 'perceive': 'they' (the fallen 
angels) do perceive (indeed 'see') the tortures of perdition, but they are, however, blind 
to the moral gravity of their position.100 
Holding these two examples before us we note that Fish at this stage begins to 
reify his observations of the activity of reading, and of the nature of meaning, at the 
expense of the text. Despite maintaining that the stringent character of his method is 
'too fine for even the most analytical of tastes,' and that it 'puts restrictions on the 
possible responses to a word or a phrase,' Fish declares that 'the objectivity of the text 
is an illusion.' The physical presence of the text projects an image of completeness and 
self-sufficiency: an image of a sole repository of value and meaning. Yet this image is 
false. Literature is not a rigid object; it is 'a kinetic art.' Its physical form belies its true 
nature: when we read a book 'it [is] moving .... [its] pages [are] turning, lines [are] 
receding into the past - we [are also] moving with it.' Fish avers: 'Analysis in terms of 
doings and happenings is ... truly objective because it recognises the fluidity, "the 
movingness," of the meaning experience and because it directs us to where the action is 
- the active and activating consciousness of the reader.'lDl According to this 
hypothesis, then, we cannot extract meaning from the text - meaning is an experience 
that occurs during reading. Consequently, a change takes place in literature: it ceases 
100 Ibid., pp. 25 - 26. 
10lIbid., pp. 22; 42 - 44. 
26 
its existence as a fixed object. Instead it becomes an unfolding sequence of events in 
the reader's mind. Also, the objective of literary criticism alters and becomes the 
thorough description of the activity of reading. Thus, the questions we ask about 
literature change: they do not ultimately concern what poems mean, nor what poems 
do, but how readers make meaning. 
Conversely, Fish does not deny that words have meaning, or that the reader is 
constrained by the text, as we have seen from both examples above. Rather, he 
declares that our experience ofliterature depends largely on linguistic and literary 
competence. The reader in Fish's terms is an 'informed reader'; she or he possesses 
three attributes: first, a faculty in the language of the text; second, a mature and 
comprehensive semantic knowledge; third, a literary expertise enveloping 'the 
properties of literary discourses.' Such a reader is a 'hybrid' - an abstract and a real 
reader combined - and 'Each of us, if we are sufficiently responsible and self-
conscious, can, in the course of employing the method, become the informed reader 
and therefore be a more reliable reporter of his experience.'! 02 So, rules of shared 
language make understanding uniform. These rules constrain the production of 
literature, so also do they constrain the range and direction of response. A reader reacts 
to the words of the text in certain ways because he or she shares the same linguistic 
rules with the author. In this sense the author creates the reader's experience and the 
reader accomplishes the author's will. Still, Fish's main emphasis remains that 
literature is an activity performed by a reader and is not, therefore, a stable artefact. 
To conclude, we may comment that this essay shows Stanley Fish as among the 
first critics to propound a 'moment-by-moment method of critical reading.'103 He 
claims a therapeutic effect for his theory - as we apply it we become more aware of our 
cerebral processes when reading: 'It is a method which processes its own user, who is 
also its only instrument. It is self-sharpening and what it sharpens is you. It does not 
organise materials, but transforms minds.'104 Yet despite the benefits of the method, 
102 Ibid .• pp. 48 - 49. 
103 Moore, literary Criticism and the Gospels, p. 112. 
104 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,' p. 66. 
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Fish's autobiographical account of his developing position openly declares a major fault 
in his reasoning. Although his essay seeks to counter the New Critical espousal of the 
idea of a self-sufficient text (even so far as to question its existence), it nevertheless 
posits a reader who is 'an extension of formalist principles, as his every operation 
is ... strictly controlled by the features of the text.' Retrospectively, Fish acknowledged 
how he practised self-deception in order to mask this inconsistency: 'I kept this 
knowledge from myself by never putting the two arguments together but marshaling 
each of them only to rebut specific points.' When charged with potential solipsism and 
anarchy in emphasising the reader, he would highlight the constraints the text imposes. 
If accused of merely extending New Critical praxis, he would claim that his model 
freed the reader from the tyranny of the text and provided a central role for her or him in 
the production of meaning. 1 05 Despite this inconsistency we note that even at this 
stage Fish's ideas about the creation of meaning extend much further than his 
predecessors. Nevertheless, he still held 'to the assumption (shared by the fonnalists) 
that the text and reader are independent and competing entities whose spheres of 
influence and responsibility must be defined and controlled.' From this point we must 
look at an essay in which fish makes a significant step: it involves the realisation that 
we may not uphold the claims of either the text or the reader 'because neither has the 
independent status that would make its claim possible.' 106 
In 'Interpreting the Variorum,' an essay written in three stages, Fish 'moves 
into the position that he has since occupied.'107 Taking six examples from the Milton 
Variorum Commentary, he uses them to illustrate his developing thoughts. The first 
part of the piece represents a restatement of his views in 'Literature in the Reader,' 108 
but at this juncture he directly confronts his relation to formalism. 1 09 Most significant 
for our purposes are the manoeuvres Fish makes in the second and third parts of the 
105 Ibid .• 'Introduction,' pp. 7 - 8. 
106 Ibid .• 'Introduction,' p. 12. 
107 Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels, p. 114. 
108 Freund, Return of the Reader, p. 106. 
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essay. In part two he seeks to answer a question regarding whether the text contains 
the author's intention and produces the reader's experience. For Fish this question 
only has force if one assumes that the formal patterns of the text exist independently of 
the reader's experience: it is only under these conditions that they seem to have priority. 
The claims of independence and priority for the text are actually 'one and the same'; to 
separate them enables them to 'give circular and illegitimate support to each other.' If 
we ask whether formal features exist independently, those who believe so will point to 
their priority: 'they are "in" the text before the reader comes to it.' Ukewise, if we ask 
if formal features are prior, the formalist will affirm that they are 'by pointing to their 
independent status: they are "in" the text before the reader comes to it.' Fish says that 
this is not a progressive argument but 'an assertion supporting itself.' Any attack 
mounted against the independence of formal features is also an attack on their priority 
(and vice versa). He conducts such an attack using two passages from Lycidas. 110 
First, Fish looks at a short passage beginning at line 42: 
'The willows and the hazel copses green 
Shall now no more be seen, 
Fanning their joyous leaves to thy soft lays.' 
As we have seen, Fish believes that the reader is always 'making sense' (a term he says 
he uses in this case with 'literal force': rather an ironic claim considering his argument). 
As a person reads 'something is always happening.' Here the reader makes sense by 
means of the assumption ('and therefore the creation') of a completed assertion after the 
word 'seen': Lycidas' death has caused a sympathetic reaction in the local flora to the 
extent that it dies away ('will no more be seen by anyone'). Therefore, at the end of 
line 43 the reader will have accomplished a single action that might take any of four 
forms; she or he has: made sense, interpreted, performed a perceptual closure, and 
decided intention. Yet, whatever the reader has accomplished (rather, 'however we 
characterize it'), it will unravel while reading the next line. The closure or sense made 
proves premature, so the reader must construct a new solution completely reversing the 
110 Ibid., 'Interpreting the Variorum,' pp. 161 • 162. 
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relationship between man and nature originally assumed. It is others who will now see 
the flora; Lycidas has gone forever but the plants will move to the music of someone 
else; thus the whole of line 44 serves to modify and remove the absolute nature of 
'seen.' Nature is indifferent and any notion of sympathy is a false surmise. We must 
note at this point that the words of Fish's summation become the basis for an 
innovation in his thinking: the poem 'is continually encouraging and then disallowing' 
these false surmises. I I I 
Fish declares that the use of words such as 'encourage' and 'disallow' 
demonstrate how easy it is to submit to the bias of our critical language. We begin to 
talk 'as if poems, not readers or interpreters, did things.' The words 'encourage' and 
'disallow' (along with others he has used) imply agency, assigning it both 'to an 
author's intentions and then to the forms that assumedly embody them.' However, 
Fish thinks that, rather than intention and its formal realisation producing interpretation, 
it is the reverse that applies: 'interpretation creates intention and its fonnal realization by 
creating the conditions in which it becomes possible to pick them out.' His analysis of 
the first passage from Lycidas deliberately followed the standard critical line to 
illustrate his new thought: he 'saw' what his 'interpretive principles permitted or 
directed [him] to see'; he then attributed what he had 'seen' to a text and an authorial 
intention. Fish's principles lead him to 'see' readers performing acts: the points at 
which he finds (or more precisely. he says, 'declares') those acts to have been 
performed become '(by sleight of hand) demarcations in the text.' The next step is for 
these demarcations to receive the designation 'formal features' and as such gain an 
'(illegitimately) assigned responsibility for producing the interpretation which in fact 
produced them.' In this passage the demarcation Fish's interpretation 'calls into being' 
occurs at the end of line 42; but, under his innovation he views the end of that, or any 
other, line as there only because the model used 'demaruis (the word is not too strong) 
perceptual closures and therefore locations at which they occur'; he notes that not every 
111 Ibid., pp. 162 - 163. 
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line ending occasions a closure, and that another model, one that did not emphasise 
reading activity, would not raise the possibility of its being a closure. 1 12 
So, Fish's suggestion is 'that formal units are always a function of the 
interpretive model one brings to bear.' We cannot say that these units are 'in' the text-
and the same is true, he says, for authorial intentions. Intention and formal unit alike 
emerge 'when [one hazards] perceptual or interpretive closure.' It is an interpretive act 
alone that verifies intention: 'intention is known when and only when it is recognised; it 
is recognised as soon as you decide about it; you decide about it as soon as you make a 
sense; and you make a sense [according to Fish] as soon as you can.'l13 
Looking now at Fish's second passage from Lycidas, he quotes lines 13 - 14: 
'He must not float upon his wat'ry bier 
Unwept .. .' 
Fish explains that in this example the 'hazard' of perceptual closure occurs at the end of 
line 13. The reader makes sense of the line as 'a resolution bordering on a promise,' an 
expectation and anticipation of a call to action and a programme of rescue. As she or he 
meets the word 'Unwept,' however, these feelings abate in disappointment; readerly 
realisation of disappointment fuses with the making of a new and comfortless sense: 
nothing will happen - Lycidas will remain floating on 'his wat'ry bier' and futile 
lamentation is the only recourse; even speaking and listening to this lament is an empty 
gesture: we learn that line 15 meretriciously and self-mockingly designates the lament 
as 'a melodious tear.' Fish comments that three 'structures' emerge simultaneously: a) 
the dismantling of an initial resolution of sense and the formation of a new one; b) the 
identification of a formal unit such as a line ending or beginning; and, c) the revision of 
an inaugural decision about intention and meaning by a further decision that creates 
another intention.114 
Assembling his thesis upon his illustrations, Fish elucidates: 'that the form of 
the reader's experience, formal units, and the structure of intention are one, that they 
112 Ibid .• pp. 163 - 164. 
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come into view simultaneously, and that therefore the questions of priority and 
independence do not arise.' Yet, he remarks that this thesis provokes a question: 'If 
intention, fonn, and the shape of the reader's experience are simply different ways of 
referring to (different perspectives on) the same interpretive act, what is that act an 
interpretation of?' He cannot answer. Nevertheless, he avers that no one else can 
answer it either; the fonnalists endeavour to by pointing to patterns and making a claim 
that they exist prior to, and independent of, interpretation; but these patterns, says Fish, 
'vary according to the procedures that yield them' - statistical, grammatical, or any 
other. It is interpretive acts, therefore, that always constitute these alleged patterns 
(they have no 'innocent' existence). He concedes that this is as true of his analyses as 
as it is of anyone else's. The examples he offers work by his appropriation of the 
notion 'line ending' that he treats 'as a fact of nature,' a 'fact,' one might conclude, that 
is responsible for the reading experience. However, Fish thinks that the situation is 
exactly the reverse; 'line endings exist by virtue of perceptual strategies rather than the 
other way around.' Historically the strategy that we know as 'reading (or hearing) 
poetry' includes attention to the line as a unit, but this attention 'has made the line as a 
unit (either of print or of aural duration) available'; what we notice in a text we have 
'made noticeable' by an interpretive strategy.1 15 
It is merely our habitual practice of this reading strategy that has made the fonns 
it yields seem substantial. Fish says that the effect of alliteration, for instance, rather 
than being dependent on independently existing 'facts,' operates by an orthographic 
convention, and so may easily tolerate substitution with another convention: the 
phonetic - thus removing a supposed objective basis; effects are therefore the product of 
interpretation. Fish raises the possible objection that alliteration is an aural rather than a 
physical phenomenon; so when we hear poetry it grants unmediated access to the 
physical sounds themselves - the 'real' similarities of vowels or consonants. He 
answers this by showing that heard and seen patterns alike are the products of 
perceptual habits: 'phonological "facts" are no more un interpreted (or less 
115 Ibid .• pp. 165 - 166. 
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conventional) than the "facts" of orthography; the distinctive features that make 
articulation and reception possible are the product of a system of differences that must 
be imposed before it can be recognised.'116 
Concluding the second part of his essay Fish supports his thesis by pointing to 
competing linguistic paradigms; each of these models offers a different account of the 
constituents oflanguage. He declares that all the technical terms used to describe 
language appear or disappear according to the descriptive apparatus employed. Resting 
analyses on syntactic descriptions is actually to rest them on interpretation; any facts 
referred to 'are there, but only as a consequence of the interpretive (man-made) model 
that has called them into being.' In Fish's theory, therefore, we cannot make the choice 
between objectivity and interpretation: our choice is always between an 
unacknowledged interpretation and an interpretation that is 'at least aware of itself.' 
Fish claims this awareness for himself. In doing so he relinquishes the claims he 
formerly made: he had argued that a 'bad' spatial model of reading had suppressed 
'what was really happening,' but now he sees the notion 'really happening' as simply 
one more interpretation. 1 17 
During the third part of 'Interpreting the Variorum' Fish discusses issues 
arising from the preceding arguments. This discussion surrounds the stability of 
interpretation among readers, and the variation of interpretation in the career of a single 
reader. Further, it surrounds the assumption that these factors point to the existence of 
a text - prior to and independent of interpretive acts. Fish asserts that both the stability 
and the variety are functions of interpretive strategies rather than of texts. lI8 
He subsequently introduces a very significant facet of his scheme, that of the 
'interpretive community.' Taking the stance that there is no independent text to guide 
interpretation raises the questions: 'Why should two or more readers ever agree. and 
why should regular, that is habitual, differences in the career of a single reader ever 
occur?' Excluding the stability and variety of texts, how do we explain the stability of 
116 Ibid., p. 166. 
117 Ibid., p. 167. 
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interpretation among certain groups at certain times? Conversely, how do we explain 
the orderly variety of interpretation? 119 Fish thinks that his idea of the 'interpretive 
community' answers these questions fully. 'Interpretive communities,' he declares, 
'are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the 
conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning 
their intentions.'120 The strategies he speaks of exist prior to the act of reading and 
determine 'the shape' of the material- rather than, as is commonly assumed, the 
reverse. If a particular community believes that there are a variety of texts, the 
members of that community will possess a repertoire of strategies for making them. 
However, if a community holds that there exists only one text then 'the single strategy 
its members employ will be forever writing it.' Members of the first community will 
accuse those in the second of reductionism; those in the second will accuse the first of 
superficiality. Fish explains that such a situation arises because each community 
assumes that the other fails correctly to perceive the 'true text'; actuatly, he says, 'each 
perceives the text (or texts) its interpretive strategies demand and call into being.'121 
So, we discover that the explanation of the stability of interpretation among different 
readers is that they belong to the same community. Similarly, we find that the issue 
concerning the regularity with which a single reader will employ different interpretive 
strategies, and thus make different texts, has its solution in that she or he belongs to 
different communities. Also, we ascertain why disagreements happen and why debate 
can go on in a principled way: 'not because of a stability in texts, but because of a 
stability in the makeup of interpretive communities and therefore in the opposing 
positions they make possible.'122 Fish acknowledges that this stability is a temporary 
event (unlike the timeless stability of the text posited by the formalists). Interpretive 
communities operate in a state of flux, they expand and contract, members transfer 
from one to another. Thus, although alignments are impermanent 'they are always 
119 Ibid., p. 171. 
120 Ibid., p. 171. 
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there' and they provide sufficient stability for interpretive disagreements to continue; 
they also supply enough 'shift and slippage' to ensure that the disagreements will never 
find resolution. The idea of interpretive communities hangs poised between an ideal 
and a fear. The ideal is the impossible conception of perfect agreement that requires 
texts with a status independent of interpretation; the fear is of interpretive anarchy - a 
fear that causes many to maintain the ideal. Fish assures us that such a fear would only 
come to realisation 'if interpretation (text making) were completely random.' However. 
it is the 'fragile but real consolidation of interpretive communities that allows us to talk 
to one another, but with no hope or fear of ever being able to stop.'123 
Interpretive communities, then, have no more stability than texts because 
interpretive strategies are 'not natural or universal, but learned.' Nevertheless, we do 
have an inherent ability to interpret. What we acquire beyond this ability are the ways 
of interpreting - ways that we may forget, that become supplanted or complicated, or 
that fall into obsolescence (the reasons for these alterations in our ways of interpretation 
I will discuss in chapter 2). Should any of these things befall our ways of interpreting, 
a corresponding change in texts occurs 'not because they are being read differently. but 
because they are being written differently.'124 
In Fish's model the sole stability lies in the 'fact' that the reader constantly 
deploys interpretive strategies; communication under these circumstances becomes 'a 
much more chancy affair than we [customarily] think it' Fish describes the situation in 
terms of a question: '[I]fthere are no fixed texts, but only interpretive strategies making 
them, and if interpretive strategies are not natural, but learned (and are therefore 
unavailable to a finite description), what is it that utterers (speakers, authors, critics. 
me, you) do?' We have already observed that under 'old' models 'utterers' express 
prefabricated meanings in codes that exist independently of those who decipher them. 
As we have also seen. Fish holds that we do not extract meaning but make it125 We 
do not make meaning by recognising the encoded forms (the Iserian 'textual 
123 Ibid .• pp. 171 - 172. 
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instructions' referred to in section 3) but by interpretive strategies that create the fonns. 
Fish now avers 'that what utterers do is give hearers and readers the opportunity to 
make meanings (and texts) by inviting them to put into execution a set of strategies.' A 
presumption operates here that the audience will recogise the invitation; the presumption 
itself has its basis in the speaker's or author's projection of the 'moves he would make 
if confronted by the sounds or marks he is uttering or setting down.'126 
Fish recognises that this looks like an admission that a fonnal coding exists 
after all, albeit not of meanings, but of directions for making them - for executing 
interpretive strategies. In answer he states that they 'will only be directions to those 
who already have the interpretive strategies in the first place.' The directions are a 
product of an interpretive act - they do not produce them. It is not because of 
something 'in' the marks on a page that the author 'hazards' his projection of strategies, 
but because of an assumption about something in the reader. Fish asserts that the 'very 
existence of the "marks" is a function of an interpretive community'; it is only members 
of a community that will recognise (that is make) the marks. Those who are outside the 
community will marshal a different set of interpretive strategies (fish insists that it is 
impossible to withhold interpretation) and will consequently make different marks.1 27 
Concluding his essay, Fish admits that although he has 'made the text 
disappear,' a particular dilemma remains. This dilemma centres on the discovery of 
membership of an interpretive community. How does an individual who is performing 
interpretive strategies (and who is thus constituting 'texts, intentions, speakers, and 
authors') recognise others who use the same strategies? Fish thinks that this is an 
impossible task as 'any evidence brought forward to support the claim would itself be 
an interpretation.' 'Proof of membership lies in 'fellowship,' a subtle recognition 
from a fellow member who expresses 'what neither [individual] could ever prove to a 
third party.' Fish intends his last comment to illustrate this recognition: 'we know,' he 
126 Ibid., pp. 172 - 173. 
127 Ibid., p. 173. 
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confides, 'I say it to you now, knowing ... that you will agree with me (that is, 
understand) only if you already agree with me.'128 
It is important to comment on Fish's use of such language as 'making' (as 
opposed to 'finding') meaning, to wit: the reader does not find meaning in the text, she 
or he creates it out of the interpretive strategies employed in the act of reading. I 
suggest that although he uses this kind oflanguage to undermine a naive interpretive 
'realism' (and a prevalent critical rhetoric), he is not doing so on behalf of a personal 
belief in some sort of opposing epistemological or metaphysical 'idealism' (that holds 
as its essence that interpretation 'creates' everything our of nothing); rather, his 
argument stands outside the realism versus idealism debate. Primarily Fish wishes to 
indicate that there is no space between 'interpretation' and the 'facts' such that the 
former could be weighed against the latter. 
As I stated earlier, with the publication of 'Interpreting the Variorum' Fish 
moved into the position that he has since occupied. Subsequent to this essay he has 
sought to consolidate this position. Regarding Fish's more recent work, the Bible and 
Culture Collective rather scathingly declares that: 'These days Fish sticks to sweeping 
theoretical pronouncements and does much less practical criticism than he did in the 
days of Surprised by Sin ... Fish can avoid the text versus reader debate in which he 
used to revel only as long as he talks about criticism without actually doing it.'129 
This, however, is a sweeping statement in itself as it does not take into account his use 
of texts as part of his teaching work at numerous universities. Even in the same year 
that the Collective published their work, Fish wrote: 'At [this] moment I am not 
enriching my central thesis, or deepening it; I am abandoning it, doing literary criticism 
rather than talking about doing literary criticism.'130 Leaving aside that issue, we may 
nevertheless present brief critical observations of the two central pillars of Fish's 
128 Ibid., p. 173. 
129 Bible and Culture Collective, Poslmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 34. 
130 Fish, Professional Co"ectness - Literary Studies and Political Change (Oxford: Clarendon 
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mature theory: a) the disappearance of the text; and, b) the authority of interpretive 
communities. 
I will deal with the second pillar first - a major buttress of Fish's theory - the 
authority of interpretive communities. A comment from the Bible and Culture 
Collective expresses a widespread view of critics: 'Many have charged that Fish's 
interpretive communities are static, homogeneous, hypothetical abstractions.' Further, 
'they lack the concrete political and ethical complexities of actual communities of f1esh-
and-blood readers.'131 As we consider these criticisms we must remember that Fish's 
maxim that 'texts never dictate to readers - readers always dictate to texts'132 has 
behind it the shadow of reading conventions. A critical estimation of Fish's 
communities is that within them an individual never enjoys the act of reading or 
imagination free from communal constraints. Also, the ossified communities 
seemingly envisioned by Fish do 'not require critics to take into account the many 
different readers oftexts and their localized interests.'133 Thus, Freund contends that 
Fish's insistence on the authority of interpretive communities results in 'a radical retreat 
from reading.' Fish's reader submissively exercises the act of reading as informed by 
her or his community: she or he never engages issues of power and authority by 
resistance, reinvention, or revision. What ensues is a form of conservatism as 
institutional assumptions alone enable reading: so the reader becomes powerless. 
Freund concludes: 
Fish's position so far has refused to face up to the ways in which the 
authority of interpretive communities might become grimly coercive. 
The salutary curb on subjectivity, without a corresponding curb on the 
authority of consensual norms, remains troubling. The appeal to the 
imperialism of agreement can chill the spines of readers whose 
experience of the community is less happily benign than Fish 
assumes.134 
131 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 34. 
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We may remark, however, that this sort of observation, that Fish fails 
(especially at the early stage of his project) to give a comprehensive account of 
'interpretive communities,' does not justify any treatment of the idea as irrelevant. To 
continue the process of interpretation as if there were no legitimate point for 
consideration here would be to miss an opportunity. Surely, it is reasonable that we 
should seek to refine our understanding of this important issue. Furthermore, on the 
point of the supposed coerci ve nature of reading communities, it seems that some of the 
foregoing comments strangely hold Fish personally responsible for the nature of 
interpretation under his description. During the next chapter, therefore, I will attempt to 
establish if Fish's communities are indeed as conservative, determinative or benign as 
Freund and other critics maintain. 
The first pillar, the disappearance of the text, is also a mainstay of all of Fish's 
later work. In order to convince us of the totality of this textual dematerialization, he 
invites us on ajoumey. He asks us to descend, beneath our mere sight of paper and 
ink, 'in the direction of atoms.' Once arriving at the atomic level, we discover 'that 
these entities too have a palpability and shape only be~ause of the assumption of some 
or other system of intelligibility.' Therefore, these particles become just as vulnerable 
to deconstructive disintegration 'as are poems, assignments and lists.'135 Freund 
comments that such a move 'leads into what may prove to be an ultimately empty or 
trivial abyss of infinite regress.'136 
The 'infinite regress' Freund speaks of has its visual parallel in Escher's wood-
engraving, Depth. The artist wished to represent an 'unlimited space' and to do so he 
employed the image of a limitless number of fish expanding in all directions. 13 7 
Escher's image gives 'a perception of three dimensional space.'138 So, also, Fish's 
perspective with its emphasis on the disappearance of the autonomous text (and the 
independent reader), in tum causes the evanescence of the subject I object opposition. 
135 Fish. Is There a Text in This Class? 'How To Recognise a Poem When You See One,' p. 331. 
136 Freund. Return o/the Reader. p. 151. 
137 M.C. Escher. The Graphic Work. p. 12. and illustration 36 originally entitled 'Diepte,' 1955. 
138 G.A. Escher, 'M.C. Escher at work,' in H.S.M. Coxeter et aI., (eds.), M.e. Escher - Art and 
Science, pp. 4 and 7. 
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Once this opposition vanishes 'reader-response criticism also disappears at a 
stroke ... [t]he reader's self is itself a sign - another text.'139 Thus we observe a 
regress that talk of 'autonomous interpretive communities' cannot halt. The Bible and 
Culture Collective affinns this point: 'Not only is the reader's self constituted by the 
reading conventions of his or her interpretive community, but those reading 
conventions themselves become another construct, another text, another sign to be 
read ... and so on indefinitely.'140 Escher's fish expand into a three dimensional 
infinity, a space large enough for the ramifications of Fish's theory. 
139 Freund, Return o/the Reader, p. 108. . 
140 Bible and Culture Collective, Posl11wdern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 55. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PERTINENCE OF STANLEY FISH: 
A RE-EVALUATION, DEFENCE 
AND INITIAL APPLICATION 
Fish on the Menu at The Missing Persons: l .. unch I - 1976 
'Y ou reading over my shoulder, peering beneath My writing arm -
I suddenly feel your breath 
Hot on my hand or on my nape, 
So interrupt my theme .. .'141 
<> KOO110~, &llOLWOl~· <> ~Lo~, uJtoJ..TllPtS 
'The Universe - mutation: Life - opinion.'142 
'Toutes les histoires anciennes, comme Ie disait un de nos beaux 
esprits, ne sont que des fables convenues.' - 'All our ancient history, 
as one of our wits remarked, is no more than accepted fiction.'143 
Much of what I have written thus far (and will write in this chapter) is a 'story' 
of reader-response criticism 144 (and, ultimately, my entire thesis will form a 'story' of 
the interpretation of particular petfectionist texts). In using this word I cede that my 
observations are merely a construct, a brief abstraction of what is a complex and 
evolving ratiocination of the act of reading. 145 Regarding the status of reader-response 
142 Robert Graves, Collected Poems -1959 (London: Cassell, 1959), 'The RcadcrOvcr My 
Shoulder,' p. 89. 
142 Marcus Aurelius, Communings. 4. 3 (Haines, LCL). The Locb Cla'>sical Library translator and 
editor C.R. Haines says this was also a maxim of the Pythagorean Democrates. 
143 Ulla Kolvig (general cd.) and Christiane Mervaud (cd.), Oeuvres Completes De 
Voltaire, 21 Romans, (Paris: Gamier Freres, Libraires - Editeurs, 1879), Fran~ois-Marie Arouet, 
called Voltaire, 'Jean not et Colin' (1764), p. 237. Mervaud attributes the original quote to Bernard 
Ie Bovier Fontenelle (1657 - 1757) but does not give a reference. 
144 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism.' pp. 25 -
26. 
145 The Bible and Culture Collective allows that virtually all the theoretical approaches covered in 
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criticism, moreover, I note that it now has the reputation in some circles as having 'a 
past rather than a future'; 146 the comments I have made concerning 'the evanescence of 
the subject I object opposition' in the previous section illustrate the reasons for its 
supposed vitiation. Yet, in the orbit of biblical studies it retains its standing as 
somewhat of an avant-garde methodology.147 Its continued relevance among biblical 
scholars invites an attempt to employ it in an original way. My account of Iser and Fish 
has this objective: to study interpretations of two brief 'perfectionist' passages of 1 
John using a form of reader-response criticism. The abstraction of Iser and Fish's 
insights I have thus far assembled in one sense will result in a trajectory away from Iser 
and towards an examination that incorporates Fishian perspectives on the 
commentators' treatment of the material. This is significant because it departs from the 
trend in biblical studies to use Iser's work as a model for reader-centred studies. 
The Bible and Culture Collective regard Iser as 'the most influential figure in the 
appropriation of reader-response criticism by biblical critics'; but the Collective adds 
that these critics have so far failed seriously to engage Fish's ideas. 148 During the 
course of this thesis I shall take up the challenge implied by this comment. Researching 
and writing as I am at the threshold of the twenty-first century, and so acknowledging 
the matrix within which the delicate balance ofthe numerous factors affecting my own 
reading occurs, I intend first to delineate an eighteenth-century reading of the letter 
(along with some earlier and synchronous readings that influenced it) that began to 
address an interpretive problem; then, in contrast, I mean to illustrate six extant 
academic readings thus revealing the continuing efforts to solve the issue. As I said in 
my introduction, it is not my intention to make a typical intervention of my own into the 
debate with the purpose of settling the exegetical problem known as the 'sinlessness 
contradiction.' Neither is it my aim to give a complete account of twentieth century 
exegesis of 1 John. It is rather to provide an analysis of the hermeneutical moves that 
their work we might class as versions of reader-response criticism. Ibid .• p. 26. 
146 Freund, Return of the Reader, p. to. It is interesting that Freund should make this 
comment as early as 1987. Evidently even by that time some scholars regarded it as obsolete. 
147 Bible and Culture Collective, PostmodernBible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 38. 
148 Ibid., pp. 31 and 55 .. 
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interpreters make in such a debate. Viewing the pre-critical and recent understandings 
in the light of Fish's work (and using Iser's theory as a mirror to reflect further Fish's 
ideas), I hope to exhibit the material from a new aspect. All these aims, though, rest on 
the idea that we may apply reader-response to a composition such as 1 John (we will 
discuss the vexed question of its genre later), and, moreover, they rest on the notion 
that reader-response itself has a continuing relevance as a literary critical tool. Writing 
in 1996, Ruth Edwards stated that the array of 'modem' criticisms, including 
'[s]tructuralist, post-structuralist, and semiotic interpretative methods,' had 'not yet hit 
our texts' [the Johannine epistles]. 149 There would seem to be an imperative, 
therefore, to provide some precedent for such a bearing, as New Testament critics who 
employ these 'modern' criticisms ordinarily concentrate on the canonical Gospels and 
some narratives.I SO However, recently there have been successful attempts to apply 
reader-response to other New Testament epistles, and we may regard these as having 
set the necessary precedent.1S1 Nevertheless, I believe Edwards' statement serves as a 
catalyst for remarking on any such move in the realm of the Johannine material. A brief 
digression regarding my employment of the method follows accordingly, and this 
draws on a further essay from Fish. At the head of this digression, in answer to 
Freund's charge of archaism, I will state in what form I believe we may most 
effectively use reader-response. Concomitant to this, I will provide an inaugural 
presentation in this section of how the method might operate within the confines of our 
study. 
Before we continue thus, however, it is important to make some additional 
observations on the topic of interpretation and change - for in the fourth section of 
chapter one I alluded to ways (of interpretation) that we may forget, that become 
149 Edwards,Johannine Epistles, p. 19. 
1S0 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' 
pp. 38 - 39. The emphasis is particularly on North American critics here. 
151 See J.O. Lodge, Romans 9 - 11, A Reader-Response Analysis (Atlanta, Oeorgia: Scholar's Press, 
1998). Also C.D. Stanley, Paul and Ihe Language oj Scripture - Citation Techlliques in the 
Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature (Cambridge: Society for New Testament Studies 
Monograph Series, No. 74, Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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supplanted or complicated, or that fall into obsolescence. 1 52 We must try to discover 
why our interpretations change and how those changes advance; but, considering 
Fish's emphasis on the conventions of reading, does he really allow that change (either 
in the acts of reading or composing a work) is possible? 
It is Iser who provides us with a prototype of change. He casts James Joyce as 
a writer whose works have the potential to change readers' perceptions of possible 
worlds. Using descriptions of Joyce's Ulysses as an example, Iser remarks that some 
critics characterise it as 'chaotic, destructive, nihilistic, and simply ajoke.' Explaining 
the nature of the work, he speaks of various 'minus functions' of this text that 
invalidate the criteria that readers traditionally use to understand, and that 'block off the 
reader's access to his own expectations.' A sense of 'disorientation' grows in any who 
try to 'interact' with the book. From the perspective of Iser's system we discover that 
when one reads Ulysses it proves 'virtually impossible to stabilize any of the 
connections that one has established.' Although Iser concedes that the text 'resists all 
attempts at integration into a single unified structure,' he argues that this 'leads not to 
chaos but to a new mode of communication.' Now the reader experiences 'everyday 
life' not 'compressed into a superimposed pattern,' but rather, 'as a history of ever-
changing viewpoints.'153 There is a marked contrast in Fish's attitude to Joyce; he 
incuriously discards him in barely a sentence when he writes of 'Baroque eccentrics 
like ... James Joyce.'154 Does Fish's silence on Joyce's work - and on Iser's assertion 
that it constitutes a new mode of communication - signify that there are forms of writing 
that escape communal constraints? We can only postulate that from the disposition of 
his system, Fish would argue that Joyce recognised others as members of the same 
interpretive community, and they likewise recognised him. Those held by the same 
perspective as Joyce's, such as Edouard Dujardin, Dorothy M. Richardson, Virginia 
Woolf, and Marcel Proust, as we know, thought of themselves as 'stream of 
consciousness,' 'interior monologue,' or 'modernist' writers. It was Dujardin's novel 
152 See note 125. 
153 Iser, Act oj Reading, pp. 209 - 210. 
1 S4 Fish. Is There a Text in This Class? 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics.' p. 30. 
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Les Lauriers sont coupes (1888) that Joyce later credited as the source of his own use 
of interior monologue. We might discover a deeper source in the experiments of 
Sigmund Freud and William James. Inevitably, Joyce's style of writing eventually 
became absorbed into the literary field insofar as it no longer seemed unorthodox.1 55 
My point is that it is possible to argue that Joyce's work, rather than being a singular 
cause of change as portrayed by Iser, sprang out of existing assumptions in literature 
and science concerning the importance of studying consciousness. Furthermore, it 
arose in radical dependence on existing types of writing that give it its distinctive 
appearance (and the latter assertion features in a general Fishian topic we will deal with 
later). One could say that, from Fish's point of view, writers of Joyce's literary group 
do not so much challenge the pervasiveness of communities or conventions as actually 
further establish them. Any interpretive difficulties initially arising from 'stream of 
consciousness' writing we could attribute to the process of the shift of conventions. 
Yet, regardless of his dismissal of Joyce, we do find other conceptions of change 
within Fish's work. 
Several related questions arise concerning Fish's notions on why alterations 
occur in our ways of interpreting. These questions concern: the reasons for change in 
the conventions of interpretation; the impetus behind decisions to change allegiance 
from one interpretive community to another; the explanation for changes in communal 
constraints; the belief in the conventional interpretation of all texts (and whether this 
leads to a restriction on imagination); the simultaneous support for self-conscious 
reading on the one hand, and interpretation on the other. As a preamble to our 
exploration of these questions on change, I would like to make some associated 
remarks concerning interpretive communities, disagreement, and political awareness. 
I cited earlier Freund's portrait of a Fishian reader. She or he is a submissive 
and powerless figure who obediently follows institutional assumptions when 
interpreting a text. Furthermore, within Fish's communities Freund detects a worrying 
ISS Drabble (ed.), Oxford Companion to English literature, pp. 520,658,944. 
G.A. Miller, Psychology - The Science of Mental Ufe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1966), pp. 54 - 55, 196. 
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lack of restraint on the authority of consensual norms. Such authority, she argues, has 
sinister undertones in its 'appeal to the imperialism of agreement': an agreement whose 
innocuity would disappear under certain circumstances. l 56 Presumably, Freund has in 
mind hostile environments in which singular interpretations, and, therefore, 
interpreters, that do not accord with an accepted standard of correctness suffer 
exclusion as a consequence. She implies that though Fish's communities are 
potentially oppressive, Fish ensures the safety of his compliant readers. He achieves 
this by creating congenial (and, thus, unrealistic) settings as the context of interpretive 
activity. His communities certainly confine interpretation, but do so in a refined 
manner. Admittedly, Fish seems to envision interpretation oftexts as a process that 
occurs in a civilised 'literary institution.'l57 Indeed, the first context in which Fish 
speaks is, of course, the academic discipline ofliterary criticism. Thus, we discover 
that, for him, interpretation is merely a 'game' - indeed it is the 'only game in 
town. '158 However, I think that critics exaggerate what they perceive as Fish's lack of 
political awareness. Statements that impugn Fish's communities as politically and 
ethically simplistic, and his readers as hopelessly docile, do not, I propose, take into 
account certain aspects of his later work. As we will see, even at the end of the 1970s, 
Fish did not exclude critical deprecation and contention within interpretive communities 
and among 'subcommunites.' Still further, we will see that by the 1990s he had 
illustrated his theory of interpretation by means of 'flesh-and-blood' political and ethical 
questions, and had positively 'take(n) into account the many different readers of texts 
and their localized interests.' 1 59 
So, returning to Fish's position two decades ago, in the preface to his 
eponymous essay, 'Is There a Text in this Class?', Fish recalls a public 'forthright 
attack' on his work. 160 He also facetiously recollects that a review of his lectures at 
l56 See note 135. 
157 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?' p. 343 and 
Passim. 
158 Ibw., p. 355. 
159 See notes 132 and 134. 
160 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'Is There a Text in This Class? ' p. 303. 
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this period contained the observation that his 'intellectual skill' in debate was 'not 
always the skill of a gentleman.'161 We have already seen an example of Fish's 
'ungentlemanly' acerbity in 'Who's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser?' - and we find further 
evidence of this in Alan Sinfield's accusation that Fish uses a 'bullying tone' in his 
arguments162 (a charge that Fish freely admits163). Evidently, these instances of 
comparatively mild censure and rebuttal remain far from the communal malignancy 
foreboded by Freund, and accord to some extent with the critical estimate of Fish's 
'safe' communities. Nevertheless, I think that there is much evidence in Fish's work to 
demonstrate his mindfulness of the factional stances inherent in interpretation, and of 
the potential dangers. I note that he states that there are no political implications 'built 
into [his] theory [of interpretive communities].'164 Nevertheless, I think that we will 
find contained in Fish's notion of change a caution that interpretation is sometimes a 
hazardous game to play. 
In part four of chapter one we saw how Fish briefly outlined his thoughts 
concerning: i) the reasons for interpretive disagreement; and, ii) the basis for the 
continuity of 'principled' debate. As an explanation for both he pointed to a stability in 
the makeup of interpretive communities, and therefore in the opposing positions they 
make possible, though he emphasised that this stability is transitory in nature. 
Disagreement occurs because communities operate in a state offlux, they expand and 
contract as their members transfer allegiance from one interpretive stance to another. 
Alignments are impennanent, but always present; they provide enough stability for 
interpretive disagreements to continue, but enough instability to ensure that the 
disagreements will never find resolution) 65 In two pertinent essays Fish elaborates 
on this theme, and at this stage I think it aids our purposes carefully to scrutinise his 
arguments as I think that they exhibit his ideas about interpretive change as a continuum 
161 Ibid., p. 304. 
162 A. Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading 
(Oxford! Oxford University Press, 1992.), pp. 288 - 90. 
163 Fish, Professional Co"ectness - literary Studies and Political Change, 'Yet Once More,' p. 2. 
164 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and lhe Practice o/Theory in 
literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 'Change,' p. 156. 
165 See note 124. 
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within his communities. Turning, then, from my preliminary remarks, the first essay I 
wish to look at is 'What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?' 
Those who believe in determinate meaning and attempt to offer an explanation 
for interpretive disagreement suffer merciless sarcasm from Fish. For these objectivists 
'disagreement can only be a theological error.' The truth is plainly available in texts, 
they say)66 It is only those who 'perversely' choose not to see this truth that go on to 
'substitute their own meanings for the meanings that texts obviously bear.' Yet they 
offer no explanation for this 'waywardness' in readers. Fish taunts the objectivists: 
'original sin would seem to be the only relevant mode1.' He wonders why they also do 
not explain why 'some readers seem to be exempt from the general infirmity.' Disputes 
over meaning reach resolution by impartial interpreters referring erring readers to 'the 
facts as they really are.' Our discussion in sections three and four of chapter one 
demonstrated how, for Fish, 'facts' appear only in the context of the reader's 
perspective. Thus, we do not settle disagreements by the facts - disagreements are the 
means by which we settle the facts. In other words, facts do not exist in some self-
evident form that one party may indicate and thus solve an interpretive contention. 
Rather, those elements which readers perceive as indisputable 'emerge only in the 
context of some point of view.' Inevitable disagreements occur 'between those who 
hold (or are held by) different points of view, and what is at stake in a disagreement is 
the right to specify what the facts can hereafter be said to be.' Ongoing disputes unveil 
how the 'facts as they really are' undergo metamorphosis. It is not the stability of 
textual objects that accounts for either agreement or disagreement; their explanation lies 
only in: 'the power of ... interpretive communit[ies] to constitute the objects upon which 
[their] members (also and simultaneously constituted) can then agree.' 1 67 
Using four examples, Blake's 'The Tyger,' Faulkner's 'A Rose for Emily, ' 
Austen's 'Pride and Prejudice,' and Booth's 'An Essay on Shakespeare's Sonnets,' 
166 Later we will see that this is the very attitude that John Wesley held concerning the tex.ts from 1 
John that he adduced in support of his view of Christian perfection. Moreover, it is the 
position occupied by many commentators at the latter part of our century, as will become evident 
later. 
167 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?' pp. 338 - 339. 
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Fish dissects the critical struggle for authoritative interpretations. The extant 
conventions ofliterary criticism require that critics support their own interpretations by 
arguing that they more perfectly accord with the facts. Other readers must see the 
veracity of the critic's interpretive principles, as it is in the light of these principles that 
the purported facts will appear indisputable. Consequently, we find opposing critics 
using the same words from a disputed work as internal and confirming evidence. 
However, (given the type of exclusive claim each critic makes - that they alone present 
the interpretive/acts), two conflicting commentators cannot both be right, says Fish; 
and furthermore there is no foundation for deciding between the interpretations they 
advocate. As we have seen, they cannot appeal to the text as it is merely a product and 
consequence of their respective interpretations. The uninterpreted text is unavailable to 
adjudicate between competing interpretations. Thus any appeals to 'the text' become 
circular, merely referring to earlier interpretations. Any word or context cited as 
evidence becomes so because of an already assumed interpretation. Therefore, what is 
at stake in any dispute are the assumptions behind interpretation, rather than the 
supposed facts. Every new reading of a work is a function of a critic's interpretive 
perspecti ve.168 
Pluralists have always argued that a poem such as Blake's The Tyger is open to 
more than one interpretation - however, it is not subject to an infinite number. Critics 
may argue about subjects such as the theme, or 'speaker,' of the poem, but certain 
readings will not enjoy admittance to the circle of accepted interpretations. Such limited 
plurality testifies to the potential of a great work of art to produce many readings (no 
single reading can encapsulate its abundant richness and complexity). Fish agrees with 
Wayne Booth that it is right to rule out at least some readings, but he questions the 
authority of critics to do so. For the pluralist this authority lies in some mysterious 
quality of the text. Booth's pragmatic view is that there is usually a unanimity in 
agreement about what constitutes 'unacceptable meanings'; he sees justified limits to 
legitimate uses of a text, and this is evident as disagreement could not occur without a 
168/bid., pp. 340 - 341. 
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core of agreement. The concurrence Fish has with Booth on this point he qualifies by 
saying that if the text is a function of interpretation then we cannot say that the text is 
the locus of the core of agreement that enables us to reject interpretations. An impasse 
seemingly arises in that we have no foundation from which to regard an interpretation 
as inadmissible, yet conversely we reject interpretations as a matter of course. 169 
However, Fish contends that the impasse exists solely on the strength of the 
assumption that interpretive activity is itself unconstrained. It is the literary institution 
that will determine the contour of this activity as it will authorise only a finite number of 
interpretive strategies. The core of agreement consists in the ways of producing the 
text, rather than in the text itself, and remains open to change. There is no catalogue of 
acceptable ways of interpreting; yet Fish says that there is common knowledge among 
critics regarding how interpretation operates within the literary institution as presently 
constituted. An example of this knowledge comes from one of Fish's students who 
successfully applied one of several interpretive routines in any literary class regardless 
of subject. She variously viewed texts as instances of the tension between nature and 
culture; as providing evidence of large mythological oppositions; as vehicles for 
arguing that the real subject concerned composition; as demonstrations that narrative 
simply reveals the speaker fragmenting emotionally and displacing personal anxieties 
and fears. All these routines were peIfectly acceptable within the given institution, the 
John Hopkins University. Nevertheless, Fish declares that if the student tried to argue 
that a text represented a prophetic message from a deceased relative, this interpretation 
would suffer exc1usion.1 70 
The student's routines represent: an application of the 'unwritten rules of the 
literary game'; a display of the 'common knowledge' ofliterary interpretive protocol; an 
awareness of how interpretations gain admittance or undergo exclusion. Indeed, all 
those who play the 'literary game' instinctively know its rules: journal writers and 
editors; readers and audiences in professional meetings; those who seek and award 
169 Ibid., pp. 341 - 342. 
170 Ibid., pp. 342 - 343. 
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tenure in literature departments; graduate students who wish to display professional 
competence. However, these rules and their concomitant practices are not monolithic 
or stable. Fish says that within the literary community there are 'subcommunities' such 
as those formed by the adherents of opposing literary journals. Furthermore, within 
any community there is a constant reassessment of the boundaries of the acceptable, 
and issues of authority come into play within a community. Professors who emphasise 
psychological factors in reading might indeed admit an interpretation of a text 
supposedly based on a message from a deceased relative; conversely, teachers holding 
New Critical views would instantly dismiss such an understanding as non-literary and 
illegitimate.171 
Fish emphasises that although there exists a category of interpreti ve actions that 
are illegitimate - and this is simply the reverse of a category of those that are legitimate -
the contents ofthat category constantly change. We see them change in a lateral manner 
when an interpreter moves from one subcommunity to another; we see them change in a 
temporal manner when a previously excluded interpretive strategy gradually gains 
acceptance. Reader-response criticism is itself an example of the latter. In chapter one 
section 2 we briefly discussed the New critical dictum against perceived 'Affective and 
Intentional Fallacies.' Fish descries juridical terminology in Wimsatt's and Beardsly's 
dismissal of the reader's response: they treated their own pronouncements as legal 
decisions against violation of institutionalised conventions. However, with the passing 
of several decades we have seen the once interdicted strategy of reader-response 
transformed from a 'fallacy' to a widely used methodology. We can see by the 
emergence of factions among its followers the extent to which reader-response has 
become established as a critical 'orthodoxy.' So, reader-centred criticism, though not 
invulnerable to challenge or attack, had by the late 1970s become a recognised and 
competing literary strategy. It had become acceptable not by virtue of its universal 
reception but by the fact that those who rejected it now had to argue against it. Fish 
repeats his acquiescence with Booth that we are right to exclude at least some readings, 
1 711bid., p. 343. 
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but goes on to explain that because of the inclusion of reader-response as a legitimate 
procedure within the literary institution critics can nOW admit some previously excluded 
readings. 172 
It is not the text that excludes a particular reading, but rather the absence of a 
refined interpretive procedure for producing that text. To demonstrate this, fish 
evaluates Norman Holland's psychoanalytic analysis of Faulkner's A Rose Jor Emily. 
Here is an example of a strategy that, though innovative, is subject to supersession. 
This strategy is pluralist in nature in that it treats the text as a matrix of possible 
readings. Holland deliberately sets limits, however, as he thinks that only some 
possibilities fit the matrix.. A reading that equated two of the principal characters with 
'Eskimos,' for instance, would not represent a justifiable response to the story, but 
rather appear as the pursuit of a 'mysterious inner exploration.' This reading would not 
find a hearing in the literary community and Fish agrees that it should not. However, 
he disagrees with Holland's assertion that it is the language of the text itself that rules 
out the Eskimo reading. Fish argues that it is simply the lack of an interpretive strategy 
for producing this reading that hinders its acceptance: there is presently no way of 
looking at, or reading, the text that aids the emergence of an unmistakably Eskimo 
reading. Fish goes on to posit a scenario under which the required strategy could 
establish itself - a scenario based on recent precedents for reading works by W.B. 
Yeats, William Blake and James Miller. He envisions the discovery of a letter in which 
Faulkner discloses that he has always believed himself to be an Eskimo changeling. On 
the strength of this discovery interested critics (or, the 'Faulkner industry' as fish calls 
them) would begin to reinterpret the canon of his work. This would involve the 
development of a symbolic or allusive system (similar, Fish says, to mythological or 
typological criticism) the application of which would at once transform the text to one 
informed throughout by Eskimo readings. fish precludes the charge that he seems to 
acknowledge the existence of a text per se, and explains that he refers to the text (or 
texts) supplied by the interpretive strategies destined for dislodgement or expansion by 
172 Ibid., pp. 343 - 345. 
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the Eskimo strategy. 173 Thus, appropriation of the new interpretive strategy leads to 
the addition of a new reading of the text (Fish lists the following as instances of 
currently accepted understandings: Freudian; mythological; Chrlstological; regional; 
sociological; and linguistic). Given Fish's hypothetical scenario, an 'Eskimo' reading 
of A Rose for Emily gains legitimate status. 17 4 
As the means for ruling out readings lies solely in the presently recognised 
interpretive strategies for producing the text, it follows that no reading, no matter how 
eccentric, is innately unrealisable. Moving to a third example to demonstrate this point, 
Fish notes Booth's report on Austen's PrideandPrejudice that he has never found a 
reader who fails to see the jokes against Mr Collins - and that therefore the text 
'enforces or signals an ironic reading.' Replying, Fish rehearses a similar argument to 
that we discussed at the end of chapter one, section 3: that it is entirely possible to 
imagine a reader who empathises completely with Mr Collins' values - values that are 
diametrically opposite to those we would have to assume for the passage to have an 
obviously ironic tone. In this instance, however, Fish's concern is the exclusion of a 
reading by the wielding of the professorial authority referred to earlier. He presumes 
that none of Professor Booth's students would hold values that lead to the rejection of 
an ironic reading of the text. Most significantly though, Fish also presumes that Booth 
would not 'allow' these students to hold them; he states: 'students always know what 
they are expected to believe.'175 Before we continue to look further at Fish's essay, I 
would like to make some comment on this statement, as it exposes an aspect of the 
supposed detenninative function of interpretive communities. 
The statement assumes an assertive control on interpretation, and I educe from it 
that a student may adjust her or his 'beliefs' according to the credence of a lecturer or 
the ethos of a department. Entirely practical considerations are at the heart of this 
adjustment: the achievement of the highest grades possible, the avoidance of failure, or 
the acquisition of professional status. Thus, the student seeks to conceal her or his 
173 Ibid., pp. 345 - 346. 
174 Ibid., pp. 346 - 347. 
175 Ibid., p. 347. 
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personal opinions if their expression would result in institutional disapproval; many 
would rather conform to established views to gain kudos. So called liberal and radical 
establishments (shortly we will see that Fish does not think anyone can be radical) on 
the one hand, and putative conservative establishments on the other, insist upon their 
own interpretive mores to varying extents. We have already discussed in chapter one 
section 4 Fish's contention that in the act of reading we 'create' or 'write' the text. Yet, 
we must also ask how interpretation continues during the act of writing as distinct from 
reading a text. If students always know what their lecturers and departments expect 
them to believe, they must, if they wish to avoid institutional stricture and gain prestige, 
embrace that belief and express it in writing, moreover, using only accepted language 
and literary forms. Just as students learn to write only that which is acceptable to 
teachers, teachers also notice how their authority curtails perceived aberrant readings of 
texts. Arrogating interpretive conventions in this manner represents a type of collusion 
between writers and those readers who approve or disapprove of their work. Such 
collusion does not confine itself to the relationship between students and lecturers, 
however. We may see lecturers writing their lessons and research papers in accord 
with institutional requirements rather than their own ideas. Furthermore, as we noted 
above, Fish detects thatjoumal writers and editors play the literary game - both parties 
becoming cognisant of the requirements of content and style necessary for the 
successful publication of a work. All these scenarios suggest a situation well expressed 
in the lines by the poet Robert Graves quoted at the head of this section: the writer feels 
the influence of the reader upon her or his work almost as if someone were reading 
over their shoulder as they wrote. Be this as it may, we must stress that no interpretive 
community can exert total determinative power over a writer. A community can 
change, or its members shift allegiance to another. A confident writer may, as in the 
case of Joyce that we recited above, deliberately challenge the accepted conventions of 
writing (although, as we will see later, do so solely from a position of dependence on 
existing types of writing that give it its distinctive appearance). We will make further 
comment later how dominant attitudes to a text within a community can change through 
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a process of persuasion, thereby releasing formerly suppressed writers' voices - voices 
that, in tum, become representative of the community. Moreover, other interpretive 
avenues exist: the student can transfer to another course, the lecturer move to a different 
university, the journal writer produce work for rival publications. My point in this 
digression is that the particular interpretive strategy characterising any community can 
have an effect on the writers, as well as the readers, within it. The extent and nature of 
that effect varies considerably according to the complexion of a community, and that 
complexion always remains vulnerable to change. However, I recognise that I have 
concerned myself here with matters involving more-or-Iess self-conscious choice and 
that it is not possible to render all the influences of community and convention 
transparent in this way. 
Returning now to Fish's essay, he continues to show: 'that while there are 
always mechanisms for ruling out readings, their source is not the text but the presently 
recognized interpretive strategies for producing the text.' Regarding the Austen 
example he describes the conditions under which a new reading might become 
convincing. He argues for the credibility of these conditions given the procedures used 
within literary institutions to propose and establish fresh understandings. To establish 
a non-ironic reading of PrideandPrejudice would require the unearthing of new 
documentation (such as a letter, a lost manuscript or a contemporary response) leading 
to the conclusion that critics had previously misunderstood the author's intents. These 
conditions would indicate to the literary fellowship that all along Austen had not written 
in a sardonic tone. The work would then appear not as a satire, but rather as a 
celebration, of the country 'gentry' and their ways. Objections to this reading 
inevitably arise - for instance, how do we account for the narrator's absolute 
condemnation of Mr Collins? Fish comments that within the literary institution it is 
possible to meet this, or any other objection. A portrayal of the narrator as fallible 
serves to undermine the vilification of Collins; we could variously depict the narrator as 
dupe, moral prig, uneducated innocent. This would result in the narratorial 
condemnation taking 'its place in a structure designed to glorify Mr Collins and 
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everything he stands for.' Thus, we see the potential transfonnation of our 
understanding of the piece. Even though, after answering objections, many critics 
would reject the revised reading, Fish contends that the conditions he has described 
leaves the text as a work that changes shape according to the interpretive assumption 
applied to it. We may say, then, that anyone who understands the procedures for 
proposing and establishing an interpretation, and knows how to apply such procedures, 
could elaborate any reading whatsoever.1 76 
Still, we have our 'canons of acceptability' and continue to rule out readings -
and remain right to do so, Fish repeats. That we deem some readings as ridiculous 
demonstrates how these canons are always with us. Though, as we have seen, there 
are conditions that we can imagine under which a reading once thought of as asinine 
can move into the circle of respectability or even orthodoxy. For Fish, this is evidence 
that the 'canons of acceptability' can change - and change not in an erratic fashion, but 
systematically, and with elements of predictability. New interpretive strategies become 
acceptable in a certain 'relationship of opposition' to strategies they destine to replace. 
Old strategies often indicate forbidden interpretive practices from which the new 
strategies emerge (witness how Fish's own strategy 'a poem is what it does' arose 
from Wimsatt's and Beardsley's regime).!77 
Of course, advocates of a new strategy herald it as an absolute separation from 
the old; but Fish maintains that the new exists in radical dependence upon its precursor. 
It is wholly in the context of some differential association that we perceive it as new, or 
indeed perceive it at all. Any patronage of Mr Collins as hero would appear futile (even 
as an intended absurdity) if the critical assessment had not already allocated that status 
to Elisabeth and Darcy. It is only as set against their status does the claim for Collins 
have any power to surprise.! 7 8 Hence, new readings require established ones to 
validate their existence (and this point applies, I think, to new writing: Joyce's 'stream 
of consciousness' style required the Victorian and Edwardian framework of narrative, 
176 Ibid., pp. 347 - 348. 
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descriptive, and rational exposition in poetry and prose to validate its existence).179 
Answers to questions that critics have previously asked about a text become the basis 
for different answers - or for declining to answer, or for declaring that the 'real point' 
of a work is that there is no answer.1 80 
Those who advocate new interpretations always claim discovery of this 'real 
point.' However, we can only make sense of that claim in relation to a point (or points) 
heretofore considered as the real one. A dependency ensues where the critic launches 
her or his interpretation only from the basis of a prevenient understanding. This 
dependency becomes apparent in the unwritten requirement that, to claim our attention, 
the new interpretation must amend some significant fault in the previous understanding. 
The New Critical approach honours critics who,judging by its criteria, enhance the 
appreciation of a work. Fresh interpretations must have the foundation of a scholar's 
proofs that old readings failed to esteem sufficiently the piece's literary qualities, it is 
this failure that the propounder of the new reading claims as justification for her or his 
actions. The latest reading remains in dependent opposition to what has gone before 
and yet pierces the centre of the text's literary value. Fish uses Stephen Booth's An 
Essay on Shakespeare's Sonnets to illustrate the assumptions behind the search for the 
real point.181 
Booth states in his preface: 
The history of criticism opens so many possibilities for an essay on 
Shakespeare's sonnets that I must warn a prospective reader about what 
this work does and doesn't do. To begin with the negative, I have not 
solved or tried to solve any of the puzzles of Shakespeare's sonnets. I 
do not attempt to identify Mr. W. H. or the dark lady. I do not 
speculate on the occasions that may have evoked particular sonnets. I 
do not attempt to date them. I offer neither a reorganisation of the 
sequence, nor a defense of the quarto order. What I have tried to do is 
find out what about the sonnets has made them so highly valued by the 
vast majority of critics and general readers.182 
179 Drabble (ed.), Oxford Companion to English Uterature. p. 658. This referen(,'C 
explains the style of writing in place at the time of Joyce's challenge to its authority. 
180 Ibid., p. 350. 
181 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 'What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?' pp. 350 - 351. 
182 Ibid .• pp. 351 - 352. 
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Fish comments that Booth's first move is to set himself in 'differential opposition' to 
the work of the previous interpreters that he seeks to dislodge. Booth will not repeat 
their interpretive strategies as (he implies) they have mislead readers or are irrelevant. 
The location of the source of the sonnet's value (,what ... has made them so highly 
valued') now becomes the central issue. Booth's predecessors have looked in error to 
find this source in the historical identity of the characters, in the biographical details of 
composition, in the establishing of an authoritative manuscript order. Now, though, 
the correct source of value has emerged through Booth's research, and the account he 
gives will truly elevate Shakespeare's work. Thus, Booth's interpretation fulfills all the 
requirements ofliterary critical conventions: it uncovers an inadequacy in former 
interpretations and proposes a solution; the solution involves the production of a 
superior elucidation of the work; this results in an enhancement of the sonnet's val ue. 
Fish records that, at the end of his book, Booth hails Shakespeare's 'remarkable 
achievement.' This validation reflects on Booth also, however, as he has demonstrated 
to his peers that he is a competent member of the institution, having satisfied all 
requirements.183 
Booth goes on to declare: 'I do not intentionally give any interpretations of the 
sonnets I discuss. I mean to describe them, not to explain them.' This is an interesting 
manoeuvre in that by it he claims to free himself and the sonnets from the very 
institution (with its practices) that he has sought approval from. Fish comments that 
this is ironic because at the precise moment Booth declares himself outside of the 
'game' of interpretation, he has, in fact, performed one of its most familiar moves. 
Here we see two versions of this move: i) what Fish terms as the 'external-internal' 
where a critic dismisses earlier interpreters as not sufficiently literary; and, ii) the 'back-
to-the-text' in which we see the revulsion of the critical history of a work as an 
accretion that serves only to obscure. Fish regards the latter as the most potent version 
of the move as it harmonises with a basic assumption made by the literary profession: 
183 Ibid .• p. 352. 
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'the function of literary criticism is to let the text speak for itself.' This seeming 
humility before the text has a tinge of 'righteousness' to it, however. It suggests that 
although other critics have displayed the ingenuity of their interpretations, the one who 
supposedly returns 'back-to-the-text' is a servant of that text with the simple desire to 
make it accessible to its readers - 'who' Fish remarks dryly 'happen also to be (the 
'servant's') readers.'184 
What appears, then, as a move to abjure interpretation in favour of the simple 
presentation of the text, is actually a gesture in which one set of interpretive principles 
displaces another. The new set of principles bears the claim that it is not an 
interpretation. Fish contests this claim by pronouncing its impossibility on the grounds 
that a so-called 'simple presentation' must involve description; this description can only 
occur within 'a stipulative understanding' of what is before us for description, 'an 
understanding that will produce the object of its attention.' So, when Booth rejects the 
existing assumptions regarding the problems surrounding the sonnets in favour of 'the 
assumption that the source of our pleasure in them must be the line by line experience 
of reading them,' he is not seeking to avoid interpretation but rather proffering an 
alteration in the terms in which it will occur. He expressly proposes a transfer of 
attention from the poem conceived as a spatial object that contains meanings to one 
conceived as a temporal experience in which meanings become momentarily available. 
As we read the poem, meanings fade as others take their place in a process of 
commutation, contradiction, qualification and forgetfulness. Fish observes that it is 
only as a reader submits to Booth's opinion of the location of value and significance in 
a poem does she or he see the 'facts' of his subsequent analysis. Booth's description 
of the temporal reading experience that replaces interpretation is therefore an interpretive 
construct of the same order as the interpretations it claims to replace. ISS 
The 'back-to-the-text' manoeuvre, in Fish's judgement, is not an option 
because the text returned to is simply the one demanded by an interpretation that 
184 Ibid., pp. 352 - 353. 
185 Ibid., pp. 353 - 354. 
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governs its production. Yet, the stratagem is effective rhetorically inasmuch as it rides 
on an unchallenged assumption that the text must have an elevated position over 
criticism, and that we must not pennit criticism to overwhelm it. Fish charges Booth of 
not only failing to challenge this assumption, but also of invoking and relying on it - as 
he relies on other assumptions that are equally open to dispute: that we may distinguish 
literary language from the ordinary as the literary fonn displays an invulnerability to 
paraphrase; 'that a poem should not mean, but be'; that the higher the complexity of a 
work, evinced by the number of its propositions held in tension and equilibrium, the 
better it is. These assumptions point to a certain 'conservatism' in Booth's thought 
thus undermining his reputation as a radical. However, the issue is not that Booth is 
not truly radical, but that he could not be. As we foreshadowed earlier, Fish argues 
that no one can be radical. No one would even recognise Booth's work as a challenge 
to some of the conventions of literary study (the poem as artefact, the issue of 
meaningfulness) if unquestioned conventions were not already firmly in place. It is 
impossible to conduct a wholesale challenge to the conventions as there are no terms in 
which to make it - such a challenge would require the use of terms wholly outside the 
institution. Any attempt would be unintelligible as it is exclusively within the institution 
that the 'facts' of literary study such as texts, authors, periods and genres become 
available. fish states that the price Booth, and everyone else, pays for intelligibility is 
entanglement in the 'structure of assumptions and goals from which one desires to be 
free.'186 
He closes his essay by observing that there are no moves outside of the 'game' 
of interpretation, including the move of claiming that one is no longer a player. 
Fundamental to the institution, Fish says, is a wish to disclaim that its actions have any 
consequences and this leads to a situation where scholars practice literary criticism and 
simultaneously deny they are doing so. Within the circle of most literary institutions, 
scholars' training leads them to believe that they are the guardians and transmitters of 
the best that others have thought and said. To be accused of substituting personal 
186 Ibid •• pp. 354 - 355. 
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meaning for received meaning is an anathema. No one wishes to face the accusation 
that they have interpreted. Yet, Fish concludes, 'whatever they do, it will only be 
interpretation in another guise.'187 
It is important to make some comments concerning Fish's observations on the 
typical critical claim not to be 'interpreting' but simply listening to the text without the 
imposition of an agenda. I posit that in giving voice to these observations Fish is not 
seeking to mount a covert expose of supposed henneneutical incoherence. As we have 
seen, the 'back-to-the-text' manoeuvre (in Fish's judgement) is not an option as a proof 
of the veracity of a reading because the text returned to is simply the one demanded by 
an interpretation that governs its production. Nevertheless, his work recognises that as 
part the ebb and flow of interpretive practice almost everyone uses such henneneutical 
rhetoric. Indeed, in terms of that rhetoric, there is a degree of inevitability about using 
this type of language. However, his remarks on the scholarly claim of going 'back-to-
the-text' reveal that claim as a 'move;' a style or gesture that we do not notice because 
of its seeming naturalness or obviousness. His observations serve to unveil the 
rhetoric of objectivity or 'truth-telling.' Fish attends to what readers do in their effort to 
have their reading prevail, how they commend their work, the type of posture they 
adopt towards it. His insights might well make one more guarded about such critical 
rhetoric, yet it remains doubtful that they could, or should, entirely remove that 
rhetoric. One cannot commend a reading to others by asserting its non-existence in 
relation to the text, by declaring that it is fictive. As we will now see, Fish proposes a 
model of interpretive praxis that places persuasion - based on our beliefs and 
assumptions - at its centre. 
A second relevant essay, 'Demonstration vs. Persuasion: Two Models of 
Critical Activity,' is the medium by which Fish supplies another paradigm of 
interpreti ve change. Reiterating that there are no moves outside of the game of 
interpretation, he explains that not onl y may we not opt out of the game, we may not 
disrupt it either. No matter what interpretation we offer it will be 'in the game'-
187 Ibid .• p. 355. 
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otherwise we would not even recognise it as an interpretation. Literary critical practice 
thus continues in a seamless manner. We always produce and perceive change within 
the provisos of the interpretive game, and a recognisable challenge to some of those 
provisos can only occur if others remain in place. Assurance of the continuity of the 
practice of literary criticism grows from the absence of a text that is independent of 
interpretation. It is merely an incoherent emotion to fear the discontinuity of the 
practice; and further, an irony lies in that it is only as one supports the idea of a free-
standing text is there a possibility of moving away from it. Fish's system suggests that 
any movement away from the text is at once a movement toward it - 'toward its 
reappearance as an extension of whatever interpretation has come to the fore.' 188 
Fish foresees an objection: that his model of the continuity of literary critical 
practice would result in greater incoherence. If we can explain changes by the 
conventions of criticism rather than by a more accurate presentation of an independent 
text, it follows that the succession of those changes deteriorates into irrelevance; there 
remains no reason to argue for one interpretation over another, except for the 
opportunities afforded by the conventions. Under these circumstances criticism 
becomes ultimately a cynical exercise in which one would only advocate a reading to 
'win points' or because it had not previously been proposed. Although all 
developments have a link and are not random in nature, without a goal outside of the 
institution such as the progressive clarification of the text all these developments are 
empty.1 89 
A view that gives supremacy to the conventions of criticism seems 
counterintuitive to many. Those who are teachers and critics often sense in their work 
that they are advancing towards a clearer sight of the object they study. To counter the 
denial of detenninate meaning, critics evoke the powerful fear that it will make of the 
whole literary institution 'a gigantic confidence trick.' Following an abandonment of 
belief in determinate meaning how may teachers presume to judge their students' 
188 Fish. Is There a Text in This Class? 'Demonstration vs. Persuasion: Two Models of Critical 
Activity.' pp. 356 - 358. 
189 Ibid .• p. 358. 
62 
approximations of texts - or indeed presume to teach anything? How maya teacher 
claim a validity of reading superior to that of any pupil? One might ask a further 
question: does not 'common sense' and 'professional self-respect' aid the assertion that 
the foundation of interpretation must rest on 'something other than the accidental fact of 
a teacher's classroom authority'? 190 
At issue, says Fish, is the teacher's self-confidence. We have learned that the 
force and persuasiveness of an interpretation depends not on a nonnative standard of 
correctness, but on constantly changing institutional circumstances. On what basis, 
then, may we argue with conviction for the interpretation we presently hold? Fish 
answers this by a statement that the general ormetacritical belief he advocates has no 
affect whatsoever on the tenets we currently regard as inescapable and obvious. He 
explains how a knowledge that a present reading follows from assumptions we have 
not always held, and may not hold in the future, does not prevent us from regarding 
our existing understanding as the correct one. Fish can offer this explanation because 
the uncertainty attendant to a presentation of a reading amounts simply to an admission 
of a possible change of mind. Yet, the possibility of a future change of mind does not 
affect what we now believe. Any subsequent beliefs we might adopt will, in their tum, 
seem correct. Awareness of a limited personal perspective does not cast doubt on the 
reality of the 'facts' resulting from that perspective. Subsequent perspectives result in 
new 'facts' that we then regard as 'real.'191 
What of the doubt regarding the evidence of one's sense that could ensue from 
constant changes of mind? Fish says that the mental activity that is doubt occurs within 
a set of assumptions that cannot simultaneously be the object of doubt. We can only 
doubt from some perspective - a perspective that is itself invulnerable to doubt until 
another has taken its place; and the newly established perspective will then display the 
same invulnerability. Therefore, Fish argues for the impossibility of radical doubt: 'in 
order to doubt everything, including the ground one stands on, one must stand 
190 Ibid., pp. 358 - 359. 
191 Ibid., pp. 359 • 360. 
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somewhere else, and that somewhere else will then be the ground on which one 
stands.' Thus, we find another Fishian 'infinite regress' cognate to that we discussed 
at the end of chapter one, section 4. We could only halt this regress by standing free of 
any ground whatsoever - having a mind completely at liberty from prejudice and 
presupposition and free to start anew. However, this position would leave nothing to 
start with. Moreover, any thought from which one attempted to start would 
automatically count as prejudice and presupposition. The mind would require an 
existence independent of the categories of understanding that inform it to enable radical 
scepticism to exist. Fish's claim, that it is the categories of understanding that 
constitute the mind, makes it impossible for anyone to achieve the detachment required 
to make such categories accessible to critical investigation. Scepticism and relativism 
alike become infeasible in this scenario because of our inability to distance ourselves 
from our beliefs and assumptions to the extent that they hold no more authority for us 
than those held by others - or even those we used to hold. An inescapable tautological 
conclusion emerges from all this: 'one believes what one believes, and one does so 
without reservation.' Articulating the qualification inherent in his general position -
'that one's beliefs and therefore one's assumptions are always subject to change' - Fish 
avows that it has no real force. For until a change occurs the interpretation we regard 
as axiomatic will continue to seem so regardless of the number of previous changes 
remembered.192 
Fish emphasises, though, that our present perspective does not confine us. We 
may always consider beliefs 'other than [our] own,' but they will appear exactly that to 
us - extraneous beliefs 'that are false, or mistaken, or partial, or immature, or absurd.' 
He asserts that this is why a 'revolution' in our beliefs always feels like a progression, 
despite its appearance to others as mere change. We believe in the veracity of our 
beliefs, and conversely we believe in the falsehood of our doubts - even if what we 
now doubt we accepted as true only a moment ago. Our currently held opinions seem 
sounder than those we had previously or than those professed by others. The 
192 Ibid .• pp. 360 - 361. 
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privileged position of our existing views casts the positions of the past as false, 
imperfect, mistaken, opaque or deflected. An impression ofprogre&s grows, based, 
not on actual movement towards a clearer sight of an independent object, but on a 
feeling of progression - an inevitable consequence, says Fish, 'of the firmness with 
which we hold our beliefs, or, to be more precise, of the firmness with which our 
. 
beliefs hold us.'193 
This confidence in our newly held beliefs does not, however, repress a 
nostalgia for what we formerly regarded as true. Sometimes discomfort accompanies 
the sense of progress, and we find it an inconvenience to embrace our latest thoughts, 
but find also that it is impossible not to believe them. Fish uses an example from 
formal linguistics to depict this nostalgia, discomfort and inconvenience. The ideas of 
Noam Chomsky were highly influential form the 1950s and resulted in the elevation of 
linguistics and the appropriation of his methods by other disciplines. At the apex of its 
success during the 1960s several of Chomsky's best students raised grave doubts about 
his model and it subsequently collapsed. Many of those who had used the paradigm 
discovered that they could no longer believe in it. Yet, this was something that they 
wished to believe in. Fish quotes Barbara Partee, a (former) Chomsky disciple, 
writing in 1971: 'I'm by now sure that the [Chomsky] model can't work, and I 
consider that a great pity.' 'Pity or not,' comments Fish, 'she can't help herselr; the 
many conveniences for Partee's teaching and research, and for her confidence in the 
discipline's future, that follow from belief in the model, cannot persuade her to espouse 
it again; it is only possible for her to believe what she believes. It is impossible to will 
belief in something we have abandoned,just as it is impossible to will disbelief in 
arguments that have persuaded us to desert our original position. Actions of the mind 
such as willing (and doubting) cannot occur 'outside the beliefs that are the mind's 
fumiture.'194 
193 Ibid., pp. 361 - 362. 
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Fish empathises with Partee's position, as he has experienced as a literary critic 
the compulsion to give up an interpretation that he once regarded as obvious. As a 
result of arguments for a less solemn version of the pastoral, Fish revised his view of 
Spencer's Shepheardes Calender from one that treated it as a serious exploration of 
rural life, to one apprised by 'the spirit of play and playful enquiry.' He now looks on 
the composition and no longer sees what he used to see; furthermore, he sees things 
that did not enter his vision before, yet presently seem obvious and indisputable. 
Consequently, various eclogues within the Calender have lost their centrality in his 
teaching, while others have moved from the margins to become pivotal. He acutely 
feels this '(self-) depriv[ation]' of what were important features of his work.195 
These prevalent experiences of a perceived progression in belieflead to the 
same conclusion says Fish: we believe in - and teach - only what we believe, regardless 
ofthe convenience, safety, and satisfaction of teaching something else. Fish states 
categorically that no teacher would teach an interpretation she or he has rejected in 
preference over one that they currently embrace. I would remark, however, that this 
statement presumes the teacher feels at liberty to offer a personal opinion; we have 
already discussed how teachers might write their lessons and research papers in accord 
with institutional requirements rather than their own ideas. Nevertheless, we must 
remind ourselves that Fish is here simply emphasising the possibility of our changing 
our perspective on a work, and stressing that even under the rule of institutional 
circumstance over interpretation we may have confidence in our current reading. He 
thus circumvents any objection that he has created a situation where we may treat texts 
in whatever way we wish. Fish continues by declaring that to believe in an 
interpretation is to regard it as superior. Furthermore, because we always believe in 
something we will never lack something to teach, and teach with a firm confidence and 
enthusiasm borne out of belief - albeit with the knowledge that belief may change. We 
are always and already proceeding within a perspective because we are likewise 
proceeding within a structure of beliefs. Our certain knowledge regarding a reading 
195 Ibid .• p. 364. 
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may change if and when our beliefs change, but at anyone time we invariably know 
what is true as we constantly remain held by a belief. It is, then, perfectly possible to 
argue from and for a perspective based on our belief. Teachers may with certainty 
expound what they see to their students and readers, and try to change their perceptions 
to the point where they share the sight.196 
Successful efforts to persuade others to accept our beliefs do indeed result in a 
shared sight of a text. They also result in a conjoint appreciation of the facts brought 
forward to support an interpretation. Fish opines that this is the entire purpose of 
critical activity - 'an attempt on the part of one party to alter the beliefs of another so that 
the evidence cited by the first will [appear] as evidence by the second.' The New 
Critical model of this activity operates in the following manner: critics deploy evidence 
that they regard as existing apart from all conviction to judge between competing beliefs 
(or interpretations). Demonstration, then, emerges as the principle factor in the New 
Critical paradigm: confirmation or denial of a reading depends upon independently 
specified facts; our perception changes as we progress towards an increasingly accurate 
account of a fixed and stable text. Whereas, in Fish's rationale persuasion forms the 
centre: the facts cited become available only due to an already assumed interpretation; 
change occurs as one perspective yields to another, bringing al1ied facets to our 
attention for the first time. So, set against the supposed objecti vity of the New Critical 
pattern, Fish argues for a system in which 'prejudicial and perspectival perception is all 
there is.' He emphasises again that the text may emerge from 'a number of equally 
interested perspectives.'197 
The risks and responsibilities attendant to Fish's persuasion model are very 
high. Most articles we read or write merely corroborate or attenuate existing 
assumptions. Yet, the literary institution approves of those who seek to challenge the 
'ordinary' practice of critical performance - as long as the challenge has the purpose to 
redefine and reshape its configurations, rather than to eliminate it. Despite a 
196 Ibid., pp. 364 - 365. 
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paradoxical resistance to this action from some quarters, interrogation of critical 
performance can occur at numerous levels - one could attempt: the overturning of the 
interpretation of a single work; the recharacterization of a significant author's entire 
canon; to argue for a wholly new arrangement of genres, or even question the very idea 
of genre; most significantly, to propose a new definition of literature and its function in 
the world. The critic questioning at any of these levels, if she or he is to successfully 
convince others of the verity of a particular conclusion, must argue from a shared point 
of departure and common idea of how to read.198 Implicit in the performance of these 
actions, however, is the goal of the establishment of new points of departure and the 
refashioning of ideas about reading. Herein lies the increased risk and responsibility of 
Fish's mod~l: a demonstration pattern solely requires adequate description of an 
independent object, an object, moreover, that always retains its ontological distinctness; 
whereas, his paradigm of persuasion portrays critics' actions as directly constitutive of 
that object. In the latter even the terms in which we can describe the object, and the 
standards by which we evaluate and validate it, also spring from critical activity. To 
illustrate the point, Fish returns to his 'game' metaphor: 'rather than being merely a 
player in the game, [the critic] is a maker and unmaker of its rules.'199 
Fish reasures us that, in appropriating his paradigm, we still retain 'texts, 
standards, norms, criteria of judgement, critical histories, and so on' - though not in the 
same form. The acts of convincing others that they are 'wrong,' that one interpretation 
has merit over another, the citation of evidence for our preferred reading, all these acts 
continue as before; now, however, we operate with the knowledge that we complete 
them within a set of institutional assumptions that may themselves tum into disputed 
objects. An advantage emanates from this model as we obtain a 'principled account of 
change' and an explanation, sufficient for ourselves and for others, for intractable 
interpretive problems.200 
198 Ibid .• p. 366. 
199 Ibid .• pp. 366 - 367. 
200 Ibid .• p. 367. 
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Furthermore, using the model of persuasion provides novel perspectives on 
problems concerning the history ofliterary criticism; where we find attempts at 
explication previously regarded under the demonstration pattern as unsuccessful, we 
may view them as developments born out of a literary culture holding assumptions 
different - and not inferior - to our own. When we set aside the essentialist notions that 
inform a demonstration pattern, it permits us to think about the evolution of the literary 
institution, and to lay bare the interpretive strategies that enabled the production and 
understanding of its canons.201 
Moving to the final phase of his essay, Fish seeks to answer two hypothetical 
questions from a poststructuralist standpoint regarding 'the status of [his] own 
discourse.' First, if all arguments continue within assumptions and presuppositions 
that are also subject to challenge and change, does not that make Fish's reasoning itself 
as vulnerable as the claims it seeks to replace? Fish nonchalantly dismisses this 
question: of course his position shares the vulnerability of all argument, the question is 
irrelevant; no one can claim privilege for her or his standpoint, all must use persuasion. 
Thus, Fish's essay is itself not merely a presentation, but an argument - it is also, he 
says, a (not necessarily) successful example of how the model of persuasion works. It 
is essential always to contend, to establish our perspective, to anticipate objections 
regarding the consequences of our contention. Fish maintains that he has tried to 
remove all sources of objection and to alleviate the fear of dire consequences. Really, it 
is only within his position that we can account for the phenomena his opponents wish 
to preserve.202 
Fish readily accepts the possibility that the reverse could happen: someone 
could persuade him that what he wishes to preserve depends upon a position other than 
his. If this befell he would share the other's belief and position. However, until such 
an event he would argue for his position with all the certitude that springs from belief -
simultaneously acknowledging that under certain conditions in the future he might 
201 Ibid., pp. 367 - 368. 
202 Ibid., pp. 368 - 369. 
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believe something else. This subjection to the same challenge as that put to his 
predecessors is not, in Fish's view, a weakness in his position but a restatement of it. 
Indeed, it is incoherent to conceive of a position that is invulnerable to challenge, unless 
one accepts the possibility of a position innocent of assumptions. Certainly, Fish does 
not accept the latter and, therefore, the fact that his assumptions remain subject to 
dislodgement does not overthrow his argument but confirms it, for it is an extension of 
it.203 
In the second hypothetical question, Fish considers the practical consequences 
of his ideas in the realm ofliterary criticism. Tersely, he states that there are none 
whatsoever. As we know, Fish's proposition is that all that seems evident and 
unequivocal to us 'is only so within some institutional or conventional structure,' 
therefore, we can never work outside such a structure. Yet, he does not think that 
anyone could conduct their practical criticism by means of his position - it is purely a 
matter of theoretical reasoning about assumptions. Once we cease from this reasoning 
we inhabit our assumptions again and speak about literature from within whatever 
beliefs we held before. Any thought that Fish's ideas might prevent practical criticism 
has no basis because for this to happen one would have to have absolutely no belief 
about authors or texts; such a situation remains impossible as we cannot think of them 
independently of belief. Our ability to think about these matters safeguards our capacity 
to speak of them, and to have the confidence to do so. There is no potentiality of any 
practical consequences ofFish's work as it would involve a perpetual analysis of 
beliefs, without commitment to any, and that is not a stance anyone can take. Fish 
says, though, that we 'liv[ e] out' the position he proposes as our firmly held beliefs 
yield to others, and bring with them a boundless consecution of 'practical activities that 
we are always able to perform.'204 
A question surrounds the relevance of Fish's position as a result of his laconic 
statement. If there are no effects on the way we read and teach literature, why should 
203 Ibid .• pp. 369 - 370. 
204 Ibid .• p. 370. 
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we concern ourselves with Fish's work? At the heart of this query is an assumption 
that to have any interest for us a matter must have a direct affect on our customary 
experience ofliterature; connected to this assumption is an anti-theoretical bias central to 
the ideology of New Criticism. Fish thinks the question typifies the very parochial 
view he challenges, and it damns his argument 'only from [that] point of view.' He 
further emphasises the importance of elaborating his position by highlighting that the 
issues he deals with have a pivotal place in the concerns of the literary institution.20S 
So, in these two essays we have seen Fish's exemplar of interpretive change. 
We have observed the process of alteration in conventions and constraints; we have 
noted how interpretive communities modify their configurations during the admission 
of new understandings; we have learned of the process of persuasion, rather than 
demonstration, as an impetus of change; we have explored Fish's simultaneous support 
for self-conscious reading on the one hand, and interpretation on the other; we have 
discovered that interpretive communities do not lead to a confinement of imagination. 
Surveying these essays a decade later, Fish emphasises that change is an 
integral part of his thesis. Incorporated into his scheme is the idea of self-
transformation. He explains that the sum of connected beliefs that is our mind is not an 
inert structure. Beliefs can pressurise each other and this can lead to a shift in 
perception. The mind, rather than simply being an object of observable change. 'is an 
engine of change' (another Fishian mechanistic analogy); it is 'an ongoing project 
whose operations are at once constrained and the means by which those same 
constraints [may undergo alteration].' 206 
The interpretive community is also (by extension) 'an engine of change.' It is 
so 'because its assumptions are not a mechanism for shutting out the world but for 
organizing it, for seeing phenomena as already related to the interests and goals that 
make the community what it is.' Therefore. we find that the interpretive community 
perpetually works to transform everything into material for its own project; and the 
20S Ibid., pp. 370 - 371. 
206 Fish, Doing Whal Comes Naturally, 'Change,' pp. 146 - 147. 
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process does not end there, as the project itself then becomes transformed by the work 
it does.207 Thus, the critical probation into the reputed conservatism and determinism 
offish's communities discovers an answer: not only does he believe that interpretive 
change is possible - it is at the very centre of his idea of how interpretation progresses. 
Our opening quotation from Marcus Aurelius Antoninus' meditations neatly presage 
Fish's ideas: the Universe is indeed mutation (or, change), and Life is merely opinion 
(or, interpretation). 
We must tum our attention now towards other matters. Before I begin to look 
at the nucleus of my thesis, I will try to address the remaining issues that I identified 
earlier. First, I wish to make a statement regarding the form in which J believe we may 
most effectively use reader-response. Drawing, furthermore, on an additional essay by 
Fish, I will make some brief remarks about its employment in this context. Also, I will 
provide an inaugural presentation in this section of how the method might operate 
within the confines of our study. Second, I will endeavour to show, as concisely as J 
can, how Fish has discussed interpretation, and, indeed, interpreted, within the arena 
of 'flesh-and-blood' political and ethical life. 
Beginning here the statement about the form of reader-response we may 
effectively use, we must recall that it is a term that covers many approaches. So, as we 
progress towards an examination that incorporates Fishian perspectives, it is important 
that we carefully refine our understanding. We must make a distinction between 
reader-response as a method of practical criticism, like the 'Affective Stylistics' of the 
early period, and the sort of literary-hermeneutical considerations of the later work by 
Fish. It is the latter aspect of his theory that I wish to incorporate into my thesis. As 
we have seen, Fish first earned his reputation as a reader-response critic by his design 
of Mfective Stylistics. However, studying facets of his career has shown us that his 
account of reading is a self-revising project, and that his ideas have evolved 
considerably over almost three decades. Although still thought of as under the umbrella 
of reader-response, one could now speak of his recent work as akin to hermeneutics. 
207 Ibid., p. 150. 
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Fish's present observations apply to reading generally. without offering a method that 
applies only to particular types of text. The emphasis on the reader remains, but he has 
adopted a more generalised and abstract reflection on reading. Fish's account now 
centres upon perception and communication rather than specific word and sentence 
analysis. Such an account aids my quest to illustrate how readers solve the particular 
interpretive problem we will explore in due course. Far from being anachronistic as 
charged by Freund, this form of the literary critical tool has much to offer for the 
completion of my task. Having stated the appropriate form for my purposes I will now 
make some brief remarks about its employment in our context. 
To remark, then, on my use of reader-response, I propose that we refer to 
Fish's critique of juridical concerns in his essay 'Don't know Much About the Middle 
Ages: Posner on Law and Uterature.'208 Richard Posner is 'an [American] appellate 
judge of national reputation and a scholar of enormous influence'209 who has written 
on the relationship ofliterature to the statutes oflaw.210 Looking at this critique will 
demonstrate how Fish, as a proponent of reader-response, has dealt with a genre of 
writing that is outside the accepted field of that perspective. 
Fish takes forward his argument in this way. He begins from the apparently 
intractable statement set forth by Posner that the study of literature has little to 
contribute to the interpretation of legal texts.211 From there Fish takes us to the place 
where we see this declaration as merely an accurate account of interpretive conditions 
presently in force, conditions, moreover, that have no inevitability. So. Fish 
appreciates that currently differences exist between the two disciplines, but he 
repudiates the judge's assertion that these differences have any connection with their 
supposed essential nature, or that we can assume that such differences will last. During 
the process of his argument we learn that the difference between literary and legal 
208 Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law 
and Literature,' pp. 294 - 311. 
209 Ibid., p. 311. 
210 Richard Posner, 'Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued,' 72Virginia Law Review 
1351 (1986): pp. 1351 - 1379. 
211 Fish. Doing What Comes Naturally. 'Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law 
and Literature,' p. 294. 
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interpretation has nothing to do with the nature of the texts; this is because it is the 
already differing interpretive strategies that establish textual differences rather than the 
reverse. Also, the specific strategies oflaw and literature remain as historically 
achieved and contingent as the texts they enable us to produce. Accordingly, the very 
natures of the legal or literary enterprises, along with any perceived sense of their 
difference from other enterprises, may undergo revision. Hence, Fish speaks of a 
blurring of differences between enterprises (they 'may become less sharp').212 I 
propose, therefore, that this blurring of differences could serve to remove any obstacle 
to the use of my chosen perspective. If, as Fish avers, literature has no essence. if it 
merely adopts a succession of forms according to its location within different social 
settings; and if some cultures own institutional arrangements that result in law being 
indistinguishable from religion or prophecy; and still others understand that literary 
productions issue from specific political agendas213 - then why should we continue 
under these circumstances to enforce barriers between these supposedly different types 
of undertaking when it comes to our study of the act of reading? Specifically. why 
should we limit the application of reader-response solely to what we classify as Gospel. 
narrative, or poetic texts? 
The questions may seem particularly apposite in the case of 1 John due to its 
amorphous literary constitution as perceived by biblical critics. Ruth B. Edwards 
encapsulates recent scholarly opinion on this matter when she writes. '[tlhe literary 
form of 1 John is an enigma.'214 Judith Lieu reinforces thisjudgement when she 
comments that not only is 1 John very different from 2 and 3 John in that it lacks 'the 
unambiguous marks which would characterise it as a letter,' she adds, 'nor is there any 
comparable literature which would help us to classify it.'215 These remarks, and 
comments such as that of Robert Kysar's that 'the question of literary genre is 
212 Ibid .• p. 304. 
213 Ibid .• pp. 304 - 305. 
214 Edwards,lohannine Epistles. p. 34. 
215 J. Lieu, The Theology 0/ the lohamline Epistles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 3 - 4. 
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problematic in the case of 1 John,'216 represent a frustrated critical endeavour to 
categorise the piece. Kysar thinks that it is 'useful to imagine' the present form of 1 
lohn as a collection of 'homilectical' fragments. 217 For Luke T. Johnson, the writing 
arrived at its destination as part of 'a three-letter packet from the Elder,' though he 
concedes that, unlike the accompanying sections, it is 'not really a letter at all but a 
word of exhortation, closer in nature to a sermon.'218 Raymond.E. Brown first looks 
at three options, that 1 John is: a) a universal religious tractate; b) a circular epistle; c) a 
homily, diatribe, informal tractate, or an encyclical. Rejecting all of these he observes 
that 'they do little to clarify the nature of 1 John.' Notably, he decides to 'offer no new 
name for the literary genre represented by [the composition].' Rather, Brown promises 
that his study will 'simply attempt to describe what the work basically does.' He opts 
for an explanation that posits an essential relationship of 1 John to the Gospel of John. 
First John is an attempt to expound ideas found in the Gospel in order to refute a group 
of secessionists whose 'misinterpretation' of the latter was disturbing those 'Johannine 
Christians' who remained in communion with the author. This author directed it not to 
the secessionists themselves, but to the faithful group with the purpose of strengthening 
them.219 Brown advances this view of 1 John as part of his extensi ve project to 
reconstruct the historic setting of so-called 'Johannine Christianity' - a project that he 
began over four decades ago.220 Pheme Perkins sees analogies to 1 John 'in treatises 
like Heb[rews] and la[me]s.' Still, she qualifies her opinion by taking up a similar 
stance to Brown - that unlike those writings 1 John arose from a desire to refute the 
teachings of dissidents; rather than being the primary purpose behind the composition 
of the work, the elements of general instruction emerged from lohannine tradition and 
then underwent specific fashioning to accomplish this disavowal. 221 David 
216 R. Kysar, 'Epistles of John,' AnD 3: 902. 
217 Ibid., p. 902. 
218 L.T. Johnson, The Writings 0/ the New Testament - An Interpretation (London: SCM, 1986), 
p.504. 
219 R.E. Brown, The Epistles of John (AB; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 86 - 90. 
220 R.E. Brown, The Community o/the Beloved Disciple (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1979), p. 5. 
221 P. Perkins, 1'he Johannine Epistles' in R.E. Brown, J.A. Fitzmyer, R.E. Murphy (eds.), The 
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Rensberger finds 'serious problems' in codification, and declares that the composition 
is 'hard to specify.' He comes to no conclusion, but simply states that similarities exist 
with forms such as 'ancient demonstrative (epideictic) rhetoric ... [and] exhortation 
(parenesis).'222 Finally, noting Stephen S. Smalley's departure from any effort to 
solve the problem of its ancient genre because it is 'entirely debatable' and his claim that 
the piece 'approximates to what might be termed today ... a "paper,"'223 we can 
understand Lieu's resigned remark: 'It seems that 1 John must be interpreted from itself 
using such hints as the letter offers, with all the problems of misreading that such an 
approach entails.'224 
If we look atthe annals ofinterpretivejudgement, during post-enlightenment 
times the main emphasis of those who have studied this material has been historical-
critical. Moreover, in the past two decades there has emerged an additional interest in 
the subject of social background. We find that historical concerns have predominated 
in Johannine scholarship during the whole of the modem era.225 The assumption is 
that it is essential to establish the nature, purpose and setting ofthe 'epistle.' However, 
even under this interpretive regime, the reputedly indistinct literary silhouette of first 
John could serve both to reduce our ability to distinguish it from other types of 
document, and to give it a certain plasticity. It is possible to argue that since scholars 
do not know how to classify it there is no reason why various readers might not 
interpret the nature of our text in any number of different ways. Indeed, those who 
base their projects on the idea of objectivity notice the potential for such capacious 
interpretation: 'Proposed structures are almost as numerous as those who propose 
them,' comments Lieu.226 Yet, in Fish's assertions: that our definition of language 
governs how we scrutinise texts, that it is the assumed background circumstances of 
New Jerome Biblical Commentary, Article 62, Section 9, Topic (V), London: Geoffrey Chapman, 
1989, p. 988. 
222 D. Rensberger, J John 2 John 3 John (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), pp. 30 - 31. 
223 S. S. Smalley, Word Biblical Commentary 51 -1. 2, 3 John (WBC; Dalllas TX: Word, 1984; 
repr., Milton Keynes: Word [UK], 1991), p. xxxiii. 
224 Lieu, Theology O/Ihe lohannine Epistles, p.4. 
225 Edwards,Johannine Epistles. pp. 18 - 19. 
226 Lieu, Theology a/the Johanlline Epistles, p. 4. 
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possible use that supply shape and significance to any composition, that there is no 
distinction between so-called 'straightforward' or 'specific' language and supposedly 
'vague' or 'literary' language, that distinctions emerged in history through argument 
and debate - we discover indications that the nature of 1 John, even if one deemed that 
nature as more certain, is absolutely vulnerable to change. Even the notion of 'genre' 
itself presents difficulties according to some scholars. Fish explains: '[F]or those who 
write under the influence of the new historiography as represented in the work of 
Foucault and others, the persistence of genres, either in literature or criticism, is a 
fiction.'227 Given, then, that forms may alter and that lines of division may become 
unclear, and given also that scholarly readers do not know how to classify the work, I 
suggest it is purely an artificial restraint that prevents us from discovering how reader-
response as a perspective might illuminate this particular text (or, indeed, any text). I 
believe that the background assumptions suggested by Fish provide us with a critical 
starting point to begin to employ a form of this criticism apropos 1 John. Furthermore, 
because Fish has already used his own insights to comment on legal texts - a genre, it 
seems, thought of as unsuitable material for reader-centred critics - this encourages us 
that we may use similar insights to elucidate readings of our chosen work. Prior, then, 
to making an inaugural exhibition using the relevant 'perfectionist' extracts from that 
text, I wish to make some final remarks to create a transition from existing interpretive 
practice to an adaptation of the method for my purposes. 
Recalling aspects of what we have discovered thus far, we may imagine a 
sequence of events in which biblical critics concerned with historical-critical matters 
might augment their list of the accepted characteristics of our document. Recollecting 
again Fish's observation that some cultures own institutional arrangements that result in 
law being indistinguishable from religion or prophecy, we can detect a similar 
arrangement as the setting of our piece. We may consider the posited Judaeo-Christian 
scriptural background of the recipients of the communication as an instance of this. 
227 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Change,' p. 158. 
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Dale Patrick writes of 'a built-in ambiguity in the study of Hebrew Scripture.' He 
continues: 
The [Law of Hebrew Scripture or the Old Testament] is at once the 
tradition of an ancient society, Israel, and the Word of God for two 
living religious communities, Judaism and Christianity. As the tradition 
of an ancient society, [readers may study] the texl . .forthe legal system 
and scheme of values of that society. As the Scripture for Jews and 
Christians, [readers may study] the document .. .for its representation of 
God and God's will for the people.228 
I contend that this ambiguity in the institutional arrangement of the culture in which 1 
John appeared,229 coupled with the discovery of a new paradigm to 'guide' 
perception, could lead to a fresh comprehension. Studying our text in these 
circumstances we may discover that it is possible to produce a 1 uridical' reading of it 
that harmonises with current practice. One could imagine a conviction growing within 
the company of biblical critics that the author of 1 John adopted some type oflegal 
format for his composition. The discovery of an ancient text at Ephesus, Palestine, or 
Syria230 - reminiscent of the style of First John - that dealt with religious matters using 
some judicial terms would be enough to generate a new reading of the Johannine 
material. If this appears ludicrous, we should remind ourselves of Fish's hypothetical 
scenario of a newly discovered document producing an 'Eskimo' reading of Faulkner's 
A Rose for Emily. Fish's illustration shows how an equivalent situation could arise in 
secular circles. A condensed visualisation of how a find of this nature might alter 
perceptions of elements within 1 John therefore follows. 
New understandings of the terms used in the work would emerge. Now a 
reader may 'see' for the first time a framework of trial procedure in the document. 
Here are those who give 'eyewitness testimony' (hopaKUf.'EV Kat f.'apt'UpoUf.'EV231 
228 Dale Patrick, Old Testament lAw (London: SCM, 1985), pp. 7·8. 
229 Judith Lieu comments that '1 John's apparent disregard for the Old Testament is deceptive, and 
the Jewish parallels offer useful insights into the letter.' She adds that: 'many of the images (in 
1 John) have Old Testament roots.' See Lieu, Theology oflhe Jo/umnine Epistles, pp. 20 
and'if7. 
230 Scholars suggest these sites as possible locations for the Johannine community. Kysar, 'Epistles 
of John' in ABD 3:F4; 909. 
231 K. Aland et al., (eds.), Greek New Testament. (3rd ed. [corrected]; Stuttgart United Bible 
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- 1: 2) to the remarkable life of Jesus. These witnesses also have heard a declaration 
regarding God's integrity (1: 5). Yet, this testimony has an annexed deposition. God 
has a case against his people that they have sinned, but deception is rife and some 
suppress the truth. The people must 'confess' their sin (Eav 0j.10AoyIDj.1EV 'ta~ 
oj.1ap-tLa;) as this is the one condition on which they can receive pardon (1: 8 - 9). 
Denial of the offence represents a counter-charge against God that he is 'lying' (E<IV 
fUtWj.1EV <nt oUX; ~j.1apn]Kaj.1EV 'i'EV<m')V :n:OwUj.1EV amov) - or as we could call it 
under the new reading, committing peIjury (1: 10). Though the principal thrust of the 
document is to prevent sin, if anyone does sin, Jesus, whose character is beyond 
question (Kat aj.1ap'tLa EV airaP OUK EO'ttV - 3: 5b), will act as an 'advocate' 
(:n:apaKAf)'tov) for them before God (2: 1). So serious is this case that it transcends 
mere community wrongdoing and has required a universal propitiation or expiation 
(tAaaj.1~) for a solecism that has had world-wide effects (2: 2). Issues of light and 
darkness, love and hate, perfection and sin, pride and humility, lust and purity, truth 
and deceit, life and death, murder and mercy, penuriousness and philanthropy - all 
feature throughout this adversarious hearing. A ruling has established that the practice 
of sin is synonymous with 'lawlessness' (o.VOj.1La - 3: 4). Such lawlessness has an 
inextricable link with the spiritual opponent of Jesus. No one may remain neutral - all 
must discriminate between the attestations offered on behalf of the respective litigants 
(4: 1 - 6). Some have already given their allegiance to this opponent - and it is they 
who have lied (2: 18 - 22), even while they accused God of deception (5: lOb). Which 
party will others believe'? For, ultimately, the case rests on a matter of believing 
(:n:~01V - 5: 5) either the 'spirit of truth' ('to 3t'VeUj.1a Tfj~ &.A.f)efLa~) or the 'spirit 
of error' ('to 3t'VeUJ.l.a Tfj~ :n:AaVf)~ - 4: 6). Is Jesus the Christ - the Son of God, or 
not? In order for him to act as advocate of the people, a resolution of this issue must 
emerge. The choice made will reflect in subsequent behaviour and affections (4: 7 - 21; 
5: 1 - 4, 13 - 21). Not only do human witnesses (ttiv j.1apt'UpLav 'tWv &vep~) 
Societies, 1983). Throughout my thesis I will quote from this source when referring to the 
Greek text, unless otherwise stated. Likewise, unless otherwise stated, all quotations from the 
English text I will take from the New Revised Standard Version. 
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testify to Jesus' standing (5: 9a), three further witnesses appear - the Spirit, the water, 
and the blood - whose harmonious testimonies (lCa'L 0'" 'tP[L; ['t; 'to EV ['LOW) 
corroborate the evidence (5: 8). One other steps forward to give additional testimony in 
support of his Son, a testimony greater than that offered by humans - it is God himself 
(5: 9b). 
Echoing Fish, I am not formally submitting this forensic reading as an 
alternative, I am simply highlighting that such an understanding of the text remains a 
possibility should the necessary strategies for producing the text alter in the way we 
have described. As we have seen, Fish would argue that it is simply the lack of an 
interpretive strategy for producing this reading that hinders its acceptance: there is 
presently no way oflooking at, or reading, the text that aids the emergence of an 
unmistakably legal understanding. 
Many biblical critics treat the text as a stable entity with determinate meanings 
and a real sociohistorical reference point. Clearly such critics use the text of 1 John as a 
kind of tableau vivant from which to reassemble the 'actual' setting. The life work of 
Brown we referred to earlier, his extensive project to reconstruct the historic setting of 
so-called 'Johannine Christianity,' is the prime example ofthis enterprise. An Anglican 
exegete, Barnabas Lindars, reveals the status of his colleague's efforts by commenting: 
'Brown's reconstruction is not definitive, but it is the best on offer.'232 We might say 
that for the biblical scholar, historical reconstruction of a first or early second century 
setting is the presently recognised interpretive strategy for producing the text.233 
Referring again to Fish's critique of Posner, we find the judge invoking historical 
context as a constraint upon interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.234 Similarly, 
Brown and others appeal to a historical context that, they would argue, provides a 
232 Barnabas Lindars, lohn (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), p. 62. 
233 Similarly, R. Schnackenburg portrays the community at the 'tum of the first century of the 
Christian era.' See R. Schnackenburg, The lohannine Epistles - Introduction and Commelltary, 
(New York: Crossroad, 1992), p. 41. Translated by R. and I. Fuller. 
Originally Published as Die lohanllesbriefe. Herders Thcologischer Kommentar zum Neuen 
Testament 13/3. Verlag Herder KG Freiburg im Breisgau, 1975. 
234 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner 
on Law and Literature,' pp. 298 - 300. 
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constraint on biblical interpretation. The Bible and Culture Collective sum up the 
situation thus: 'A meaning, or an acceptable range of meanings, is ... determined by a 
consensus among the various congregations of historical-critical readers.'23S 
Yet, it is not only scholars such as Brown who hold to historical principles 
when interpreting texts. The Collective observes that: 'The works of reader-response 
criticism that biblical scholars have produced surely must appear strange to secular 
literary critics because of the predominance of historical concems.'236 We have 
already alluded to a trend in biblical studies to use Iser's work as a model for reader-
centred studies; the Collective sees much of the resulting activity as the consequence of 
a marriage between Iser's ideas and historical criticism.237 Such an admixture 
simultaneously tries to give some autonomy to the reader while she or he discovers 
historical meaning in the text. 238 On the one hand, readers bring their own 
assumptions to a work, on the other, they presuppose 'the efficacy of the biblical text to 
guide them to historically verifiable knowledge.'239 If we are to use a form of reader-
response criticism that reflects present reading agendas, we must disengage the text 
from this quest to reconstruct original settings. On this point, Stanley E. Porter has 
said: 'If the historical question as traditionally posed in Biblical studies is not bracketed, 
if only temporarily, reader-response criticism will never have a genuine opportunity to 
, 
contribute to New Testament studies, but will be reader-response criticism virtually in 
name only.'240 
Ironically, it is Iser who provides the opportunity for biblical critics to effect 
just such a bracketing of the historical question. In his essay 'The Art of Fail ure: The 
Stifled Laugh in Beckett's Theater,' Iser writes of the 'unmask[ing] [of] the true nature 
235 Bible and Culture Collective, Poslmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' pp. 41 -
42. 
236 Ibid., p. 39. 
237 Ibid., p. 39. 
238 Ibid., pp. 39 - 44. 
239 Ibid., p. 42. 
240 S.E. Porter, 'Why Hasn't Reader-Response Criticism Caught on in New Testament Studies?' 
Journal of literature and Theology 4 (1990): 285. 
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of meaning, which is nothing but a substitute for reality .'241 Taking this statement to 
include the meaning produced by historians the Bible and Culture Collective reassures 
us that 'Iser does not necessarily mean, of course, that nothing happened in the past; he 
only means that one's access to what happened [emerges] through language and 
through narrative constructs written by historians themselves.'242 They emphasise 
that Iser's statement has significance for biblical critics in that it implies that the act of 
'writing about historical events is like writing a fictional account.'243 Iser is more 
explicit in another essay, 'Representation: A Performative Act.' He says: 
Thus in philosophical discourse - particularly that of the empiricists - at 
one moment fiction is being unmasked as an invention, and the next it is 
being elevated to the status of a necessity. Small wonder that it turned 
into a burden for epistemology, which could not come to grips with the 
dual nature ofthe fact that make-believe is indispensable for organising 
that which appears to be given .•. What distinguishes fiction in 
philosophical discourse from fiction in literary discourse is the fact that 
in the former it remains veiled whereas in the latter it discloses its own 
fictional nature.244 
For the Collective, this has the implication that biblical critics 'cannot know the past on 
its own terms but only through their narrative constructs.'245 
This unveiling of the 'fictional nature' of philosophical discourse by Iser 
demonstrates a poststructuralist element in his theory that many biblical reader-response 
critics seem to ignore. Following Hayden White in a correlative exposure of the 
assumptions of historiography, the Collective writes: 'What they have felt obliged to 
ignore or repress is the unsettling possibility that "the historical milieux," which really 
"exist" for historians, are themselves products of their own "fictive capability. "'246 
We may not accede entirely to the idea expressed in Voltaire with which we began this 
241 Iscr, Prospecting: From Reader Response to lJterary Amhropology, (Baltimore, Maryland: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), ~he Art of Failure: The Stifled Laugh in Beckett's 
Theater,' p. 179. 
242 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. SO. 
243 Ibid., p. SO. 
244 Iscr, Prospecting, 'Representation: a Performative Act,' pp. 240 - 241. 
245 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' pp. 50 - 51. 
246 Ibid., p. 49. See H. White, Tropics oj Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 89. 
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chapter, that all our ancient history has the status of accepted fiction; yet, I think it is 
important to acknowledge that the work of biblical critics and historians alike can only 
account for past events by reference to their own reading strategies - strategies, 
moreover, that have both defined the relevant data and predetermined its 
intetpretation. 247 
To say that readers cannot know the past on its own terms but only through 
their narrative constructs is to involve all readers in an act of construction. Iser says 
that a text represents a 'recodification of social and historical norms.' This 
recodification 'has a double function.' It enables: i) contemporary readers 'to see what 
they cannot normally see in the ordinary process of day-to-day living'; and, ii) 
'subsequent generations of readers ... to grasp a reality that was never their own.'248 
Iser fails to explore the implications of this observation. Characteristically, Fish 
presses the issue to a further point: 
Iser avoids the hard choice ... between historical and ahistorical 
intetpretation. The readers contemporary to an author are in no more a 
privileged position than the readers oflater generations; for both sets of 
readers are provoked to an act of construction rather than an act of 
retrieval; and since the blue-print for construction is significantly 
incomplete - it displays gaps and blanks and indeterminacies - no 
instance of construction is more accurate, in the sense of being truer to 
an historically embodied meaning, than any other. Even the first reader 
of a work is called upon to complete the connections left unspecified in 
the text according to his "individual disposition. "249 
Hence, we might say that readers of 1 John - whether at the tum of the first century of 
the Christian era, or in the eighteenth century, or at the end of the twentieth century -
stand in equal relation to that text, in that all 'create' it through their own acts of 
construction born out of their own reading strategies. 
If we now tum to the primary exhibition of the relevant 'perfectionist' extracts 
from 1 John, we may begin to discern how a form of reader-response - a form 
disengaged from the notion of objective historical reconstruction - might operate within 
247 Bible and Culture Collective, Poslmodern Bible - 'Rcader-Rcsponse Criticism,' p. 49. 
248 Iser, Act of Reading, p. 74. 
249 Fish, 'Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,' p. 4. 
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the confines of our study. In the first chapter we find a dual declaration: a) 'If we say 
that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' (faV EimoJ.lEV Ot:t 
• , ,.., II .. _'\. #Ii " II , '\.,'0 "., • II Itt 
aJ.lafYttav OUK EX0J.lEV, EamOU~ ;/LI\.avooJ.lEV Kat T) al\.T) Eta OUK EattV EV T)J.ltV 1: 
8); and, b) 'If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not 
. II'" .,:11 II' , #Ii 'I" " II 
1D us' (Eav ElJtO)J.lEV Ott ouX T)J.laPTIlKaJ.lEV ..pEUO't1]V XOLOUJ.lEV amov Kat 0 
A.6yo~ amou aUK lattv EV iiJ.lLV 1: 10). I would infer from these verses that denial 
of sin represents both self-deception and fundamental dishonesty. Accompanying these 
faults is a tacit accusation that God is guilty of equivocation, and this proves that 'his 
word is not in' those who deny their sinful acts. The underlying implication, I deduce, 
is that sin is an inherent flaw of humanity - a flaw surely shared by Johannine 
Christians. Occurring as it does during the opening phase, one might suppose that this 
declaration might form the infrastructure of the entire composition. However, when we 
reach the third chapter we find another biform assertion: a) 'No one who abides in him 
sins; no one who sins has either seen him or known him' (lEa~ (, EV atrup J.lEVON oUX 
aJ.l(lp"tuVEto xa~ (, UJ.l(lp"tUVON aUX eoopaKEv amOv aU~ lYVOOKEV 3: 6); and, b) 
'Those who have been born of God do not sin, because God's seed abides in them; 
they cannot sin, because they have been born of God' (na~ (, yEY£'V'VTIJ.lEv~ EK 1:00 
OEOU uJ.lafYtwv aU 3totEL, Ot:t rntEpJ.l(l au"too W aUaP J.lEvEt Kat aU oova't(lL 
af.lap'taVELV Ot:t EK 1:00 OEOU YEyEvvrp:aL 3: 9). My understanding of these verses is 
that sin has no presence in the lives of the believers. J ndeed, if someone commits sin it 
indicates that no association has ever existed between that person and God. The state 
of 'having been born of God' is one in which the individual does not sin. To sin is an 
impossibility because of the presence of 'God's seed' within him.2S0 
Historical-critical scholars accept that there is an apparent contradiction between 
these two assertions. Kysar's comment typifies those of other critics when he states 
that: 'a serious contradiction arises within the treatment of sin in [1 John]. The author 
250 I acknowledge that it is not possible fully to isolate these verses from others within I John. We 
might say that several verses within the work repeat similar ideas, or link those ideas in some 
way. For instance we could also incorporate the following: 1: 6; 1: 7; I: 9; 3: 8; 5: 18. During 
our study I will deliberately refer to such verses also. The exhibition of verses 1: 8, 10 and 3: 6, 
9 simply help us to view most clearly the perceived hermeneutical problem. 
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claims, on the one hand, that the Christian is guilty of sin ... On the other hand, there is 
the absolute assertion that the Christian does not sin.' He adds: 'This contradiction is 
resolved by interpreters in a number of different ways.'251 It is the interpreters' 
resolutions of the contradiction that must absorb our attention in this thesis - how 
readers have made meaning of these verses within their set of particular reading 
conventions.252 If we briefly reassemble the foundations of their respective theories 
(using the context of the verses in question), we may signal how we intend to use 
Iser's ideas as a mirror to reflect Fish's, and so concentrate our focus on the ways 
people have created the text. 
I suggest that an Iserian approach would treat the two dual declarations, 1: 8, 10 
and 3: 6,9, as the definable'points of instruction (or 'textual segments'). These verses 
are among the 'stars' in this biblical text that remain 'fixed.' Iser's system allows a 
simultaneous acknowledgement of a certain (limited) indeterminacy resulting from the 
reader's role {'the lines that join them are variable'}. Thus, we would discover his 
explanation of why interpreters resolve the contradiction in a number of different 
ways.253 '[T]he structure of the text allows for different ways of fulfillment.'254 His 
admission that all judgement on a text has its basis in 'private' comprehension has the 
accompanying emphasis that this comprehension is not 'arbitrary' because it is 'guided' 
by the text.255 Here we see the inception of the idea of 'dyadic interaction' between 
text and reader so favoured by biblical reader-response critics. Previously we have 
discovered that literary texts are not entirely explicit and contain 'blanks,' 'gaps,' 
'places [or 'spots'] of indeterminacy' and 'vacancies.'256 The definable points of 
instruction, 1: 8, 10 and 3: 6,9, appear in our text without clear connections, say 
scholars - consequently the reader discovers a 'blank' between them that she or he must 
251 Kysar, 'Epistles of John,' ABD 3; G3; 910; cf. Rensberger,] John 2 John 3 Jo1m, pp. 90 - 9J; 
Edwards, Johannine Epistles, pp. 98 - 99; Lieu, Theology of the lohannine f:pi.stles, pp. 64 - 65; 
Smalley, 1.2.3 John. p. 159; R.E. Brown, Epistles of Jolm, pp. 412 - 413. 
252 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 53. 
253 See note 29. 
254 See note 30. 
255 See note 31. 
256 See note 36. 
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fill. 257 It is this hiatus that prompts the reader to seek 'coherence' (and to construct, 
dismantle, and reconstruct 'Gestalts' - or the various reconstructions of the historical 
situation that may explain the contradiction). The blank or gap represents 'the 
fundamental asymmetry between text and reader, that [leads to] communication in the 
reading process.'258 
Conversely, a Fishian posture regarding 1 John would emphasise that all 
perception of it is at once mediated and conventional.259 Fish would posit readers 
with contrasting presuppositions, and this would have the effect of irreparably blurring 
the supposedly hard lines of Iser's theory. Thus, he would claim that the 'textual 
signs' in the 'epistle' do not announce their shape but appear in a variety of shapes 
according to the differing expectations and assumptions of the various readers. He 
would argue that the 'blank' is not built into the text, but appears as a consequence of 
particular interpretive strategies - including the search for coherence. So, there is no 
distinction between what the text gives and what the reader supplies; she or he supplies 
everything. To reverse Iser's image, no stars remain fixed in the text of 1 John - they 
are just as variable as the lines that join them.260 Rather than critics explaining the 
contradiction by studying the text, and thereby also accumulating evidence to 
reconstruct the historical setting, it is the critics' interpretive strategies that write that 
text;261 we might say that the interpretive community represented by an association of 
biblical critics creates another community, the 'Johannine community.' along with its 
problems - which the critics then go on to 'resolve.' Fish would declare that biblical 
scholars share interpretive strategies that constitute the properties of 1 John and assign 
its intentions. 
As I have advanced towards constructing a form of reader-response to apply to 
I John, I have determined to engage seriously Fish's ideas. So that I may press this 
257 See note 37. 
258 See note 38. 
259 See note 68. 
260 See note 83. 
261 See note 121. 
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engagement to a conclusion, however, I must defend Fish against the charges noted 
earlier: that he lacks political awareness, that his communities are politically and 
ethically simplistic. Additionally, I intend to defend him against a further accusation 
made by the Bible and Culture Collective (following M.L Pratt). The essence of this 
charge is that his model, along with Iser's, would: 'efface the insights offered by 
ideological critics that every reading is a contextualised reading, and that different 
readers of biblical texts (whether they be male or female, white, black, Latino, Asian, 
and so on) stand in asymmetrical relationships concerning power and in their ability to 
speak about the text even within the same general interpretive community. '262 I 
propose that Fish does not efface such insights, but contemplates their significance 
from within his system. Therefore, to demonstrate this I now return to the essay 
'Don't know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature,' as its 
conclusion provides the basis for my brief defence of Fish's political awareness. 
Fish says in the essay that it is historical factors that constitute our preferences 
for certain institutional arrangements in relation to various contending political and 
social agendas. When we defend or reiterate our preferences (and Posner's article, 
Fish says, is just such a defence and reiteration) we do not do so on behalf of some 
pellucid truth, but on behalf of 'interests whose universality is always contestable.'263 
Taking up his reasoning at this point, we find that Fish goes on to question Posner's 
interests. He seeks to reveal the agenda behind the judge's disquisition. We discover 
that Posner desires to remove all obstacles to secure the authority of economics in the 
legal academy.264 Though he does not explicitly state his purpose, we find that it is to 
give legitimate status to the interpretive strategies authorised by economics. Posner 
attributes a powerlessness to literary interpretation, at least in comparison to legal 
interpretation, and this is a disguised move in a power game. If he can halt, and even 
262 Bible and Culture Collective, Postmodern Bible - 'Reader-Response Criticism,' p. 58. 
See M.L Pratt, 'Linguistic Utopias' in NigeI Fabb et aI., (eds.),11ze Linguistics of Writing: 
Arguments Between lAnguage and Literature (New York: Methuen, 1987), pp. 48 - 66. 
263 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law 
and Literature,' pp. 302 - 305. 
264 Ibid., pp. 305 - 308. 
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reverse, the increasing incursions ofliterary studies into the legal profession achieved 
by members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, the judge can then freely promote 
the doctrines of another pressure group known as Law and Economics.265 Fish 
claims that Posner: 
detects in the perspectives offered by literary and deconstructive theory a 
danger to the program with which he is so closely associated. It is, after 
all, a thesis of deconstructive theory that forms of representation, of 
which any system of currency is an instance, are always agencies of 
power and manipulation and never simply stand in for natural forces like 
the market. Perhaps the trouble with literary studies is not that they are 
irrelevant but that, at least potentially, they are too relevant.266 
So, Posner writes in a manner that suppresses the significant developments in academic 
law and legal interpretation that have resulted from the liaison between forensic and 
literary schools. Still, this liaison has seen 'the former [school] borrowing and 
appropriating far more than the latter, and to considerable effect.' 267 
Fish believes that neoconservative agendas lie behind Posner's work. Tracing 
connections through the judge's asides and footnotes, Fish uncovers a phalanx of right-
wing activists: economists, law school professors, literalists and formalists with 
university affiliations, and government advisors (of the Bush administration). Such 
forces in the late 1980s were mounting a concerted attack on the humanities-
particularly literary interpretivism - through the press and even at congressional level. 
Posner's essay is, for Fish, 'part and parcel of a wholesale effort to restructure several 
key American institutions in accordance with a very definite, and some would say 
extreme, political and moral vision.'268 Fish declares that 'it is incumbent upon those 
who find his views not only wrong, but supportive of wrong views now being put 
forward in other (sometimes high) places, to challenge them in the strongest terms 
possi ble.'269 
265 Ibid., pp. 308 - 309. 
266 Ibid., p. 309. 
267 Ibid., p. 307. 
268 Ibid., p. 310. 
269 Ibid .• p. 311. 
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Dealing as he does with issues of power, I propose that in the conclusion of his 
essay we see a demonstration of Fish's political awareness. Not only do we find in it 
descriptions of arguments among sub-groups within the legal guild, those who embrace 
the adoption of literary interpretivism and those who oppose it, but also a report of two 
communities in contention - the legal and the literary. Fish is acutely conscious 
throughout his observation ofthe debates that interpretation is political- it is not value-
free. Furthermore, I suggest that the piece reveals that within his theory there is no 
sense that interpretive communities are ideologically sterile. As we would expect, the 
interpreti ve strategies that infl uence the judge, objectivism and literati sm, recei ve full 
exposure from Fish. However, he also uncovers the right-wing ideology that lies 
behind Posner's essay, and explains how deconstructive theory is a threat to its 
programme. 
By the early 1990s Fish had published a series of essays that addressed his 
theory of interpretation to texts dealing with 'flesh-and-blood' political and ethical 
questions such as: feminism; racism; Mrocentrism; multiculturalism; lesbian and gay 
rights; political correctness; and discrimination.270 In these pieces Fish uses this list of 
issues as stimuli to explore the interpretation of words and phrases like 'reason,' 
'merit,' 'fairness,' 'neutrality,' 'free speech,' 'the marketplace of ideas,' 'color blind,' 
'level playing field,' and 'tolerance.'271 The moral drawn throughout is that individual 
readers do indeed stand in asymmetrical relationships concerning power and in their 
ability to speak about texts: 
While notions like "merit" and "fairness" are always presented as if their 
meanings were perspicuous to anyone no matter what his or her political 
affiliation, educational experience, ethnic tradition, gender, class, 
institutional history, etc., in fact "merit" and "fairness" (and other 
related terms) will have different meanings in relation to different 
assumptions and background conditions. That something is fair or 
meritorious is not determined above the fray but within the fray; the 
words do not mark out an area quarantined from the pull of contending 
partisan agendas; they are among the prizes that are claimed when one 
political agenda is so firmly established that its vision of the way things 
270 Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and ii's a Good Thing, Too (New York: 
The Oxford University Press, 1994). These issues appear throughout ?-cU1 1 of the lxx)\(. 
2711bid., Preface p. viii and 'Introduction: That's Not Fair,' p. 16. 
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should be is normative and can go without saying. At such moments of 
political victory (which can last a moment or a millennium), the agent 
who lives entirely within the reigning paradigm will look at a practice 
and say ... "That's not fair," in perfect confidence that his judgement will 
be as obvious to his hearers as it is to him.272 
That this asymmetrical relationship exists even within the same general interpretive 
community is a notion, I submit, that Fish's system would encompass. He is careful to 
explain that an interpretive community is not monolithic in nature.273 This is so 
because its members may simultaneously belong to several communities.274 Members 
of a biblical interpretive community, therefore, may also belong to other communities; 
and this multiple membership, I suggest, signifies the delicate balance of many factors 
that affects our perception and stimulates our creation of the text. We have just referred 
to Fish's opinion that a dominant interpretation arises from a struggle among differing 
agendas. There should exist no doubt as to the complexity of this process. The factors 
shaping perception converge on us from many directions. Hence, interpretive 
communities, as we saw in chapter one, section 4, operate in a state of flux. A 
complex network of influences operates within and without any discipline. We should 
not make the mistake Fish says, of 'accepting at face value the boundaries that separate 
disciplines and render their respective activities discrete from one another. In fact, 
neither disciplines nor the activities they enable are discrete; they exist in networks of 
affiliation and reciprocity.' The process of change within interpretive communities that 
we discussed earlier continues as 'a position taken in one comer of the institutional 
world is authorized by and authorizes in its tum positions of a similar kind taken 
elsewhere. Given the structural interdependence between disciplines. the effects of a 
piece of writing will always extend to contexts apparently far removed from the ones 
explicitlyaddressed.'275 
272 Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and it's a Good Thing, Too, 
'Introduction: That's Not Fai,r,' p. 4. 
273 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Change,' p. 142. 
274 Ibid., p. 144. See also note 123. 
275 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 'Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law 
and Literature,' p. 310. 
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Moving now towards the end of chapter two, I believe that Fish's remarks on 
politics and power aid us in three ways: a) they enlighten us regarding the ideological 
influences behind interpretation; b) they point to the existence of networks of affiliation 
and reciprocity between disciplines; and, c) they guide us towards a self-reflectiveness 
in the appropriation of reader-response. As I said in my introduction in chapter one, 
we must openly declare that many factors have the potential to shape how we read. 
Hanging in Gallery 10 of the Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art in 
Edinburgh is a retouched colour photograph mounted on aluminium plate. Featured in 
the photograph are several people seated at a dinner party. The table, laden with food 
and drink, has an empty chair drawn away from it. Viewing the picture, one questions 
why the assembled company look towards an open door. Ger Van Elk, the artist 
responsible for the picture, created it as part of a series under the collective title, 'The 
Missing Persons,' and the one I refer to is 'Lunch I 1976.' Van Elk found inspiration 
for his series in images from totalitarian regimes. Reading the gallery's accompanying 
explanation we learn that a member of a community who formerly enjoyed acceptance 
from her or his piers, has now fallen into disfavour. Tellingly. we see in the picture the 
aftennath of this person's removal.276 In linking Fish's name with this work in the 
heading of this section, I wished to accent his awareness that interpretations, and 
therefore interpreters, can disappear from view as a result of rival understandings 
gaining ascendancy. Such evanescence, he understands, occurs in malignant and 
benign circumstances alike. The First Epistle of John, we might say, has its own 
portrayal of 'missing persons' - the disapproval of, and departure of the so-caned 
'secessionists': 'They went out from us, but they did not belong to us; for if they had 
belonged to us, they would have remained with us. But by going out they made it plain 
that none of them belongs to us' (£1; TUUlN E1;T}A6av MAl oUK ~oav £1; r.flWv- ItL 
'" 11 • A Z ' ,.,. 6'. It .!.'t. 't. ' .. A .. yap El; Tlf1WV 'Ioav, IlEIlEVT)KEtOaV av flE TlJ.1ON' \MI./\, tVa cpaVEPro6<OOtV O'tt 
276 No publication of Ocr Van Elk's work exists yet. This description and explanation arises from 
my own visit to the gallery. However, during a conversation with the gallery's librarian I 
discovered an exhibition catalogue featuring his photographs: Venice Biennale, published by the 
Visual Arts Office for Abroad, Amsterdam, June 1980. 
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OUI( E"'La-LV JtUvtE; ES lJf·UW. 2: 19). According to the influential reconstruction 
undertaken by John Bogart, their departure centred on the question of 
petfectionism.277 Because of the same issue, we leam,large numbers became 
'missing persons' from Wesley's communities in the eighteenth century.278 
Concluding this chapter, I contend that I may use a form of reader-response criticism to 
discover how people have read - or, as we may say, created - a petfectionist text that 
accounts for these disappearances. Therefore, I propose now to take forward our 
investigations in five ways. First, I want to illustrate Wesley's reading of the verses 
we have outlined in chapters 1 and 3 of 1 John, along with his accompanying 
comments on Christian perfection and interpretation. Secondly, I wish to display the 
commentaries that the Methodist leader used to formulate his own understanding of the 
verses, and to look at the additional remarks on interpretation made by these exegetes. 
Thirdly, during my exhibition of the solutions offered by Wesley and his associates,l 
propose to employ our Fishian critical perspective to conduct an appraisal of their 
explication of the problem. In the fourth place,l plan to provide a concise excursus 
regarding a secular instance of perfectionism in the eighteenth century that might serve 
to set Wesley'S reading in an interpretive context. Lastly ,I intend to investigate the 
extant academic conventions regarding the issue using six monographs that have 
appeared in the last thirty years. 
277 John Bogart, Orthodox and Heretical Perfectionism in the JohaJlnine Community as Evident ill 
the First Epistle of John (Missoula, MT: Scholar's Press), pp. 132 and 140. 
278 Rack, ReasolUlble Enthusiast, pp. 333 - 342. 
92 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EXPLICATION OF THE VERSES AND CHRISTIAN 
PERFECTION BY WESLEY AND AN APPRAISAL OF THAT 
EXPLICATION FROM A FISHIAN PERSPECTIVE. 
'[Ble sure that you go to the author to get at his meaning, not to find yours ... the metal 
you are in search of being the author's mind or meaning, his words are as the rock 
which you have to crush and smelt in order to get at it.'279 
3. 1. 'Christian Perfection' 
London Bridge was a structure that had progressively borne houses, shops, and 
even a chapel since its completion in 1209.280 A person walking along its stretch in 
1741 eventually came upon the 'Looking Glass and Bible' - a book shop owned by W. 
Strahan. Here, and at the 'Foundery' (sic) near Upper Moorfields in the East of the 
city, the browser might find the newly published 'Christian Perfection: A Sermon, 
Preached by John Wesley, M.A. Fellow of Lincoln-College, Oxford.' Sixpence was 
the price of what would prove to be John Wesley's principal comment on our verses in 
chapters 1 and 3 of 1 John.281 
Philippians chapter 3 verse 12 appears at the head of the sermon in the 
Authorised Version (A V): 'Not as though I had already attained, either were already 
perfect.' Unex.pectedly, Wesley uses the verse merely as a proem in this explanation 
and defence of his assertion that perfection is attainable in this life.282 Initially one 
would think that the sermon should feature an exegesis of the Pauline epistle and the 
'seeming contradiction' that he notes between this verse and Philippians 3: 15 - 'Let us 
279 J. Ruskin, Sesame and lilies (London: George Allen, 1904), I. 'Of King's Treasuries,' 
sections 13 (2) and 14, pp. 18 - 19. 
280 P.W. Goetz (cd.), 171e New Encyclopcedia Britannica (14th cd.; Chicago: Encyc1opa:dia 
Britannica, 1985), Volume 23: 'London.' p. 292. 
281 I have reconstructed these publication details from the facsimile of the sermon frontispiece in 
Sermons 2.II, facing p. 97. 
282 Ibid., Sermon 40, § I, p. 99. 
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as many as be perfect, be thus minded.' However, the Methodist leader283 instead 
turns to 1 John as his prototype of 'the counsel of God.' Furthermore, he goes on to 
discuss the enigma that concerns us. Studying this sermon in some detail will serve to 
reveal his interpretation of our verses, but will also introduce us to an understanding of 
the related Wesleyan nuances of Christian perfection. In my introduction, I stated that 
Wesley's main formulation of the doctrine was the disquisition, A Plain Account of 
Christian Perfection, first published in 1767. While this statement remains true for the 
doctrine in its entirety, we find in his sermon 'Christian Perfection' the anterior, and 
indeed only, exhibition ofthe doctrine that offers Wesley's explicit solution to the 
Johannine discrepancy. His 'Plain Account' merely reproduces the sermon (though 
with some comments that we will draw on for a concluding observation concerning 
Wesley's form of perfectionism). Five further works - four sermons and a 
commentary - also address the interpretive issue, albeit indirectly, and make interesting 
supplementary remarks on Christian perfection, so these also will prove valuable to our 
study. When I have examined this core of composition I will introduce and scrutinise 
the works of the Methodist leader's favoured annotators. As we move forward thus, I 
will attempt to highlight and assess significant aspects of each of the commentators' 
interpretive manoeuvres and assumptions from our theoretical perspective. 
Wesley begins his 1741 sermon by showing 'First in what sense Christians are 
not, and Secondly, in what sense they are perfect.' 'Experience and Scripture' 
apparently teach us that believers 'are not so perfect as to be free' from: i) ignorance; ii) 
error (in the sense of a 'mistaken' understanding 'in things unessential to salvation,' for 
Christians 'do not mistake as to the things essential to salvation'); iii) bodily infirmities 
and those infirmities 'which are not of a moral nature' (such as 'slowness of 
understanding' as opposed to 'uncleanness'); iv) temptation.284 Wesley explains that, 
contrary to what 'some men seem to have imagined,' Christian perfection does not 
283 Throughout his life Wesley remained within the Anglican Communion and his 'class meetings' 
operated with the permission of its bishops. I have used the titles 'Methodist leader' or 
'Methodist' for the sake of our discussion to differentiate Wesley's position from that of his 
Anglican critics. 
284 Sermons 2.11.40, §2; I.1 - 1.8, pp. 100 - 104. 
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exempt us from this four-fold fragility - indeed the term is merely synonymous with the 
term 'holiness.' Those who are perfect are holy, and those who are holy are 'in the 
Scripture sense' perfect. Yet we may not conclude that there is 'any absolute perfection 
on earth.' There is no state of perfection in this life that 'does not admit of a continual 
increase ... [s]o that how much soever any man hath attained, or in how high a degree 
soever he is perfect, he hath still need to "grow in grace," and daily to advance in the 
knowledge and love of God his Saviour.'285 Thus, we discover that Christian 
perfection does not preclude the forms of fragility we have listed. Furthermore, it is 
not an ultimate zenith beyond which there is no further ascension; it is rather a state of 
continual mounting to higher levels of holiness. 
Wesley continues: 'In what sense then are Christians perfect? He suggests that 
as in natural life there are three stages in Christian experience. Utilising the 
designations of 1 John 2: 12 - 14, those of 'children,' 'young men,' and 'fathers,' the 
preacher discusses the attainments of people at each level. Other references from the 
New Testament also come into play at this point.286 'Children' have received 
forgiveness of sins, have been 'justified freely,' and enjoy peace with God. 'Young 
men' have overcome the 'wicked one,' are strong, and have the word of God abiding 
within them. Furthermore, they have 'quenched the fiery darts' of diabolic doubt and 
fear, and now enjoy the divine witness to forgiven sins as an abiding assurance. 
'Fathers' know 'him that is from the beginning' - in their 'inmost soul' they have an 
intimate knowledge of the Trinity. Those at this third stage 'are perfect men,' says 
Wesley, 'being grown up to the measure of the stature ofthe fullness of Christ.'287 
The believers belonging to the latter echelon represent a state of spiritual maturity, and 
285 Ibid., 1.9, pp. 104 - 105. 
286 In this section of the sermon these include: a) Romans 3: 24; b) Romans 5: 1; c) Romans 6: 1,2, 
5 - 7, II, 14, 15, 18; d) Ephesians 4: 13; e) Ephesians 6: 16; and, f) 1 Peter 4: 1 - 2. Wesley 
rarely supplied book, chapter and verse in his sermons. He seemed to assume that his audience 
knew the Bible well enough to recognise his allusions. Because of his remarkable familiarity 
with the Scriptures 'even his natural speech was biblical.' See Sermons 1.1, Introduction V., 
'Wesley and His Sources,' pp. 69 - 70. 
287 Sermons 2.11.40, IU, p. 105. As we will see later, Wesley (who was 38 when he wrote this 
sermon) does not necessarily link chronological age with spiritual attainment God may suddenly 
grant freedom from sin at any stage of the natural Hfetime. 
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'these only are properly Christians.'288 However, even 'babes in Christ,' as people 
who are born of God, 'are in such a sense perfect. .. [so as] not to commit sin.' They 
do not continue in sin, serve it, or live any longer within its domain; united with Christ 
in his crucifixion and death their old life is at an end; not under law but under grace, 
they live to God and now experience freedom from sin; moreover, they now serve 
righteousness. According to the preacher, even the most cautious interpretation of the 
Johannine, Pauline and Petrine witness leads to a conclusion that all real Christians 
possess a freedom, at the very least, from outward sin - from any outward 
transgression of the law. The will of God is now the Christian's central concem.289 
At this point, Wesley begins to examine 1 John 3: 9 and its attendant verses as 
the 'most express' of the biblical testimony to Christian perfection. From the beginning 
of his exegesis we see that for the Methodist there is the need to resist a tendency to 
modify the verse. Evidently, some (unnamed) ministers had glossed it in this way: the 
one who is born of God 'sinneth not wilfully; or he doth not commit sin habitually; 
or, not as other men do; or, not as he did before. '290 A faithful person does not sin 
with the liberty of her or his former life, but nonetheless remains subject to the power 
of sin. It is not St. John who makes such qualifications, counters Wesley. No 
explanations of this kind appear 'in any part of his writings whatsoever.' Therefore it 
is incumbent upon the interpreters who insert these explanations to prove them from the 
Word of God.291 The preacher records the evidence the annotators bring to support 
their contention. First, that many of the pious biblical figures committed sin: Abraham; 
Moses; David; Solomon; Peter; and, Paul. Second, that there are assertions in 
Scripture that expressly declare that the virtuous remain subject to sin: 1 Kings 8: 46; 
288 Ibid., 11.2, p. 105. Outler makes the following comment: 'Taken literally, this would mean that 
none but the perfect are "proper Christians." In 1750 and thereafter, Wesley altered this to read, 
"these only are perfect Christians."' See his note 57, p. 105. 
289 Ibid., 11.2 - 11.4, pp. 105 - 106. 
290 See also Sermons 1.1.18, 'The Marks of the New Birth,' pp. 420 - 421; here Wesley 
briefly restates in 1748 his arguments of 7 years before. Outler eites the work by James Hervey, 
Eleven Letters .•. to .. John Wesley (1765) as a later example of this gloss. On page 128 of that 
work Hervey comments: 'True, he [the believer described in 1 John 5: 18] sinneth not habitually. 
It is not his customary practice.' Sermons 1.1.18, 'The Marks of the New Birth,' p. 420, note 24. 
291 Sermons 2.11.40, U.S - 11.6, pp. 106 - 107. 
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Ecclesiastes 7: 20; 2 Corinthians 12: 7 - 10; James 3: 2. During a lengthy rebuttal of 
this evidence, Wesley acknowledges that the prominent believers in both the Jewish 
and Christian 'dispensations' did commit sin. However, he rejects the idea that these 
examples of infraction indicate that Christians of all generations will commit sin as long 
as they live. 'Without doubt,' he declares, during the period from Adam to Christ 
people could affirm that 'there was then no man that sinned not.' However, the 
Advent ended this period. For the Methodist leader, the life, death, resurrection, and 
glorification of Christ had instituted a redemption, adoption, grace, life, and 
immortality that superseded any benefice obtained from adherence to the Old Testament 
law: 'So that, whatsoever was the case of those under the law, we may safely affirm 
with St. John that since the gospel was given, "He that is born of God sinneth 
not. "'292 Even the Apostolic failure in the face of temptation is not a reason for 
inferring that all Christians must necessarily sin. The sin of Paul in his contention with 
Barnabas (Acts 15: 36 - 40), and the sin of Peter by his dissimulation at Antioch 
(Galatians 2: 11 - 14), were both unnecessary as the grace of God was as sufficient for 
them as it is for later generations. Such is that grace 'that [those who are] tempted to 
any sin need not yield; for no man is tempted above that he is able to bear.' Moreover, 
it is shamefully poor reasoning from the scriptures by 'the patrons of sin' that upholds 
their annotation of 1 John. Not one of the verses that they claim as evidence of sin's 
continuous power over the believer will Wesley admit as being correctly interpreted. 
The verses cited from Kings, Ecclesiastes, Corinthians, and James, when understood 
properly. in no way undermine St. John's assertion of Christians' freedom from sin. 
Though the specific details of the Methodist's exposition of these passages do not 
concern us, we note that he takes it as an axiom that the authors of Scripture are entirely 
consistent with each other.293 
It is here that Wesley faces our hermeneutical problem. He remarks: 
292 Ibid., II.7 - II. 10, pp. 107 - 110. 
293 Ibid., II.7 - II. 17, pp. 107· 115. 
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But here a fresh difficulty may arise. How shall we reconcile St. John 
with himself? In one place he declares, "Whosoever is born of God 
doth not commit sin [1 John 3: 9]." And again, "We know that he 
which is born of God sinneth not [1 John 5: 18]." And yet in another 
he saith, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the 
truth is not in us [1 John 1: 8]." And again, "If we say that we have not 
sinned we make him a liar, and his word is not in us [l John 1: 
10]."294 
As great a difficulty as this initially appears, the problem 'vanishes away,' says 
Wesley, if we 'observe' certain things about these verses. Several prefatory remarks 
lay the basis for the exegesis. First, in chapter one of the work it is important to realise 
that 'the tenth verse fixes the sense of the eighth: "If we say we have no sin" in the 
former being explained by, "If we say we have not sinned" in the latter verse.' 
Second, the point under present consideration is not whether we have or have not 
sinned in times past, it is rather that 'neither of these verses asserts that we do sin, or 
commit sin now.' Third, 1: 9 explains both 1: 8 and 1: 10: 'If we confess our sins, he 
is faithful andjust to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. 
We could paraphrase St. John's position, Wesley declares, as follows: it is as if he had 
said, 
I have before affirmed, "The blood of Jesus Christ clean seth us from all 
sin." But let no man say, I need it not; I have no sin to be cleansed 
from. If we say "that we have no sin", "that we have not sinned", we 
deceive ourselves, and make God a liar. But if we confess our sins, he 
is faithful and just, not only to forgive our sins, but also to cleanse us 
from all unrighteousness, that we may go and sin no more.295 
St. John is therefore 'well consistent with himselr and with other 'holy 
writers.' This consistency becomes more evident, we learn, when we place all the 
Apostle's assertions on this matter in a synopsis: a) the blood of Christ cleansing from 
all sin; b) the need for admission of personal sin; c) the divine readiness to forgive and 
cleanse past sins, and 'to save us from them for the time to come'; d) the promise of a 
294 Ibid., II. IS, p. 115. 
295 Ibid., 11.119, pp. 115 - 116. 
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heavenly advocacy (1 John 2: 1) that will render continuance in sin an anomaly. 'Thus 
far all is clear,' declares Wesley, but in case any doubts remain regarding this 'point of 
so vast importance,' he informs us that the Apostle's resumption of the subject in the 
third chapter 'largely explains his own meaning.' However, despite the supposedly 
self-evident nature of St. John's words, the Methodist inserts a gloss in 3: 7 - '"Little 
Children", saith he, "let no man deceive you (as though I had given any encouragement 
to those that continue in sin)"; "he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is 
righteous.'" Also, citing verses 8 - 10 from the AV, Wesley reveals his interpretive 
stance in stark terms. He states: 
Here the point, which till then might possibly have admitted of some 
doubt in weak minds, is purposely settled by the last of the inspired 
writers, and decided in the clearest manner. In conformity therefore 
both to the doctrine of St. John, and to the whole tenor of the New 
Testament, we fix this conclusion: "A Christian is so far perfect as not 
to commit sin."296 
This freedom from sin is the privilege of every Christian, even, he reiterates, of 
those who are 'babes in Christ.' Yet, there are greater heights to climb, and here 
Wesley embarks on an aside concerning spiritual progress that draws from numerous 
parts of the New Testament. It is only 'the strong in the Lord,' who 'have overcome 
the wicked one,' those who 'know him that is from the beginning,' it is only these 
whom we may regard as perfect in the sense of being free from 'evil or sinful thoughts 
and evil tempers.' Regarding evil thoughts, it is important to distinguish between a 
thought concerning sin and a sinful thought. Just as Christ thought of or understood 
the temptations proffered to him in the wilderness yet 'had ... no evil or sinful thought, 
nor indeed was capable of having any,' so also 'it follows that neither have real 
Christians; for "everyone that is perfect is as his master [Luke 6: 40]."'297 Therefore, 
296 Ibill .• II.20. p. 116. 
297 Note Wesley's use of the Authorised Version (A V) here in its employment of the word 'perfect' 
Yet, as we know, the Greek text has 1C(lT)fYtt.oJ4lvo~ ('having been fully trained') rather than 
't~Aet.o~ ('perfect,' or 'complete,). See BAGD, pp. 417 and 809. It is interesting to find that 
Wesley's own translation of this verse is: 'every one that is perfected shall be as his master.' 
See John Wesley. Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament. 'Notes on the Gospel 
According to St Luke' (1755; repr .• London: Epworth. 1976). p. 225. 
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if he was free from evil or sinful thoughts, so are they likewise. Where would evil 
thoughts come from in a servant who is 'as his master?' It is out of the heart of man 
(and Wesley pointedly comments 'if at all') that proceed evil thoughts. Therefore, if 
the heart is no longer evil, then evil thoughts can no longer proceed from it. A good 
tree can only produce good fruit. This freedom is the 'happy privilege of real 
Christians' and we discover testimony to it in various scriptures. Paul wrote of the 
formidable weaponry used through God to demolish 'strongholds' (2 Corinthians 10: 4 
- 5). Their use entails 'casting down imaginations (or "reasonings" rather, for so the 
word AoyLOf1oU~ signifies: all the reasonings of pride and unbelief against the 
declarations, promises, or gifts of God).' All haughtiness contrary to the knowledge of 
God consequently falls, and every thought comes into captivity to the obedience of 
Christ.298 
'Evil tempers' likewise no longer imprison the real Christian. The believer's 
perfective congruence with Christ results in an entirely new disposition, a heartfelt love 
even for enemies. Christ 'was free from all sinful tempers ... So therefore is his 
disciple, even every real Christian.' Crucified with Christ, her or his evil nature is now 
'destroyed,' moreover 'all that is holy, and just, and good' becomes essential through 
the indwelling of Christ. A 'purification' has occurred that has rid the heart of pride, 
self-will or desire, and anger (except for that Christ-like ire against sin that has an 
accompanying grief for the predicament of the sinner). 'Thus,' says Wesley, 'does 
Jesus save his people from their sins' - from the sins of 'the heart' as well as 'outward' 
sins, 'from evil thoughts and from evil tempers.'299 
Returning to his exegesis of 1 John, the preacher continues to resist those who, 
as he sees it, would modify its perfectionist thrust: 'True,' say some, 'we shall thus be 
saved from our sins, but not till death; not in this world. But how are we to reconcile 
this with the express words of St. John? "Herein is our love made perfect, that we may 
have boldness in the day of judgement: because as he is, so are we in this world."' For 
298 Sermons 2.11.40. 11.21 - I1.23, pp. 117 - 118. 
299 Ibid., 11.24 -1I.27, pp. 118 - 119. 
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Wesley, the Apostle here affinns 'beyond all contradiction' about himself and other 
living Christians, that 'not only at or after death but "in this world" they are as their 
Master.' Indeed, the affinnation of 4: 17 appears in the text as if St John had foreseen 
the same sort of evasion now perpetrated by the annotators 'and set himself to overturn 
it from the foundation.' The verses in 1: 5 - 9 prove 'exactly agreeable' to 4: 17 in that 
the Apostle evidently 'speaks of a deliverance wrought "in this world."' The pure 
luminescence of God's nature, if consistently revealed by the believers through the 
transparency of their lives, will result in present fellowship and cleansing. St. John did 
not say, "'the blood of Christ will cleanse" (at the hour of death. or in the day of 
judgement) but it "cleanseth (at the time present) us (living Christians) from all sin."' It 
is equally evident for Wesley that: i) 'if any sin remain we are not cleansed from all 
sin'; and, ii) 'if any unrighteousness remain in the soul it is not cleansed from all 
unrighteousness.'300 One could argue that Wesley's reasoning becomes fragmentary 
at this point in his effort to enforce his perfectionist agenda. For a sinner to say that the 
Apostle's words relate to justification only, or solely to cleansing from the guilt of sin, 
is tantamount to speaking against her or his own soul. This is because thereby: a) the 
sinner confuses 'what the Apostle clearly distinguishes' as he mentions first the 
forgiveness of sins, and second the cleansing from all unrighteousness; and, b) it 
erroneously asserts 1ustification by works in the strongest sense possible
' 
- it makes 
'all inward as well as outward holiness necessarily previous to justification.' For, 
reasons Wesley, if the cleansing referred to is merely a cleansing from the guilt of sin, 
then it follows that there is no cleansing from guilt; that is, the believer does not enjoy 
justification, unless it is on the condition of 'walking in the light, as he is in the light.' 
Only one conclusion remains, then, that God saves Christians from all sin and 
unrighteousness 'in this world'; 'that they are now in such a sense perfect as not to 
commit sin. and [to have] freed[om] from evil thoughts and evil tempers.'301 
300 Ibid., II.27 - 11.28, pp. 119 - 120. 
301 Ibid., 11.28, p. 120. 
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Drawing his sennon to a close, the preacher declares that this perfection is the 
fulfilment of God's word through the 'holy prophets ... since the world began.' 
Alluding to various scriptures,302 Wesley displays the divine blueprint for Christian 
holiness: the promise of a circumcision of the heart and soul; the creation of a clean 
heart and right spirit; the cleansing from filthiness and idols; the gift of a new heart and 
right spirit; the salvation from all uncleanness and iniquity; the possession of the 
prophetic word confinned in the gospel by Christ and his apostles. Accordingly, he 
reminds his audience of the urgency to appropriate all that God has pledged; they are to 
cry to God day and night until they experience deliverance 'from the bondage of 
corruption' and enter the liberty of the sons of God.303 
3. 2. 'Salvation by Faith' 
As I stated earlier, Wesley wrote several other pieces that have some bearing on 
our subject, and it is to these we turn at this juncture. While my assertion remains true 
regarding the sennon 'Christian Perfection,' that it is the anterior, and indeed only, 
exhibition of the doctrine that offers Wesley's explicit solution to the Johannine 
discrepancy, an earlier sermon contains a brief passage that foreshadows it. Following 
his noteworthy experience in Aldersgate Street, London, on 24 May 1738, Wesley 
preached 'Salvation by Faith' at St. Mary's church, Oxford eighteen days later on 11 
June.304 Affirming Ephesians chapter 2 verse 8, 'By grace ye are saved through 
faith,' the Methodist leader explains his proposition of 'free grace' and the nature of 
authentic faith and salvation. Amidst a section on the latter, Wesley states: 
[A]ll that believe in him, he will save from all their sins: from original 
and actual, past and present sin, of the flesh and of the spirit. Through 
faith that is in him they are saved from the gUilt and from the power of 
it. .. They are also saved from the fear, though not from the possibility, 
of falling away from the grace of God, and coming short of the great 
and precious promises ... Again, through this faith they are saved from 
302 See Luke 1: 70; Deuteronomy 30: 6; Ezekiel 36: 25ff; Psalm 51: 10 (A V); 2 Corinthians 7: I; 
Hebrews 4: 1; Philippians 3: 13 - 14; Romans 8: 21. 
303 Sermons 2.11.40, 11.29 - 11.30, pp. 120 - 121. 
304 Sermons 1.1.1, Introductory Comment. p. 110. Outler records that Wesley had tested the ideas in 
this sermon on several occasions in and near London during the intervening period. 
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the power of sin as well as from the guilt of it. So the Apostle declares, 
'Ye know that he was manifested to take away our sins, and in him is 
no sin. Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not.' Again, 'Little children, 
let no man deceive you .... He that committeth sin is of the devil.' 
'Whosoever believeth is born of God.' And, 'Whosoever is born of 
God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot 
sin, because he is born of God.' Once more, 'We know that whosoever 
is born of God sinneth not; but he that is begotten of God keepeth 
himself, and that wicked one toucheth him not.' 
He that is by faith born of God sinneth not, (1), by any habitual sin, for 
all habitual sin is sin reigning; but sin cannot reign in any that believeth. 
Nor, (2), by any wilful sin; for his will, while he abideth in the faith, is 
utterly set against all sin, and abhorreth it as deadly poison. Nor, (3), 
by any sinful desire; for he continually desireth the holy and perfect will 
of God; and any unholy desire he by the grace of God stifleth in the 
birth. Nor, (4), doth he sin by infirmities, whether in act, word, or 
thought; for his infinnities have no concurrence of his will; and without 
this they are not properly sins. Thus, 'He that is born of God doth not 
commit sin.' And though he cannot say he hath not sinned, yet now 'he 
sinneth not'. 305 
Thus we find in this earlier piece similar elements to those found in the 1741 
sermon. The bedrock of Wesley's solution we discover in the last line: 'And though he 
cannot say he hath not sinned, yet now "he sinneth not".' From this statement we may 
again deduce that verses eight and ten of chapter one synonymously refer to past sin, 
but 3: 6 and 9 pertain to the regenerate state of the believer. Furthermore, we also 
descry from the beginning of the extract the proviso that the Christian retains a frailty 
that could lead to a 'falling away from the grace of God.' So, on first sight, some 
might argue that these sermons form a definitive statement of the Methodist leader's 
interpretation of our verses. 
3. 3. Wesley's Shifting Emphases 
However, though he does not approach Wesley's writings from any type of 
reader-response perspective we find that M.R. Fraser cautions us against drawing 
absolute conclusions about any of Wesley's statements on interpretation. He does so 
because Wesley often 'shifted' emphases and modified scriptural applications or 
definitions according to the audience he addressed. Without doubt the Methodist leader 
305 Ibid., II.2, 4, S, 6, pp. 122 - 124. 
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taught from the foundation of his belief in an 'unquestionably authoritative Scripture 
[that was the] incunabulum of his doctrine and the canon against which [he measured] 
every interpretation and experience.' Moreover, he built upon this biblical basis a 
soteriology that became his 'rule of faith.' After he had studied a scriptural theme 'he 
rarely deleted any of the constituent elements.' At times though, says Fraser, Wesley 
'might consider that some point was more applicable to an advanced stage of the 
Christian life, but this involved a shift rather than a deletion.' The area most subject to 
modification was the application of his rule of faith to his audience. He placed accents 
upon different elements of his practical divinity according to 'the general context and 
the perceived needs of his hearers.' He realised that: 'Temporary experiential 
aberrations called for temporary shifts in the balance between the elements of his 
application.' A 'continual dialectic flowed between the religious experiences he 
observed in his serious hearers and his application.'306 Consequently, Fraser declares 
that: 
Wesley modified his application of Scri pture whenever he percei ved 
spiritually malformed believers. For this reason, it is almost impossible 
to place a single definition on any important soteriological term he used; 
he varied its meaning depending on the pastoral and pedagogical 
context. For the same reason, it is unwise to use the date of publication 
alone to determine the maturity of his thought in any particular 
work.307 
The matter becomes still more complex when we consider two additional 
factors. Fraser informs us of the first factor which was that: 'Wesley went through 
three major stages before 1759 in his developing doctrine of Christian perfection.'308 
These were (in a greatly simplified form): i) a brief period from 1733 to the middle 
years of the decade when he thought that 'a lif eli me of earnest endeavour after holi ness 
preceded justification which most likely occurred near death'; ii) the interval after he 
306 M. R. Fraser, 'Strains in the Understandings of Christian Perfection in Early British 
Methodism' (Ph.D. Thesis, Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University, 1988, 
Microfiche Order Number: 891(848), pp. 24 - 25. 
307 Ibid .• p. 25. 
308 Ibid .• p. 25. 
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met the Moravians in October 1735 when he began to believe, under their influence, 
that 'one could be justified in an instant by faith long before death and that the normal 
fruit of this experience was happiness and holiness'; iii) the move away from the 
Moravian influence after the end of 1738, when 'frustrated in his own experience and 
observant of the experience of others, he came to believe that a [Christian] could 
become penect in Christ in a moment after justification and before death.'309 After 
reaching this third stage, Fraser says that Wesley: 
did not deny the possibility that a person could be renewed in love when 
justified, he claimed not to know such a person. The typical experience 
[he discovered after conducting numerous personal interviews] was that 
of a justified believer seriously seeking Christian perfection for years 
and, finding it, to continue growth as love excluded sin. While he 
believed that such an entire sanctification would take place in an instant, 
his primary emphasis lay on the disciplined spiritual life of which that 
instant was an integral part,3l0 
Evidently, the limited number of works concerning us here emerged from the third 
stage. Nevertheless, it seems that in the final stage we may detect traces of ideas 
Wesley had during the first two stages. 
Beside these phases in the development of the doctrine, we must also consider 
the second factor Fraser presents as an impediment to conclusiveness regarding 
Wesley's interpretative stances. Fraserinforms us that the Methodist leader deliberately 
concealed the extent of his perfectionist beliefs from all but a coterie of sympathisers: 
He became quite sensitive to his audiences, so much so that he 
published different claims about Christian perfection to the populace at 
large than he did among the inner circle of Methodists. Among the latter 
group he advocated a more radical understanding ofthe possibilities of 
grace.311 
Furthermore, we learn that: 
309 Ibid., pp. 75; 27 - 45. 
310 Ibid., p. 75. 
311 Ibid .• p. 26. 
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Certainly, within the [Methodist] community Wesley expressed verbally 
possibilities of grace seldom mentioned to those on the outside. These 
possibilities rarely found their way into print; it was probably a common 
theme of the select societies which were reserved for those close to or 
professing Christian perfection.312 
We might say, then, that hidden dynamics were at work behind Wesley's 
pronouncements on biblical matters - forces that shaped the interpretation of our texts. 
As we analyse the remaining pieces that deal with them we will be able to discern 
certain shifts in emphasis that correlate with the considerations raised by Fraser. 
3. 4. 'The Great Privilege of Those that are Born of God' 
Taking these pieces in chronological order, for his next comment we move 
forward ten years to 1748. In 'The Great Privilege of those that are Born of God,' the 
preacher uses 1 John 3: 9 to clarify certain issues surrounding the 'new birth'; whilst 
this sermon does not address the contradiction directly by referring also to 1: 8 and 10, 
it nevertheless alludes to it by discussing again the apparent sinfulness of the most 
reputable of biblical characters. Moreover, it provides a valuable background for our 
understanding of the Methodist's manner of interpretation. 
Those who suppose that 'the being born of God was all one with the being 
justified; that the new birth and justification were only different expressions denoting 
the same thing' have misunderstood God's dealings with his people. Wesley can allow 
that justification and the new birth 'are in point of time inseparable from each other.' 
However, we must distinguish them as 'things of a widely different nature.' 
Justification 'changes our outward relation to God,' whereas the new birth changes 
'our inmost souls ... so that sinners become saints.' The former restores us to the 
favour of God, and takes away the guilt of sin. The latter restores us to the 'image of 
God,' and 'tak[es] away the power of sin.'313 Such a failure to discern or observe the 
difference there is between justification and the new birth 'has occasioned exceeding 
312 Ibid., p. 52. 
313 Sermons 1.1.19, §1 - §2, pp. 431 - 432. 
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great confusion of thought in many who have treated on this subject; particularly when 
they have attempted to explain this great privilege ... to show how "whosoever is born 
of God doth not commit sin."' Therefore, it is necessary for a 'clear' apprehension of 
St. John's assertion to approach the verse in two stages: a) to consider what is the 
'proper meaning' of 'whosoever is born of God'; and, b) to inquire 'in what sense' the 
Christian 'doth not commit sin.'314 
Explaining his view of regeneration occupies the preacher for a significant 
portion of the sermon. Condensing his arguments here, we learn: 'that it implies not 
barely the being baptised, or any outward change whatsoever; but a vast inward 
change; a change wrought in the soul by the operation of the Holy Ghost, a change in 
the whole manner of our existence; for from the moment we are "born of God" we live 
in quite another manner than we did before; we are, as it were, in another world.'31 5 
Before new birth a person has no awareness of God, but when born of the Spirit 'lhlis 
whole soul is now sensible of God.' '[H]e has a clear intercourse with the invisible 
world.' Peace,joy, love and knowledge are now his.316 
Moving on to consider in what sense the believer does not commit sin, Wesley 
states that one who has been born of God lives 'by a kind of spiritual re-action.'317 
This is a devout state whereby the believer 'returns the grace he receives in unceasing 
love, and praise and prayer .. .' As a person thus 'keepeth himselr [1 John 5: 18, A V] 
in this condition, he does not commit sin. Furthermore, the preacher declares, 'so long 
as this "seed remaineth in him he cannot sin" [1 John 3: 9], because he is born of God.' 
On this occasion the term 'sin' Wesley defines as 'outward sin, according to the plain, 
common acceptation of the word.' He delineates it as 'an actual, voluntary 
"transgression of the law"; of the revealed, written law of God; of any commandment 
314 Ibid .• §3 - §4. p. 432. 
315 Ibid .• 1.1, p. 432. 
316 Ibid., 1.8 - I.l O. pp. 434 - 435. 
317 Ibid .• 11.1, p. 436 and III.2. p. 442. Wesley here coins the word 'reaction' but inserts 
a hyphen for emphasis. As Outler observes, the Oxford English Dictionary mistakenly cites this 
pioneer use of the term as appearing in tnt rather than in this sermon in 1748. See Sermons 
1.1.19, p. 436, note 26. Cf., C.T. Onions [cd.], The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
(2 vols.; 3rd ed. with etymologies revised by O.W.S. Friedrichsen; Oxford: Clarendon and Oxford 
University Press, 1973), Volume II, p. 1754. 
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of God acknowledged to be such at the time that it is transgressed.' Those who have 
experienced the new birth - those who 'abide in faith and love and in the spirit of prayer 
and thanksgiving' - not only do not, but cannot commit sin. It is plain that so long as 
the Christian believes in God through Christ, and unreservedly loves him, he 'cannot 
voluntarily transgress any command of God, either by speaking or acting what he 
knows God hath forbidden.' The 'seed' that remains in the Christian Wesley 
establishes as 'that loving, praying, thankful faith'; so long as this faith resides, it 
'compels him to refrain from whatsoever he knows to be an abomination in the sight of 
God.'318 
Distilling his arguments from 1741, the preacher answers again those who 
inculpate biblical heroes in an effort to disprove Christian perfection. We may note. 
however, some additional elements to the earlier sermon. He admits that the sin of 
these prominent characters is a difficulty that has appeared insuperable to many, and 
'has induced them to deny the plain assertion of the Apostle.' How can we reconcile 
such sin with St. John's words if we take them 'in the obvious literal meaning'?319 
Again emphasising the importance of the believer 'keeping himself,' Wesley stresses 
that this self-maintenance is entirely achievable through the grace of God. In this 
condition the Christian remains safe from the touch of the 'evil one.' However, 'if he 
keepeth not himself, if he abide not in the faith, he may commit sin even as another 
man.'320 Therefore, it is easy to understand how any ofthe faithful might fail in their 
steadfastness, 'and yet the great truth of God, declared by the Apostle, remain steadfast 
and unshaken.' The blame lies entirely with the individual: 'He did not keep himself by 
that grace of God which was sufficient for him.' A 'step by step' declension followed: 
beginning with 'negative inward sin' characterised by the neglect of the devotional life; 
continuing with 'positive inward sin' marked by an inclination to wickedness, evil 
desire or temper; followed by a loss of faith, 'his sight of a pardoning God,' and 
consequently his love of God; finally, 'being then weak and like another man he was 
318 Ibid., 11.1 - 11.2, p. 436. 
319 Ibid., 11.3, p. 436 and 11.6, p. 438. 
320 Ibid., 11.7, p. 438. 
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capable of committing even outward sin.'321 All the biblical saints who transgressed 
followed just such 'an unquestionable progress from grace to sin.' Their culpability in 
no way devalues the veracity of St. John's statement Thus Wesley deduces that 'it is 
unquestionably true that he who is born of God, keeping himself, cannot commit sin; 
and yet if he keepeth not himself he may commit all manner of sin with greediness.' It 
remains only for the preacher to urge faithfulness upon his audience. The 'man of God' 
is 'to watch always, that thou mayest always hear the voice of God. Watch that thou 
pray without ceasing, at all times and in all places pouring out thy heart before him. So 
shalt thou always believe, and always love, and never commit sin.'322 
3. S. Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament 
The interpretation of the Johannine verses proposed by the preacher became 
established Methodist doctrine with the pUblication in 1755 of his Explanatory Note.'; 
Upon the New Testament. This work provided Methodists with an exegetical tool that 
contained some original notes by Wesley, but also remarks borrowed from 
commentaries that he admired (I will list and examine these commentaries in due 
course). Additionally, Wesley constructed the Notes as a revision of the A V New 
Testament; though he regarded the AVas 'abundantly the best [translation he had) 
seen,' he took 'the liberty ... to make here and there a small alteration' to the text to bring 
it 'nearer to the original.'323 From a document dated eight years later we discover the 
importance of this work. To try to correct acute problems (as he saw them) of doctrinal 
variance among the preachers he had appointed, Wesley drew up a 'Model Deed' for 
new chapels in 1763. It declared that the trustees of each chapel must welcome the new 
preachers provided that they 'preach no other doctrine than that contained in Mr. 
Wesley's Notes Upon the New Testament and the four volumes of Sermons.'324 
321 Ibid., II.7, pp. 438 - 439. 
322 Ibid., 11.8 -111.4, pp. 439 - 443. 
323 John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, Preface pp. 6 and 8. 
324 Sermons 1.1, Introduction III, 1'he Sermon Corpus,' pp. 41 - 42. 
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His Notes of 1755 are largely staccato observations designed to 'assist serious 
persons, who have not the advantage of learning, in understanding the New 
Testament.' They are for 'plain, unlettered men, who understand only their mother-
tongue, and yet reverence and love the Word of God, and have a desire to save their 
souls.' So, Wesley ensured that he 'studiously avoided, not only all curious and 
critical inquiries, and all use of the learned languages, but all such methods of 
reasoning and modes of expression as people in common life are unacquainted 
with.'325 Consequently, he does not draw attention to the inconsistency in 1 John. 
Rather he offers his explication for each of the verses taken in isolation. 
Looking first at his handling of 1: 8, here is an example of the disconnected 
style adopted by the Methodist leader: 'If we say - Any child of man, before His blood 
has cleansed us. 'We have no sin - To be cleansed from, instead of confessing our sin.It 
(verse 9), the truth is not in us - Neither in our mouth nor in our heart.'326 Assuming 
an intention of consistency with the sermon of 1741,327 we could infer that Wesley 
interpreted this verse as a censure against those who would not admit having sinned 
before their conversion. He would deny that it implied an inescapable tendency to sin 
subsequent to justification and new birth. The comments subjoined to verses 7b and 9b 
confirm this: 'Cleanseth us from all sin - Both original and actual, taking away al1 the 
guilt and all the power.' [7b]; 'And to clean.lte us from all unrighteousne.u - To purify 
our souls from every kind and every degree of it' [9b].328 For Wesley, the boon of 
becoming a Christian was an emancipation from sin. Yet, this emancipation could only 
become effective following a heartfelt confession of the sin committed during the 
unregenerate period of life. 
325 John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, Preface, pp. 5 - 7. 
326 Ibid., 'Notes on the First Epistle of St. John,' p. 904. 
327 Sermons 2.II.40, 11.19, p. 115 - 116. Wesley always maintained that he had been consistent 
in his presentation of Christian perfection from the Scriptures. See John Wesley, A Plain 
Account of Christian Perfection, (1767; repr., Peterborough: Epworth Press, 1952), 
section 27, p. 108. 
328 John Wesley, Explallatory Notes Upon the New Testament, 'Notes on the First Epistle of 
St. John,' p. 904. 
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The elucidation of chapter 3 reveals a Christ manifested: 'To take away our sins 
- To destroy them all, root and branch, and leave none remaining' [3: 5]. Furthermore, 
as this manifestation had the purpose of destroying the works of the devil, that is 'All 
sin,' the question remains, 'And will He not perform this in all that trust in Him?' 
[3:8]. Some of the phraseology of the comment on 3: 9 reappears from the 1741 and 
1748 sermons. Provided that 'the divine seed ofliving faith abideth' in the believer, 
he cannot sin - he remains 'inwardly and universally changed.'329 
So, we see that though Wesley does not mention the inconsistency he observed 
in 1741, he nevertheless performs the same act of harmonisation. The sin spoken of in 
1: 7 - 10 he effectively consigns to a pre-conversion state, and he then, by using 
chapter 3, seeks to demonstrate that the faithful believer can go on to enjoy freedom 
from the guilt and power of sin. Interestingly, however, he remarks concerning 1: 10 
that despite the purification of our souls from 'every kind and every degree' of sin, 
'still we are to retain, even to our lives' end, a deep sense of our past sins.'330 He 
thus urges upon his readers the necessity of humility and repentance. Such an entreaty 
appears to link with the accent on continuous spiritual ascent that we saw in his work of 
1741. Furthermore, we have noted the emphasis on spiritual self-maintenance in the 
sermon of 1748 - that without it there is a danger of inclination to sin, even following 
the new birth. By making an abbreviated examination of two further sermons 
published in 1763 and 1767 we discover the reason for the Methodist leader's 
introduction of these ideas. 
3. 6. 'On Sin in Believers' 
Throughout much of his ministry Wesley found himself caught between 
opposing views of 'sin in believers.' The Lutheran and Calvinist theologians, on one 
side, stressed that Christians, though justified, continued to be subject to the power of 
sin - they would enjoy freedom from it in heaven only. The Moravians and some 
329 Ibid .• pp. 910 - 911. 
330 . Ibid .• p. 905. 
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Methodist ministers, on the other, took the statement that 'whosoever is born of God 
doth not commit sin' to its 'antinomian extreme of sinless - even guiltless - perfection, 
as if the power not to sin meant the extirpation of all "remains of sin"' during a 
person's lifetime.331 'On Sin in Believers,' the 1763 sermon, begins to chart what 
Wesley regarded as a valid third altemative.332 
Opening his argument, the preacher poses the question: 'Is there sin in him that 
is in Christ? Does sin remain in one that "believes in him?" Is there any sin in them 
that are "born of God," or are they wholly delivered from it?' This is a question of 
great importance to 'every serious Christian' insofar as its resolution 'concerns both his 
present and eternal happiness.'333 Alluding to numerous parts of the New Testament, 
and to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England,334 Wesley proposes that 
believers in Christ 'till they are "strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might," 
have need to "wrestle with flesh and blood," with an evil nature, as well as "with 
principalities and powers. '" Despite regeneration, Christians continue to suffer from an 
'infection of nature,' and this receives further confirmation from the testimony of the 
'Greek and Romish Church' and from that of 'every Reformed Church in Europe, of 
whatever denomination.'335 
However, some churches 'carry the thing too far ... so describing the corruption 
of heart in a believer as scarce to allow that he has dominion over it, but rather is in 
bondage thereto ... [a]nd by this means they leave hardly any distinction between a 
believer and an unbeliever.' Conversely, in trying to avoid that 'extreme' many 'well 
meaning men, particularly those under the direction of the late Count Zinzendorf336 
331 Sermons 1.1. Introduction to Sermons 13 and 14 'On sin in Believers' and 'The Repentance 
of Believers,' pp. 314 - 316. See also H.D. Rack, ReasOfUlble Enthllsiasl- John Wesley and the 
Rise of Methodism, p. 334. 
332 Sermons 1.1. Introduction to Sermons 13 and 14 'On Sin in Believers' and 'The Repentance of 
Believers.' p. 315. 
333 Sermons 1.I.13.I.l, p. 317. 
334 See the Book of Common Prayer, 'Articles of Religion,' Article IX O/Original or IJirrh-s;n 
(1662; repr., Glasgow: Collins, 19(8), p. 564. 
335 Sermons 1.1.13.1.2 - 1.4, pp. 317 - 318. 
336 For information regarding Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf and the Moravian Church, sec Edward 
Langton, History 0/ tile Moravian Church (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956). It 
seems that the literary sources that record the history of the Fnglish Moravians of this period are 
not currently available. My attempt to gain access to the Moravian archive in London did not 
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take up a position at the opposite pole in 'affirming that "all true believers are not only 
saved from the dominion of sin but from the being of inward as well as outward sin. 
so that it no longer remains in them."' This results in an opinion 'that even the 
corruption of nature is no more in those who believe in Christ.' Responding to 
Wesley's challenge to their stance many of the Moravians conceded 'that sin did still 
remain in the flesh. but not in the heart of a believer.' Furthermore. once experience 
had proved to them the 'absurdity' of this notion also. they abandoned it. conceding 
'that sin did still remain, though not reign. in him that is born of God.' Yet. the 
Methodists who had originally received the tenet from the Moravians '(some directly. 
some at second or third hand) were not so easily prevailed upon to part with a favourite 
opinion.' Even when most of them became convinced that it was utterly indefensible a 
few people. says Wesley. 'could not be persuaded to give it up,' and maintained it to 
that day.337 
By sin in this sermon, the preacher understands 'inward sin: any sinful temper. 
passion or affection; such as pride. self-will. love of the world, in any kind or degree; 
such as lust, anger, peevishness; any disposition contrary to the mind which was in 
Christ.'338 Although he remains convinced that all the parties concerned agree that 
'Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin,' he enquires: 'lI]s a justified or 
regenerate man freed from all sin as soon as he is justified? Is there then no sin in his 
heart? Nor ever after. unless he fall from grace?' The state of the justified person is 
indeed 'inexpressibly great and glorious.' However. Wesley cannot believe that there 
is no sin in her or his heart. He argues that the whole tenor of the Scriptures runs 
against this. and adduces many verses to prove his case. This is the 'grand point, that 
there are two contrary principles in believers - nature and grace, the flesh and the 
spirit.' The inspired writers continually exhort Christians 'to fight with and conquer 
succeed as it is currently stored pending potential sale to the John Rylands Library, Manchester. 
Therefore, we remain reliant upon Wesley's account of their doctrine. See Sermons 1.1.14, 
p. 352, note 134. 
337 Sermons 1.1.13,1.4 -1.7, pp. 318 - 319. 
338 Ibid., 11.2, p. 320. 
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[wrong tempers and practices], by the power of the faith .. .in them.'339 Those who 
insist 'that there is no sin in believers' are propounding a doctrine that 'is quite new in 
the church of Christ.' From the inception of Christianity to the eighteenth century no 
such teaching has appeared, 'never till it was discovered by Count Zinzendorf.' 
Wesley is unequivocal: 'it is a new, unscriptural doctrine.'340 
According to the preacher, Zinzendorf and some of his Methodist colleagues 
advanced their view by declaring that because the Spirit of God dwells in the Christian 
that one is consequently 'delivered from the guilt, the power, or, in one word, the 
being of sin.' Yet, they have erroneously coupled these things together as if they were 
the same; whereas they are separate matters. 'That believers are delivered from the 
guilt and power of sin,' Wesley allows. 'That they are delivered from the being of it,' 
he denies.341 To affirm, as do the acolytes of Zinzendorf, that 'sin cannot in any kind 
or degree exist where it does not reign: for guilt and power are essential properties of 
sin ... [and] [t]herefore, where one ofthem is, all must be' is contrary to 'all experience, 
all Scripture, all common sense.' For instance, one might feel resentment for an affront 
(an emotion Wesley confesses to have 'existed in me a thousand times'). Resentment 
is a sin, 'avoJ.1ta, disconformity to the law of love.' The believer might feel it, it 
might exist within her or him, and yet not reign. If 'the resentment .. .is not yielded to, 
even for a moment, there is no guilt at all, no condemnation from God upon that 
account.' Consequently, the Methodist leader declares, the sin 'has no power: though 
it "lusteth against the Spirit" [Galatians 5: 17] it cannot prevail. Here, therefore as in 
ten thousand instances, there is sin without either guilt or power. '342 
Supposing that sin is in us does not imply that 'it has the possession of our 
strength.' Acknowledging its mere existence in the believer does not imply 'its 
usurpation of our hearts.' Wesley assures his audience that the usurper has suffered 
dethronement. Sin 'remains indeed where [it] once reigned; but remains in chains.' It 
339 Ibid., 11.3 - IIl.3, pp. 320·322. 
340 Ibid., 111.9 -111.10, p. 324. 
341 Ibid., IVA, p. 328. 
342 Ibid., IV. 10, pp. 330 - 331. 
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'in some sense' prosecutes the war against the Christian, but becomes increasingly 
enfeebled, 'while the believer goes on from strength to strength, conquering and to 
conquer.'343 Christians are not slaves to sin, says the preacher, yet 'sin remains (at 
least for a time) in all that are justified.' Sins such as pride or self-will exist in the 
believer and unbeliever alike. These failings, however, do not govern the believer. 
The unregenerate man obeys sin, but the regenerate man does not. 'Resh is in them 
both,' we learn, but the Christian differs from his opposite inasmuch as he walks after 
the Spirit rather than the flesh. Even the sin of unbelief exists in the faithful (principally 
'in all babes') in the sense of 'littlefaith,' rather than in the sense of 'no faith' as in the 
unbeliever.344 
Ifwe '[u]nderstand the proposition right' the doctrine that sin remains in the 
believer will not serve to encourage people to sin. God's favour may rest on a man 
even though he 'feel [s] sin.' It is when he yields to sin he forfeits that favour - merely 
'having sin' does not contribute to its loss. Wesley remarks: 'Though the flesh in you 
"lust against the Spirit,' you may still be a child of God. But if you "walk after the 
flesh," you are a child of the devil. Now, this doctrine does not encourage to obey 
sin, but to resist it with all our might.'345 
The preacher leaves his audience with a summation of his teaching. We must 
see Christians as 'sanctified, yet. .. only inpart.' In a degree, according to the measure 
of their faith, they are spiritual; yet in a degree they are calm!.' The contrary principles 
working within the justified person make necessary the biblical exhortations to 'watch 
against the flesh, as well as the world and the devil.' A witness lies within believers 
that they have 'a will not wholly resigned to the will of God.' They know that they are 
in Christ and yet find a readiness in their hearts to depart from him, 'a proneness to evil 
in many instances, and a backwardness to that which is good.' The new doctrine 
claiming that God frees Christians from the 'remains of sin' is 'attended with the most 
fatal consequences.' To embrace such a doctrine is to remove 'all watching against our 
343 Ibid., lV.Il. p. 331. 
344 Ibid., IV.12, pp. 331 - 332. 
345 Ibid., lV.13, p. 332. 
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evil nature.' Moreover, the doctrine 'tears away the shield of weak believers, deprives 
them of their faith, and so leaves them exposed to all the assaults of the world, the 
flesh, and the devil.'346 
3. 7. 'The Repentance of Believers' 
Having argued for the continuing existence of sin in believers subsequent to 
justification Wesley went on in 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767) to emphasise the 
necessity of acts of repentance throughout a Christian'S life. Without doubt, repentance 
and faith are the 'gate of religion.' However, these acts in a slightly modified sense 
'are requisite after we have "believed the gospel"; yea, and in every subsequent stage of 
our Christian course.' Lacking them we cannot progress spiritually. So, the Methodist 
leader asks: '[I]n what sense are we to repent and believe, after we are justitied?'34 7 
A post-justification understanding of repentance moves beyond the initial 
inward change, the 'change of mind from sin to holiness.' The Methodist declares: 'we 
now speak ofit in a quite different sense, as it is one kind of self-knowledge - the 
knowing ourselves sinners, yea, guilty, helpless sinners, even though we know we are 
children of God.'348 Our first appreciation of redemption, di vine love and the 
kingdom of God may lead to a supposition that we are no longer sinners, 'that all our 
sins are not only covered but destroyed. As we do not then feel any evil in our hearts, 
we readily imagine none is there.' This is the very perspective taken by those 'well· 
meaning men ... [who] having persuaded themselves that when they were justified they 
were [also] entirely sanctified.' Without referring to the Moravians and their associates 
by name, Wesley portrays their belief that justification brings complete destruction of 
all sin: absolutely no sin remains in the heart, it is 'altogether clean from that moment.' 
Again, he acknowledges a shared belief with them in the words of 1 John that 'he that 
believeth is born of God' [5: 1], and that 'he that is born of God doth not commit sin' 
[3: 9]. However, he restates that he cannot accept that the Christian does not/eel sin 
346 Ibid., V.I, pp. 332 - 333. 
347 Sermons 1.1.14. opening paragraphs § 1 - §3, pp. 335 - 336. 
348 Ibid .• 1.1. p. 336. 
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within himself. Wesley's axiom is: 'it does not reign, but it does remain.' The 
'conviction of the sin which remains in our heart is one great branch of the repentance' 
he now speaks of.349 
A theme of spiritual self-maintenance reappears in the sermon - along with 
many previously stated proofs of sin in the believer. Additionally, we find statements 
regarding the utter helplessness of Christians. They have no strength of their own 'to 
do good or resist evil; no ability to conquer or even withstand the world, the devil, or 
their own evil nature.' Yet, they have indeed a power to overcome all these enemies, 
but not one born of their own vigour or from their own nature. It is simply the gift of 
God. 'Nor,' we learn, 'is [this gift] given all at once, as if they had a stock laid up for 
many years, but from moment to moment.'3S0 Helplessness, thus, takes various 
forms. Of ourselves we cannot find freedom from 'gUiltiness' or 'desert of 
punishment.' Furthermore, we are unable to remove, either by grace or by our natural 
powers, any sins of commission or omission. We experimentally know that a 
predisposition to depart from God remains in our hearts in spite of all our endeavours, 
even after regeneration. 3S 1 
Wesley issues a challenge to anyone 'not satisfied of this.' Let hi m make 
repeated experiments to try to expel 'inbred sin' even 'by the grace he has already 
received.' The preacher promises that 'the longer [the believer] tries the more deeply 
will he be convinced of his utter helplessness in all these respects.' He declares that 
although 'we may weaken our enemies day by day, yet we cannot drive them out.' It 
remains true that even by 'all the grace ... given at justification we cannot extirpate 
them.' Attendance on watchfulness and prayer is to no avail- it is '[m]ost sure we 
cannot.'352 Significantly, however, at this point Wesley appears to insert a proviso. 
We cannot eradicate sin 'till it shall please our Lord to speak to our hearts again, to 
349 Ibid., 1.2, pp. 336 - 337. 
350 Ibid., 1.17, p. 345. 
35 l/bid., 1.18, p. 345. 
352 Ibid .• 1.19 - 1.20, p. 346. 
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'speak the second time, "Be clean. "'353 It is at the point of this second divine 
utterance that the deliverance from sin becomes effective. Wesley states: 
[T]hen only "the leprosy is cleansed." Then only the evil root, the 
carnal mind, is destroyed, and inbred sin subsists no more. But if there 
be no such second change, if there be none but a gradual work of God 
(that there is a gradual work none denies) then we must be content, as 
well as we can, to remain full of sin till death. And if so, we must 
remain guilty till death, continually deserving punishment. For it is 
impossible the guilt or desert of punishment should be removed from us 
as long as all this sin remains in our heart, and cleaves to our words and 
actions. Nay, in rigorous justice, all we think, and speak, and act, 
continually increases it.354 
Here, then, we note a re-emergence of the emphasis on freedom from sin. Not 
all is certain, however. It seems that believers may, or may not, receive the boon of 
sudden perfection. Some remain under the shadow of guilt and anticipation of 
punishment, hoping only for a gradual improvement in personal holiness. The fate of 
all ties in the mystery of sovereign grace. Suffice it to say at this juncture that the 
Methodist leader regards awareness of a predilection to sin in the Christian (prior to a 
possible full deliverance at some stage) as an essential type ofrepentance. For until we 
become sensible of our need we will not seek the solution. Assuming, then, that such a 
repentance becomes pivotal to a Christian's life, the preacher now advises that she or he 
must persevere and 'believe the gospel.' As we have seen, a post-justification 
understanding of repentance must move beyond the initial issue of inward change. It 
must progress towards a recondite self-knowledge of guilt and helplessness. Now we 
discover that Wesley proposes a similar redefinition of belief. From viewing belief as 
that trust that ushered in justification, we must go on to see it as a confidence in the 
ability and willingness of God to 'save .. .from all the sin that still remains in ... [the] 
heart.'35S Christ bestows the power to overcome sin on a 'moment to moment' basis. 
353 Here Wesley quotes from a work by his brother, Hymns alld Sacred Poems (1749),11.164; 
ef. Collection of Hymns (1780) reproduced in F. Baker (ed.)lhe Complele Work.\' 
of JohnWes/ey -Hymns(Vot. 7; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1982), Number 386:5. 
354 Sermons 1.1.14, 1.20, pp. 346 - 347. 
355 Ibid., JI.1, p. 347. 
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Our faith in his life, death and intercession for us, and our devotion to him, are the 
conduits of divine life to us. Without God's power, Wesley warns, 'notwithstanding 
our present holiness, we should be devils the next moment.'356 
Thus, we learn that 'in the Children of God repentance and faith [or 'belief,' for 
Wesley uses the terms interchangeably in this sennon] exactly answer each other.' 
Repentance brings a sensitivity to the sin remaining in our hearts and cleaving to our 
words and deeds; it makes us sensible of our desert of punishment for inward and 
outward sins; it supplies an abiding conviction of our own helplessness; it disclaims the 
possibility of other help than the divine; it declares that without Christ we can do 
nothing. Faith encourages our reception of the power of God in Christ that purifies our 
hearts and actions; it makes us conscious of Christ's continuous advocacy for us that 
obviates condemnation and punishment; it conveys mercy and grace to us in every 
need; it aids our acceptance of help from the Almighty; it declares that with Christ we 
can do all things by his strength. Repentance and belief so work together within us that 
we may declare: 'Through him [ cannot only overcome, but expel all the enemies of my 
soul.' I can love God with heart, mind, soul and strength and, moreover. live a holy 
and righteous life until my death.357 
The danger of adopting the Moravian teaching is that if believers suppose that 
they became wholly sanctified at the time of justification they will regard it as 'absurd to 
expect a farther deliverance from sin, whether gradual or instantaneous.'358 Those 
'who are not convinced of the deep corruption of their hearts ... have little concern about 
entiresanctijication.' To break this complacency it is necessary that God 'unveils the 
inbred monster's face, and shows them the real state of their souls.' It is only when 
they feel the burden of sin will they long for emancipation. 359 Therefore, a deep sense 
of our 'demerit' (which Wesley says 'in one sense may ~ termed guilt'), even after 
our acceptance in Christ. is a prerequisite of 'our seeing the true value of the atoning 
356 Ibid., 11.4 - 11.5, pp. 348 - 349. 
357 Ibid., 11.6, pp. 349 - 350. 
358 Ibid., II1.t, p. 350. 
359 Ibid., 111.2, p. 351. 
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blood.' Without this conviction we may count Christ's blood 'a common thing ... of 
which we have not now any great need, seeing all our past sins are blotted out.' Our 
helplessness, Wesley exhorts, must bring us to the place where Christ is not only our 
Priest, but also our King. We must 'go out of ourselves, in order to be swallowed up 
in him.' We are to 'sink into nothing that he may be all in all.'360 
It is interesting that in 'On Sin in Believers,' and 'The Repentance of Believers' 
we find, again, no mention of 1 John 1: 8 and 10. Perhaps this is because (as we have 
seen) Wesley had already consigned the relevance of these verses to the period prior to 
conversion.361 We could argue that in an effort to maintain the consistency of his 
scheme of Christian perfection he forwent the inclusion of the very verses that might 
aid him in his debate with those he perceived as guilty of antinomian error. Having 
made them applicable to the unregenerate state he cannot use them to prove the 
existence of sin in those born of God. Nevertheless, despite their absence, the verses' 
warning against the denial of culpability reverberates throughout the sermons. Now the 
Methodist leader has to use the implication that Christians may sin as a corrective to 
what he regards as the excesses of other perfectionist groups. 
J. 8 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' 
Previously we noted that the disquisition 'A Plain Account of Christian 
Perfection,' apart from reproducing the 1741 sermon, does not offer any further 
explanation of the conundrum of 1 John. However, we may draw on it for a 
concluding observation concerning Wesley's form of perfectionism. Appearing in the 
same year as 'The Repentance of Believers,' that is 1767, it is the work in which 
360 Ibid., II1.3 - III.4, pp. 351 - 352. The concluding remarks to the effect that the believer's self 
must somehow become obliterated for perfection to become effective appear5 in Charles Wesley's 
poem The Promise of Sanctification.' Verse 28 well expresses the entire aspiration of the work: 
'Now let me gain perfection's height. 
now let me into nothing fall! 
Be less than nothing in my sight, 
And feel that Christ is all in all.' 
It forms an addendum to Sermon 40 'Christian Perfection.' See Sermons 2.11.40, p. 124. 
Cf. John Wesley, A Plain Account of Christian Perfection. 'Brief Thoughts on Christian 
Perfection.' p. 116. 
361 See notes 293;306;316;331. 
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Wesley sought to 'give a plain and distinct account of the steps by which [God led me 1, 
during a course of many years, to embrace the doctrine of Christian Perfection.'362 
Writing on the question of the timing of sanctification, he acknowledges two 
possibilities. Christians may 'gradually die to sin and grow in grace, till at or perhaps a 
little before death, God perfects them in love.' The Methodist leader believes 'this is 
the case in most, but not all' instances. God usually allows 'a considerable time' for 
the process of leading men to the place of either of justification or sanctification. 
However, it is true that 'He does not invariably adhere to this; sometimes He "cuts 
short His work": He does the work of many years in a few weeks; perhaps in a week, a 
day, an hour.' So, a person may suddenly enter a state of justification and 
sanctification. It is not a prerequisite to undergo a preparatory period. The Lord may 
do as he wills with his own. Regarding sanctification we may assume: that 'most men 
[become] perfected at last'; that 'there is a gradual work of God in the soul'; and that, in 
general, much time ('even many years') elapses before the destruction of sin occurs. 
Yet we may also assume that God may 'with man's good leave' condense the 
perfecting of the Christian 'in whatever degree He pleases, and do the usual work of 
many years in a moment.' God accomplishes this immediate sanctification 'in many 
instances; and yet there is a gradual work, both before and after that moment, so that 
one may affirm the work is gradual, another it is instantaneous, without any manner of 
. contradiction.'363 
3. 9. Summation and Appraisal of Wesley's Solution 
Thus, we have now studied the sennons, commentary and disquisition written 
by the Methodist leader dealing at any important level with our verses.364 Also, we 
have gleaned from our study much of his argument on the nature of Christian 
perfection. Following from our achievement of these objectives, I wish to conduct a 
362 John Wesley, A Plain Account o/Christian Perfection, Section I, p. 5. 
363 Ibid., Section 25, Question 25, pp. 80 - 81. 
364 Thomas Jackson (ed.), The Works 0/ John Wesley [London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 
1831 and Third Edition 1878; repro Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondcrvan Publishing House], 
Volume XIV: Grammars, Musical Works, Letters, Scripture Index, Subject Index, pp. 371 .372. 
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summation and appraisal of what these works reveal of the background to Wesley's 
solution of the problem, and of his declared stance concerning interpretation. 
Moreover, to conduct this summation and appraisal I will include from this point some 
germane observations of the Methodist's work from our critical perspective. 
Drawing first upon the insights gained during our earlier study of lser I suggest 
that the main characteristic of Wesley'S solution is his refusal to accept the notion of 
any 'gap' or 'indeterminacy'365 between our two groups of verses. For him the 
argument 'Of 1 John continues in a seamless manner. It is not that he docs not recognise 
that some may see a hiatus in the Apostle's reasoning, it is rather, as we h.lve seen, that 
he appears to abjure the suggestion of any dissonance between the verses on the basis 
that it is a threat to the integrity of the scriptures. He effectively regards those who note 
any such 'blank' in this instance as either being 'patrons of sin' as they balk at his 
perfectionist agenda, or as having 'weak minds' and in need of protection from error. 
Certainly Wesley would concur that the two dual declarations are 'definable points 'Of 
instruction,' that they are 'stars' in the biblical firmament that remain fixrd. Howrvrr, 
he would object to the notion that 'the lines that join them are variable:366 
Yel, there is some evidence in Wesley's pieces 'Of his recognition that 'the 
structure of the texts allows for different ways of fulfilment'367 (this is certainly not 
true of his explicit exegesis of our verses but, as we will see, there may be some 
evidence of such a recognition in his general comments 'On interprel1ltion that 
accompanies the exegesis). Nevertheless, as there is no pos."ibility 'Of a rontrndict'Ory 
element in this case - the verses in chapter one refer to our sin while unregenerate and 
so do not gainsay the assertion of regenerate perfection in chapter three -the necessity 
does not arise of variously solving it. Some trace evidence exists, moreover. for the 
idea of a 'dyadic interaction' between text and reader despite the Methodist's opinion 
that the Apostle had made his meaning patently obvious to his audience. We may say 
365 See note 36. 
366 See note 29. 
367 See note 30. 
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that Wesley's observation that some readers might see a contradiction is an unconscious 
admission of the reader's interaction with the text. 
Furthennore, it is possible to argue that the lserian notion of 'gaps' in the text 
that prompt the reader to seek 'coherence' has an equivalent in Wesley's works as we 
see him striving to demonstrate the consistency of 1 John. One could say that he treats 
the text, albeit on behalf of other readers, as if it contained a blank or gap and that this 
induces him to construct a 'Gestalt' that resolves the apparent contradiction. Thus, 
despite Wesley's refusal to countenance any gap in the text, he indeed responds to the 
'indeterminacy' that represents 'the fundamental asymmetry between text and reader, 
that [leads to] communication in the reading process.'368 
Overall we may say that Wesley's view of 1 John coincides with a formalist 
element ofIser's theory, that is that the text has a determinate nature, that meaning has a 
referential foundation within the text.369 It seems that the Methodist's view of our 
material is akin to Iser's view of a scientific text - it is the 'most express' of the biblical 
testimonies to Christian perfection and so does not contain 'places of indeterminacy' as 
do literary texts. So from it we may obtain the 'facts' of empirical existence.370 By 
carefully studying the 'epistle' we discover St. John's unambiguous testimony to the 
divine providence of perfection. 
When we discuss the material from a fishian standpoint, however, the presence 
or absence of a gap, indetenninacy or contradiction between the two groups of verses 
becomes purely a question arising from the differing expectations and assumptions of 
the readers. Recalling again the foundations ofFish's rationale - that all perception of 
the text is at once mediated and conventional- enables us to comment on Wesley'S 
interpretive stance in a way that runs counter to his formalist bias, and yet recognises 
the extant communal preconstraints. Hence. we could say that regarding the issue of 
mediation Fish would propose that the 'textual signs' in 1 John do not 'announce their 
shape' but appear in a variety of shapes according to the manifold readerly expectations 
368 See note 38. 
369 See note 44. 
370 See notes 56 - 59. 
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and assumptions; correspondingly, concerning the idea that all reading remains subject 
to convention he would place the Methodist within an 'interpretive community' 
composed of those that emphasised perfectionism. A Fishian analysis would serve to 
demonstrate the particular constraints on interpretation in force in this case. 
Therefore, addressing mediation, we may move towards several standpoints. 
That Wesley on the one hand, and disparate readers on the other, denied or 
acknowledged the existence of an apparent contradiction between our verses is a 
consequence of the particular 'interpretive strategies' adopted by each party. Also, the 
interpretation tendered by Wesley, or by any other readers, remains predicated upon the 
presuppositions he, or they, held concerning the text. So, viewed from this perspective 
the Methodist leader's emphasis on the coherence of 1 John becomes simply a matter of 
what he has brought to the text; that the preacher regards the entire epistle as a lucid and 
unbroken argument is an outcome of his interpretive strategies - his explication of it we 
may say is merely his interpretive strategies writing the text. It is Wesley who has 
constituted the properties of First John and assigned its intentions.371 
Using these observations in a thematic manner, we can now conduct our 
summation and appraisal of what the Methodist's pieces reveal of the background to his 
solution of the problem, and of his declared stance concerning interpretation. To begin 
with, if we take up the point that all reading is conventional, we find that much 
documentation exists showing that Wesley counted several significant Christian figures 
as influences in his adoption of Christian Perfection. Apart from his period of 
association with Zinzendorf, we learn that Bishop Taylor, Thomas a Kempis and 
William Law represent the early influences on Wesley to pursue holiness.372 Outler 
comments that Wesley is among those few in the West that had ever envisioned 
perfection as a realistic possibility in this life. 373 We may say, therefore, that these 
figures represent an interpretive community. 
371 See notes 66; 83; 119 - 122. 
372 John Wesley, A Plain Account o/Christian Perfection, Sections 2 - 4. pp. 5 - 6. 
373 Sermons 2.11.40, Introductory Comment, p. 97. 
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However, these well-documented direct influences on Wesley are not the only 
examples of perfectionism we should consider as part of this interpretive community. I 
maintain that we should consider a wider milieu of perfectionist thought: one that, 
although not having any immediate influence on the Methodist, demonstrates a 
coexistent tendency within English society to aspire to perfection. As I said in my 
introduction, there are secular forms of perfectionism, and it is to one of these forms 
that we must tum in due course. In a short excursus that will constitute chapter five I 
will present a model that was extant in the late eighteenth century, so setting Wesley'S 
ideas in a wider context. Consequently, I hope that we will gain an extended purview 
of the interpretive community to which Wesley belonged. I intend to show that it is not 
only the religionists who argued for perfection. Before we discuss this wider view of 
the Methodist leader's interpretive community, though, we must look further at other 
issues behind his explication of 1 John. 
Throughout his life the Methodist founder maintained that he had never wavered 
from his position taken in the early 1730s, nor had he 'encountered serious difficulty' 
in harmonising 'Christian perfection' with his later emphases on 'faith alone' and 
'assurance.,374 He had an interest in proving his own consistency in the treatment of 
the biblical texts as well as defending their own internal coherence in the matter of 
Christian perfection. This often involved him in controversy. When advised to forbear 
the use of expressions referring to perfection because ofthe great offence they gave, 
Wesley refused to comply as he believed that these statements appear 'in the oracles of 
God,' and as such remain inviolable. God has spoken the words of scripture: they are 
'all the counsel of God,' the 'words of God, and not of man.' However, he states: 
'But we may and ought to explain the meaning of them, that those who are sincere of 
heart may not err ... [from the path leading to divine reward).'37S 
Remarking directly on the issue of interpretation Wesley says: 
374 Ibid., p. 98. 
375 Sennons 2.11.40, §2; §3; §4, pp. 99 - 100. 
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[W]ith regard to the Holy Scriptures themselves, as careful as they are 
to avoid it, the best men are liable to mistake, and do mistake day by 
day; especially with respect to those parts thereof which less 
immediately relate to practice. Hence even the children of God are not 
agreed as to the interpretation of many places in Holy Writ; nor is their 
difference of opinion any proof that they are not the children of God on 
either side. But it is a proof that we are no more to expect any living 
man to be infallible than to be omniscient. 376 
The Methodist leader goes on to gloss the Apostle's statement in 1 John 'Ye have an 
unction from the Holy One, and know all things' [2: 20 in Wesley's own translation] as 
follows: 'Ye know all things that are needful for your soul's health.' To imply any 
greater knowledge would be to 'describe the disciple as above his master.' It seems 
that for Wesley, then, the believer may only be sure of the interpretation of scriptures 
relating to salvation, and this reinforces his earlier statement in this sermon (,Christian 
Perfection'), to wit that 'the children of God do not mistake as to the things essential to 
salvation.'377 Most remarkable here, though, is the comment on interpretation. 
Mistakes in exposition do occur, particularly respecting those passages that 'less 
immediately relate to practice.' Even leading interpreters may fail to interpret properly, 
and this simply shows human fallibility in handling the Scriptures. The significant 
element in this statement is that Wesley seems to equate differences in interpretation 
with mistakes. Though he graciously says that difference in opinion does not indicate 
the salvific condition of opposing parties in an interpretive dispute, he implies that one 
party must have the 'correct' understanding. Also, he does not state how we choose 
between interpretations apart from an appeal to the text, but by using the language of 
'mistake' he hints that some interpretations should suffer exclusion. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that Wesley acknowledged the possibility of 
interpreting words and phrases within the Bible in different ways. For instance he says 
regarding the phrase 'born of God' that it is 'an expression taken also in divers senses.' 
However, regarding any doubt concerning the 'privilege' of those so born - that is, the 
freedom not to commit sin - we learn: 
376 Ibid., 1.5, p. 102. 
377 Ibid., 1.4, p. 102 and 1.6, pp. 102 - 103. 
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[T]he question is not to be decided by abstract reasonings, which may 
be drawn out into an endless length, and leave the point just where it 
was before. Neither is it to be determined by the experience of this or 
that particular person. Many may suppose they do not commit sin when 
they do, but this proves nothing either way. 'To the law and the 
testimony' [Isaiah 8: 20] we appeal. 'Let God be true, and every man a 
liar' [Romans 3: 4] By his Word will we abide, and that alone. Hereby 
we ought to be judged.378 
Thus we find that the preacher appeals to the existence of a stable biblical text. It is not 
'abstract reasonings' or personal experience that will solve the interpretive issue at stake 
in 1 John, rather the solution lies in a text the meaning of which is self-evident 
Wesley's argument seems to oscillate between what he sees as the determinate nature of 
the text and the perceived need to provide an explanation for passages other readers find 
hard to understand. 
Discounting the interpretations of others seems a straightforward task for 
Wesley: 'Why, then, the best way to answer a bold assertion is simply to deny it,' he 
says. Those with whom he contends bring to the argument merely 'strange assertions, 
drawn from examples recorded in the word of God.'379 The contempt in which 
Wesley holds his adversaries' reasoning powers we may observe by the following 
remarks. A 'child of common understanding' would suffer shame if found reasoning 
in the same manner as they. Their examination of the issue has a real futility at its heart: 
'Least of all can you with any colour of argument infer that any man must commit sin 
at all.'380 Given the level of disdain Wesley displays for the contrary reasoning of his 
rivals, it is remarkable that the Methodist leader makes the admission, albeit a tacit one, 
that any 'colours [or varieties] of argument' might gain entry to the discussion. 
The Methodist leader's collection of his own discourses, including the ones we 
have studied, that he called 'Sermons on Several Occasions,' featured a preface to the 
1746 edition that contained some remarks on interpretation apposite for our purposes. 
Used in conjunction with Wesley's exposition we can penetrate further into his 
378 /bid., 11.2, pp. 105 - 106. 
379 Ibid., 11.6 - 11.7. p. 107. 
380 Ibid .• 11.14, p. 112. 
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elucidative methods. A serious approach from one who peruses these sermons, the 
Methodist says, will reward him by providing the ability to 'see in the clearest manner 
what those doctrines are which I embrace and teach as the essentials of true 
religion.'381 That Wesley regarded the first of our set, Sermon 40 (Christian 
Perfection), as also part of 'the essentials of true religion,' we may presume as he used 
this preface again at the beginning of every volume that incorporated number 40 
published in his lifetime, including Volume 111.382 
The clarity Wesley claims for his sermons he attributes to his design to 
'write ... ad populum - to the bulk of mankind ... ' He claims that: 'Nothing' in his 
collection 'appears in elaborate, elegant, or oratorical dress.' 'I design plain truth for 
plain people,' he asserts. His is a project that avoids 'philosophical speculations,' 'the 
show of learning,' and 'technical terms.'383 Moreover, Wesley'S sermons, he avers, 
are expressions of his design: 
to forget all that ever I have read in my life. I mean to speak, in the 
general, as if I had never read one author, ancient or modern (always 
excepting the inspired). I am persuaded that, on the one hand, this may 
be a means of enabling me more clearly to express the sentiments of my 
heart, while I simply follow the chain of my own thoughts, without 
entangling myself with those of other men; and that, on the other, I shall 
come with fewer weights upon my mind, with less of prejudice and 
prepossession, either to search for myself or to deliver to others the 
naked truths of the gospel. 384 
He writes to 'candid and reasonable men'; to such he is 'not afraid to lay open what 
have been the inmost thoughts of [his] heart.'385 I propose that this is a Wesleyian 
version of what Fish called the 'back to the text' manoeuvre. Fish, we remember from 
our remarks in chapter 2, employed this expression to describe the artifice used by 
Stephen Booth in his work An Essay on Shakespeare's Sonnets. Like Booth, Wesley 
381 Sermons 1.1, Sermons on Several Occasions, Preface, § I, p. 103. 
382 Ibid., Outler's 'Introductory Comment' to the Preface, p. 103. 
383 Ibid., Preface, §2 - §3, pp. 103 - 104. 
384 Ibid., Preface, §4, p. 104. 
385 Ibid., Preface, §5, p. 104. 
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aims to reveal the 'real point' of I John 3 verse 9. Fish's analysis helps us to expose 
the assumptions lying behind that quest.386 
The Methodist resembles Booth inasmuch as he sets himself in 'differential 
opposition' to the work of previous or fellow interpreters. He will not repeat the 
interpretive strategies of others. He will engage the text he says: 'without entangling 
[him]self with [the thoughts] of other men.' Consequently, he will: 'come [to it] with 
fewer weights upon [his] mind, and so with less of prejudice and prepossession.' This 
action will enable him to achieve either a personal discovery, or an impartation to 
others, of 'the naked truths of the gospel.' The location of the heart of St. John's 
epistle has become the central issue for Wesley, and that heart is Christian perfection. 
From the sermons we learnt that those who have interpreted the work thus far have 
placed wrong emphases on it either by highlighting human vulnerability, or by 
accenting sinlessness. Yet, now the correct third alternative has emerged through 
Wesley's research, and his account suitably elevates the Scriptures. The preface adds 
to the impression that he has exposed the inadequacies of other interpretations and has 
proposed a superior elucidation that results in an enhancement of the val ue of the piece: 
St. lohn's First Epistle reveals nothing less than God's promise of Christian perfection 
in this life. 
The Methodist leader's approach further correlates with Booth's in this instance 
in that he effectively claims to be merely describing the Apostle's message. 
Unencumbered by the influences of other expositors, Wesley can faithfully report on 
what he has found. Significantly, he does not seem to regard his own thought 
processes as in any way mediatory in the establishment of meaning. The exclusion of 
other interpreters Wesley sees as a way of facilitating a clarity of expression in his 
personal judgement of the epistle. Under such conditions he remains free 'to simply 
follow the chain of [his] own thoughts.' Because the comments of others proved to be 
'entanglements: achieving a state of isolation from them is essential; being left to his 
own deliberations about the text means that he can more easily see its true meaning. 
386 See note 164. 
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Thus, we may say that Wesley claims to be outside of the 'game' of interpretation. 
This becomes evident in the assertion we have noted that he delivers 'naked truths.' 
Contradicting this claim, a Fishian analysis enables us to comment that at the precise 
moment Wesley distances himselffrom interpretation he has, in fact, performed one of 
its most familiar moves. He has dismissed other interpreters and claimed to return to 
the text alone. Moreover, he has treated the critical history of 1 John as an obscuring 
accretion. Booth's effort to appeal to the literary profession by declaring that 'the 
function of literary criticism is to let the text speak for itself,' has its complement in the 
Methodist's endeavour to court the believing community by engaging their confidence 
in biblical transparency. On the strength of this engagement he introduces his doctrine 
of Christian perfection. To the believers he says that the scriptures are self-explanatory 
in their divine promise of perfection, and that we must not stifle that perspicuity. Thus, 
Wesley joins Booth in a seemingly artless humility before the text. This potent move 
suggests that although other critics have displayed their ingenuity in interpreting the 
text, the Methodist leader has returned to the text alone on behalf of the 'plain people.' 
Acting as servant of the text he has laid it open with the candid desire to make it 
accessible to Everyman. 
Wesley'S move to renounce interpretation in favour of the simple presentation 
of the text is really a gesture in which one set of interpretive principles displaces 
another. As with Booth, so with Wesley: the new set of principles bears the claim that 
it is not an interpretation. We may contest this position by arguing its impossibility. A 
purported 'simple presentation' must involve description and this description can only 
occur within a stipulative understanding of what is before us for description, an 
understanding that will produce the object of its attention. Therefore, Wesley'S 
declaration that he has excluded 'philosophical speculations' regarding I John in favour 
of 'plain truth' does not indicate that he has successfully avoided interpretation but 
rather that he is proffering an alteration in the terms in which it will occur. He 
expressly proposes a transfer of attention from the 'thoughts' of 'other men' to the text 
of 1 John. Wesley has read that text while supposedly mentally disengaged from other 
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influences and he claims now to display it in its elemental state. Once he has so altered 
the terms of engagement with the piece, he presents as unmediated truth his explication 
of it. In the sermons, as we saw earlier, the Methodist avers that the unadorned truth of 
1: 8 - 10 is that it refers to pre-conversion sin. This enables him to make the claim that 
the obvious meaning of 3: 6 - 9 is that subsequent to conversion the Christian does not 
(or, in some instances, cannot) sin. Taking a Fishian position on this leads us to 
conclude that it is only as a reader submits to Wesley's opinion of the location of 
emphasis in these verses does she or he see the 'facts' of his analysis. Therefore, we 
may conclude that the Methodist leader's description of the 'naked truths' of 1 John is 
an interpretive construct, and, moreover, one of the same order as the interpretations it 
seeks to exclude. 
Our earlier exploration of Fish's ideas demonstrated that the 'back-to-the-text' 
manoeuvre is not an option as a proof of the veracity of a reading because the text 
returned to is simply the one demanded by an interpretation that governs its production. 
In this case the text returned to is one produced by the Methodist leader's perfectionist 
hypothesis of the benefits of the new birth. As we discussed in chapter 2, it is 
important to emphasise that Fish is not seeking to make a covert expose of 
hermeneutical incoherence. His observations on the claim to have gone 'back-to-the-
text' have the purpose of revealing that claim as an interpretive 'move,' a style or 
gesture; such observations serve to unveil the rhetoric of objectivity or 'truth-telling.' 
They illuminate the actions taken by readers in their effort to have their reading prevail. 
The 'back-to-the-text' stratagem remains rhetorically effective, however, as it rides on 
an unchallenged assumption that the text must have an elevated position over criticism, 
and that we must not permit criticism to overwhelm it. All of Wesley's work ostensibly 
rests on his invocation of, and reliance upon, such an assumption. Indeed, it is 
possible to argue that (in the West) the self-effacing rhetoric of biblical interpretation is 
the very origin of the rhetoric of objectivism that Fish exposes. 
Unlike Booth, Wesley does not lay claim to radicalism. Rather, he sees himself 
as a conservative who is adhering to the ancient tenets of Christian belief in perfection. 
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A consistent rejection of innovation in doctrine was a feature of the Methodist leader's 
theology. Reacting to the supposed inventions of Count Zinzendorf, Wesley says that 
'whatever doctrine is new must be wrong: for the old religion is the only true one; 
and no doctrine can be right unless it is the very same "which was from the beginning'" 
[1 John 1: 1].387 It is his opponents, Wesley avers, who offer novel solutions-
whether they overemphasise human vulnerability on the one side, or sinlessness on the 
other. For the Methodist, his third alternative is the authentic voice of New Testament 
Christianity. Yet, we would not recognise the distinctiveness of the Methodist leader's 
teaching except for its position over against the conventions already in place at the 
inception of his movement: for instance the conventions of Calvinism. All successive 
understandings of any text exist in dependence upon their precursors. In the melee of 
interpretive dispute the Anglicans, Lutherans, and Calvinists of all persuasions, would 
accuse Wesley of extremism (and, conversely, the Antinomian Moravians would 
charge him with rigidity). Taking a Fishian view ofthe matter, however, even if 
Wesley had professed a revolutionist theology it would have been an empty boast. No 
one can conduct a wholesale challenge to extant conventions as there are no terms in 
which to make such a challenge - in this case it would require the use of terms wholly 
outside the institution of Christian thought. Any attempt would prove to be 
unintelligible as it is exclusively within that institution that the 'facts' of theological 
study become available. All the protagonists in the dispute must entangle themselves in 
the structure of assumptions and goals in order to be intelligible. 
So, Fish's perspective repudiates Wesley's claim that he can return to the text 
alone to present the 'naked truths of the gospel.' There are no moves outside of the 
'game' of interpretation - including the move of claiming that he is no longer a player. 
He cannot say that he is merely transmitting the message. Whatever the Methodist 
leader does it will only be interpretation in another guise.388 
387 Sermons 1.1.13,111.9, p. 324. 
388 See notes 187 and 188. 
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The inspired and transparent text to which Wesley refers nonetheless contains 
perplexing passages. Despite his avowal to 'forget all that ever I have read in my life' 
concerning the Bible, and so achieve unmediated access to the text, later in the preface 
to the sermons the Methodist seemingly reneges this pledge. On reaching obscure 
passages Wesley puts into effect a series of three levels of enquiry: the first is an 
entreaty for divine insight; the second is a search for, and a musing on, comparative 
scriptures. The third level, however, is a consultation of the opinions of others. We 
receive the following advice of how to read these portions: 
Is there a doubt concerning the meaning of what I read? Does anything 
appear dark or intricate? I lift up my heart to the Father of lights: 'Lord, 
is it not thy Word, "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God"? 
Thou "givest liberally and upbraidest not" [Cf. James 1: 5]. Thou hast 
said, "If any be willing to do thy will, he shall know" rCf. John 7: 17]. 
I am willing to do, let me know, thy will.' I then search after and 
consider parallel passages of Scripture, "comparing spiritual things with 
spiritual" [I Corinthians 2: 13]. I meditate thereon, with all the attention 
and earnestness of which my mind is capable. If any doubt still 
remains, I consult those who are experienced in the things of God, and 
then the writings whereby, being dead, they yet speak. And what I thus 
learn, thatl teach.389 
We do not receive any indication that this consultation might influence the 
eventual presentation of the bare truths of the text. It appears to have only an 
illuminative effect. Following the resolution of any difficulties in understanding, 
Wesley declares that he has: 
set down in the following sermons what I find in the Bible concerning 
the way to heaven, with a view to distinguish this way of God from all 
those which are the inventions of men. I have endeavoured to describe 
the true, the scriptural, experimental religion, so as to omit nothing 
which is a real part thereof, and to add nothing thereto which is not.390 
Although he has taken upon himself the role of teaching others, the Methodist leader 
moves to admit the possibility of mistake: 
389 Sermons 1.1, Sennons on Several Occasions, Preface, §5, p. 106. 
390 Ibid., Preface, §6, p. 106. 
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But some may say I have mistaken the way myself .. .!t is probable many 
will think this; and it is very possible that I have. But I trust, 
whereinsoever I have mistaken, my mind is open to conviction. I 
sincerely desire to be better informed. I say to God and man, 'What I 
know not, teach thou me.'391 
Furthermore, he makes the following request: 
Are you persuaded you see more clearly than me'? It is not unlikely that 
you may. Then treat me as you would desire to be treated yourself upon 
a change of circumstances. Point me out a better way than I have yet 
known. Show me it is so by plain proof of Scripture. And if I linger in 
the path I have been accustomed to tread, and am therefore unwilling to 
leave,labour with me a little, take me by the hand, and lead me as I am 
able to bear. But be not displeased if I entreat you not to beat me down 
in order to quicken my pace. I can go but feebly and slowly at best-
then I should not be able to go at all.392 
Though the text remains axiomatic in his view, it seems that Wesley here 
acknowledges again that interpretation occurs. Furthermore, he seems to entertain the 
possibility of changes in interpretation. The text is self-explanatory, but it is possible 
for some readers to see its verities more clearly than others. However, it is only by the 
'plain proof of Scripture' that changes may gain admittance as legitimate 
understandings of the Word. 
In his Explanatory Notes, as we would expect, the Methodist has an elevated 
view of the biblical texts: 
This is what we now style the Holy Scripture: this is that 'word of God 
which remaineth for ever' [Cf. Isaiah 40: 8]; of which, though 'heaven 
and earth pass away, one jot or tittle shall not pass away' [Cf. Matthew 
5: 18]. The Scripture, therefore, of the Old and New Testament is a 
most solid and precious system of divine truth. Every part thereof is 
worthy of God; and all together are one entire body, wherein is no 
defect, no excess. It is the fountain of heavenly wisdom, which they 
who are able to taste prefer to all writings of men, however wise or 
learned or holy.393 
391/bid., Preface, §8, p. 107. 
392 Ibid., Preface, §9, p. 107. 
393 John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon lhe New Testament, Preface, paragraph 10, p. 9. 
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The di vinel y pristine nature and certainty of meaning of the Scri ptures become apparent 
to the reader even when studying particular words and phrases: 
An exact knowledge of the truth was accompanied, in the inspired 
writers, with an exactly regular series of arguments, a precise 
expression of their meaning, and a genuine vigour of suitable 
affections .. .In the language of the sacred writings we may observe the 
utmost depth, together with the utmost ease. All the elegancies of 
human composures sink into nothing before it: God speaks, not as man, 
but as God. His thoughts are very deep, and thence His words are of 
inexhaustible virtue. And the language of His messengers, also is exact 
in the highest degree: for the words which were given them accurately 
answered the impression made upon their minds ... To understand this 
thoroughly, we should observe the emphasis which lies on every word-
the holy affections expressed thereby, and the tempers shown by every 
writer. But how little are these, the latter especially regarded! though 
they are wonderfully diffused through the whole New Testament, and 
are in truth a continued commendation of him who acts or speaks or 
writes.394 
So, we see that Wesley holds that it is by means of a careful word analysis of 
Scripture that we discover its meaning: we are to 'observe the emphasis which lies on 
every word.' Even the writers' 'holy affections' and 'tempers' become discernible to 
us when we read in this way. Fascinatingly, we discover that even in 1754 (when he 
wrote the preface) the Methodist had to bewail 'how little are these, the latter especially 
regarded!' He cannot contain his astonishment at the failure of many other readers to 
discover these emotions in the writers' words. He, however, sees their obvious 
diffusion throughout the New Testament. Seen in the light of our exploration of New 
Critical praxis and the origins of reader-response, this belief in the reader's access to 
the authors' feelings again demonstrates an unconscious awareness of the reader's role. 
Not for Wesley the strictures of the rule of the 'Affective and Intentional Fallacy,' he 
regarded the New Testament writers' emotions as recQverable.395 Nevertheless, he 
would reject any Fishian notion that the pathos so discovered was merely a construct of 
the reader's interpretive strategies. The text definitely contained the precious lode of 
Apostolic meaning. Wesley would agree with John Ruskin's instruction appearing at 
the head of this chapter - a mandate published 150 years later: '[B]e sure that you go to 
394 Ibid .• Prof ace, paragraphs 11 - 12, pp. 9 - 10. 
395 See notes 17 - 19. 
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the author to get at his meaning, not to find yours.' The Methodist's careful word 
analysis represents the metaphorical 'crushing' and 'smelting' process Ruskin 
recommended to obtain from the text the metal of the author's mind or meaning. 
We may deduce, furthermore, that should the reader conduct such an attentive 
study of the First Epistle that person will discover not only the meaning intended by the 
Apostle John, but through him the 'counsel of God.' Moreover, as a result of this 
diligent reading of the text the believer may encounter nothing less than the 
transforming power of God. From what we have observed of Wesley's account, the 
ramifications of reading the epistle are manifold. An earnest pursuit of holiness may 
begin and result in a gradual and ongoing ascent to perfection. Although God may 
sovereignly grant freedom from sin at any time during this life, this remains conditional 
on the reader 'keeping himself' within the means of divine grace. Due to inherent 
frailty, the believer requires moment-by-moment divine sustainment to remain holy. A 
new self-knowledge convinces the reader of her or his status as both child of God and 
guilty sinner, and so ensures continual repentance and a profound appreciation of the 
merits of the blood of Christ. Of course, at no time will the reader legitimately be able 
to claim that they have never sinned, as according to 1: 8 and 10 all have sinned in their 
pre-conversion state. Correspondingly, if one approaches the text correctly - that is, 
without preconception - it is not possible ever to infer from it a condition of sinless or 
guiltless perfection. However, because God's 'seed' abides within the Christian 
reader, such a one may have assurance that the declaration of 1 John 3: 6 and 9 will 
come to fruition in personal terms during the post-conversion period. Even at the 
earliest stage of Christian commitment the reader enjoys a freedom from sin's dominion 
through the power of God. From the text the reader finds a surety that by the Spirit one 
may experience liberation from habitual and wilful sin, sinful desire, and sin through 
certain types of infirmity. Though sin remains within everyone as a predisposition and 
a potential undermining force, it does not reign in the genuine Christian. Moreover, at 
some time after conversion, the reader will know in the fullest measure the truth that 
those that are born of God cannot sin. 
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It is important to note that in Wesley's scheme the believer discovers this 
propitious state through the act of reading. We have explored how for the Methodist 
leader the text of 1 John, when correctly understood, is a lucid and consistent treatise 
on God's purpose to grant holiness to his people. Wesley read this text and found its 
message both self-evident and puissant. Yet, while recommending that others read it, 
he perceived a danger that they may misunderstand it. In providing aids to 
understanding, he claimed to set forth the unadorned truth of the epistle. Wesley takes 
this interpretive certitude (that accompanies all reading situated in an interpretive 
community) and perceives within it the power of God at work, due to the agency of the 
Holy Spirit. Thus, we may say that the mere act of reading becomes elevated into a 
spiritual experience. Engaging with the text imparts to the reader not only the truth of 
the divine declarations, but also ushers her or him into the benefits of those 
declarations. The text itself, because it is 'the word of God and not man,' has intrinsic 
power. It is 'the fountain of heavenly wisdom, which they who are able to taste prefer 
to all writings of men, however wise or learned or holy.' God has so imbued this 
written word with his authority that the reader may find within it the divine fillip leading 
to sinlessness. When viewed from our Fishian critical stance, however, Wesley's 
elevation of the act of reading 1 John (along with the rest of the New Testament) 
appears as an interpretive strategy. The presentation of 1 John as the word of God 
creates an expectation in the reader that the deity will fulfil heror his aspirations to 
perfection. It is a move to control the reader's assumptions about the text. In reading 
the epistle the believer will receive a message directly from God. A document with 
such a source guarantees the bestowal of perfection upon the believer. Yet, the 
question of the reader's ability to understand the message continually exercised Wesley. 
In his Explanatory Notes we find a self-imposed suspension of his scholarly 
facility for the sake of 'the unlearned reader.' The Methodist leader does not deny his 
own theological erudition. He declares: 'I purposely decline going deep into many 
difficulties, lest I should leave the ordinary reader behind me.' Despite his affirmation 
of the exactness of biblical language, and the 'precise expression of [its] meaning' by 
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with the pursuit of meaning for its own sake. Interestingly, there is no attempt by the 
Methodist leader to reconstruct the first-century conditions of the creation of 1 John. 
He does not seek to solve the interpretive problem in retrospect. This is because in 
Wesley's estimation no such problem existed in the primitive church. Referring to the 
issue of the remnant of sin he says that it is 'of the utmost moment to every serious 
Christian' - and confines his remarks to the believers of his own generation. Yet, about 
the first century situation he makes, for him, this rare observation: 
And yet I do not know that ever it was controverted in the primitive 
Church. Indeed there was no room for disputing concerning it, as all 
Christians were agreed. And so far as I have observed, the whole body 
of ancient Christians who have left us anything in writing declare with 
one voice that even believers in Christ, till they are 'strong in the Lord, 
and in the power of his might', have need to 'wrestle with flesh and 
blood', with an evil nature, as well as 'with principalities and 
powers'.398 
Thus we begin to discover a reason why Wesley omits to embark on any 
reassemblage of the Johannine church situation: it is because seventeen hundred years 
before his own day all faithful Christians lived in blissful agreement - at least on the 
point in question here. If any interpretive problems arose among Wesley's audience, 
they did so because Georgian Christians simply misunderstood a text that possessed an 
original clarity. No need existed to discover first century meaning - such meaning the 
text had obviously retained to that day. Any contradictions perceived in the New 
Testament were due to interpretive mismanagement of the text. For instance, of the 
Pauline corpus he says: 'But we must not so interpret the Apostle's words as to make 
him contradict himself. And if we will make him consistent with himself the plain 
meaning of the words is this .. .'399 So, we may say that managing the text correctly 
involves a recognition of, and a submission to, the existing harmony of all parts of the 
Apostle's testimony. Once the reader acknowledges and submits to this harmony the 
'plain meaning' of the text then emerges. 
398 Sermons 1.1.13, 1.2, p. 317. 
399 Ibid., IV.2, p. 327. 
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However, the reader's submission to the hannony of the Bible was not the 
Methodist leader's only concern. Affinning the consistency of his own presentation of 
the doctrine Wesley states inA Plain Account of Christian Perfection: 
This is the doctrine which we preached from the beginning, and which 
we preach at this day. Indeed, by viewing it in every point of light, and 
comparing it again and again with the word of God on the one hand, 
and the experience of the children of God on the other, we saw farther 
into the nature and properties of Christian perfection. But still there is 
no contrariety at all between our first and our last sentiments.4OO 
My own reading of the material leads me away from concluding that Wesley 
demonstrated the congruity he claims. On this point Outler warns: 
None of these sennons stands alone; none is nonn for all the others. 
Wesley can quite readily be quoted against himself when this passage or 
that is taken out of context. His sennons are bound to be misread 
unless they are understood as experimental statements and restatements 
of his vision of the Christian life.401 
According to Outler apparent disparities exist throughout the body of sennons. 
It is therefore necessary to regard each sennon as an 'experimental statement' or 
'restatement' of Wesley's position in order to create any sense of coherence. So, 
taking an Iserian view of this warning, we could say that like 1 John Wesley's entire 
comment on its interpretive enigma contains 'gaps' and 'indetenninacies' that the reader 
must fill. Our Fishian analysis, moreover, induces us to regard both Wesley's 
explication and his reader's understanding of it (and of 1 John itselO as simply a 
product of their interpretive assumptions. The fonnation of interpretive assumptions is 
a complex issue as we noted in our introduction: a delicate balance of many factors 
affects our perception of the written word. Now we must explore one aspect of the 
fonnation of the assumptions held by Wesley - the commentaries he used to aid him in 
his search for a solution to our problem. 
400 John Wesley, A Plain Account oj Christian Perjection, Section 15 (6), p. 30. 




THE VERSES AND CHRISTIAN PERFECTION 
AS EXPLAINED BY THOSE WESLEY RESPECTED 
When some hypothesis absurd and vain 
Has flU'd with all its fumes a critic's brain. 
The text that sorts not with his darling whim. 
Though plain to others. is obscure to him.402 
4. 1. 'Beoaelius' 
We have already discussed the 1755 work Explanatory Note ... Upon the New 
Testament. We have mentioned how the Methodist leader augments his own notes with 
remarks borrowed from biblical commentaries written by theologians whom he 
admired. As we have said, it was the discovery of the work of one man that prompted 
Wesley to decide to augment his work thus, and we must now look at the nature of his 
influence, and that of others, on the Methodist's interpretation of our verses in 1 John. 
In the preface to his Notes Wesley states: 
[N]o sooner was I acquainted with that great light of the Christian world 
(lately gone to his reward) Bengelius, than I entirely changed my design 
[to merely write personal comments on the texts], being thoroughly 
convinced it might be of more use to the cause of religion, were I barely 
to translate his Gnomon Novi Testamenti, than to write many volumes 
upon it. Many of his excellent notes I have therefore translated; many 
more I have abridged, omitting that part which was purely critical, and 
giving the substance of the rest.403 
The 'Bengelius' Wesley speaks so highly of is the German scholar John Albert Bengel 
(to Anglicize his name), whose Latin commentary of 1742 (with its Victorian English 
402 H.S. Milford (cd.), The Poetical Works oJ William Cowper {l905;4lh ed.1934; repro London: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), 'fhe Progress of Error,' lines 444 - 447, p. 27. Cowper wrote 
this in December 1780 and published it in 1782. 
403 John Wesley, ExplaMlory Notes Upon the New Testament, Preface, paragraph 7, p.7 . 
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translation by A.R. Fausset and William Aetcher) is the first we will study in our effort 
to understand the influences upon Wesley's interpretation. 
Other Theologians and their works quoted by Wesley are: i) Matthew Henry, 
An Exposition of All the Books of the Old and New Testament (1725); ii) Matthew 
Poole, Annotations Upon the Holy Bible (1688 and 1696); iii) John Guyse, A 
Practical Exposition of the Four Evangelists, in the Form ofa Paraphra.<te, with 
Occasional Notes, 3 Volumes (1739 - 1742); iv) John Heylyn, Theological Lectures, 
With an Interpretation of the Four Gospels, 2 Volumes (1749,1751); v) Philip 
Doddridge, Family Expositor: Ora Paraphrase and Version of the New Testament, 
with notes (1739). Though he quotes from these theologians, we are unable to discern 
the source materials, however. Wesley explains the reason for this: 
It was a doubt with me, for some time, whether I should not subjoin to 
every note I received from them the name of the author from whom it 
was taken, especially considering I had transcribed some, and abridged 
many more, almost in the words of the author. But upon further 
consideration I resolved to name none, that nothing might divert the 
mind of the reader from keeping close to the point in view, and 
receiving what was spoke, only according to its own intrinsic value.404 
As the Methodist leader chose to filter his sources from the reader it is essential, 
if we are to discover something oftheir influence on Wesley, to study each of these 
works in their original form. The Bodleian Library in Oxford holds the first or very 
early editions of each of the commentaries listed, so we may now conduct an inquiry 
using these source materials. I do not intend to try to discern the particular words, 
phrases or passages that Wesley borrowed from these theologians. Rather my purpose 
is: i) to explore how the commentators addressed our verses, and, ii) to understand the 
general areas of influence on Wesley exercised by these men regarding the 
interpretation of the New Testament, and 1 John in particular. 
404 Ibid., paragraph 8, p.8. Sermons 1.1, Introduction section III, 'The Sermon Corpus,' p. 41, note 
50. This list supplies the titles of the first volume of each of the commentaries. The titles of the 
subsequent volumes containing 1 John vary according to their contents. 
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Wesley's effusive reference to I.A. Bengel as the inspiration for his own 
Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament leads us to begin our investigation with 
the Gnomon Novi Testamenti. By the time Wesley wrote his Notes, the Gennan 
scholar Bengel had been dead for scarcely three years, hence Wesley's aside that his 
cynosure had 'lately gone to his reward.'405 It is understandable that the Methodist 
leader expressed such admiration given that the two men shared a similar attitude to the 
biblical text. A.R. Fausset records the scholar's axiom: Te Totum applica ad Textum; 
Rem totam applica ad te' - 'Apply thyself wholly to the Text; Apply the subject wholly 
to thyself.'406 
Choosing the title 'Gnomon' for the work, Bengel wished to impress upon the 
reader that his comments merely 'indicate what lies within the compass of the sacred 
text; for Scripture is its own safest and best interpreter.' 'My annotations,' he says,' 
are so far from being intended to preclude the reader from increased research, that I 
wish rather to put him upon investigation of the text itself, by merely showing him how 
to set about it.' The Gnomon thus serves as a 'pointer' to aid the reader in the 
discovery of the inherent meaning of the text. Bengel declares that his design is also to 
refute those expositors 'who put upon isolated passages of Scripture their own forced 
(mystical) construction' in their effort to appear impressive. Instead he means to 'insist 
upon the full and comprehensive force of Scripture in its whole connection.'407 I 
suggest that this is another instance of the 'back-to-the-text' manoeuvre that we 
observed in Wesley's work, and I discern that here Bengel includes that fonn of the 
stratagem to exclude other commentators who supposedly overlay the text with their 
own 'constructions.' Referring again to our discussion in chapter 2. Fish's perspective 
draws attention to the 'back-to-the-text' claim to reveal it as an interpretive 'move.' to 
unveil it as an example of the rhetoric of objectivity. There is no intention here to imply 
henneneutical incoherence. Further examples of this move appear in the work of the 
405 Bengel died on 2 November 1752. A.R. Fausset (rev. and ed.),Gnomon of the New 
Testament by John Albert Bengel, (Edinburgh: T & T. Oark, 1858), Volume V. 'Sketch of the 
Life and Writings of J.A. Bengel by the Reverend A.R. Fausset,' p. xxxii. 
406/bid 
., p. xv. 
407lbid .. 
. , p. XVII. 
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other commentators Wesley admired. We will return to Bengel's general observations 
later as he has much to say that demonstrates eighteenth century scholarly views on 
interpretation, at least from an evangelical perspective. However, an unfolding of his 
comments on our verses must occupy our attention at this point. 
Exploring Bengel's Gnomon we may notice in certain passages elements of the 
same staccato style of writing that Wesley later used in his Notes. For instance, 
regarding chapter 1 verse 7b Bengel expounds it within two lines: 'ICaOaptt;Et r.J1U~, 
cleanseth us) by remission and taking away: compo ver. 9. - xaOt1~, all) original and 
actuaI.'408 My understanding of this abbreviated note is that not only does the blood 
of Christ provide for a pardon for sin - it also in some way removes it. However, as he 
passes on to subsequent verses Bengel adopts a more flowing, and fuller, mode of 
expression that may enable us to make further judgements on his interpretation. 
There is an incompatibility between those who deny their sinfulness and those 
who confess their sins. The latter have responded to St. John who, we learn. speaks 
of actual sins, indeed 'those which flow from original sin.' Alluding to Proverbs 28: 
13, and so warning against any attempt to veil personal sin and promising mercy to 
those who confess and forsake it, the annotator says that: 'In proportion as each person 
has contracted less or more. so he deems it necessary to confess less or more.' 
Wholehearted commitment to Christ, therefore. leads to sensitivity to sin; whereas a 
lesser allegiance results in a reluctance to acknowledge sin. The Apostle. Bengel says. 
differentiates between 1: 10. which refers to sin we have committed in the past. and 1: 
8, which indicates present sinfulness. So. all periods of life 'without distinction' St. 
John includes under the realm of sin. In a fleeting mention of the first century 
situation, Bengel declares: 'But there were even then some who extenuated sin. and 
therefore also disparaged grace.' As in the past, so also now there is a futility in thus 
denying our sin. for: 'The fault is in us ... [it] is ours: the glory belongs to God: ver. 
9.'409 
408 Ibid., p. 113. 
409 Ibid., 'On The First Epistle of John: Chapter 1: 7b - 9, pp. 113 • 114 (Translated by Rev. 
William Aetchcr). 
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Verse nine, the annotator tells us, lies 'between two antithetical sentences.' 
There is a further contrast between the statements 'I have no sin' (1: 8), and 'I have not 
sinned' (1: 10): 'The former is concerning the guilt of sin, which still remains; the 
latter is concerning the actual commission.' By the former statement we practice self-
deceit, by the latter we make God a liar. Confession is 'the best plan' as God 'holds us 
guilty as sinners, ver. to.' The Apostle asserts here the universal necessity of this 
confession. St. John, according to Bengel: 'not only says that if we have sinned we 
must confess,' but also 'that all have reason to say, I have sin, and I have sinned, and 
ought to confess that, although with different degrees: otherwise we should not need 
cleansing by the blood of Jesus Christ.'410 So, from these statements we may 
conclude that for Bengel, unlike Wesley, 1: 8 and to have an application to the period 
after regeneration. The apostle inveighs against Christians who claim to be 
invulnerable to sin after their new birth or to have been innocent of sin before it. 
Thus there is a dichotomy between Bengel and Wesley regarding the sphere of 
intention of verses eight and ten. However, I submit the possibility that Bengel's 
opinion influenced Wesley to increase his emphasis on the continuing moral frailty of 
believers, even though we do not see this influence frankly stated in the Methodist's 
work. We have seen how Wesley having stated that the application of 1: 8 and 10 
belongs to the pre-conversion state does not alter his opinion of the verses, even when 
to do so would suit his purposes in confronting the antinomians. However, we have 
also observed how the tension seems to increase between the Methodist leader's belief 
in the perfectionist thrust of3: 6 and 9 and the perceived need to counter 'sinless 
perfection.' We could speculate that Wesley's reading of Bengel (and, as we will see, 
the other commentators) influenced him to resist the espousal of an extreme 
perfectionism. Much of the essence of what we have found in Bengel's commentary 
410 Ibid., 'On The First Epistle of John,' Chapter 1: 7b - 9. pp. 113 - 115 (Translated by Rev. 
William Aetcher). Here is Bengel's original Latin text regarding the necessity of confession: 
'Optimum consilium. conjileri, erga Deum, nos peccatores reos agentem: v. to. & hujus 
confessionis necessitas hie asse-ritur universalis. ut Iohannes non solum dicat, si peccaverimus, 
eonfitendum esse; fed omnes haber quod dicant, peccatum habeo, &, peccavi, idque confiteri 
debere, quanquam vario gradu. Alias non egeremus purifieatione per sanguinem Iesu Christi.' 
Alberti Bengelii, Gnomon Nov; Testamenti, (Ttibingen: Henr. Philippi Schrammii, 1742), 'In 
Epistolam Primam Iohannis, Caput I,' p. 1045. 
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we find in Wesley's work, particularly the need for the confession of past and present 
sins - because without such confession we may think that 'we should not need 
cleansing by the blood of Jesus Christ.' 
Despite universal sinfulness, Bengel says, divine faithfulness is such that 'He 
makes good all things, which we promise our-selves respecting the goodness of 
God ... so that we experience it, and do not make him a liar.' Christ meets every 
expectation that the Christian has of him, and the believer's apperception of divine 
benevolence turns to fruition in the experience of God's kindness and the believer's 
consequent vindication of God. 
Moreover, God is also just 'so as to spare the sinner, and abolish the sins.' We 
note that this reference to the abolition of sins seems to begin to run in parallel with the 
emphasis upon all-pervasive sin and the absolute and constant need for confession. 
Bengel writes: 
KaL ()LKatO~. andjust) so as to spare the sinner, and abolish the sins. 
Thus also Jesus Christ is called the righteous, ch. iLl. 0 - acpQ. to remit) 
while He takes away the guilt. - Ka9apWQ. to cleanse) so that we sin 
no more.411 
'So that we sin no more,' and the previous phrase 'abolish the sins,' taken together 
may seem to suggest perfectionist considerations by Bengel. Indeed. when we arrive at 
chapter three we find some evidence of the idea of freedom from sin. but the emphasis 
on guilt and confession remains. 
Without remarking on any strain between the messages of chapters one and 
three. this scholar says of3: 6a that in the Christian: 'the good of righteousness is not 
overcome by the evil of sin.'412 However. explaining 6b Bengel tells us that he who 
sins, whether he has merely seen Christ 'in spirit,' or has perhaps beheld his 'personal 
appearance .. .in the flesh,' does 'at the very moment of sin' become 'as though he has 
411 Ibid .• Chapter 1: 9, p. 115. See the Latin text: 'lea' 6(lCa .. o~. justus) ut peccatori parcat. pcccata 
aboleat. Sic quoque Iesus Christus dicitur luslus. cII.i. &+'\i. remittal) dum reatum tollit. 
lCaOapWv. purificet) ut posthac non peccemus,' p. 1045. 
412 Ibid .• Chapter 3: 6a. p. 127. cr. the Latin: 'Bonum justitire in eo non supcratur malo pcccati,' 
p. 1053. 
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never seen Him in any way.' The occasion of sin brings not only instantaneous 
severance of spiritual sight, but also proves that the one who sins has never known 
God 'in truth.' Prior knowledge of Christ by anyone, 'although perhaps he hath 
fonnerly known Him personally: seems to be of no consequence. After pronouncing 
on the possibility of this exclusion from Christ, Bengel suddenly hints at a time when 
sin will not have the opportunity to impair the believer's communion with God in such 
a manner. He says in a terse statement bringing in 3: 2: 'Light and knowledge produce 
likeness to God: ver. 2.'413 
Devoting a much longer section to 3: 9, Bengel carries forward the expression 
from verse six, 'sinneth not: and states that in verse nine this 'sentiment is immediately 
increased in weight' by the declaration that the believer 'cannot sin.' In the explication 
of 3: 9 we learn that to each of the propositions a(lap'tLav aU mlLEt ('is not practising 
sin') and ou bUva'taL aflap'tav£LV ('is not able to sin') 'its own because [au] is 
added.' The first 'because' refers 'to the seed, or the regenerate man'; the second 
refers to 'the part of God Himself as the source of regeneration. The seed of God 
(defined first as 'the word, with its peculiar efficacy') remains in the regenerate person 
and keeps him from habitual transgression, 'although sin often endeavours, by a 
furious attack, to overthrow' him. Furthennore, Bengel offers an alternative 
interpretation of the 'seed.' He proposes that 'It may be taken in this sense: the seed of 
God, that is, he who is born of God, ahideth in God.' In support of this interpretation 
he adduces Malachi 2: 15 A V where God declares his desire for people who truly are 
his 'godly seed.'414 
The possibility of such a one sinning, says Bengel, 'is not absolutely denied.' 
Yet the Apostle affinns 'that the new birth and sin cannot exist together.' Just as in 
Revelation 2: 2 the believers cannot bear those who are evil and in Acts 4: 20 they 
cannot but speak of the things that they have seen and heard, so in the matter of sin the 
413 Ibid., Chapter 3: 6b, p. 127. Cf. the Latin: 'oon v;dil /llum spiritu; quam vis forte de facie cum in 
came vider;t. vel etiamsi spiritu viderit, in ipso peccati momento talis fit, acsi eum nullo 
viderit modo ... neque novit ilium vere; quamvis forte de fade quondam noverit. Visio & cognito. 
similes Deo Facit v.2.' p. 1053. 
414 Ibid., Chapter 3: 9, p. 127. 
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Christian displays a repugnance that amounts to a compelling inner restraint, 'he cannot 
sin.' We learn: 'The matter is, as in the case of an abstemious man, who cannot drink 
wine, and in various kinds of antipathy (i.e. natural aversion).' Bengel advances a 
paraphrase of this verse to explain his position: 
The regenerate man does not sin: he proposes to himself, as far as 
possible, a life free from sin; nor does he ever spontaneously give 
himself up to sin. And if at any time, contrary to the purpose of his 
mind, he shall have offended, he neither rushes headlong into sin, nor 
does he continue in it; but having acknowledged his error, he 
immediately returns in haste to his former course as soon as, and as far 
as, he is able.415 
As the magnetic needle, which usually points to the pole, 'is easily turned aside from 
this direction, but always reseeks the pole,' so also the believer after falling into sin will 
admit his offence and tum again to his post-conversion life ofholiness.416 
We have already noted that Bengel does not observe any contradiction between 
our verses. For him the congruity of the New Testament was a first principle. 
Moreover, it seems that he had established to his own satisfaction that 3: 6 and 9 
referred to the impossibility of the practice of sin; but also that we have sinned in the 
past and presently remain expugnable to sin's power as revealed in 1: 8, 10. The image 
of the believer that emerges is of one vulnerable, and yet strongly disinclined to sin. 
Thus, we see that this scholar tries to hold in tension the ideas of holiness and 
propensity to sin - a feat performed in a similar manner by his admirer Wesley. Yet, 
unlike the Methodist leader, he does not overtly touch on any questions of biblical 
consistency or perfectionism. Having discussed Bengel's comments on 1 John, I now 
415 Ibid., Chapter 3: 9, pp. 127 - 128. Regarding his preferred explanation of 3: 9 compare the Latin 
text: 'Regenitus non peccat: vitam peccato immunem, quantum potest, fib; proponit: nee peccalo 
unquam sponte dat operam. quod si quando prreler animi propositlun deliqllerit, nee in peccatllm 
totus proruit, nee in eodem persistil,' sed e"ore ag"ito ad instilutwn max pristillllm, quam 
primum quantumque potest,/estinus reverlilur.' This paraphrase Bengel attributes to 
'Oatakerus' [Oataker] 'Posth., ch. 33' without supplying full bibliographic details, p. 1053. 
From my investigations in Oxford I think that this source could be Thomas Oataker (1574 -
1654) whom I found sometimes referred to in catalogues of his work as Thomre Oatakeri, 
although I could discover no entry resembling the composition mentioned by Bengel. An 
alternative author of the paraphrase could be Charles Oataker (1614 - 1680), but again none of 
this person's works equate to Bengel's citation. 
416 Fausset (rev. and ed.),Gnomon o/the New Testament by John Albert Bengel, 
Volume V, Chapter 3: 9, p. 128. 
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wish to return to his general observations as he makes several points that illustrate 
eighteenth-century evangelical views on interpretation as he saw it, and so provides a 
background to much of what we have studied so far, and of what we will go on to note 
in the works of the remaining commentators of the period. To return to these 
observations will also aid our survey of these interpretations from our chosen 
theoretical perspective. 
The title page of the Gnomon reveals much of Bengel's assumptions about the 
New Testament. He presents his work as one 'in which, from the natural force of the 
words, the simplicity, depth, consistency and saving power of the divine revelation 
therein contained is indicated.' Fausset says that here Bengel's Latin literally speaks of 
'The symphonious harmony of the heavenly meanings.'417 Not only do the words of 
the New Testament contain a 'natural force,' that is, I presume, inherent meaning, but 
also a divine consistency characterises the Christian Scriptures taken as a single entity. 
Furthermore, the Gnomon effectively indicates these attributes to the reader. 
thus: 
In his 'Sketch' of Bengel's life, Fausset records the scholar urging his readers 
Put nothing into the Scriptures, but draw everything from them, and 
suffer nothing to remain hidden, that is really in them ... Though each 
inspired writer has his own manner and style, one and the same Spirit 
breathes through all, one grand idea pervades alL.Every Divine 
communication carries (like the diamond) its own light with it, thus 
showing whence it comes: no touchstone is required to discriminate 
it ... The true commentator will fasten his primary attention on the letter 
(literal meaning), but never forget that the Spirit must equally 
accompany him; at the same time we must never devise a more spiritual 
meaning for Scripture passages than the Holy Spirit intended ... The 
expositor who nullifies the historical groundwork of Scripture for the 
sake of finding only spiritual truths everywhere, brings death on all 
correct interpretation. Those expositions are the safest which keep 
closest to the text.418 
417 Faussct (rev. and ed.),Gnomon of the New Testament by Jolin Albert Benge/, 
Volume I, Frontispiece. The Latin Frontispiece in full reads thus: 'Gnomon Novi Testimenti in 
quo ex navila verborum vi simplicitas, profunditas, concinnita.-'I, salubritas sensuum coelestium 
indicatur opera io. Aberti Bengelii. Tubinga: sumtibus ac typis io Henr. Philippi Schnunmii A. 
MDCCXUI.' 
418 Fausset (rev. anded.),Gnomon of the New Testament by John Albert Bengel, Volume V, 
'Sketch of the Life and Writings of J.A. Bengel by the Reverend A.R. Fausset,' p. xvii. Fausset 
here quotes from Bengel's 'Essay on the Right Way of Handling Divine Subject'l,' which formed 
the prefix to the volume of 'Sermons' by J.e. Storr, publisher not listed, 1750. 
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So, we may deduce, the reader, according to Bengel. interacts with the 
scriptural text in that she or he may 'draw everything from [it],' and conversely, by 
implication, have the (illegitimate) power to insert meaning, or suppress it. Despite the 
stylistic differences displayed by each ofthe New Testament writers, a divinely 
inspired congruity characterises the whole. Every work within it is a source of 
enlightenment that awaits discovery, its heavenly source evident to all. Literal meaning 
is the primary concern of the 'true commentator,' though all annotators need the help of 
the Spirit to discern it Bengel implies that it is possible to know the Holy Spirit's 
intended meaning for a given passage and thus avoid the mere contrivance of spiritual 
meaning. Moreover, historical concerns must inform interpretation, as without them 
spurious meanings may occur to us. 'Correct interpretation' will cease if we allow the 
quest for merely 'spiritual truths' to predominate. Those who pay closest attention to 
the text will produce the most reliable exposition. 
Several passages from Bengel's Preface to his Gnomon further confirm the 
scholar's confidence in the certainty and clarity of the biblical text. However, they also 
display his belief in the necessity of guiding the reader towards correct understanding: 
It is, in short, my intention briefly to point out, or indicate, the full force 
of words and sentences, in the New Testament, which. though really 
and inherently belonging to them, is not always observed by all at first 
sight, so that the reader, being introduced by the straight road, into the 
text, may find as rich pasture there as possible. The Gnomon points the 
way with sufficient clearness. If you are wise, the text itself teaches 
you all things.419 
While it is true that the text possesses an obvious meaning that is discernible by the 
wise reader, the Gnomon serves to introduce her or him immediately to its authentic 
419 Fausset (rev. and ed.),Gnomon o/Ihe New TeJlamenl by John Albert Bengel, Volume I, 
The Author's Preface, Paragraph VII, (Edinburgh: T and T. Clark, 1857), p. 9. Cf. the Latin 
text: 'Hoc denique agitur, ut, qure in sententiis verbisque Scripturre N.T. sita vis est, neque tamen 
primo intuitu semper ab omnibus observatur, ea breviter monstretur,lectorque in tcxtum recta 
introductus quam lautissime pascatur. Nonni hillndicii salis est in Gnomo"e fiu'lum: Omnia Ie 
teXtllS, si sapis, ipse docet.' Alberti Bengelii, Gnomon Novi Teslamenli, PR..£FA TIO VII, (There 
are no page numbers to the preface of the original Latin commentary). 
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sum and substance. We might say that this scholar wishes to retain a position of 
superior status for the New Testament text, in that the 'full force' of its words and 
sentences 'really and inherently [belong] to them.' However, he also argues for the 
necessity of an indicator, one of 'sufficient clearness,' to save the reader from initial 
misunderstanding. 
He tells us that 'writings and commentaries' such as his Gnomon have several 
purposes: a) 'to preserve, restore or defend the purity of the text'; b) 'to exhibit the 
exactforce o/the language employed by any sacred writer'; c) 'to explain the 
circumstances under which any passage was uttered or written, or to which it refers'; 
and, d) 'to remove errors or abuses which have arisen in later times.'420 However, 
not all those who have read the Christian scriptures have been in need of these helps; it 
is only those belonging to later periods that suffer lack. It is the commentaries that 
bring an equality before the text to the entire readership. Bengel states: 
The first hearers required none of these things. Now however, it is the 
office of commentaries to effect and supply them in some measure, so 
that the hearer of today, when furnished with their aid, may be in a 
condition similar to that o/the hearer in primeval times who made use of 
no such assistance. 421 
A commentary, therefore, when judiciously used alongside the scriptures, 
assures the reader of a refined experience of the text, an experience comparable to those 
who first perused it. Though, we learn, the primitive Christians had no need of aids to 
understand that which they read, their initial advantage over later readers becomes 
negligible when the modems use reliable commentaries. The eighteenth century 
believer could discover the 'exact force' of the sacred writers' language, and the 
circumstances governing composition. These statements by Bengel remind us of 
Fish's discussion of the same issue: the perceptual standing of primitive and modem 
420 Fausset (rev. and ed.).Gnomon of the New Testament by John Alht'rtlkngel. Volume I. 
The Author's Preface, Paragraph IV, p. 7. 
421 Ibid., p. 7. The Latin text is a.1i follows: 'Nil horum desiderabant primi auditores: nunc autem 
commentariorum est, hrec quodammodo supplere, & efficere, ut auditor hodie ;;s adjllj'llIs ;nJtar 
sit auditoris antique tali subsidio nil utenlis.' PR£FATIO IV. The italics are in the original text. 
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readers before an ancient text Within the Fishian rationale likewise, the readers 
contemporary to an author are in no more a privileged position than the readers of later 
generations. However, this is not because of the provision of an additional text - such 
as Bengel'S commentary - that serves to heighten the understanding of modem readers 
to that of their forebears, and thus produce equality. Rather it is because both sets of 
readers experience provocation to an act of construction rather than an act of retrieval. 
Even in Iserian terms, since the blue-print for construction (in this case 1 John) is 
significantly incomplete - it displays gaps and blanks and indeterminacies - no instance 
of construction is more accurate, in the sense of being truer to an historically embodied 
meaning, than any other. Indeed, the first reader of 1 John had to complete the 
connections left unspecified in the text according to her or his "individual disposition." 
This theologian wishes us to accept the premise that he has not interpreted the New 
Testament. Rather he would have us think that he has merely provided an aid to 
facilitate the reader's immediate access to its meaning. Yet, according to our Fishian 
perspective, Bengel cannot do anything but interpret and, along with other readers, 
write the text of 1 John according to interpretive strategies.422 
Regarding the fourth purpose of commentaries, the removal of later errors or 
abuses surrounding the text, it is an action extensively practised by Bengel as a 
commentator. For this scholar the task of protecting the reader from error had a high 
priority, as not all interpretations are worthy of admission: 
It is beuer .. .for the weak to be wholly ignorant of opinions which are in 
themselves foolish, and would scarcely enter into the mind of anyone, 
than to have them recorded in connection with the passages to which 
they refer (even though in each instance they be carefully and 
successfully refuted). We should fare badly, if, in order to ascertain the 
royal road to truth, it were necessary for us to obtain an accurate 
knowledge, and make a personal survey of all the tracks which lead 
away from it - In fact the true interpretation is more frequently buried 
than assisted by a multitude of conflicting opinions. I have, however, 
guarded the reader against some erroneous interpretations of modem 
date, without either naming the authors or quoting their words.423 
422 See notes 249 - 250. 
423 Fausset (rev. and ed.),Gnomon o/the New Testament by John AlberllJengel, Volume I, 
The Author's Preface, P'.uagraph XVII, p. 51. cr. Bengel's Latin text '1nepta.'1 vero sententias & 
vix cuiquam in mentem venturas, subinde commemoratas legere, minos juvat infirmos, quam 
152 
From this passage we may deduce that it is certain that we can arrive at 'the true 
interpretation' in every case. Bengel's scholarship acts as a sign that directs the reader 
along 'the royal road to truth' and blocks off any mere 'tracks' that he deems 
erroneous. So complete is the assurance displayed by this scholar that he excludes 
incredibly 'foolish' understandings of scripture on behalf of the 'weak' (and by this I 
presume he means 'impressionable') reader. Though he could 'carefully and 
successfully' refute these modem explanations, it would be detrimental to the process 
of obtaining 'an accurate knowledge' of any passage to explore such errors. The 
names of the perpetrators remain anonymous and their words excised. The reader 
enjoys the safety of reading only Bengel's cautiously directive account of the text, thus 
shielded from 'a multitude of conflicting opinions.' As an aside, we may remark here 
how the history of interpretation displays many such critical appeals to one true path 
and the censure of the numerous departures from it. 
Having excluded the readings he disapproves of, Bengel nevertheless assures 
us that he recognises the value of interpretive historiography. That he does not 
undertake the task is simply because to do so is not the purpose of his Gnomon: 
He who comprehends the intention of this work, will not expect to find 
differences of opinion carefully enumerated and laboriously refuted, 
with the names of their advocates and the titles of their works. It is 
expedient indeed that some should undertake that office, and deduce the 
history of Scriptural interpretation from century to century; few, 
however, possess the opportunity or the capacity for performing such a 
task; though there are many who can search out and bring together many 
particulars for the general advantage.424 
ignorare. Male nobiscum ageretur, si ad regiam veritatis viam dignoscendam neecllum eoset, 
omnia avia in numerato habere & pcrtentare: imo multitudo scntentiarum vcram interpretationem 
srepius obruit, quam subministrat Novis tamen quibusdam interpretationibus aceurro, neque 
auctoribus neque verbis corum eitatis.' PRJEFATIO XVII. 
424 Ibid., Paragraph XVII, p. 51. Bengel's Latin text reads thus: 'Opinionum divortia operose 
enumerata ae refutata, cum scriptorum nominibus & Iibrorum titulis, non admodum requiret, qui, 
quid hie agatur, intelligit. Esse quosdam expedit, qui cas partes suscipiant, historiamque 
interpretationum vel per secula deducant: sed paucorum faculla'l est; nee desunt tamen, qui multa 
in utilitatcm communem eruant & convehant' PRJEFATIO XVII. 
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Herein, then, is an acknowledgement by the theologian that interpretations change, an 
admission made despite his overarching claim that the text contains unequivocal 
meaning. He seems to impl y that although the compilation of interpreti ve development 
is a worthwhile task there exists only an elite who can perform it effectively. 
As we move on from our examination of Bengel, our suggestions are that 
Wesley found in this scholar's work several assumptions that he shared, namely: the 
essential availability of authorial meaning within the text of 1 10hn; the coherence of 
that text; its importance as a guide to Christian holiness; the idea that 'Scripture is its 
own safest and best interpreter' and yet that there is a need to guide and inform the 
reader. We might comment regarding the last point that it is possible to view the need 
to guide and inform the reader as a desire to control her or him. Indeed, we might 
arraign Wesley's 'model deed' that we mentioned earlier as an example of such an 
effort to control.425 With Bengel, Wesley tries to hold in tension the ideas of holiness 
(which Bengel sees from 3: 6 and 9 as a 'repugnance' to sin) and vulnerability to sin. 
Indeed, we may hypothesise that Wesley's resistance to sinless perfection may, in part, 
stem from the influence of Bengel. However, the Methodist leader differs from his 
exemplar in his insistence that 1: 8 and 10 refer to the period before new birth. Our 
scrutiny of the remaining works will reveal similar emphases to those that we have 
highlighted in Bengel's annotations. 
4. 2. Matthew Poole 
Looking at those commentaries in chronological order, and so first to the work. 
of Matthew Poole (1688 and 1696), we discover that this is a posthumous publication 
'being a continuation of Mr. Poole's work by certain judicious and learned divines.' 
The frontispiece declares that regarding the 'Sacred Text,' Poole (and the anonymous 
custodial contributors to his commentary) had created a work in which: 'the more 
difficult terms in each verse are explained. Seeming contradictions reconciled. 
Questions and doubts resolved. And the whole text opened.' Moreover, by quoting 
425 See note 325. 
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Nehemiah 8: 8 (A V) they align themselves with the priest Ezra and his companions in 
their interpretive role: 'So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave 
the sense, and caused them to understand the reading.' Furthermore, they identify 
themselves with the evangelist Philip in his conversation with the Ethiopian: 
'Understandest thou what thou readest? .. How can I, except some man should guide 
me?' (Acts 8: 30,31 A V). It seems that the commentators wished to appear as those 
who: a) had read the Bible 'correctly' on their own behalf, thereby solving perceived 
contradictions, questions and doubts; and, b) had the authority and ability to interpret 
the Scriptures on behalf of others. This impression becomes reinforced when we come 
to the special 'Preface to the Reader': 
Our sincere design and endeavours have been to search and unfold the 
meaning of the Sacred Oracles; abhorring the impious arts of those who 
pervert the Scriptures from their Pure and native sense, to gi ve colour 
and countenance to their private fancies. 
Despite their confidence, however, there is an open acknowledgement from these 
divines that they had experienced some difficulties in interpreting certain texts: 
Wherein we have mistaken their genuine sense (for who in the present 
state of infirmity and imperfection fully knows the mind of the Lord in 
them?) it has not been for want of Love to the Truth, nor of using the 
best helps within our com pas [sic] for the clearing [of] the difficulties 
found in them.426 
Turning to Poole's comments on 1 John chapters 1 and 3 we discover, as we might 
expect from a longer theological work, a more elaborate treatment of the issues than we 
find in Wesley's sermons or Notes. Also. the convoluted sentences ofthis 
seventeenth-century piece seem far removed from the Methodist leader's ideal of 
plainness of expression. 
, 
426 Matthew Poole. Annotations upon the Holy Bible (London: Printed for Thomas Parkhurst. 
Dorman Newman. Johnathan Robinson. Brabazon Ailmcr. and Thomas Cockerill. 1(88). 
Volume II. Frontispiece and Preface. 
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Beginning at 1: 7, we note that the scholars speak of 'a continued and 
progressive motion' whereby believers: 'do persevere and improve in Holiness. 
Being transformed into the Holy Image and Likeness of God, and shewing themselves 
the children of light, as he is Light, and the Father of Lights.' However, they maintain 
that this emphasis in 1 John receives a qualification from the Apostle 'lest our Purity 
and Holiness should be thought to have deserved such a Privilege.' So, say the 
commentators, 'tis cautiously added' that it is the 'Blood ... which alone expiateth, or 
makes atonement for our sins.' It is both our 'former sinfulness and present imperfect 
Holiness' that 'render it impossible' for God to 'admit us to Communion with him for 
our own sakes, or without such an intervening Sacrifice.' Even if we 'further extend 
the notion of cleansing, so as to comprehend internal subjective purification' we must 
still attribute 'even that purifying influence, whereby we are qualify'd for present holy 
walking with God, and for final Blessedness in him ... to the merit and procurement of 
the Redeemer's Blood.' 
The act of 'saying', we learn, 'usually signifies the habitual bent and 
disposition of the heart and practice,' declare the commentators concerning 1: 8. 
Therefore, to 'say' that we have no sin indicates that we regard ourselves as 'so 
innocent creatures' as not to need the expiatory sacrifice of Christ, and that 'we may be 
admitted to Communion with God' on our own merit. To speak or think thus 
demonstrates that in our self-deceit 'The system and frame of Gospel Doctrine ... hath 
no place with effect in us.' 
However. the self-abasing confession of our sins (1: 9) results in God's faithful 
and just forgiveness based on the 'Atonements made by his Son.' Poole significantly 
remarks regarding the accompanying verb 'cleanse': 
[The word] may either be added as a farther expression of the same 
thing [that is, divine forgiveness] or may. more-over, signifie his 
vouchsafing that purifying Influence of the Spirit of Christ (obtained 
also by his Blood) which shall both purge away, and prevent the 
Defilements that would render us incapable of his own holy 
Communion. 
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The phrases 'which shall both purge away ... and prevent the Defilements' seem to 
indicate that Poole envisioned a twin aspect of God's work that involved: a) the 
forgiveness of past sins and, b) a purifying and safeguarding influence against future 
transgression. This impression becomes stronger when we read the comment attached 
to 1: 10. Believers will not receive admittance into 'God's holy Society and 
Communion under the notion of [having been] always innocent.' Rather, they will 
only enjoy fellowship with him 'as pardoned and purified sinners.' Not only must a 
person's former sins be forgiven, but she or he must experience purification for future 
conversance with God.427 As we know, Wesley's sermons display a comparable 
emphasis to that which we find here regarding progressive growth in holiness, the folly 
of self-righteousness and the value of Christ's blood as the sole means of expiation and 
communion. However, Poole holds that 1: 8 and 10 apply to the believer's ongoing 
relationship with God. 
Poole's treatment of our verses in chapter three, and their relationship with 
those in the first chapter, entails the inclusion of evidence from the other works in the 
Johannine corpus and elsewhere: 'The Apostle's notion of committing Sin, may be 
interpreted by his own Phrase, 3d Epist. v.I1. <1 KaK03tOUW, a Doer of Evil: and by 
that, used in both Testaments, a Worker of Iniquity.' This use of 3 John 11 forms the 
basis ofthe following exegesis of 1 John 3: 6 to 9. 
A 'doer of evil' in 3 John 11 is not a person who has committed 'anyone single 
act of sin,' just as <1 ayaOoJtotWv ('a doer of good') in the same verse, and <> 3tOtWv 
.n.v 6LKatOoUVt'fY ('a doer of righteousness') in 1 John 3: 7, do not refer to 'every one 
that doth anyone righteous or good Action.' Rather, the term refers to 'him who hath 
acquir'd the habitual skill, and doth ordinarily imply [sic] himself accordingly.' 
Therefore, we may conclude that <1 3tOtWv"t'l1v QJlap-tLav, or 'a Maker of Sin' in 
Poole's translation of 1 John 3: 8, designates a 'habitual or customary Sinner ... one 
that Sinneth with deliberation, not by surprize [sic], [but] from a prevailing Habit.' 
427 Ibid .• Pfhe First Epistle of John,' Chapter I. verses 7 - 10. [This edition does not contain page 
numbers]. 
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Such a habit either maintains him in 'a Course of actual known Sin,' or 'with-holds 
him from repenting sincerely.' The repentance envisioned by Poole is of an order 
unknown to 'an im-penitent Person.' She or he may, 'upon other inducements,' 
'refrain from further gross Acts of Sin.' However, the Christian must so repent as to 
'mortify and prevail against all sinful Habits and Inclinations.' It seems that a believer 
may reach a state of success in subduing the power of sin by means not only of the 
initial act of repentance at conversion, but by a lifelong practice of repentance. I 
propose that in this passage we have a possible influence on the Methodist concerning 
repentance as an abiding feature of the Christian life. The believer's acts of repentance 
remain a necessary feature of the Christian life because of her or his vulnerability - sin 
'remains but does not reign.' On the other hand, repentance also plays its part to usher 
in a liberty from sin. 
Bringing in evidence from verses 6 and 9 at this point, the commentator tells us 
that the allusions to sinning in these verses refer to exactly the type of habitual, 
customary and deliberate transgression depicted in 3: 8. One who sins in this manner 
the Apostle regards as 'of the devil' insofar that she or he is 'born of him, were his 
Child, really conformed to him, and having his sinning nature' [Cf. John 8: 34; 44]. 
Introducing, then, the idea of being 'Born of God,' Poole says that this latter 
expression is 'elliptical in reference to the former.' Yet, the original work of the devil, 
that is sin, receives an obliterative stroke on the appearance of the Son of God, whose 
purpose is to 'dissolve the Frame of all such Works' [3: 5]. 
Quoting (without supplying a reference) from 'a very learned Annotator, Dr. 
Hammond'428 (and here we discover a still earlier layer of reading - a theologian 
studied by Poole or his custodians), Poole defines the phrase 'born of God' in 3: 9 as 
the state of 'having received some special Influence from God, and by the help and 
power of that, to be raised to a pious Life.' Once entered into this state the believer 
428 From my examination of the catalogues of the Bodleian and British Libraries I have concluded that 
the theologian referred to here is Dr. Henry Hammond (1605 - 1660). Of an his published works 
I think that Poole in this instance alludes to A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all tM Books 0/ 
the New Testament. Briefly Explaining all/he Difficult Places Tilereof, (London: Printed by 
J. Aesher for Richard Royston, 1653). The British Library hold the Second Edition of this 
commentary. 
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becomes 'sincerely changed from all Evil to all Good.' However, we must note that 
the phrase does not simply denote 'the Act of this Change ... the single transient Act of 
Regeneration, or Reformation' that has occurred in the past. Rather, it connotes 'a 
continued course, a permanent state' in which the believer 'lives a pious and godly life, 
and continues to do so.' It seems at this point that Poole propounds a form of 
perfectionism akin to Wesley's, at least as the Methodist leader saw it in 1741. At that 
stage, we remember, he emphasised very strongly the element of freedom from all sin. 
At this juncture, Poole addresses the problematic comparison of3: 6,9 with 1: 
8. Though the Apostle asserts that the one born of God 'does not commit sin,' the 
commentator emphasises that this should 'not be understood simply, as if he could not 
sin at all,' for this would be 'to contradict what he had said before, chap. 1.8.' There 
is no contradiction to solve, says Poole: "tis plain, the Apostle intends by these two 
Expressions the same thing.' The Christian 'cannot sin' in the sense that she or he 
cannot: 
do an Act of known, gros [sic] Sin, deliberately, easily, remorselessly, 
maliciously, as Cain v.12. out of an hatred of Goodne~: Or do not such 
Acts customarily, or not so unto Dealh, (as chap. 5: 16). 
Instead, 'through the advantage of inlaid Principles, or the remaining Seed,' and 'by 
dependence upon the Grace, Spirit, and Covenenant of God in Christ,' the Christian 
will 'recover.' That is, because he is born of God, 'in as much as it belongs to his 
Temper and Inclination, in respect of the holy new Nature receiv'd in Regeneration' he 
will 'abhor from the grosser Acts, [and] much more from a Course of Sin.' So, the 
believer, upheld solely by the virtue of the divine 'remaining Seed,' may not only resist 
the malicious perpetration of the worst sins, but also the routine practice of sin. 
However, the stress Poole lays is on the necessary reliance upon God for holy living -
the Christian is not intrinsically immune from sin. Though God has forgiven the sin of 
our pre-Christian state, this is no basis for complacency. We will always remain 
dependent on divine grace. 
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The 'Child of God' has an 'Interest in the Grace of Christ.' Being born of God 
the Christian 'may and ought' to expect God to keep him from the dominance of sin. 
The believer 'may implore, trust, obtain, and improve' his claim on that Grace to keep 
him 'from such destructive sinning.' There may be clear evidence of 'his deep and 
thorow [sic] Change, that [proves that] he is born of God'; nevertheless, the believer 
must not cherish 'presumptuous negligence' in his anticipation of holiness. There must 
always be an attitude of 'Vigilance and humble Dependence' within him. The 
commentators assert confidently that, in comparison with the 'boasts' of some 'pagans' 
who claim that 'one might as soon divert the Sun from its Course ... as tum [one of their 
adherents] from the Course of Righteousness,' it is not 'strange' that 'so much should 
be affirm'd upon so unspeakably better Grounds ... of the Christianstate.' However, in 
an interesting aside about 3: 9 they qualify this assertion by remarking: 
Tho [sic] we may also suppose this Form of Speech might be intended 
by the Apostle to be understood by the more superficial Professors of 
Christianity, (who might be generally apt enough to look upon 
themselves as born of God, and his Children) as pareneticaJ, and more 
enforcingly hortatory, in pursuance of his former Scope, to keep them 
off from their licentious Courses of their Seducers; q.d. II cannot be, 
that you who avow your selves born of God, should do like them. So 
we usually say, that cannot but be, or cannot be, which we apprehend 
more highly and clearly reasonable should be, or not be. Non pates 
avelli, &c. Such Rhetorick the Apostle uses with Agrippa, I know thou 
believest, as if it were impossible he should not. 
Although the emphasis remains upon the stated holiness of the believer, the annotators 
propose that there may be a rhetorical element in 3: 6 and 9 intended to influence less 
committed Christians, a rhetoric designed to persuade them of their divinely imparted 
sanctity, and thus encourage their rejection of the 'Seducers.' Alluding to such a group 
in this manner seems to represent a limited attempt at historical reconstruction by 
Poole.429 
429 Matthew Poole. Annotations upon thL Holy Bible. Volume II .. 7he First Epistle of 
John.' Chapter III. verses 6 - 10. To make a general note here regarding forms of speech, Stanley 
Fish displays a sensitivity to how, even where there seems to be agreement about 'what someone 
has said,' there remains dispute about the 'force' of the utterance. Thus, there is always mom 
for this kind of rhetorical play. See Doing Wllat Comes Naturally, 'Rhetoric' and 'Force,' pp. 471 
- 524. 
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4. 3. Matthew Henry 
For Matthew Henry, who was the next to write (in 1725), chapter 1 verse 7 is a 
'beatific communication to us.' The cleansing by Christ's blood 'dischargeth us from 
the guilt of all sin, both original and actual, inherent and committed; and so far we stand 
righteous in his sight: and not only so, but his blood procures for us those sacred 
influences by which sin is to be subdued more and more, 'till it is quite abolished, Gal. 
iii. 13, 14.' Thus, having explained a comprehensive cleansing from sin this 
commentator declares that the blood has further benefits for Christians, namely the 
progressive subdual, and eventual abolition, of sin. However, regarding verses 8 to 10 
Henry discusses an apostolic supposition that believers 'have yet their sin' (which is 
precisely the emphasis we find in Wesley'S argument that sin 'remains,' though he 
does not use these verses to pursue it). Justifying that supposition, St. John shows the 
dreadful consequences of denying sinfulness, not least self-deceit. Henry sees in the 
apostle's words a recommendation that 'the more we see [our sins], the more we shall 
esteem and value the remedy' (this is, again, an accent in Wesley's exposition). The 
Christian religion 'is the religion of sinners; of such as have sinned, and in whom sin, 
in some measure still dwells.' Therefore, the Christian life is 'a life of continued 
repentance, humiliation for, and mortification of sin.' Coupled with this self-
abasement is a continual faith, thankfulness and love expressed towards 'the 
Redeemer,' and a hopeful, joyful, expectation of a day of redemption 'in which the 
believer shall be fully and finally acquitted and sin abolished forever.' 
Dealing specifically with the denial of sin in 1: 10, Henry says that God has 
testified to the 'continued sin and sinfulness of the world' by providing Christ's 
sacrifice for sin 'which will be needed in all ages.' Furthermore, God's testimony 
extends 'to the continued sinfulness of believers themselves, by requiring them to 
confess their sins, and apply themselves by faith to the Blood of that sacrifice.' A 
denial 'either that we have not sinned or do not yet sin' simply proves the absence of 
the divine word in both the heart and mind. Penitent confession and acknowledgement 
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of sin (1: 9) is 'the believer's business, and the means of his deliverance from its guilt.' 
The 'contrite confessor' will enjoy forgiveness of 'all his sins,' and cleansing 'from the 
guilt of all unrighteousness; and in due time deliver[anceJ ... from the power and practice 
of it.'430 
It is noteworthy, then, that on the one hand the commentator looks forward to 
'a day of glorious redemption' as the occasion when Christians receive full and final 
acquittal and sin becomes 'abolished forever'; while on the other he appears to refer to a 
process in this life whereby sin, being 'subdued more and more' by 'sacred 
influences,' finally becomes 'abolished.' On this latter point, he adds that despite the 
'continued sinfulness of believers,' in 'due time' there remains a deliverance both from 
the 'power' and the 'practice' of sin. Henry writes of the believer's 'obligation to 
purity.' The Son of God came to 'take away the guilt of [our sins] by the sacrifice of 
himself,' and to 'take away the commission of them by implanting a new nature in us.' 
The exposition of chapter 3: 6 - 9 starts with a statement that the sin referred to 
in verse 6 is 'the same as to commit sin, ver. 8,9.' We discover that: 'to commit sin is 
to practice sin. He that abideth in Christ continues not in the practise [sic] of sin. As 
vital union with the Lord Jesus broke the power of sin in the heart and nature; so 
continuance therein prevents the regency and prevalence thereof in the life and 
conduct.' The 'practice of sin and a justified state are inconsistent.' Christ's 
destruction of the works of the devil (3: 8) prompts the annotator to state: 'Sin will he 
loosen and dissolve more and more, till he has quite destroyed it. Let not us serve or 
indulge what the Son of God came to destroy.' There is 'a connexion between 
regeneration and the relinquishment of sin.' Inward renewal and restoration by the 
Spirit of God explain the expression 'born of God'; those so born gain 'a holy integrity 
or rectitude of nature.' The believer 'does not work iniquity and practice disobedience 
that is contrary to his new nature and the regenerate complexion of his spirit.' This is 
430 Matthew Henry, An Exposition of AIJthe Books of tile Old and New Testol1lt'II' (6 vols.London: 
Printed for John and Paul Knapton in l.udgate Street, Thomas Cox under the Royal-r:xclllwge, 
Richard Ford and Richard Hett both in the Poultry, Aaron Ward in little-Britain, and Thomas 
Longman in Pater Noster Row, First Published 1725, Fourth Edition 1738). Volume V, 
Including 'An Exposition of the First Epistle Gencral of John, With Practical ObsclVations,' 
chapter I, verses 7 - 10 [This edition does not contain page numbers]. 
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because of the presence of the divine 'seed' in him - a seed defined by Henry as 'either 
the word of God, in its light and power,' or, 'the spiritual seminal principle of 
holiness.' As religion is not an art, 'an acquired dexterity and skill,' but rather 'a new 
nature,' 'the consequence is, the regenerate person cannot sin. ' 
Breaking off his discussion momentarily, Henry makes the following comment: 
that he cannot commit an act of sin, I suppose no judicious interpreter 
understands. That would be contrary to chap. i. 9. where it is made our 
duty to confess our sins, and supposed our privilege thereupon to have 
our sins forgiven. He therefore cannot sin, in the sense that the apostle 
says, he cannot commit sin. He cannot continue in the course and 
practice of sin. 
Thus, this commentator, clearly aware of an interpretive dilemma here, suggests that 
prudent and sensible interpreters will reject an overtly perfectionist understanding of3: 
9. Moreover, he seeks to maintain an association between 3: 9 and 1: 9, so avoiding 
contradiction. To reinforce an essential element in his hannonisation of the two verses, 
that the sin referred to by St. John is that which is continual and practised, Henry 
proposes that these verses serve to differentiate the saint from the sinner (a 
differentiation Wesley also wanted to make, but without a direct reference to 1: 8 and 
10). The believer 'cannot so sin, as to denominate him as sinner.' He 'cannot sin 
comparatively, as he did before he was born of God, and as others do that are not so.' 
The state of being born of God is one that provides an 'inhibition and impediment' to 
sin. A 'light in his mind' shows the believer 'the evil and malignity of sin.' There is 
now 'that bias upon his heart, that disposes him to loath and hate sin.' Furthennore, 
there is 
the spiritual, seminal principle or disposition that breaks the force and 
fulness of the sinful acts. They proceed not from that plenary power of 
corruption as they do in others, nor obtain that plenitude of heart, spirit 
and consent, as they do in others. The Spirit lusteth against the flesh 
ref Gal. 5: 17 A VJ. And therefore in respect to such sin it may be said, 
it is no more I that do it but sin that dwelleth in me [Rom. 7: 17 A V J. It 
is not reckoned the person's sin in the gospel account, where the bent 
and frame of the mind and spirit is against it. .. There is a disposition for 
humiliation and repentance for sin, when it has been committed. 
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Henry says that in St. John's assertion of 3: 9 'we may call to mind the usual 
distinction of natural and moral impotency.' The unregenerate person 'is morally 
unable for what is religiously good,' but, 'the regenerate person is (happily) disabled 
for sin.' Operating within the regenerate person is 'a restraint, an embargo (as we may 
say) laid upon his sinning powers .. .It goes against him sedately and deliberately to 
sin.' Just as is 'usually said of a person of known integrity, he cannot lie, he cannot 
cheat and commit other enormities ... so,' declares the commentator, 'they that persist in 
sinful life, sufficiently demonstrate that they are not born of God.'431 
4. 4. Philip Doddridge 
Now we must look at two commentaries that appeared during the same period -
the 1730s to the 1740s - those of Philip Doddridge and John Guyse. These are the last 
of the commentaries favoured by Wesley that we will explore (as John Heylyn's 1761 
work simply includes a translation of 1 John, so we may pass over it without remark). 
Turning to the commentary of Philip Doddridge D.O. (first published in 1739), from 
the first remark on the text we note that Doddridge has realised various interpretive 
dilemmas in reading 1 John: 
In the stile [sic] of this Apostle there is a remarkable Peculiarity; and 
especially in this Epistle. His sentences, considered separately, are 
exceedingly clear and intelligible; but when we search for their 
Con-nection [sic], we frequently meet with greater Difficulties than we 
do even in the Epistles of St Paul [ ... ] His conceptions are apparently 
delivered to us in the Order in which they arose to his own mind, and 
are not the Product of artificial Reasoning, or laboured 
Investigation.432 
So, says the commentator, it is when we search for the connection between the 
sentences in 1 John that we meet problems in understanding the Apostle's message. 
This is, we learn, because the epistle is the product of natural and artless thought rather 
431 Ibid .• Chapter III. verses 4 - to. 
432 Philip Doddridge. Family Expositor: Ora Paraphras~ alld Version of th~ N~w T~stam~"t. with 
Critical Noles (6 vols. London: Printed and sold by J. Waugh and W. Fenner. at the TUTk's-Head 
in Lombard Street. and J. Buckland, at the Buck, in Pater-Noster Row. First Volume Published 
in 1739. The copy held by the Bodleian bears the date 1756) Volume VI including 'A GenemJ 
Introduction to the Paraphrase and Notes on the First Catholic Epistle of SL John,' p. 320. 
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than intellectual artifice. In the subsequent pages Doddridge seeks to correlate these 
sentences, or as we may say with Iser fill the 'blanks,' 'gaps: 'places [or 'spots'] of 
indeterminacy' and 'vacancies' that lie between the 'definable points of instruction.' 
Dealing initially with chapter one verse seven, the commentator tells us that it is 
within the encompass of the light of holiness that we become 'indeed conscious to 
ourselves of many past Offences, for which so holy a GOD might for ever banish us 
from his Presence, and of many remaining Imperfections, which might discourage our 
Approaches to him.'433 However, we have the consolation of the blood cleansing our 
sins 'be they ever so numerous, or ever so heinous.' This is a consolation 'which we 
absolutely need' (1: 8). Denial of the need is gross self-deception and a revelation that 
we 'must be destitute of every good Principle, [and are] are utterly insensible of our 
own Guilt and Imperfection.' 
Confession of our sin (1: 9) 'with a becoming Lowliness and Contrition of 
spirit' results in forgiveness and cleansing from 'all Unrighteousne.'iS by his atoning 
Blood, and the Influence of that Sanctifying Spirit, which it has purchased for us.' Our 
confidence and security may safely rest on this foundation of mercy and grace. and we 
may 'often renew our Applications to it.' It is 'rash and presumptuous' to say that we 
have not sinned, in doing so we lie and, moreover. 'make [God] a Lyar.' The 
'Constitution of the Gospel' sent by God to all people 'goes on a supposition. that 
every soul to whom it is addressed. is under Guilt and Condemnation.' Consequently. 
if we 'assert and maintain our own personal Innocence: we demonstrate 'that this 
humbling Message of his Grace has never been cordially received by us, nor hath 
produced its genuine Effects in our Hearts.'434 
In the further remarks on the text that appear under the title 'Improvement: 
Doddridge writes of the advantage gained from the divine forgiveness that answers 
confession: 'Instead of being, as we deserved. Companions in Condemnation and 
Ruin. we shall share together in that compleat [sic] Freedom from all the penal 
433 Ibid., Section I, p. 325. 
434 Ibid., Section I, pp. 325 - 327. 
165 
Consequences of Sin, which will be the Portion of all those who truly repent and obey 
the Gospel.'435 This commentator, then, appears to opt for an interpretation of 1: 7-
10 that emphasises God's remittal of the believer's sin, and the consequent removal of 
the threat of judicial punishment. 
When we reach the section dealing with chapter three, we discover that the 
annotator lays the ground for his interpretation of the relevant verses at 3: 5. The 
manifestation of Christ contained the design to 'take away the Guilt and Power of our 
Sins.' The atonement and 'Sanctifying Influences of his Spirit' accomplish this design. 
Christ is entirely pure. He is 'of the most opposite Nature' to sinners. Given the 
purity of Christ, Doddridge says that ,[ilt is plain therefore' that those who abide in him 
(3: 6) do not sin. They 'cannot make a trade and practice of it.' Everyone 'who thus 
habitually and allowedly' sins has not seen or known Christ: 'His Views and 
knowledge of him have been so super-ficial as that they deserve not to be mentioned, 
since they have not conquered the Love and Prevalence of sin and brought the man to a 
holy temper and Life.'436 Regarding the proviso 'Every one who habitually and 
allowedly sinneth,' we discover that: 
It seems absolutely necessary to interpret the expression thus, not only 
to prevent some of the best Christians from falling into Despair, on 
Account of those Remainders of Sinful Imperfection, which their very 
Eminence in Religion causes them to discern, and to kunent; while 
others, evidently their inferiors, are vain and ignorant enough to 
conclude themselves perfect and lacking nothing; but likewise to make 
one scripture consistent with another, (compare Jam. iii.2.) and even to 
reconcile this assertion to other Passages in the Epistle before us. (See 
chap. i. 8, - 10.)437 
So, there is a necessity to gloss 'whosoever abideth in him sinneth not' (3: 6 
A V) by making the term 'sin' refer solely to habitual and deliberate transgression. This 
necessity arises partly from a danger that sensitive Christians reading the verse may 
misunderstand it, thinking that God required absolute moral perfection, and regard 
themselves as failing to meet this standard. A contrast exists between these perceptive 
435 Ibid., Section I, 'Improvement: p. 328. 
436 Ibid., Section IV, p. 345. 
437 Ibid., Section IV, p. 346. 
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believers, acutely sensible of their remaining propensity to sin, and 'inferior' 
colleagues, who, in their arrogant and unenlightened minds, interpretthe verse as a 
confinnation of the perfection that they imagine that they have attained; the former could 
suffer despondency by wrongly interpreting the verse, despite the 'eminence' of their 
piety. However, we must also explain 3: 6 in these terms in order to 'make one 
scripture consistent with another: and, this being the significant point for us, 'even to 
reconcile this assertion Ithat whoever abides in God does not sin] to other passages in 
the Epistle' (that is 1: 8 - 10). Believers 'cannot make a trade and practice of it.' 
The exegesis of 3: 5 and 6 governs our understanding of 3: 9. Doddridge 
declares that everyone who is born of God 'doth not practise [sic]Sin.' The divine 
'Seed' abiding in the Christian is 'an immortal Principle implanted by God in the Heart, 
which will not suffer a Man, who hath received it, entirely to overbear it; and he cannot 
sin, in such a Manner and to such a Degree as others.' It is 'certain: says the 
commentator, that we must take the words 'cannot sin' in 'a qualified Sense.' If we 
do not thus qualify the phrase it will serve to prove not only the 'sinleu perfection' of 
every Christian, 'but also the 'Impeccability of every such Person, or the Impossibility 
of his sinning.' According to the commentator 'none have been wild and enthusiastical 
[sic] enough to assert' this. He remarks: 'It must therefore, I think, be understood only 
as expressing a Strong Disinclination to sin, in the Kind and Degree referred to 
before.'438 Concluding his comments in a further 'Improvement: Doddridge adds 
regarding 3: 9 and 10: 
And instead of flattering ourselves that tho' [sic] we do commit Sin with 
Allowance, yet there may be some secret Seed of God still concealed in 
our Hearts, let us judge of our having received this regenerating Seed, 
by its Tendency to preserve usfrom Sin, and the Victories it enables us 
to gain over its destructive Wiles and insufferable Tyranny.439 
Doddridge's comments that a regenerate person 'cannot make a trade and 
practice' of sin, that she or he cannot 'habitually and allowedly' sin, 'cannot sin, in 
438 Ibid., Section IV, pp. 346 - 347. 
439 Ibid., Section IV, 'Improvement,' p. 349. 
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such a Manner and to such a Degree as others,' bear a similarity to the sort of 
explication that Wesley denounced as an attempt to modify the perfectionist thrust of3: 
9. Indeed, we have perceived this type of reasoning in the commentaries of the 
theologians we have studied previously. We remember that in the sermon 'Christian 
Perfection'dated 1741 Wesley spoke of some (unnamed) ministers who had glossed 
the verse in this way: the one who is born of God 'sinneth not wilfully; or he doth not 
commit sin habitually; or, not as other men do; or, not as he did before. '440 A 
faithful person does not sin with the liberty of her or his former life, but nonetheless 
remains subject to the power of sin. Wesley disapproved of such a response to the 
verse and declared that no annotations of this kind appear 'in any part of [St. John's] 
writings whatsoever.' Here is an example of an interpretation that the Methodist leader 
excluded in 1741, even though it came from theologians that he admired. However, 
our earlier investigations have showed that by 1763 Wesley had moved nearer to this 
position himself. At that stage, in his effort to refute the notion of sinless or guiltless 
perfection, he assured his audience that though sin has suffered dethronement at the 
new birth it 'remains indeed where [it] once reigned; but remains ;nchain.~.' It 'in 
some sense' prosecutes the war against the Christian, but becomes increasingly 
enfeebled, 'while the believer goes on from strength to strength, conquering and to 
conquer.'441 
4. 5. John Guyse 
Finally, we come to the commentary published by John Guyse during the 
period 1739 - 1742. Walking truly 'in the Light of Gospel-Revelation,' says Guyse of 
1:7, Christians may 'then have the best of all Communion,' with God and feHow 
believers. The 'one great blessing. and even the Foundation' of this communion is the 
atoning blood of Christ. This blood is 'continually efficacious for cleansing us from 
the Guilt, Condemnation and Power of all our sins; and, at length, from all remaining 
440 See note 291. 
441 See note 344. 
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Defilement and In-being of sin, which, for his sake, shall be intirely [sic] purged 
away.' Sin 'will have no more Place in us, or bad Effects upon us.' However, the 
entire purification from sin will become effective only on the occasion of Christ's 
second advent: 'but we shall be as like as possible to him when we shall see him as he 
is (chap. iii. 2).'442 
Guyse informs us that 'sin came into the World with us, and can't be utterly 
extirpated till we die out of it.' It is ignorance, pride, vanity and an act of the 
imagination that lead believers to suppose that, 'in this present State of Weakness and 
Mortality by reason of sin,' we have become 'so throughly [sic] cleansed from it, as to 
have no Remainders of its Workings in us.' To say that we have no sin [I: 8J goes 
against the 'Truth of God's Word, which abundantly declares the contrary.'443 
The required confession of sin [1: 9] 'under a humbling sense of our 
Imperfections and many disallowed Failures,' leads to a comprehensive pardon. Along 
with this exoneration God will 'purge our Consciences from Guilt; and ... c1eanse us 
from the reigning power and Defilement of all our Iniquities by the Sanctification of the 
Spirit.' This sanctification appears to occur during earthly existence for we note that it 
will 'purify our Hearts and Lives, that we may be fit for Communion with him in this 
World, till we be presented faultless before the Presence of his Glory with exceeding 
Joy in the World to come (Jud. Vcr. 24).' 
To continue 'to assert that we have not transgressed the Law of God, so as to 
need Pardon' is not to only 'make God himself a Liar [1: IOJ,' but is also to deny the 
truth of his Word 'the very nature of which supposes us to be sinners, and is designed 
to bring us to a humble, penitent Confession of sin ... (ver. 9).' Further, this Word 
holds the divine aim to bring us to 'Faith in the Redeemer's Blood for the Remission of 
442 John Guyse, A Practical Exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians And from the"ce forward to 
the End of Revelation. in the Form of a Paraphrase. with Occasional Notes. 3 vols. London: 
Printed for John Oswald, at the Rose and Crown in the Poultry. First Published 
1739 - 1742. The Bodleian Edition dated 1752), Volume III, containing 'The First Epistle Genentl 
of St. John,' p. 674. 
443 Ibid., p. 674. 
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it, (ver. 7) and for Victory over it, till we shall be completely delivered from the Whole 
of Sin in that heavenly Jerusalem . •• '444 
Making additional comments on chapter one in a division he calls 
'Recollections,' Guyse writes of the 'Blood of Christ. .. effectually applied to us for the 
Remission of all our sins, and for subduing their power within us.' In faithfulness and 
justice God will 'pass by our Transgressions ... and gradually sanctify and cleanse us 
from all iniquity; 'till, at length, in a better world, we shall be holy, and without 
Blemish; not having spot, or Wrinkle, or any such Thing [Cf. Eph. 5: 27 A V].' So, it 
seems that this commentator envisioned a gradual progression in holiness culminating 
in a perfection granted to the believer in a future 'better world.'445 This view is 
diametrically opposite to that held by Wesley in 1741. For the Methodist leader the 
affirmation of 4: 17 - 'as he is, so are we in this world' [A V] - is enough to counter the 
idea that believers may only enjoy Christian perfection in heaven. Recalling this 
assertion from the sermon 'Christian Perfection' Wesley says that the verse appears in 
the text as if St. John had foreseen the same sort of evasion now perpetrated by certain 
annotators 'and set himself to overturn it from the foundation.' The verses 1: 5 - 9 
prove 'exactly agreeable' to 4: 17 in that the Apostle evidently 'speaks of a deliverance 
wrought "in this world. "'446 The 'cleansing' spoken of in chapter one is the turning 
point in a person's life when she or he begins to live a life free from sin's power as 
depicted by 3: 6 and 9. Despite this disagreement, Wesley would concur with Guyse in 
the notion of a gradual sanctification and cleansing taking place in the Christian's life, 
though he would add that God may perform these actions in an instant should it please 
him to do so. 
A 'strict and proper notion of sin' for Guyse is 'a Deviation from, or contrariety 
in Thought. Word. or Deed to, the Law of God, that in-changeable Rule of 
Righteousness, which is a Transcript of his holy Nature and Will.' The commentator 
focuses on those who 'liv[e] in any known sin, as a wilful Evil doer, or Worker of 
444 Ibid., Chapter I, verses 7 - 10, pp 674 - 675. 
445 Ibid., Chapter 1. 'Recollections,' p. 676. 
446 See note 301. 
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Iniquity [3: 4].' He especially refers to 'the allowed Practice of any sin' as such sin 'is 
utterly inconsistent with good Hope of seeing Christ, and being like him, at his second 
coming.' It is 'evident' that sin of this deliberate kind militates against 'the whole 
Tenor of the Gospel.' Christ became manifest [3: 5] and sacrificed himself that 'he 
might effectually deliver us from the Guilt, and in consequence thereof, from the 
Power. and at length. from all Defilement and In-being of our sins.' From this 'it 
plainly follows' that whoever abides in him 'doth not deliberately, habitually, 
presumptuously and willingly sin [3: 6].'447 
Now Guyse directs us to a lengthy footnote. 'We are not to imagine: he 
declares, 'the Apostle's Meaning to be. that a true Christian never sins.' As in the case 
with the other commentators we have studied. this annotator's concern is with the text's 
consistency. To understand 3: 6 and 9 in terms of sinlessness would be: 
to make [St. John] contradict what he had said. Chap. i. 8. 9. about 
deceiving ourselves. ifwe say we have no sin. and about the duty of 
confessing our sins, which supposes us to have Occasion to do so. 
And therefore he sinneth not must be understood in some such 
sense ... and is sufficiently explained in several other Verses of this 
context. 448 
Referring to the Greek text, Guyse informs us that the expressions 1tOUW and 
l'tOL£L atlap"tLav are 'very strong.' They signify 'committing [sin] as Practisers. 
Workers, or Doers of it with Freedom and Choice. like persons who make a Trade of 
it.' Moreover, Guyse declares: 
[I]t is the very same Expression that our Lord used when he said, (John 
viii. 34) Whoever committeth Sin (0 mlWN-n]V aJiap"tUxv) is the 
Servant of Sin; and our Apostle says, ver. 8, He that commilteth Sin 
(0 1tOuOv [-n]v] aptlap"tl.av)is of the Devil, and ver. 9. whoever is 
born of God doth not commit Sin (aptlap"tl.av oU 1tOL£i:).449 
447 John Guyse, A Practical Exposition of the Epistle to tile Galatians And from Ihellce forward to 
the End of Revelation, in the Form of a Paraphra..,e, wilh Occasional Noles, Chaplcr III, verscs 4 -
9, p688 
448 Ibid., Chapter III, verse 6, Footnote, p. 688. 
449 Ibid., Chapter III, verse 6, Footnote, p. 688. 
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Resuming the main text, this commentator reaches hisjudgement on the one 
who sins 'deliberately, habituaIIy, presumptuously and wiIIingly.' Guyse pronounces: 
'He that sinneth, at this Rate, has never had any realizing [sic] View by Faith of him, 
nor any experimental and saving Acquaintance, or Communion with him.'450 He has 
already effectively sought to reassure us that the Apostle does not require sinlessness. 
However the annotator emphasises that a purposeful inclination to sin receives St. 
John's condemnation. The believer, according to Guyse, may enjoy a measure of 
liberation from sin in this life, and fuII deliverance in heaven. Yet, it seems that there is 
a tension in this commenator, as in the others we have studied, as to the extent of the 
holiness achievable by divine grace during earthly life. We note this tension in Guyse's 
concluding comments. God's purpose remains thus: 
[That] they, who believe in Christ Jesus, and hope to live with him, and 
to be like him for ever ... may be delivered from the Guilt and Dominion 
of sin, and live no longer in it here; and might, at length, be intirely [sic] 
freed from all Remainders of it, and from all its dreadful Fruits and 
Effects for ever hereafter. 
Whosoever he be that is a partaker of a divine nature by the regenerating 
Spirit, is no longer a Doer or a worker of Iniquity like other Men, or like 
the DeviL.For that divine Principle of Grace, which is infused into 
him, by means of the incorruptible Seed of the Word (1 Pet. i. 23) has 
an abiding Root and Residence in him, to rule and govern him; and he 
has such a thorough Hatred of all Iniquity, that he cannot give himself 
Liberty to sin with Deliberation and full Consent, as he used to do ... he 
cannot love and live in sin.451 
Should the believer sin through 'Temptation, Surprize [sic], or Inadvertence,' on the 
instant of conviction he 'cannot but sorely repent' as did David and Peter. This is 
because he has received_ 'a Principle of Grace, that wills and works in direct Opposition 
to all Sin.' He certainly cannot sin 'as though his new birth were a Licence for it, or 
had any Tendency towards it.'452 
450 Ibid., Chapter III, verse 6, p. 688. 
451 Ibid., Chapter III, verses 8 and 9, Footnote, pp. 689 - 690. 
452 Ibid., Chapter III, verse 9, p. 690. 
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4. 6. The Exegeses of Wesley and His Luminaries -
A Brief Comparison 
We have now completed our survey of the commentaries favoured by Wesley. 
It seems that there are two associated points of divergence between Wesley and the 
theologians that he admired. These are: i) the sphere of application of 1: 8 and 10; and, 
ii) the extent to which believers enjoy freedom from sin in this life. It appears also that 
there are points of convergence, such as: a) the necessity of holiness in the life of the 
believer; b) the perceived importance to maintain the coherence ofthe text; and, c) the 
belief that the text has an inherent meaning that is readily accessible to all, though it may 
need some explanation. Moreover, we may contend that there is some evidence that the 
Methodist leader modified his stance on perfectionism in line with the interpretations 
put forward by the annotators he had studied. On this point, we could say that he used 
several of their explanations to counter those who propounded sinless, or guiltless, 
perfection. He consequently affirmed that sin, and the propensity to sin, not only 
dwells in the individual before conversion, but remains in her or him after new birth. 
However, Wesley continued to claim that God may graciously grant release from sin 
during the Christian's lifetime, either by degrees or instantaneously. Taking our entire 
survey into account I propose that, despite any differences among them, Wesley stands 
as part of this interpretive community of theologians whom he regarded as aids in 
promoting his 'third alternative' against those who, in his eyes, advanced a new 
doctrine. 
Concerning the solution to our problem, we have seen how the annotators 
endorsed by Wesley have used 1: 8 and 10 as the touchstone for their exegesis of3: 6 
and 9. Because the verses in the first chapter apply, they say, to the post - as well as 
pre - conversion state, it must be the case that St. John intended the verses in the third 
chapter to mean that believers can enjoy a form of relief from the power of sin, but 
certainly not a complete emancipation from it. Thus, the overriding concern of these 
theologians is to ensure that the perceived congruity of the scriptures remains intact. 
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The verses in chapter three cannot mean that the believer can no longer sin for they 
would thus contradict those in the first chapter. 
Our opening words by William Cowper encapsulate something of the 
interpretive stance of Wesley and his affiliates. To them, the hypotheses of certain 
other biblical critics were indeed 'absurd and vain.' Wesley, we remember, called his 
rivals' interpretations 'strange assertions, drawn from examples recorded in the word 
of God.'453 Bengel had said of others that they 'put upon isolated passages of 
Scripture their own forced (mystical) construction.' He, however, would 'insist upon 
the full and comprehensive force of Scripture in its whole connection.'454 The 
custodians of Poole's commentary seemingly spent their careers 'abhorring the impious 
arts of those who pervert the Scriptures from their Pure and native sense, to give colour 
and countenance to their private fancies.' Poole's colleagues were able to declare: 'Our 
sincere design and endeavours have been to search and unfold the meaning of the 
Sacred Oracles.'455 When referring to the New Testament, Wesley could speak of the 
'precise expression of [its] meaning.'456 He would agree that any contrary hypotheses 
to Christian perfection had indeed 'fill'd with fumes' the brains of those that 
propounded them. For Wesley and his colleagues the meaning of the text of 1 John is 
'plain.' If a commentator did not understand the text it was simply because he held a 
'darling whim' that the text ran contrary to. A 'whim' (or we might sayan assumption) 
cherished by a commentator simply served to render the text obscure. Because Wesley 
and his luminaries came to the text without assumptions they allowed the obvious 
meaning to emerge. 
As we will soon deal with twentieth century solutions to our problem, I wish to 
suggest that the stance of our eighteenth century theologians regarding the status of a 
text represents for us an archetype of the position maintained by later interpreters: just 
as Wesley and those he venerated pointed to the text as the accessible repository of the 
453 See note 380. 
454 See note 408. 
455 See note 427. 
456 See note 3CJ7. 
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author's intention and meaning, so also their colleagues over two centuries later claim 
to discover authorial purpose. Moreover, scholars in our era assert that they can 
discover from the 10hannine text the material to reconstruct with some accuracy the first 
or second century historical background to our problem. 
At thisjuncture, however, having analysed the relevant works of Wesley and 
his affiliates, I plan to provide the promised excursus concerning a secular instance of 
perfectionism. Belonging as they do to the eighteenth century - albeit to its last decade-
the philosophical ideas that we will look at in the next section may serve to set Wesley's 




JOHN WESLEY AND 'THE MARCH OF MECHANICS' 
Dilke, whom you know to be a Godwin Perfectibil[it]y Man, pleases himself 
with the idea that America will be the country to take up the human 
intellect where England leaves off - I differ there with him greatly ... 
[Men such as] Frankli[n] and Washingto[n) ... are great but they are not 
sublime Man - the humanity of the United States can never reach the sUblime ... 457 
The twenty-three-year-old John Keats thought of himself and Charles 
Wentworth Dilke as 'capital friends.'458 However, he disagreed with Dilke 
concerning some of his friend's perfectionist views (in the case of our opening 
quotation they differed on the extent to which North Americans are perfectible). After 
one year had elapsed, by 1819, so entirely had Dilke adopted a fonn of perfectionism 
that others from the poet's circle expostulated to Keats about a change that had come 
over their mutual acquaintance. In another long letter to his brother George and his 
wife, Keats says: 'Brown459 complained very much in his Letter to me of yesterday of 
the great alteration the Disposition of Dilke has undergone - He thinks of nothing but 
'Political Justice' and his Boy ... He is a Godwin-methodist.'460 From these two 
fragmentary remarks we ascertain that work which so transfonned Dilke, and the name 
of its author: Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and 
457 R Gittings (cd.), leiters 0/ John Keats (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. Reprinted 
with corrections 1m), Letter to George and Georgiana Keats 14 - 31 October 1818, 
pp. 164 - 165. 
458 Gittings, John Keats (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1968. Reprinted with 
corrections, 1970), p. 170. 
459 Here Keats refers to Charles Annitage Brown. For biographical details of Keats' circle of friends 
see J. Richardson, TILe Everlasting Spell - A Study of Keats and His Friends (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1963). 
460 Gittings (ed.), leiters of John Keats, Letter to George and Georgiana Keats 17 - 27 
September 1819, p. 326. 
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Happiness by William Godwin. Having descried this work we may begin to display 
the nature and extent of William Godwin's influence. 
For the poet to employ the epithet 'methodist' in connection with Godwinian 
thought is interesting. On the one hand, we may conclude that he simply used the term 
to indicate that Dilke possessed an expertise in Godwin's system of thought. 
However, on the other, it is possible to surmise that Keats utilises the designation to 
satirise his friend's devotion to the philosophical ideal depicted in Politicallustice - a 
devotion that supposedly equalled the affection Dilke had for his own son: one akin to 
the fervency displayed by the acolytes of the late Wesley, perhaps.461 In his use of the 
expression, moreover, the poet may also have intended to caricature the perfectionist 
element in Godwin's philosophy by alluding to Wesleyan notions of holiness. 
Whatever were the poet's intentions, here was a perfectionism that for its proposer held 
no Christian connotations. Yet, according to Roy Porter, the pantheism and anarchism 
of Godwin's adulthood that formed the basis of Politicallustice emerged from a 
youthful Dissenting Calvinism.462 While it is true that we can assume that Keats did 
not imply a direct connection with John Wesley, a study of Godwin's Dissenting 
family reveals an association with a person known also by the High Tory Anglican. 
From F.K. Brown we learn that the philosopher's grandfather, also known as 
William Godwin, had charge over the publication of Dr. Philip Doddridge's 
commentary Family Expositor; Ora Paraphrase and Version o/the New Testament, 
with Critical Notes - one of the works favoured by Wesley that we have studied. Also, 
the next generation of the Godwin family had connections with Doddridge. The 
youngest son John - William's father - studied for the ministry under the theologian 
(the eldest son, Edward, became a convert to Christianity through the ministry of 
George Whitfield and subsequently became a Methodist minister). Furthermore, the 
philosopher himself - from the age of 17 in 1773 - studied (at the Dissenters' college in 
Hoxton near London) under Dr. Andrew Kippis who had been a student of Doddridge 
461 John Wesley died in 1791. 
462 Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 163. 
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and became his biographer.463 As we have noted, Doddridge did not display an overt 
perfectionism, rather he emphasised that people could arrive at a state whereby they 
'cannot make a trade and practice of [sin].' Freedom from sin for the theologian merely 
meant that a person had a 'strong disinclination' to sin. However, if any of 
Doddridge's ideas on this theme affected Godwin we do not learn it from him. Indeed, 
all so-called 'orthodox' Christian concerns soon became irrelevant. 
In 1778 Godwin accepted a position as a Dissenting minister at Ware in 
Hertfordshire and we ascertain from Isaac Kramnic that from this point on Godwin's 
Calvinist faith started to waver. He began to study the works of the French 
philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Paul Heinrich d'Holbach and Claude Adrien 
Helvetius. Interestingly, he also came under the influence of Joseph Priestley: a 
rationalist Unitarian whose sermons reveal a perfectionist emphasis. So complete 
became Godwin's disillusionment that in 1783 he left the ministry. Kramnic makes the 
comment that 'in 1787 [the philosopher] embraced total religious scepticism.'464 
After a short and unsuccessful career as a teacher, Godwin embarked upon a 
half-century of literary activity. In the year that Wesley died, 1791, Godwin started to 
formulate his ideas for PoliticalJustice. The philosopher declares that he undertook 
the work in reaction to a political study by another French philosopher he had read, 
C.L. de Secondat de Montesquieu. Godwin says that he 'proceeded on a feeling of the 
463 F.K. Brown, The life of William Godwin (London: J.M. Dent and E.P. Dutton, 
1926), pp. 2 and 11. Wesley's association with Doddridge went beyond his admiration of the 
commentary. He visited the theologian at his home in Northampton on Monday 9 September 
1745. Furthermore, Doddridge's letters to Wesley dated 15 March 1745 (in which he mentions the 
forthcoming printing of the third volume of his commentary) and 18 June 1746 reveal a growing 
friendship between the two men. Doddridge died in 1751 at the age of 49. See: W. Reginald 
Ward and R.P. Heitzenrater (cds.), The Works of John Wesley - Journal and Diaries III 
(Vol. 20; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), Journal 6, p. 89; and, Frank Baker (ed.), 
The Works of John Wesley - Letters II (Vol. 26; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 190 - 192; 
195 - 196. 
464 I. Kramnic (ed.), William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on 
Morals and Happiness (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pcnguin, 1 g"/6, Godwin's work first 
Published in 1793), Introduction, p. 10. For a discussion of Joseph Priestley's perfectionism 
see J.J. Hoecker, Joseph Priestley and the Idea of Progress (New York: Garland, 1987), Part II, 
'The Progress of the Mind,' chapter III, 'The Mechanics of Human Perfectibility,' pp. 84 - 102. 
In this work Hoecker records Priestley's statement: 'It is ... our duty, and will be the concern of 
every wise and good man, to employ his passions as sails to carry him forwards in his progress 
towards that perfection and felicity for which his maker has designed him .. .' p. 99 (Taken from 
Priestley's sermon 'The Importance of Self-Government,' delivered October 27, In!. [Underline 
in Hoecker's text]. 
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imperfections and errors of Montesquieu.'465 The study referred to, F.E.L. Priestley 
says, is Esprit des Lois, published in 1748. Godwin reacted against Montesquieu's 
ascription of climatic and geographical factors to the appearance of different modes of 
national government; also, he objected to the Frenchman's idealistic presentation of the 
English constitution. The onset of the French revolution in June 1789 caused such 
admirers of the government of England to hope that the French would adopt the same 
pattern. However, Godwin and others believed that a better system could and should 
emerge. People of any nation would not discover it by the historical comparative 
method, Godwin maintained. Neither would they determine it by analysis of existing 
forms of government. Rather, the best model would follow from a rigorous 
examination of the philosophic bases of all government. In addressing these issues 
Godwin took on the role of a political philosopher; that he emphasised virtue and 
happiness in connection with politics leads to a view of him also as a moral 
philosopher. Priestley points out that in the third edition of PoliticaUustice Godwin 
changes the name for the seeker after political truth from 'philosopher' to 
'moralist.'466 
Writing this work was a capacious task and it displays colouration from many 
literary, political and philosophical sources.467 One major influence Priestley discerns 
is that of Plato, whose notions suffuse PoliticalJustice; he particularly notes an 
emphasis on eternal and immutable truths that exist independently of the Creator. Such 
truths serve as a formal cause in the process of creation. Priestley states: 
465 See K. Paul, William Godwin (London: 1876), Diary 1791, 1. p.67. See also 
F.E.L. Priestley (ed.), William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Politirai Justire and its Influence on 
Mora/sandHappiness [Toronto: The University of Toronto Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege, 
Oxford University Press, 1946. Facsimile of the Third Edition.), Volume III, 
Critical Introduction and Notes, Introduction, p. 4, note 1. The formulation of his ideas involved 
consolidating various influences on his thought, other than the Greek and French philosophers 
already mentioned, and these became evident in Political Justice: David Hume, John Locke, 
Jonathan Swift, Jonathan Edwards, David Hartley, ~tienne Bonnot de Condillac, Thomas Paine, 
Raynal, Anthony Ashley Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, 
Cesare Beccaria and Fran~ios Fenelon. See F.K. Brown, The liJe oj William Godwin, p. 54. 
466 F.E.L Priestley (ed.), William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on 
Morais and Happiness, Volume III, Critical Introduction and Notes, Introduction, pp. 4 - S. 
467 Ibid., pp. 6 - 100. Here Priestley conducts a comprehensive discussion of the influences on 
Godwin. Our concern is not to analyse the philosopher's sources but to discuss his formed 
perfectionist thrust. 
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The doctrine of eternal truths is of fundamental importance in Godwin's 
scheme of rational progress, since all progress demands some external 
standard towards which progress is made, and to which all is relative: 
rational progress demands as this external standard a system of absolute 
truths discoverable by reason.468 
With the intent of ranging over the areas of metaphysics and psychology, moral 
philosophy, political science and economics, Godwin declared the subject of his 
enquiry: 
The object proposed in the following work is, an investigation 
concerning that form of public or political society, that system of 
intercourse and reciprocal action, extending beyond the bounds of a 
single family, which shall be found most to conduce to the general 
benefit. How may the peculiar and independent operation of each 
individual in the social state most effectually be preserved? How may 
the security each man ought to possess, as to his life, and the 
employment of his faculties according to the dictates of his own 
understanding, be most certainly defended from invasion? How may 
the individuals of the human species be made to contribute most 
substantially to the general improvement and happiness? The enquiry 
here undertaken has for its object to facilitate the solution of these 
interesting questions.469 
In our effort to understand Godwin's 'solution of these interesting questions,' 
and thus his form of perfectionism, the use of Priestley's locution 'scheme of rational 
progress' has much value. The philosopher desired to see the emergence of parochial 
communities that managed their own affairs. He thought that such co-operative groups 
could make constant progress towards higher levels of civilisation in political and social 
matters. J.B. Schneewind describes the central thrust of Political1ustice that would 
inform the ethos of these communities; Godwin, he says: 'argued for radical forms of 
determinism, anarchism, and utilitarianism.' Forms of national government corrupt 
everyone as they encourage stereotyped thinking and so prevent people from seeing 
each other as unique individuals. It is merely prejudice and artificial inequality that 
prevents us from seeing our behaviour as entirely determined, so we must abandon 
468 Ibid., pp. 8 - 9. 
469 Ibid., Volume I, Book I, 'Of the Powers of Man Considered in his Social capacity,' Chapter I, 
'Introduction,' pp. 1 - 2. 
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these attitudes. Once we adopt a detenninistic view of behaviour we begin to see that 
punishment for what previously counted as wrongdoing becomes pointless. Small 
anarchistic societies are the only context in which we may see others as they really are -
and then come to empathise with them and seek their well-being. Thus, we become 
virtuous, as virtue is the performance of benevolent acts that spring from sympathetic 
feelings and have the purpose of bringing the greatest happiness to all affected. So, in 
daily social intercourse a moral attribute such as truthfulness has a claim on the 
individual only insofar as it brings happiness to the greater number. Consequently, we 
have no absolute obligation to keep a promise, for instance. If keeping a promise 
causes less good than breaking it, there is no reason to keep it. Likewise, to bring 
happiness to the greater number, given a threat to both one would have to choose to 
save the life of a great human benefactor rather than one's mother. Godwin held an 
ideal that codes to regulate morals were unnecessary. Such codes obscure individuality 
and serve to further impair the sympathetic attitudes that constitute virtue. Similarly, in 
the idyllic setting envisioned by the philosopher, human rights legislation would be 
pointless as all members of the communities would act in a sympathetic manner and 
help one another.470 
Regarding the deterministic element of Godwin's argument, he avers that: 
[T]he actions and dispositions of mankind are the offspring of 
circumstances and events, and not of any original determination that 
they bring into the world; a[lso] ... the great stream of our voluntary 
actions essentially depends, not upon the direct and immediate impulses 
of sense, but upon the decisions of the understanding.4 71 
So, our characters, actions and dispositions do not spring from any bias or tendency 
that we possess at birth. Rather it is our external circumstances that determine our 
characters, and our voluntary actions472 originate in our opinions. Therefore, we may 
470 J.B. Schneewind, 'William Godwin' in R. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
pp. 300 - 301. 
471 F.E.L. Priestley (ed.), William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on 
MoralsandHappiness, Volume I, Book I, Chapter IV, 'The Characters of Men Originate in their 
External Circumstance,' p. 26. 
472 Godwin defined 'voluntary' actions as those that arise from a foresight of the consequences 
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change and progress. The philosopher believed in the triumph of reason and this aided 
the 'scheme of rational progress' we referred to above. Godwin declares: 
Man is not a vegetable to be governed by [various] sensations ... He is a 
reasonable creature, capable of perceiving what is eligible and right, of 
fixing indelibly certain principles upon his mind, and adhering inflexibly 
to the resolutions he has made ... [Therefore,] whatever can be 
adequately brought home to the conviction of the understanding, may be 
depended upon as affording a secure hold upon the conduct. We are no 
longer at liberty to consider man as divided between [the] two 
independent principles [of 'reason' and 'animal sensations'], or to 
imagine that his inclinations are in any case inaccessible through the 
medium of his reason. We find the thinking principle within us to be 
uniform and simple; in consequence of which we are entitled to 
conclude, that it is in every respect the proper subject of education and 
persuasion, and is susceptible of unlimited improvement.473 
Unhindered by any restrictions of nascency, reason and its ;;tttendant truth will 
doubtlessly effect a liberation in the moral lives of men and women; 
Sound reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must 
always be victorious over error: Sound reasoning and truth are capable 
of being so communicated: Truth is omnipotent: The vices and moral 
weaknesses of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other 
words suscepti ble of perpetual improvement. 474 
It seems that Godwin espoused a form of perfectionism that had at its heart the idea of 
continuous human progress rather than the ascendancy to a maximal point. Given the 
required conditions of education and mutual sympathetic admonition and 
encouragement, women and men may enjoy 'perpetual improvement': their 'vices and 
moral weaknesses' vulnerable to a reasoned challenge from their peers. , 
Though these vices and weaknesses 'are not invincible,' Godwin recognised 
something of the complexities of the human condition that make their defeat 
resulting from those actions. He also discusses 'involuntary' actions (such as crying), and those 
that are 'imperfectly voluntary' (such as habits). However, he emphasises that all important 
actions are 'in some degree voluntary.' Ibid., pp. 63 - 68. See also F.K. Brown, The life of 
William Godwin, pp. 50 - 52. 
473 F.E.L. Priestley (ed.), William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on 
Morals and Happiness, Volume I, Book I, Chapter V, 'The Voluntary Actions of Men Originate 
in their Opinions,' pp. 79 - SO. 
474 Ibid., p. 86. 
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occasionally difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, he maintains that the flaws in human 
nature will eventually succumb to the force of progress. Those that offer sound 
reasoning and truth may encounter 'sophistry' with its 'plausible appearance' that 
contrives 'to a certain extent to bewilder the understanding.'47 5 However, the 
philosopher declares, 'it is one of the prerogatives of truth, to follow it in its mazes and 
strip it of disguise.' Once exposed, the sophistry of those who resist the truth 
collapses. The important factor is that truth must not be merely 'exhibited,' one must 
'adequately communicate' it so that the hearer may 'distinctly apprehend' it. Under 
these conditions 'the victory is too sure to admit of being controverted by the most 
inveterate scepticism.'476 The 'incapacity of human intellect' at times requires a long 
or repeated presentation of truth by a person who is 'master of his subject.' With 
'truth ... altogether on his side,' with 'sufficient urbanity to conciliate the good will, and 
sufficient energy to engage the attention' of the one addressed, the propagator of that 
truth overcomes any lack of understanding. Then 'no prejUdice, no blind reverence for 
established systems, no false fear of the inferences to be drawn' may resist the progress 
of truth.477 In all encounters with these barriers the 'champion' of truth simply 
'proceeds from point to point' with his fellow. retracing his argument where necessary 
until he has 'put out of reach of mistake' every point offered for consideration.478 So, 
the philosopher avers, 'it is extremely clear that, if no individual can resist the force of 
truth, it can only be necessary to apply this proposition from individual to individual, 
and we shall at length comprehend the whole.'479 Every new convert made to the 
cause of truth becomes an 'apostle' who will 'extend its illuminations through a wider 
sphere.' Moreover, each adequately informed convert will remain steadfast: 'it is 
barely possible that he should ever fail in his adherence.' Thus, whole societies will 
475 Ibid., p. 86. 
476 Ibid., pp. 86 - 87. 
477 Ibid., pp. 87 - 88. 
478 Ibid., p. 88. 
479 Ibid., p. 89. 
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undergo a transformation: 'The advocates of falsehood and mistake must continually 
diminish, and the well informed adherents of truth incessantly mul ti pI y. '480 
Apart from the impediments to progress that we have noted arising from human 
ignorance, there are also potential hindrances that spring from institutional corruption, 
war and calamity. Godwin explains that current civil policy, or 'magnificent 
emoluments and sinister motives' may impede the impetus towards perfection 'by 
distracting the attention ... [and] caus[ing] the worse reason to pass as if it were the 
better.' Furthermore, armed conflict and various disastrous events may arise that 
almost destroy the advocates of truth, and cause it to suffer obscurity, but even a small 
surviving remnant of champions would ensure that its effects 'will break out in the 
sequel with double lustre.'481 
The philosopher acknowledges the potential effects of limited human 
knowledge to restrict our comprehension of truth: 
There may indeed be propositions, which, though true in themselves, 
may be beyond the sphere of human knowledge, or respecting which 
human beings have not yet discovered sufficient arguments for their 
support. In that case, though true in themselves, they are not truths to 
us. The reasoning by which they are attempted to be established, is not 
sound reasoning. It may perhaps be found that the human mind is not 
capable of arriving at absolute certainty upon any subject of enquiry; and 
it must be admitted that human science is attended with all degrees of 
certainty, from the highest moral evidence to the slightest balance of 
probability. But human beings are capable of apprehending and 
weighing all these degrees; and to know the exact quantity of probability 
which I ought to ascribe to any proposition, may be said to be in one 
sense the possessing certain knowledge.482 
Despite temporal short-falls in knowledge and the uncertainty of the extent of our 
cognitive abilities, then, we may still possess a form of 'certain knowledge' through 
our ability to judge probabilities. When faced with intellectual equivocality we have an 
inherent ability to judge what is true even without the required evidence. 
480 Ibid., pp. 89 - 90. 
481lbid 90 ., p. . 
482 Ibid., p. 91. 
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Limitations on truth's effect on our conduct, though real because of the 
'faculties of our frame,' do not ultimately undermine the change it will effect in us. 
Within the confines imposed by our humanity, Godwin declares: 'whatever is brought 
home to the conviction of the understanding, so long as it is present to the mind, 
possesses an undisputed empire over the conduct.' Furthermore, anyone who is 
'sufficiently conversant with the science of intellect' will not act hastily in 'assigning 
the bounds of our capacity.' There are 'some things which the structure of our bodies 
will render us for ever unable to effect'; however, the philosopher avers: 'in many 
cases the lines, which appear to prescribe a term to our efforts, will like the mists that 
arise from a lake, retire further and further, the more closely we endeavour to approach 
them.'483 
So, it seems that Godwin's 'scheme of rational progress' has an inexorable 
property to it. He explains: 'Vice and weaknesses are founded upon ignorance and 
error; but truth is more powerful than any champion that can be brought into the field 
against it; consequently truth has the faculty of expelling weakness and vice, and 
placing nobler and more beneficent principles in their stead.'484 
Now that the philosopher has demonstrated the triumph of reason and truth in 
the life of the individual, and in the consequent transformation of society, he goes on to 
warn his readers against a possible misunderstanding of his statement that 'Man is 
perfectible'48S: 'This proposition needs some explanation,' he says. We have already 
seen how Godwin modifies his statement by declaring that he wishes it to convey the 
idea that people are 'susceptible of perpetual improvement.' At this point he adds that 
by perfectible he does not intend us to understand 'that [man] is capable of being 
brought to perfection.' For Godwin 'the word seems sufficiently adapted to express 
the faculty of being continually made better and receiving perpetual improvement.' The 
term 'perfectible,' thus explained, 'not only does not imply the capacity of being 
brought to perfection, but stands in express opposition to it'; if we could arrive at 
483 Ibid., pp. 91 - 92. 
484 Ibid., p. 92. 
485 lbid 92 ., p. . 
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perfection 'there would be an end to our improvement.'486 Yet, one qualification 
remains in this explanation: 
There is however one thing of great importance that it does imply: every 
perfection or excellence that human beings are competent to conceive, 
human beings, unless in cases that are palpably and unequivocally 
excluded by the structure of their frame, are competent to attain.487 
It seems that while absolute perfection has no place in Godwin's scheme, 
people may attain a form of perfection, or 'excellence,' in manifold spheres of 
endeavour. This is an inference drawn from the philosopher's argument concerning the 
omnipotence of truth. Every truth that people can communicate can effect 'the 
conviction of the mind'; every principle so effecting that conviction, 'will infallibly 
produce a correspondent effect upon the conduct.' If it were not for 'something in the 
nature of man incompatible with absolute perfection,' the 'doctrine of the omnipotence 
of truth would afford no small probability that he would one day reach it.' The 
question then arises: 'Why is the perfection of man impossible?488 
Godwin answers the point by declaring that: 'The idea of absolute perfection is 
scarcely within the grasp of human understanding.' He suggests that if science 
speculated on this issue its practitioners would discover that the notion of absolute 
perfection is 'pregnant with absurdity and contradiction.' Because we cannot be 
present in all times and places; because we 'cannot penetrate into the essences of things, 
or rather we have no sound and satisfactory knowledge of things external to ourselves, 
but merely of our own sensations'; because we 'cannot discover the causes of things, 
or ascertain that in the antecedent which connects it with the consequent, and discern 
nothing but their contiguity' (in other words, because we can know merely that one 
event will lead to another, but not the chain of causality);489 for these reasons the 
486 Ibid., pp. 92 - 93. 
487 Ibid., p. 93. 
488 Ibid., p. 93. 
489 Ibid., pp. 93 - 94. This last phrase represents part of Godwin's principle of 'Necessity': if we 
possess a knowledge of the complete circumstances prevailing in an intcIligent person's life at a 
given moment. then we may with certainty predict that person's conduct. The phrase il'ielf 
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philosopher asks: 'With what pretence can a being thus shut in on all sides lay claim to 
absolute perfection?' 
Apart from these considerations, for Godwin 'there is one principle in the 
human mind, which must for ever exclude us from arriving at a close of our 
acquisitions, and confine us to perpetual progress.' He says that as far as knowledge 
about it had progressed to that point, 'the human mind .. .is nothing but a faculty of 
perception.' All knowledge and ideas, indeed everything we possess as intelligent 
beings, 'comes from impression.' Every person's mind begins its existence in absolute 
ignorance. From this state of unawareness the mind goes on to receive impression 
upon impression. Our memory aids this accumulation; and combined with the faculty 
of association, the philosopher explains, our store of experience increases thereby. 490 
Accompanying this experience, knowledge and wisdom grows and 'every thing that 
distinguishes man from what we understand by a "clod of the valley."' Godwin 
concludes: 
This seems to be a simple and incontrovertible history of intellectual 
being; and, if it be true, then as our accumulations have been incessant 
in the time that is gone, so, as long as we continue to perceive, to 
remember or reflect, they must perpetuall y increase.491 
People may not achieve absolute perfection, then, because of a principle of 
constant perception that represents an essential part of the human psyche. As 
perception never ceases, so the mind incessantly improves, and therefore it remains 
impossible to conceive of a vertex of achievement. Hence, there is one sense in which 
prefigures the following passage: 'No experiments we are able to make, no reasonings we are able 
to deduce, can ever instruct us in the principle of causation, or show us for what rea<;<ln it is that 
one event has, in every instance in which it has been known to occur, been the precursor of 
another event of a given description. Yet this observation does not, in the slightest degree, 
invalidate our inference from one event to another, or effect the operations of moral prudence and 
expectation. The nature of the human mind is such, as to oblige us, after having seen two events 
perpetually conjoined, to pao;s, a'i soon as one of them occurs, to the recollection of the other: 
and, in cases where this transition never misleads us, but the ideal sUCl:cssion is always found to 
be an exact copy of the future event, it is impossible that this species of foresight should not be 
converted into a general foundation of inference and rea'ioning.' We should note that Godwin 
rejected the idca of 'free will.' See Volume I, Book IV, 'Of the Operation of Opinion in Societies 
and Individuals,' Chapter VII, 'Of Free Will and Necessity,' pp. 353; 367 - 368. 
490 n.u 94 lUlU., p. . 
491/bid., p. 95. 
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we may say that Godwin's scheme stands opposed to certain fonns of perfectionism: if 
women and men may reach absolute perfection then his notion of rational improvement 
proves false. On this issue Brown says that the philosopher's 'divergence from the 
famous theory of Perfectibility is ... notable.' However, we might argue here that 
though Godwin's definition of perfectionism diverged from those that emphasised 
attainment to an absolute, it still belongs within its perimeters. His scheme proposes 
the essential goodness of women and men, and their ascent to ever higher levels of 
moral and social achievement. Thus, humans are becoming more nearly perfect than 
they are at present. Brown adds that in its broadest sense the theory 'was a 
commonplace of radical speculation.'492 
The comment that perfectibility was 'a commonplace' in radical circles helps us, 
in F.E.L. Priestley's words, 'to define more accurately Godwin's place in the pattern 
of eighteenth century thought.'493 Indeed, that place within radicalism seemed very 
prominent in the last decade of the century. Priestley records William Hazlitt's memory 
of the effect Godwin's work had on the English intelligentsia of the mid-1790s: 
No work in our time gave such a blow to the philosophical mind of the 
country as the celebrated Enquiry into Politica/Justice. Tom Paine was 
considered for the time as a Tom Fool to him, Paley as an old woman, 
Edmund Burke a flashy sophist. Truth, moral truth, it was supposed, 
had taken up its abode; and these were the oracles ofthought.494 
Yet there was much opposition to PoliticalJustice. From 1795 onwards attacks 
upon Godwin and his work grew. A 'stream of novels and pamphlets directed against 
Godwin poured out.' In 1798 these assaults escalated when Thomas Robert Malthus 
published An Essay on the Principle of Population. Furthennore, literati such as Sir 
492 F.K. Brown, The Ufe oj William Godwin, p. 54. Roy Porter portrays the typical group of 
radicals that surrounded Godwin and among whom such ideas might circulate: '[T1owards the end 
of the [Eighteenth] eentury ... something like a self-conscious Enlightenment intelligenl'lia was 
coming into being: writers such as Joseph Priestley, Richard Price, James Burgh, William 
Godwin, Thomas Holcroft, Mary Wollstonecraft [Godwin's wife], William HazJilt and Arthur 
Atkin.' See R. Porter, English Society in lhe Eighteenth Century, p. 83. 
493 F.E.L. Priestley (cd.), William Godwin. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influellce 
011 Morals and Happiness, Volume III, Critical Introduction and Notes. Introduction. p. 6. 
494 Ibid., Introduction. Section VII 'The Influence of Political Justice,' p. 100. 
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James Mackintosh (who fonnerly supported the philosopher) and Samuel Parr assailed 
various elements of his system.49S W.A. Speck records William Wordsworth's 
remark: ,[H]uman nature is more effectively illuminated by William Shakespeare than 
by William Godwin.'496 Most effective in undennining that system was the sustained 
'witty distortion' of Godwinian views in publications such as the Anti-Jacohin and the 
Anti-Jacohin Review. Such was the effectiveness of the parody that by the tum of the 
century many regarded Godwin as the 'ridiculous philosopher.'497 Educated people 
had sufficient awareness of the tenets of the philosopher's fonn of perfectionism that 
early in the following century (1816) Thomas Love Peacock could write satirically in 
Headlong Hall of a character, Mr Foster, who was a 'perfectibilian.'498 Peacock, as a 
friend of Godwin's son-in-law Percy Bysshe Shelly, met the philosopher several times 
from 1814 onwards.499 Commenting on the impression of Godwin Peacock gained 
from these meetings Bryan Bums notes that 'Mr Foster may be related to the optimistic 
philosopher, William Godwin.'SOO J.B. Priestley adds that the character may also 
reflect the perfectionist views the poet Shelley had adopted from Godwin and had 
revealed to Peacock in conversations between the two and Thomas Jefferson Hogg.SOl 
H. Mills confinns Priestley's point by commenting that at one stage 'Shelley was more 
Godwinian than Godwin.'S02 It is true that Mr Foster does not represent a portrait by 
495 Ibid., p. 107. 
496 W.A. Speck, literature WId Society in Eighteenth Century England -Ideology, Politics and 
Culture, 1680 - 1820 (London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), p. 185. 
497 F.E.L Priestley (ed.), William Godwin. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence 
on Morals llIId Happiness, Volume III, Critical Introduction and Notcs,lntroduction, Section VII 
'The Influence of Political Justice,' p. 107. Cf. M. Butler, Peacock Displayed - A Satirist in His 
Context (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 31. 
498 Breu-Smith and Jones (eds.),Tlle Halliford Edition o/the Works o/Thomas Love Peacock. 
'Headlong Hall,' p. 8. 
499 Ibid., Biographical Introduction, pp. lix - Ix. John Keats met both Godwin and Peacock: the latter 
he met first on 11 February 1817 [Brett-Smith and Jones (cds.), The Hlliliford 
Edition O/Ihe Works 0/ Thomas Love Peacock, Biographical Introduction, p. Ixxx], the former on 
18 November of the same year [Gittings, JOM Keats, p. 160]. cr. Andrew Motion, 
Keats (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), p. 116. 
500 B. Bums, The Novels o/Thomas Love Peacock (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 
Introduction: Headlong Hall, p. 23. 
501 J.B. Priestley, l1wmas Love Peacock (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 33. 
502 H. Mills, Peacock - His Circle and His Age (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 20. 
See also C. Dawson, His Fille Wit - A Study 0/ Thomas Love Peacock (London: Routledge and 
Regan Paul, 1970), p. 211. 
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Peacock of Godwin the man, nor one of Shelley. However, the ideas given voice, and 
lampooned, through Foster belong to the philosopher.S03 
Two quotations from the novel are enough to help us to understand its tenor. 
The opening scene of the novel has Foster in conversation with 'Mr. Escot, the 
deteriorationist; Mr. Jenkison, the statu-quo-ite; and the Reverend Doctor Gaster' [an 
ecclesiastical Bon vivant]. Peacock allows Foster the first statement concerning all that 
they see from their carriage as they travel to visit Squire Headlong at his Welsh hall: 
'"In short," says he, "every thing we look on attests the progress of mankind in all the 
arts of life, and demonstrates their gradual advancement towards a state of unlimited 
perfection. "'504 If this is a quasi-serious presentation of Godwin's scheme, when we 
arrive at Foster's next substantial comment we know that we have entered the realm of 
raillery. Mr Escot makes a 'deteriorationist' statement (during breakfast) to the effect 
that: 'the use of animal food, conjointly with that of fire ... ris] one of the principle 
causes of the present degeneracy of mankind.' This elicits the following response from 
the perf ecti biIian: 
I cannot agree ... in the consequences being so very disastrous. I admit 
that in some respects the use of animal food retards, though it cannot 
materially inhibit, the perfectibility of the species. But the use of fire 
was indispensably necessary, as IEschylus and Virgil expressly assert, 
to give being to the various arts of life, which, in their rapid and 
interminable progress, will finally conduct every individual ofthe race 
to the philosophic pinnacle of pure and perfect felicity. 505 
This second comment of Foster's typifies Peacock's portrayal of Godwin's 
version of perfectionism. My purpose in quoting it is to illustrate Peacock's confidence 
that his audience would recognise - even through Foster's ridiculous verbosity in 
conversation - the doctrines of Godwin, at least as popularly understood. The latter 
point concerning the popular understanding of the philosopher's scheme is important. 
We note that Peacock's Foster speaks of the 'arts of life ... in their rapid and 
503 Butler, Peacock Displayed - A Salirist in His Context, pp. 40 - 41. 
504 Brett-Smith and Jones (eds.),The Halliford Edition of the Works ofT/wmas Love Peacock, 
'Headlong Hall,' chapter I, 'The Mail,' pp. 9 - 10. 
505 Ibid., chapter II. 'The Squire. - The Breakfast,' pp. 16 - 17. 
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interminable progress' conducting individuals 'to the philosophic pinnacle of pure and 
perfect felicity.' However, as our examination of PoliticalJustice has shown, Godwin 
rejected the idea of culmination in the ascent of humankind. On the issue of popular 
understanding Brown comments that perfectibility remained: 
Vaguely used and understood for the most part, it was taken to mean 
that man could become [absolutely] perfect by his own efforts; and this 
view was freely attributed to Godwin by those who had not carefully 
read his work .. .It was one of the most carelessly misunderstood of all 
his theories.506 
A view of Godwin's system that takes up the theme of our human 'faculty of 
being continually made better and receiving perpetual improvement' would satisfy 
Brown's desire to correct the perceived misunderstanding. The scheme then loses the 
colouration given to it by satirists such as Peacock: it ceases to be a manifesto of 
absolute perfection. We may then begin to regard it, I suggest, as belonging to the 
same region of perfectionist thought as Wesley's doctrine (at least as far as he publicly 
expounded it). Recollecting our delineation of the Methodist leader's sermon of 1741 
we remember that he declared that we may not conclude that there is 'any absolute 
perfection on earth.' There is no state of perfection in this life that 'does not admit of a 
continual increase ... [s]o that how much soever any man hath attained, or in how high a 
degree soever he is perfect, he hath still need to "grow in grace," and daily to advance 
in the knowledge and love of God his Saviour.' Thus, we discovered that for Wesley 
perfectionism does not denote an ultimate zenith beyond which there is no further 
ascension; it is rather a state of continual mounting to higher levels of holiness. 507 So, 
we may say that Godwin's scheme shares with Wesley'S doctrine the idea of 
continuous improvement rather than attainment Though there are vast differences in 
their cognition of the nature of the force that impels people towards improvement - for 
the philosopher it is a principle of constant perception, whereas for the Methodist leader 
it is the work of the Holy Spirit - it is possible to argue that in one respect they both 
506 F.K. Brown, The Ufe of William Godwin, p. 54. 
507 See note 286. 
191 
belong to the same interpretive community. fishian observations certainly would place 
each of the men in several disparate communities, but on the issue of the course of 
perfection such observations lead us to conclude that Godwin and Wesley would 
acknowledge each other's position.SOB In my introduction I recorded that the bare 
mention of the word 'perfection' stirred strong responses in readers and hearers.S09 It 
seems that the response fashioned by their individual and communal cognition of that 
word caused these two men to regard perfection as both gradual and continual. It is 
this response that positions them in one interpretive community on this issue. 
The action of including Wesley and Godwin within the bounds of a similar 
interpretive stance causes us to view the Methodist's work as a constituent of the 
progressive project of the Enlightenment. We have seen that Godwin's form of 
perfectionism was merely a part of a commonplace radical speculation; but we must 
also remember that that radicalism itself remained subsumed within the general 
philosophic, scientific and rational spirit of eighteenth century Europe.5 1 0 I propose 
that we may likewise define Wesley's Christian perfection as elemental to the fennent 
of ideas during that era. All those that strove for perfection of any description became, 
in retrospect, a division within the advancing force ofthe human genius. In the 
introduction to the sixty-seventh volume of his 'Standard Novels' Peacock wrote the 
following summation of the age: 
Perfectibilians, deteriorationists, statu-quo-ites, phrenologists, 
transcendentalists, political economists, theorists in all sciences, 
projectors in all arts, morbid visionaries, romantic enthusiasts, lovers of 
music, lovers of the picturesque, and lovers of good dinners, march, 
and will march for ever, pari passu with the march of mechanics, which 
some facetiously call the march ofintellect.S11 
508 See notes 120 and 121. 
S09 See note 11. 
510 Margaret Drabble (ed.), The Oxford Companion to English Literature, p. 320. 
511 H. Cole (ed.), The Works o/Thomas Love Peacock. Including his Novels, Poems, Fugitive 
Pieces, Criticisms, Etc., With a Preface by the Right Hon. Lord Houghton. A Biographical 
Notice by His Grand-daughter, Edith Nicolls. and Portrait. (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 
New Burlington Street, 1875), Volume I, Introduction by Thomas Love Peacock dated 4th March 
1837, p. vi. It is strange that Peacock should include the 'deteriorationists' in his list of 
progressives. He did so presumably because they sounded a warning against what they perceived 
as the inexorable slide of humankind into an abyss brought on by the industrial revolution and 
advocated progress through a return to 'the primitive dignity of [our] sylvan origin.' See 
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Despite its satirical timbre Peacock's lines represent a telling reflection of the 
century. Side by side with protagonists of other theories, and at an equal rate of 
progress with them, the proponents of perfectionism stride forward: with a certainty 
analogous to the rise of the new technologies they pursue a perpetual course of 
intellectual and moral ascent. In that he espouses that women and men may gradually 
grow in perfection, we see John Wesley in this 'march of mechanics' with William 
Godwin in the phalanx of the perfectibilians. 
Thus, in fulfilIment of one of my introductory comments, I have ill ustrated 
something of the span of opinion on perfectionism by presenting a secular fonn that 
had its roots in the eighteenth century, so setting Wesley's ideas in a widercontext.512 
There now remains one further task: to exhibit some late twentieth century solutions to 
the interpretive problem in 1 John. 
'Headlong Hall,' chapter I, 'The Mail,' p. 10. 
512 See note 14. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXTANT ACADEMIC CONVENTIONS 
REGARDING THE 1 JOHN PROBLEM 
'Be sure of it: give me the ocular proof ... 
Make me to see't: or, at the least so prove it 
That the probation bear no hinge or loop 
To hang a doubt on .. .'5 13 
6. 1. Prefatory Remarks 
In my closing comments about the solutions to our problem offered by Wesley 
and those he admired I suggested that their stance regarding the text represents for us an 
archetype of the position maintained by later interpreters. For the eighteenth-century 
theologians the text remained determinate and, although the reader had some role in the 
establishment of meaning, they maintained that it is from the text that the she or he 
ultimately discovered the author's original intention. As will become apparent, what 
we have said about the earlier theologians' assumptions on this matter we can also say 
about those oflate twentieth century interpreters. Consequently, we must avoid merely 
repeating the results of our Fishian standpoint as applied to the modernist appeal to a 
stable text. Therefore, while still commenting on their claim to discover meaning in the 
text, I propose to highlight a further assumption held by contemporary interpreters: 
namely, that from the text they can have access to, and can reconstruct, the historical 
circumstances that lay behind the composition of 1 John and so provide solutions to the 
problem between our verses in chapters 1 and 3. 
We have already alluded to Robert Kysar's brief outline of current efforts to 
resolve the apparent contradiction in 110hn.514 Kysar also supplies a summary of 
513 T.J.B. Spencer, S. Wells and K. Muir (cds.), William Shakespeare, Othello (London: Penguin 
Books, The New Penguin Shakespeare, 1968; repro 1996), Act III, iii, lines 357, 361·363, 
p. 118. 
514 See note 252. 
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scholarly opinions regarding the setting and purpose of the epistle. Although he 
consistently uses the language of tentative suggestion, we note that he accepts the 
premise that investigation of the text facilitates a reconstruction of the historical 
situation. Moreover, he effectively declares that this assumption governs the majority 
of scholarship regarding the epistle; he says, 'There is universal agreement that this 
writing was produced to address a situation brought on by a schism within a Christian 
community.' The text contains evidence to enable reconstruction of the setting and 
purpose ofthe work. Moreover, we learn that it is: '[fjrom I John [that] we gain some 
impressions of the nature of the separatist group.' Scholars that marshal particular 
'explicit references' in the epistle regarding this matterS 15 may then judge other verses 
as authorial 'allusions to the views of the separatists.'S 16 Following the assemblage of 
the information gleaned from the text there 'arises a scenario which may have produced 
the setting for the writing of 1 John.' 
Though the efforts of scholars to identify the separatists with a specific group 
known elsewhere in the New Testament remain frustrated due to 'the nature of the 
evidence,'S 1 7 nevertheless historical reconstruction has continued as one of the 
important stimuli to the study of 1 John. Interestingly, Kysar suggests the use of the 
imagination in the exercise: 
It may be that we should imagine a parent body with a number of 
smaller gatherings of Christians (perhaps "house churches"). One of 
the two groups held to a view of Christ and a morality which gradually 
alienated them from their brothers and sisters in the church until that 
group eventually withdrew from the community.S1S 
Despite this acknowledgement of the need to employ mental creativity, it is to 
the 'evidence' he sees within the epistle that Kysar finally appeals in order to 
reconstruct the situation. So, Kysar's introduction tells us that it is precisely this sort 
515 Kysar lists these as: 2: 9 - 11, 18 - 23; 3: 8; 4: 2 - 3, 5 - 6,20 - 21; 5: 5 - 6. 
516 These allusions Kysar sees in 1: 6 - 10; 2: 4, 9; 3: 3 - 10; 4: 6,20; 5: 16. 
517 Scholars variously propose Jewish, Christian, Gentile, 'proto-Gnostic,' Gnostic or Docetic 
groups as the dissenting party. 
SIS R. Kysar, 'Epistles of John,' ABD 3; El; 905. See note 218. 
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of appeal to textual evidence that characterises major studies of 1 John and the 
Johannine corpus at the end of the twentieth century. As modem historical-critical 
scholars' solutions to our problem rest upon their reconstruction of setting and 
purpose, it is essential that we describe instances of that reconstruction as well as the 
solutions themselves. Therefore, we will now conduct a concise examination of recent 
work on our problem. I do not intend this as an exhaustive inquiry, but rather as a 
display of typical scholarly approach to the text and as a vehicle to comment on that 
approach from our chosen perspective. 
6. 2. John Bogart 
We will begin with the influential 1977 work Orthodoxandlleretical 
Perfectionism in the Johannine Community as Evident in the First Epistle of John by 
John Bogart. In an 'effort to solve this exegetical puzzle,' Bogart's study asks 'a 
number of historical-critical questions.' This effort results in 'an attempted historical 
reconstruction of the Johannine community between the time its Gospel was written 
and the composition of the First Epistle.'S 19 In his first chapter, while laying out the 
nature of his terminological definitions and methodological presuppositions, this 
scholar declares that: 
"Perfectionism" is the term generally applied to the view that man is 
capable of achieving sinlessness in his present existence. This 
definition primarily concerns the ethical aspect of perfection, i.e., the 
achievement of ethical or moral purity; it may, however, be expanded to 
include spiritual perfection also, i.e., the union with God or the beatific 
vision.S20 
This scholar excludes from his study the achievement of complete perfectionism 
only in the after-life. Similarly he rules out the gradual reaching of some measure 'of 
ethical and I or spiritual good over a long period of time, or of having only intermittent 
periods of sinlessness.' He deduces that: '"Perfectionism" and "perfection" ... are 
S 19 Bogart, Ortlwdox and Heretical Perfectionism in the JO/lIlnnine Commufliry as Evident in the 
First Epistle of John, p. I. 
S20 Ibid., p. 7. 
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necessarily absolute terms. One cannot be "slightly perfect" any more than "slightly 
dead."' However, though the epistle contains perfectionist teaching, it is 'not 
perfectionist in the absolute sense, since the author anticipates temporary lapses into 
sin, even among the faithful.'521 
Bogart descries two forms of perfectionism and these he terms 'Orthodox' and 
'HereticaL' He sensitively notes that the 'terms obviously can vary considerably in 
meaning and content according to the theological predilections of the author employing 
them.' 'One man's orthodoxy is another man's heresy,' he acknowledges. However, 
this is not to imply that such designations do not acquire a fixed significance, at least 
for an interval. This scholar registers his awareness of the temporal development of 
expressions according to peoples' cognisance of them. As the terms only began to 
'gain a specialized meaning from the late second century on' we may not apply them to 
the New Testament with any appropriateness or accuracy. Nevertheless, a 'mind-set' 
similar to that found in the second century 'is also evident in the New Testament.' It is 
a mode of thought that: 'dichotomously divides all doctrine into well-defined categories 
labeled either "orthodox" or "heretical" (with an occasional middle ground labeled 
"heterodox").' There is no evidence in 1 John that the author faced opposition from 
organised schools of 'commonly recognised heretical teaching,' as became manifest in 
the second century. Moreover, says Bogart: '[I]t is not clear that in the late first century 
the lines between "orthodoxy" and "heresy" were as clearly drawn as they obviously 
were by the end of the second century.' Yet, the 'tendency toward drawing such 
lines ... the tendency toward dichotomous or dualistic thinking concerning doctrine, in 
light of the struggle with opponents who taught dubious doctrines ... is already present 
in 1 John.' Although the term 'orthodox' does not appear in the New Testament, as it 
originally meant 'straight teaching' Bogart sees 'no great objection to using it when 
speaking of what the author of 1 John considers correct doctrine.' This is 'provided 
that no implications of an elaborately organised system of orthodoxy were ascribed to 
521 Ibid., pp. 7 - 8 and p. 8 note 4. 
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him, as might be ascribed to the later Patristic writers.' He assures us: 'Of course we 
wish to avoid terminological anachronisms.'S22 
Further to this assurance Bogart states: 
It is ana~hronistic to apply theo!ogical terms born in a later age to 
t~eolo~lcal problems of an ~arher age. To do so leads inevitably to a 
dIstortIOn of the understandmg of the earlier age ... Care must always be 
taken not to interpret the first century through the eyes of any later 
century. This ought to be axiomatic, but it is surprising and dismaying 
how often it is ignored.523 
We discover that this scholar regards himself as having taken such care, thus avoidi ng 
the error of the 'distortion of the understanding of the earlier age.' His approach 
primarily concerns 'the First Epistle of John as it stands in its final redaction' and how 
the last redactor 'understood his sources and how he used and remolded them for his 
own theological and polemical purposes.' Bogart explains that he has used a form-
critical method of analysis (along with insights offered by the study of motifs, parallel 
perfectionist texts, contexts, theology and linguistics). He declares that his use of this 
method will achieve 'a clearer understanding of the life situation in the Johannine 
community at the time 1 John was written than would all the source criticism in the 
world. '524 Abjuring the application to the Johannine corpus of theological terms born 
in a later age, this scholar claims to return to the text to reconstruct the life-setting of the 
Epistles. The means he employs to study the texts 'are capable of yielding positive 
results for a reliable historical reconstruction.' From the texts he will 'obtain data 
which will help us understand what changes in the life situation occurred within the 
community between the writing of the Gospel and the Epistles.' Moreover, he will: 
'obtain an excellent insight into the life situation ... at the time the First Epistle was 
written by noting the apparent quotations of the author's opponents, and also by 
analysing the theological content of the author's arguments against his opponents.'525 
522 Ibid., pp. 8 - 9. 
523 Ibid., p. 20. 
524 Ibid., p. 21. 
525 Ibid., pp. 22 - 23. 
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Bogart accepts that it is impossible to know what the opponents 'literally said, 
short of discovering some hitherto unknown manuscripts.' Yet 'we need not despair of 
finding out with a reasonable measure of accuracy, what they actually claimed, in spite 
of any suspicions about either the author's accuracy in quoting his opponents or his 
possible malice in misquoting them.' We 'may reasonably trust the author of 1 John.' 
He 'is obviously giving us only what he thinks his opponents were 
asserting, but his impressions, characterizations or paraphrasings are 
reliable for this reason: There can be no doubt that his opponents' claims 
were actually upsetting the community, and causing such a disturbance 
among the faithful that the author felt obliged, as a good pastor, to write 
his congregation(s) and set them straight.'S26 
The intense reaction ofthe author proves that the community understood that the 
opponents' views represented a genuine threat to their orthodoxy. Bogart informs us 
of a point 'which is vital to [his] whole research, namely, that the apparent quotations 
(verbatim or not) are reliable indicators of the actual, historical teaching of the 
opponents in 1 John.'S27 This scholar thus attests to his confidence that he can return 
to the text and discover there, with some exactness, the historical situation of the First 
Epistle, the veracity of the author's report, and the arguments put forward by the 
opponents. 
Beginning to address the contradiction, Bogart explains: 
The first assertion, in 1: 8 aflQfYtWV m)1c EXOfll!V, is cast in the 
present indicative, which here seems to have a durative function, 
indicating a permanent state of being, existing not only in the present, 
but stretching timelessly into both the past and the future. This would 
mean that the author's opponents claim always to have been sinless, 
i.e., intrinsically sinless, a c1aim ... typical of the "gnosticizing false 
teachers" in 1 John who claim to be in the light i.e., perfect and sinless. 
The second assertion, in 1: 10 oUX lJflQJmlKQf1£V, is cast in the 
perfect, which often indicates the continuance of completed action. This 
would serve to strengthen the opponents' claim to sinlessness, made in 
526 Ibid., pp. 28 - 29. 
527 Ibid., pp. 29 - 30. 
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the present tense in 1: 8 - they never have sinned at all. No Christian 
perfectionist would ever make such a claim.528 
The claims to perfection in 1: 3 and 6, 2: 4, 6 and 7 do 'not imply that the Christian 
members of the Johannine community never in their past sinned; presumabl y they were 
sinners before they were baptized into the Church, after which they claimed a life of 
perfection, or near perfection, because of their new fellowship with the Father.' It is 
only a gnostic view of humans as intrinsically part of the Divine that could claim that 
they had never sinned. Bogart maintains that the opponents' claim represented in 
verses 1: 8 and 10: 'betrays a doctrine of human nature radically different from the 
Judeo-Christian one found throughout the whole Bible, and which hardly needs 
documenting, namely, that man is sinful and in need of redemption.' The 
'anthropology' revealed, so 'radically different .. .from that which underlies the whole 
biblical doctrine of man,' may 'properly be designated as gnostic.'529 
To counter this heretical perfectionism, and to strengthen the foundations for his 
affirmation of the orthodox type, the author introduces a theological concept 
'previously unmentioned ... in Johannine literature' (that is, previously unmentioned in 
the Fourth Gospel), the doctrine of the expiation for sin found in verses 1: 7b, 9; 2: 1 b 
- 2. These verses do not qualify the opponents' perfectionist claim. Rather, they refute 
it We discover that: 'The presence of this common Christian doctrine of the atonement 
here in 1 John indicates the author's desire to bring the Johannine community [regarded 
by Bogart as 'sectarian'] back into line with the great mainline Christian thinking about 
Christ's death, and so close the mouths of the heretics within the community.'530 
Before the author made this introduction the doctrine of expiation for sin was 'almost 
unheard of in the Johannine community.'531 Bogart elucidates for us that the story of 
the death of Christ in the Fourth Gospel lacks this element and concentrates rather upon 
528 Ibid., pp. 33 - 34. 
529 Ibid., p. 34 
530 Ibid., pp. 34 - 35. 
531 Ibid., p. 37. 
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glorification, exaltation, self-dedication and sanctification. So, the author asserted an 
emphasis held by the wider Church to demonstrate to the community that it was human 
sin that made necessary an expiatory element to Christ's death. Therefore, those under 
gnostic influence were wrong in their claim never to have sinned as to do this was to 
deny the exigency of that death.532 
It would be simplistic, however, to reduce the situation to a confrontation 
between an 'expiationist' author and a gnostically perfectionist opposition; Bogart says 
that verses like 1: 3ff reveal that the author too 'claims moral purity [as 'a gift to man, 
not his by right'] for himself and his followers.' This 'is a type of perfectionism, since 
moral purity is obviously equivalent to sinlessness.' Such assertions of perfectionism 
advanced by the author may be 'made by any good Johannine Christian, and can be 
abundantly documented in the Fourth Gospel.'S33 Moreover, besides the 'primitive 
doctrine of expiation,' to refute the opponents the author deploys 'an emphasis upon 
the qualifying motifs of abiding in God and being born o/God, found in 3: 6 and 9.' 
We learn that these two verses 'more than 1: 3ff., provide us with the locu.~ classicus 
of orthodox perfectionism in 1 John.'534 These motifs, however, have links to an 
eschatological theme within the epistle. Bogart endorses the view that: 
For the author of 1 John, the tension between perfection and sin still 
exists, as clearly stated in 3: 2, "Beloved, we are now children of God, 
and it does not yet appear what we shall be." The Christian in 1 John 
lives the dynamic life of the ever-approaching eschaton: he already has 
been born of God and abides in Christ, and insofar as he fulfills those 
two essential provisions, he is sinless (3: 6,9). But there remains a 
"not yet," a future expectation of the completion or fulfillment of his 
moral perfection, and this implies that he may yet lapse back into sin 
temporarily and have need of the forgiveness which comes through 
Christ's expiatory sacrifice (1: 7bff.).535 
Divine birth and abidance in Christ, then, exist as conditions for the enjoyment of 
sinlessness. However, even that sinlessness is not consummate. Moral perfection lies 
532 Ibid., pp. 35 - 37; 136 - 141. 
533 Ibid., pp. 37 - 38. 
534 Ibid., p. 39. 
535 Ibid., p. 44. 
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in the future, leaving the believer vulnerable to recidivation and thus reliant upon the 
benefits of Christ's death. This argument supports Bogart's assertion that any 
contradiction of 3: 6 and 9 with our verses in chapter one 'is only apparent.'536 
After providing a summary of academic solutions to the problem, in a section he 
calls 7he Real Conflict in 1 John,' this scholar explains that 'the apparent conflict 
between 1: 8ff, and 3: 6 and 9 is due to the author's condemnation of the heretical type 
of perfectionism in the former and his affirmation of the orthodox type in the latter.' 
However, he admits, 'there remains an inconsistency in 1 John.' Eagerness to combat 
heretical perfectionism led the author to employ three strate gems against the opponents. 
Beside the two already mentioned (the introduction of the doctrine of expiation, and the 
two important qualifications or provisions for sinlessness in 3: 6 and 9), a third 
manoeuvre took the form of 'a system of casuistry concerning two kinds of sin, mortal 
and non-mortal.' A problem arises in that the first and third stratagems, expiation and 
casuistry, conflict with the second, the conditions of abiding in Christ and being born 
of God. By introducing the first and third the author 'effectively nullified even his 
orthodox version of perfectionism.' We learn that there 'simply can be no way of 
harmonizing even the carefully qualified perfectionism of3: 6 and 9 with the 
antiperfectionist, gradualist ethic presupposed by expiationism and casuistry.' For, 
perfection is, by definition, an absolute. Marshalling the doctrine of expiation and the 
artifice of casuistry proved to be 'overkill' regarding perfectionism: on the one hand 
'they must have effectively countered the gnostic doctrine of perfection'; yet 'at the 
same time ... they produced an intolerable tension with the orthodox expression of 
perfection. Expiation for sin and sinless perfection by abiding in Christ and being born 
of God are simply irreconcilable doctrines.'S37 
Bogart states at this point: 
536 Ibid., p. 39. 
537 Ibid., p. 47. 
Now in order to save the author of 1 John from the accusation of being 
confused, unaware of the obvious inconsistency between expiationism 
and perfectionism, the only apparent alternative would be to say that he 
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genuinely espoused one of these doctrines, while giving the other only 
fonnal a~ceptance out of a se~se of loyalty to his church's teaching. Of 
the tw?, ~t w~uld s~em more lIkely that the author espoused the doctrine 
of expIation, In which case he could not technically be tenned a 
perfectionist, as we have strictly employed the term. (Perhaps he could 
be tenned a "semi-perfectionist" or a "quasi-perfectionist," since he 
certainly longed after perfection for his congregation [s]}.538 
Thus, this scholar realises that to rescue the author from readerly allegations of 
perplexity he must describe an assured authorial stance. Therefore, he portrays him as 
an expiationist, yet one who maintains some personal and communal aspirations to 
sinlessness. Bogart's author continues to embrace perfectionism because it belongs to 
the Johannine Gospel tradition - yet he does so with a gentle clasp. Displaying his 
insight, this scholar reveals that the 'tension in the author's mind shows up especially 
in 5: 16ff.,' when discussing intercessory prayer. The 'casuistic' compromise made 
here by attempting ('rather feebly,' says Bogart) to distinguish between 'mortal' and 
'non-mortal' sins would never have been attempted by any thoroughgoing 
perfectionist, for such a person would affirm that a believer is either sinless or not 
sinless. Furthennore, we may not find this casuistry in any part of the New Testament 
dealing with the expiatory sacrifice of Christ. It occurs in this instance due to 'the 
author's attempt to reconcile two different, and ultimately irreconcilable. concepts of 
sin. which, in tum. [rest] on two utterly different ethical systems. viz., perfectionism 
and gradualism.' Under the perfectionist ethic there is only one type of sin. mortal; but 
under an ethic infonned by expiationist theology 'sins could be seen as existing.' The 
author shows himself to be an expiationist by his belief that there could be such a thing 
as non-mortal or venial sins.539 
So. by introducing the doctrine of Christ's expiation for sin. and as a 
consequence the practice of casuistry, the author 'modified his orthodox perfectionism 
to the point that it ceased being a thoroughgoing perfectionism in the strict sense.' 
However, rather than abandonding it altogether he 'carefully qualified it, probably out 
538 Ibid., p. 48. 
539 Ibid., p. 48. 
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of loyalty to his heritage.' From our Fishian standpoint it is interesting to note Bogart's 
confidence that his work represents an insight into the 'Real Conflict' in 1 John. 
Authorial motive, for instance, becomes clear through sedulous scrutiny of the text. 
We discover that the expiatory emphasis appears not simply out of pastorally driven 
polemical concerns but 'also out of the author's personal conviction of its truth.' 
Likewise, the author retains a modified version of perfectionism not only out of loyalty 
to his Johannine heritage but also 'to be sure, out of real spiritual longing for his 
"children."' Because of the juxtaposition of the two mutually incompatible doctrines of 
expiation and perfection, the author evidently felt 'forced' to construct a compromise: 'a 
casuistic system which made, for the first time in Christian history, a distinction 
between mortal and non-mortal sins.'540 Bogart has discovered the 'real conflict' in 
the text ('the carefully qualified perfectionism of3: 6 and 9' set against 'the 
anti perfectionist, gradualist ethic presupposed by expiationism and casuistry') in 
contrast to the mistaken perception of others (regarding the seeming authorial self-
contradiction represented by our verses in chapters one and three). 
Bogart authoritatively assures us that 'we may safely conclude that the origin of 
the orthodox perfectionism found in 1 John (notably in 3: 6,9) is rooted exclusively in 
the Gospel of John itself. No additional hypothesis need be constructed to account for 
its origin.'541 From it the believer emerges as a person: born from heaven and of the 
spirit; possessing the spirit; not of this world; at once abiding in, and being the abode 
of, Jesus; elect; who is the possession of God; not subject to divine judgement; special 
to, and loved and honoured by, Jesus and the Father; presently enjoying the 
eschatological rewards of peace, joy and answered prayer; benefitting from being a 
friend rather than a slave of Jesus; already owning the life of the new aeon; interceded 
for by the Son; beloved by the Father; glorified and sanctified; doing the truth; walking 
in the light; following Jesus; doing God's work; fulfilling and surpassing Jesus' own 
mission; keeping the commandments; remaining in union and mutual love with the 
540 Ibid., pp. 48 • 49. 
541/bid., p. 91. 
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community; hated by the world; declared as already pure by the doctrine received; 
orthodox and in possession 'of the true gnosis of the Father himself.'542 'In short,' 
says Bogart, the believer in the 10hannine Gospel 'is perfect.'543 
Having sought Fourth Gospel proofs of the perfection of the believer this 
scholar explores various types of pre-Johannine literature: a) for 'evidences of 
perfectionist tendencies'; b) to 'find the source of the original perfectionism of the 
Gospel of John'; and c) for 'some clues of how and why it bifurcated into orthodox 
and heretical types by the time [of the composition of] the First Epistle.'544 His 
judgement regarding Hebrew and Jewish literature is that 'only in some writings of 
Jewish apocalyptic can we find a perfecionism like that found in the Johannine corpus.' 
Two elements must converge to produce genuine and complete perfectionism and 
Bogart terms these as: 'imminent eschatological hope and strict ethical 
dichotomization.'545 Both Jewish apocalyptic literature and the Johannine Gospel 
share these elements, but in the latter there is a greater sense of realised 
eschatology.546 Thus, the orthodox perfectionism evident in 1 John originated from 
John's Gospel; moreover, if we trace further backwards we discover that the 
perfectionism found in the Gospel has 'its ethical dualism and realised 
eschatology ... rooted in a Sitz-im-Leben not too different from that of Jewish 
apocalyptic.'547 Bogart does not claim thatJohannine perfectionism originated out of 
Jewish apocalyptic, as he admits that 'there would be no way to demonstrate this.' 
Yet, he does claim that the life-settings 'in both communities were mutually 
analogous.'548 Given this background, within the writings of the New Testament and 
the Apostolic Fathers, this scholar maintains that 'the perfectionism we meet in 1 John 
3: 6,9, which [had its roots] in the Gospel of John, is unique in the New 
542 Ibid .• pp. 63 - 90. 
543 Ibid., p. 91. 
544 Ibid .• p. 91. 
545 Ibid., p. 108. 
546 Ibid., p. 3. 
S47 Ibid., p. 115. 
548 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Testament.'549 We learn that it 'must be admitted that lohannine perfectionism is sui 
generis' in that body ofliterature.550 
Having established the origin of orthodox perfectionism this scholar goes on to 
detennine the source of its heretical variant. Concerning the gnostic literature of the 
early centuries of the Christian era, Bogart assumes that the Fourth Gospel 'came out of 
the same world of thought,' though he denies that he has any intention to establish any 
causal relationship between the two. Moreover, he says that the Gospel's 'use of 
obviously gnosticising language ... [demonstrates that] it was operating in a naive or 
unselfconscious fashion.'S51 Citing extracts from sources he acknowledges as later 
than 1 lohn (The Gospel of Truth, The Gospel of Thomas, The Odes of Solomon, the 
Excerpta ex Theodoto, and evidence from Irenaeus concerning Valentinian 
penectionism552) Bogart comments that regarding the gnostic evidence he has quoted: 
[I]t would not be unreasonable ... to hypothesise that it had earlier 
forbears which could have inspired the penectionist heretics of 1 John. 
There can be no direct proof of this, but it is possible, and because of 
the close match between the Valentini an evidence and 1 John, even 
probable that some hypothetical early gnostics were responsible for the 
heretical penectionism condemned in 1 John.553 
This scholar eliminates the idea that the heretical penectionists could have 
derived their perfectionism from the same Gospel source as their orthodox 
counterparts. The heretics' ideas were no mere extension of a 'Tendenz' already found 
in lohn's Gospel- a doctrine pushed too far and later declared as heresy. Rather, these 
ideas, as we gleaned from the earlier grammatical analysis of 1: 8 and 10, had their 
basis in a radically different anthropology from the 'basically biblical anthropology 
found in lohn.' Bogart declares: 'lohannine penectionism, originating in the Gospel 
and echoed in the First Epistle, in its orthodox fonn in 3: 6,9, was radically perverted 
549 Ibid., p. 108. 
550 Ibid., p. 114. 
551 Ibid., pp. 114 - 115. 
552/bid., pp. 114 - 119. 
553 Ibid., p. 119. 
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by an alien anthropology.'554 Heretical perfectionism derived from the Gospel of 
John 'only insofar as its exponents had been members of the Johannine community, 
and would naturally have inherited this teaching.' These community members 'had 
been converted (or perverted, from the standpoint of the author of 110hn) to a gnostic 
anthropology, and hence contaminated theirinherited perfectionism with an alien, 
gnostic view of man.'555 We discover that from this standpoint: 
[T]he heretical perfectionists, by their gnostic view of man, made all 
perfectionism thoroughly repulsive. The author of 1 John had the task 
of repUdiating his gnostic opponents and trying to save Johannine 
perfectionism in its original state. This ... he accomplished only 
imperfectly, and in the end perfectionism disappeared from the 
Johannine community.556 
So, the bifurcation into orthodox and heretical perfectionism happened because of the 
seducing influence of an alien, gnostic view of humankind. Moreover, ultimately the 
whole inclination towards perfectionism ceased as a result of both the claims of the 
heretics and the 'overkill' response of the author. 
For Bogart, the process of ascertaining the identity and claims of the heretics 
involves not only isolating 'the specific designations of the author,' but also '"reading 
between the lines" throughout the Epistle in order to discern the controversial 
background of the author's statements. '557 By so reading the material this scholar 
reconstructs the existence of ten 'identifiable categories' of people within the 
community, all of whom the author seeks to rebuke or correct in some way. Though 
the heretical perfectionists are a distinguishable category in Bogart's taxonomy, he 
informs us that the 'subsections overlap.'558 Consequently, we may, for instance, 
'legitimately' identify these opponents with both docetist and libertine parties who also 
made up the community. He makes this correlation between these categories without 
554 Ibid., p. 120. 
555 Ibid., pp. 120 - 121. 
556 Ibid., p. 121. 
557 Ibid., p. 123. 
558 Ibid., p. 131. 
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implying that they held identical views. Despite the initial impression of a plethora of 
opponents, according to this scholar the differing categories 'all comprised the same 
group'; therefore, 'the author of 1 John fought on only one front - (discounting his 
pastoral admonitions to the faint-hearted, etc. within his community).' Creating a 
poly-hyphenated compound term for this group, Bogart describes them as the: 
'hereticaI-perfectionist-docetist-libertine-charismatic-prophetic-itinerant-teachers.'559 
Concluding his work, this scholar reiterates his views respecting what he 
regards as three essential areas for his analysis: a) theology; b) anthropology; and, c) 
soteriology. Elucidating on each of these, he states that there was nothing inherent in 
the Fourth Gospel presentation of them that led directly to the development of heretical 
perfectionism, and 'which in tum was a part of a larger gnostic complex.'560 He 
states that the Gospel of John 'does not contain within itself the seeds of gnostic 
heresy.' We may not conclude 'that its gnosticizing tendencies could have naturally 
developed into any full-fledged gnostic system.'561 Therefore, to speculate that a 
perfectionist Johannine Christian had a 'mind set' that could easily lead to gnosticism is 
to indulge in 'psychologizing without firm evidence.'562 It is true that the Gospel 
'employs gnostic myth and language' in some places (exhibited mainly concerning 
christology and ecclesiology), yet 'it remains consonant with biblical faith.'563 We do 
not possess 'definite evidence' of natural vulnerability to gnostic thinking; no 'spiritual 
autobiographies' have come down to us from community members and so we cannot 
make any judgement on the issue. The 'evidence available' does not tell us with any 
exactitude how some Johannine community members became gnostics: whether they 
did so, for instance, because of an influx of pro-gnostic gentiles who failed to accept 
the 'basic biblical doctrines of God and man,' or due to the absence within the 
559 Ibid., p. 133. 
560 Ibid., p. 133. 
561 Ibid., p. 136. 
562 Ibid., p. 133. 
563 Ibid., p. 134. 
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community of 'an Old Testament background of belief in God as the creator and man as 
his creature ... [w]e cannot tell'564 He explains: 
Not even the authors and redactors of the 10hannine literature tell us 
their "inmost thoughts." If we are to trace influences and 
countercurrents we must use the only evidence we have on hand, 
namely, the texts, and not what we imagine could have gone on in the 
minds of some rather remote first and second century Christians.S65 
Having made this point it is interesting that Bogart deduces that the opponents 
of the author espoused heretical perfectionism as a result of the adoption of 'gnostic and 
alien views,' rather than following a misreading of the Gospel. As we will see shortly, 
Raymond Brown comes to the opposite conclusion on the basis of the same evidence. 
We note also that at this stage Bogart renews his claim that he has returned to the text as 
the solely reliable source of historical reconstruction. However, his assertion that he is 
making recourse to a text that has a self-evident meaning stands in tension with the 
interpretive manoeuvres he has found necessary to effect. We remember that the 
process of ascertaining the identity and claims of the heretics involves not only isolating 
'the specific designations of the author,' but also '"reading between the lines" 
throughout the Epistle in order to discern the controversial background of the author's 
statements.' Additionally, we find in his reconstruction of the identity of the opponents 
this scholar adds that in 1: 5 - 2: 17 'we meet, "between the lines," a group of worldly 
persons who are morally indifferent, i.e., libertines.'S66 Despite his admonition that 
we must not 'imagine [what] could have gone on in the minds of some rather remote 
first and second century Christians,' as we have seen he confidently asserts the 
transparency of authorial motive. The expiatory emphasis that he sees in the text 
appears not simply out of pastorally driven polemical concerns but 'also out of the 
author's personal conviction of its truth.' Also, the author's retention of a modified 
version of perfectionism emanates not only out of loyalty to his lohannine heritage but 
564 Ibid., pp. 134 and 135. 
565 Ibid., p. 134. 
566 Ibid., p. 129. See note 558. 
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also 'to be sure, out of real spiritual longing for his "children."'S67 Similarly, 
regarding the author's report of the claims of his opponents, he 'is obviously giving us 
only what he thinks his opponents were asserting.'S68 Furthennore, he claims insight 
into the cerebral processes of some other early believers: while he appeals to the textual 
authority of 1 John to deny the validity of the search for a 'mind-set' that could easily 
lead to gnosticism, he prosecutes such a search for the 'mind-set' of various New 
Testament writers to prove that they divided doctrine into categories equivalent to 
'orthodox' or 'heretical.'S69 Thus, we may argue that to reconstruct the history of the 
10hannine community Bogart must interpret rather than simply demonstrate what is in 
the texts. Though he avers to read the text exclusively, he must 'read between the 
lines' and read the mind of the author. In Bogart, then, we find another instance of a 
scholar claiming not to be interpreting - a move that we have discussed in chapter 2 and 
noted in the work of Wesley and his luminaries. Our Fishian perspective aids us to 
discern the rhetoric of objectivity that this scholar uses to recommend his reading. 
Without implying hermeneutical incoherence, I suggest that we may descry that each of 
our late twentieth century scholars execute the same move. 
6. 3. Raymond E. Brown 
Raymond E. Brown, as we have noted, has conducted an ongoing project to 
reconstruct the historic setting of so-called 'Johannine Christianity' - a project that he 
began over four decades ago.S70 The frontispiece of his book, The Community of the 
Beloved Disciple (1979), reveals the compass of Brown's perceived achievement: 
'This study in 10hannine ecclesiology reconstructs the history of that Christian 
community whose life from "the beginning" to "the last hour" is reflected in the Gospel 
and Epistles of John.' In the Preface, Brown modestly declares: 'I warn the reader that 
my reconstruction claims at most probability; and if sixty percent of my detective work 
567 See notes 566 and 541. 
568 See note 527. 
569 See note 523. 
570 See note 221. 
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is accepted, I shall be happy indeed.'571 This piece, together with his exposition The 
Epistles of John (1982) and his earlier volumes that comprise his commentary The 
Gospel According to John, 572 stands as a major contribution to the field of 10hannine 
studies. We have already noted Barnabas Lindar's commendation of the success of his 
colleague's efforts in his remark: 'Brown's reconstruction is not definitive, but it is the 
best on offer.'573 To explore in his work the factors germane to our purpose we will 
draw from The Community of the Beloved Disciple and The Epistles of John. 
Brown pays tribute to the pioneers of New Testament ecclesiological 
reconstruction,1. Wellhausen and R. Bultmann. He 'accept[s] in principle the ability 
to detect Christian community life beneath the surface Gospel story.' Yet he issues a 
caveat surrounding the 'methodological difficulties' that may arise in pursuit of the 
project. 57 4 The exegete must avoid 'overly imaginative deductions about ecclesiastical 
history' on the one hand, and 'the argument from silence' on the other.575 Moreover, 
she or he must shun a tendency to 'posit non-existent pre-Gospel sources and to 
determine the theological outlook of the evangelist (and his community) from the way 
in which he has corrected the source.' Having issued this caveat Brown reassures us 
that though 'one cannot completely avoid such perils' he is able to promise: 'I shall try 
to minimize the element of self-deception.' He will build on the foundation of the text 
of 'the existing Gospel, not on any reconstructed sources.'576 Considering our 
Fishian viewpoint the latter intention looks like a version of the 'back-to-the-text' 
manoeuvre that we have just noted in Bogart's elucidation. 
As an historical-critical scholar, Brown assumes as a matter of course that he 
may discern the meaning and historical setting of the 10hannine corpus by means of 
careful analysis. Moving from his foundation in the Fourth Gospel, he carefully 
571 RE. Brown, The Commllnity 0/ the Beloved Disciple, Frontispiece, and Prerace p. 7. 
572 RE. Brown, The Gospel According to John (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, AC, 2 
Volumes, 1966 - 70). 
573 See note 233. 
574 R.E. Brown, The Community 0/ the Beloved Disciple, pp. 17 - 18. 
S7S Ibid., p. 19. 
576 Ibid., p. 20. 
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assembles the pieces of infonnation he sees in the Gospel and goes on to incorporate 
elements that he observes in the epistles. His endeavours culminate in two charts of 
Johannine Community history that feature a four-phase time-line and a kind of dramatis 
personre of the groups involved. Brown traces the development of the community, 
beginning in the mid 50s of the first century and on into the second century. He 
initially follows the course of two Jewish parties who believed in Jesus either as 
Davidic Messiah or Mosaic leader: one made up of those embracing 'relatively standard 
expectations' (and who included in their number a personal follower of Jesus 
eventually known as the Beloved Disciple), and another group who held 'an anti-
Temple bias.'577 The amalgamation of these two parties into a single 'Johannine 
Christian' group catalysed the development of 'a high pre-existence christology.' 
Subsequent debates with other Jews concerning monotheism resulted in the expulsion 
of the 'Johannine Christians' from the synagogues. Alienation drove the Christian 
group to stress 'a realization of the eschatological promises in Jesus' teaching in 
compensation for what they had lost in JUdaism, and to regard 'the Jews' (those who 
rejected Jesus) as 'children of the devi1.' At the forefront of this transition was the 
Beloved Disciple, who encouraged others to take the same path. This development 
represents the end of phase one ('Origins') of the time-line, a closure that Brown sets at 
the late 8Os.578 
A mission to the Gentiles followed, and the group regarded the conversion of 
these peoples as God's plan of fulfilment. Brown suggests that the Johannine 
community may deliberately have moved from their Palestinian place of origin to the 
Diaspora to teach the Greeks. He says that although this contact with the Greeks 
served to draw out the universalistic aspects of Johannine thought, the persecution by 
'the Jews' and rejection by others led to the group's abjurement of 'the world' as a 
system under the dominion of Satan, a system that had rejected Jesus. Moreover, the 
577 Ibid., Summary Charts One and Two: 'The History of the Johannine Community,' and 'Different 
Religious Groupings Outside the Johannine Community as Seen Through the Pages of the 
Fourth Gospel.' Summary Chart One, Phase One: Origins, paragraphs 1 and 2, p. 166. 
578 Ibid., Summary Chart One, Phase One: Origins, paragraph 3, p. 166; Summary Chart Two, 
Section II, p. 168; Summary Chart Two, Section II, p. 168. 
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'Crypto-Christian' (a term Brown uses to describe Jewish believers who remained 
within the synagogue) rejection of the high christology of the Johannine group heralded 
a breaking of communion between these factions. Fellowship still existed with the 
'Apostolic Christians' (Jewish and Gentile believers who counted themselves as heirs 
of the Apostles' teaching), but strains remained on the issues of christology and church 
structure. The group began to accentuate christology in order to refute 'the Jews' and 
the 'Jewish Christians' (Christians who had left the synagogues, who regarded 
themselves as followers of the tradition of James the brother of the Lord, who rejected 
Jesus'divinity). However, this resulted in a split within the Johannine community. 
These events mark the end of phase two ('Gospel') of Brown's time line, and he sets 
them in the 9Os.5 79 
From about C.E. 100, a period Brown terms as phase three, 'Epistles,' the 
Johannine Community divided into two. On the one hand, the 'Secessionists' 
maintained that Jesus' divinity had been of such an order that he was not fully human. 
Consequently, he did not belong to the world, and his earthly life, and that of the 
believer, had no 'salvific import.' Jesus' human existence 'was only a stage in the 
career of the divine word and not an intrinsic component in redemption.' What Jesus 
did in Palestine held no importance for the secessionists, including his death on a cross. 
Salvation would be unchanged if the Word had become incarnate in a different human 
representative who lived and died in an altered manner. Yet, the knowledge that God's 
Son came into the world remained vital, and those who believed this already enjoyed 
salvation. On the other hand, the adherents of the author of the epistles argued that to 
be a child of God there must be a confession that Jesus came in the flesh. Furthermore, 
the believer must keep the commandments. The anointing with the Spirit obviates the 
need for human teachers, and all those who claim to have the Spirit must accept a 
testing of that claim. This fraternity regarded the 'Secessionists' as children of the devil 
and the antichrists.580 
579 Ibid., Summary Chart One, Phase Two: Gospel, paragraphs I and 2, pp. 166 - 167~ Summary 
Chart Two, Sections IV, V and VI, p. 169. 
580 Ibid., Summary Chart One, Phase Three: Epistlcs, paragraphs 1 and 2, p. 167. 
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Phase four, 'After the Epistles,' Brown describes as a period when the two 
parties further diverged. The secessionist party followed the 'road to gnosticism,' and 
gained as followers the larger part of the Johannine Community who accepted their 
theology. As the schism had completely separated them from the 'moderates,' this 
company divided three ways: i) to embrace true docetism (moving from belief in 'a not 
fully human Jesus,' to a mere appearance of humanity); ii) to endorse gnosticism 
(augmenting their belief in a pre-existent Jesus with the notion of themsel ves as also 
pre-existent and as having descended from the heavenly regions); iii) to espouse 
Montanism (departing from a belief that they possessed the Paraclete to hold that they 
embodied the Paraclete). According to Brown, this group 'took the Fourth Gospel 
with them,' and later it became accepted by the Gnostics who commented on it.581 
Some of those who now followed the Epistles' author, however, became 
gradually assimilated into a union with the 'Great Church' ('the church catholic'). This 
assimilation came about because the author's acolytes had failed to combat the 
secessionists by an appeal to tradition. The group showed itself willing to accept 
'authoritative official teachers' in the fonn of 'presbyter-bishops.' The Great Church 
simultaneously opened itself to the high Johannine christology. Brown concludes by 
stating that the Great Church only slowly accepted the Fourth Gospel because of its 
misuse by the Gnostics.S82 
So, these charts encapsulate this scholar's reconstructive research. Yet it is 
what lies behind the act of such historical-critical investigation that concerns us rather 
than every detail of the reconstructive process or the finished historical account. What 
is important to us is the assumption that the texts contain the evidence to reconstruct 
such a history, and how that assumption and reconstruction relates to the proffered 
solution to 1 John's conundrum. In this instance the explanation put forward regarding 
the problem appears within Brown's treatment of the history as it develops into phase 
three, 'Epistles.' He reminds us that as readers we discover the putative 'adversaries, 
581 Ibid., Summary Chart One, Phase Three: After the Epistles, paragraph 2, p. 167. 
582 Ibid., Summary Chart One, Phase Three: Epistles, paragraph 1, p. 167. 
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secessionists, or schismatics' through 'the author's point of view.' We use such 
epithets to characterise that group simply because of the survival of one writing. 
Therefore, we must exercise caution as '[o]ur only knowledge of them ... [we] derive 
from the assumption that they held the opinions against which the author of 1 John 
argues, and such a mirror-image approach has many perils.'583 The two main perils 
Brown adduces are: a) that it is uncertain that every idea the author opposes actually 
belongs to the adversaries; and, b) that the author may be using the Epistle to correct 
wrong ideas irrespective of their source. Despite this prompting to caution, Brown 
states: 
Nevertheless, it is a working hypothesis to separate the statements 
against which the author directly polemicizes and to see whether, taken 
together, they represent a consistent body of thought. It is my 
contention that they do, and in the pages that follow I shall reconstruct 
the christology, the ethical stance, the eschatology, and the 
pneumatology ... of the Johannine secessionists seen through the eyes of 
the author of 1 John.584 
Thus, we find that from the text of 1 John we may discover consonant elements 
of the adversaries' theological and ethical position. Moreover, we may eff eet this 
discovery with clarity as the author's perspective remains available to us. Hence, we 
learn that the 'author ha[ d] gathered [the prepared statements of the adversaries] almost 
as slogans and used them in his rebuttal.'585 Regarding these statements and rebuttal, 
the question arises as to where the parties appealed for the ratification of their respective 
positions. Rejecting the notion that outside influences lay behind the secessionists' 
views Brown tells us that it was rather a matter of interpretation of the Johannine fonn 
of the Christian message (that readers now possess in the Fourth Gospe)). Displaying 
his sensibility to matters of interpretation, he proposes that the author of 1 John and the 
adversaries used the same material but construed it differently: 
583 Ibid., p. 103. 
584 Ibid., p. 104. 
585 Ibid., p. 104. 
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I suspect that the 10hannine Gospel, as it came to both the author and to 
the secessionists, was relatively "neutral" on some of the points that 
were now coming into dispute, i.e .• it did not contain direct answers, 
for these were new questions. In the tradition there were texts on both 
sides of the issue; so each of the disputing parties was making the claim 
that its interpretation of the Gospel was correct. 586 
Brown, though, does not offer a methodical explanation for this difference in 
understanding of the tradition other than the 'neutrality' of the 'texts,' or their 
ambiguity. Moreover, ifhe suspects that the tradition used by the contending parties in 
the 10hannine Community lacked perspicuity on some issues, he does not usually seem 
to regard the Epistles or the Fourth Gospel in the same light. He treats those texts as 
sufficiently determinate for his purposes. Respecting our interest, the First Epistle 
apparently contains the necessary trace elements of the tradition to reconstruct the acute 
crisis facing the community. The contenders had evidently reduced the tradition to 
statements and we find them assembled by the author of the First Epistle. Though on 
the one hand Brown says that the 10hannine Gospel tradition was 'neutral' or vague 
enough for the community to find different meanings in it, on the other he claims that 
parts of it survive in the New Testament texts in sufficient exactness to facilitate his 
accurate reconstruction of the disputants' positions. He has confidence, for instance, 
that he can discern in the texts the presuppositions of the opponents. While 'presenting 
their views' Brown says that he will 'seek to show that they were not without logic and 
a certain persuasiveness, given their presuppositions.' We can be sure that we may 
discover those presuppositions as Brown's presentation is seemingly innocent of 
presupposition on some issues. In this case it will grant us direct access to the group's 
586 Ibid., pp. 106 - 107. E1swhere Brown augments this statement by dcclaring: 'The fact remains, 
however, that in neither the affirmations of the epistolatory author nor in the reconstructed 
affirmations of the secessionists can one find a direct citation of [the Gospel of John) ... Therefore, 
one cannot prove beyond doubt that either group reflccted on the written [Gospel of John) a.1i we 
now know it, and it is safer to speak of their knowing the proclamation of Christianity known to 
us through [that Gospel). That is what 1 mean in all tllat follows wilen 1 speak of either side 
drawing upon [the Gospel of John] or tile JOMnnine tradition.' R.E. Brown, Tile Epistles of 
John, p. 73. This scholar argues for the existence of a first written version of 
the Johannine Gospel during the nineties of the first century. It is from this document that 
Brown's parties drew 'texts' to prove thcir positions. While not quoting directly from what they 
read, according to Brown the protagonists' readings of different elements of the Gospel shaped their 
thinking and eventually led to the formulation of the respective statements and rebuttals. 
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impulsion. He presents the secessionist case 'not out of any personal sympathy for 
their position as I reconstruct it, but so that the reader can see the inner motivations of 
10hannine thought on both sides of the battle line in this civil war.'587 Furthermore, 
this scholar aids us to discern the difference between the opponents' mistaken reading 
of the Gospel tradition and the presuppositions of the writer of the Fourth Gospel. 
Addressing the possibility of a relativistic presentation of Jesus' humanity in the 
Gospel, Brown says: 'Let me remind the reader ... that I am not explaining what the 
evangelist meant, but how the Gospel could have been read by the secessionists, at 
times contrary to the presuppositions ofthe evangelist .. .'588 
Because of Brown's deterministic view of the New Testament texts he is able to 
assert that the author of the First Epistle 'does not deny the main slogans of his 
opponents but qualifies them.' The affirmations of the secessionists stand as truth for 
the author also, because they belong to the tradition. Therefore, to discredit the 
adversaries the author must demonstrate that they do not live out the implications of 
10hannine principles.S89 So, Brown proceeds, as we have noted, on the basis that he 
can discern in the First Epistle the secessionist slogans within what he regards as the 
author's refutation. 
Furthermore, he uses the text of the Fourth Gospel 'exactly as we have it' 590 to 
discern the derivations from the tradition made by the respective parties. Though he 
could, he says, exclude certain passages from the Fourth Gospel because they probably 
did not exist in the tradition known to the secessionists but are later or anti-secessionist 
additions by a redactor, Brown chooses to retain them lest he should become subject to 
a circular argument. If he excised them he would be 'proving that the secessionists 
drew upon Johannine tradition because [he] would have excluded from [his] main 
source of that tradition ... every statement that seems to contradict the position of the 
587 R.E. Brown, The Community of the Beloved Disciple, p. 104. 
588 Ibid., p. 114. 
589 Ibid., p. 107. 
590 Ibid., p. 1~. 
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secessionists.'591 Brown assures us of his awareness that the Gospel text bears the 
marks of the actions of a redactor, although he does not think that any critic knows with 
certainty where the redactor's additions are (a point that we would agree with as from 
our perspective these evidences appear in various locations according to the critics' 
assumptions that place them there). He remarks: 'I regard this added material (some of 
it ancient) as complementary to the Gospel, and I regard the redactor as a member of a 
Johannine "school" of writers.'592 However, he temporarily ignores these imprints 
'in order to test whether the position of the secessionists makes sense if they held as 
Gospel the whole of the Johannine tradition known to us in the Fourth Gospel.'593 
Therefore, under this historical critical explication the history of the texts (both the 
tradition and the Fourth Gospel) remains available to us for reconstruction along with 
the history of the community they help to reveal. 
Christology, we learn, was the main source of contention between the author 
and his adversaries, yet its implications for Christian behaviour became a further 
divisive subject because the 'opponents claimed an intimacy with God to the point of 
being perfect or sinless.' Brown isolates their 'boasts' in 1 John 1: 8a and lOa, 
supplying his own translation: 'If we boast, "We are free from the guilt of sin"'; 'If we 
boast, "We have not sinned. "'594 Regarding the first of these claims, this theologian 
states that it does not refer to an 'extreme libertinism.' He deduces rather that 'their 
claim may have reflected the thesis that actions committed by the believer were not 
important enough to be sins that could challenge the intimacy with God acquired 
through belief.'595 Brown says that this party would argue that any errors perpetrated 
by Christians 'are not "sins" that can destroy one's salvific state because by faith 
Christians are irrevocably outside the realm of sin.' Using a cautious tone Brown 
comments further: 
591 Ibid., p. 109. 
592 Ibid., p. 20 note 25. 
593 Ibid., p. 109. Regarding notes 592 - 594 see also R.E. Brown, The EpiJtles 
of John, pp. 72 - 73. 
594 Ibid., pp. 123 - 124. 
595 R.E. Brown, The Epistles of John, p. 206. 
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[T]he problem.n~ised. by the boast of 1 John 1: 8a may have been that, in 
the.author's OpInIOn.' It was.c~rrect to think that upon becoming a 
belIever the Johanmne ChristIan was rendered free from the guilt of sin, 
but it was wrong to think that this condition automatically remained after 
belief no matter what one did.596 
The author, then, may have agreed with the opponents on this issue: freedom 
from guilt following conversion. His contention with them possibly centred on another 
question: their claim of future immunity from the opprobrium of sin. Following on 
from this central statement about the eighth verse, under this scholar's explanation the 
self-deceit the author speaks of in verse 8b becomes that potentially suffered by 
community members who, 'under the influence of secessionist propaganda,' might 
adopt their stance.597 Furthermore, we discover that the clause that forms 8c 
concerning truth has its roots in Johannine theology, reflecting that it is people's inmost 
being that identifies them.598 
If the first boast involved a denial of the obloquy of believers' wrongdoing, of 
the second claim in verse lOa Brown says that it involved a denial of 'sins or bad 
actions' subsequent to conversion.599 Again, this theologian portrays an author who 
agrees with the secessionists on the foundation of their assertion, but differs with them 
on its outworking. He explains that the author viewed 'sins committed after coming to 
faith in Jesus to be all the more guilty since they are contrary to the believer's status as a 
child of Goo,'600 and yet objected to the denial of the possibility of wrongdoing. We 
learn that the boasts of the secessionists: 
flow from an exaggeration of the same principle, i.e., that at the time of 
becoming a disciple the believers received enonnous privileges- a 
perfectionist principle thoroughly at home in [the Gospel of] John. Yet 
the ... boasts show a mounting exaggeration of the implications drawn 
from the perfectionist principle ... The claim to have no guilt from sin 
recognizes that the deeds are wrong but contends that they have no 
596 Ibid., p. 234. 
597 Ibid., p. 206. 
598 Ibid., p. 207. 
599 Ibid., pp. 211 - 212. 
600 Ibid., p. 234. 
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effect. The claim not to have sinned denies the possibility of 
wrongdoing.601 
So, a Johannine 'perfectionist principle' lies behind the secessionist claims. The fault 
(as Brown's author would have it) rests in an 'exaggeration' of the implications 'drawn 
from' that principle. To illustrate the principle Brown seeks 'the rationale in John [that 
is, the Fourth Gospel] for the secessionist position, and then observ[es] how the author 
of the Epistles responds, also in fidelity to John.'602 We will now briefly look at 
facets of this depiction of the perfectionist principle embedded in the Fourth Gospel. 
Then we will explore his comments on our verses in chapter three. Taking forward our 
exploration to the conclusion of Brown's treatment of the matter will involve a critique 
of it in Fishian terms. 
The twofold claim by the opponents that they enjoyed a sinless state, Brown 
says, 'at first glance ... may seem foreign to the Johannine tradition' (unlike others such 
as 1: 6; 2: 4,6,9; 4: 20, which this scholar says 'can easily be justified from the Fourth 
Gospel'). However, the first form of the claim, 'We are free from the guilt of sin: is 
'the easier [ofthe two] to relate to the Fourth Gospel' as it has a correlation with John 
8: 31 - 34 and 9: 34,41. The Gospel uses the terminology 'slaves of sin' and 'guilty 
of sin' concerning the non-believer. During Jesus' address to those Jews who had 
'inadequately' believed in him the one who acts sinfully receives the designation 'a 
slave of sin,' whereas the disciples will know the truth and the truth will free them. In 
the case of the man blind from birth and accused of being born in sin, Jesus grants him 
enlightenment. In contrast, the Pharisees hear that if they recognised their blindness, 
they would not 'be guilty of sin: but because they claim to see, their sin remains. The 
blind man who recognised his blindness is consequently not guilty of sin, his sin does 
not remain. Explaining from these instances the rationale for the secessionist position, 
Brown says that since by contrast with the non-believer, the believer enjoys freedom 
from sin, the secessionists are simply rephrasing slightly the statement that the truth 
601 Ibid., pp. 234 - 235. 
602 R.E. Brown, TIle Community oj tlte Beloved Disciple, p. 124. 
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will free the believer. Moreover, the opponents are merely following the wishes of the 
evangelist, who desired 'the Gospel reader to identify himself with the blind man,' and 
so regard himself as among 'those who have be[come] enlightened and thus not guilty 
of sin.'603 
The second form of the claim. 'We have not sinned,' represents a greater 
difficulty in the search for parity with the Fourth Gospel. Brown consistently rejects 
the notion that this constitutes a claim never to have sinned during the whole of life. 
Rather, he affirms that the opponents professed never to have sinned since conversion. 
As an aside, it is noteworthy that here Brown remarks in a footnote: 'The distinction 
would be meaningless to those who would read John 3: 17 - 21 to mean that the light 
brought by Jesus merely makes visible what people already are, so that "he who acts in 
truth" refers to one who has been sinless when he encounters Jesus.'604 The phrase 
'those who would read John 3: 17 - 21 to mean ... ' seems to be an acknowledgement of 
the reader's role in the creation of meaning and of the plasticity of texts when viewed 
from different standpoints, and we might link it with what we have already noted 
regarding Brown's sensibility to interpretation. However, he does not expand on the 
issue and continues to analyse the texts in a formalist manner. His enquiry concerning 
the foundation of the opponents' perfectionism resumes in the following way. If the 
opponents' claim is never to have sinned since conversion, as Brown deems it so to be, 
then it could, he says, have a basis in John because of an analogy between the Christian 
and Jesus. Using a variety of verses in John (1: 12; 3: 18; 5: 24; 8: 46; 13: 10; 20: 22 
-23) Brown demonstrates this analogy thus: i) Jesus is the Son of God and those that 
believe in him become 'sons of God' also; ii) as the Son held claim to sinlessness ('Can 
anyone of you convict me of sin?'), so too the 'sons' become sinless; iii) the 'sons' 
have received the Spirit who bestows a power over sin; iv) whoever believes in the Son 
does not suffer judgement; v) Jesus had taught that 'The man who has bathed has no 
need to wash ... he is clean all over.' Such passages, then, may function to sustain the 
603 Ibid., pp. 124 - 125. 
604 Ibid., p. 126 note 247. 
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secessionists'stance.60S Accordingly, Brown concludes that the Johannine tradition 
lends itself to a thesis of post-conversion sinlessness. Yet, as we will now discover, it 
is not only the secessionists that found in the tradition the basis for a perfectionist claim 
- the author did also. 
Having established the nature and source of the secessionist claims Brown 
moves on to offer his explanation of our conundrum. The scholar tells us that although 
the author of the First Epistle rejects the declaration, 'We have not sinned,' he 'comes 
fairly close to making the same claim himself precisely in imitation o/the sinle.'iSneu 0/ 
Christ, '606 thus also demonstrating compatibility with John. Chapter three verses 5 -
6a declare (in Brown's translation): 'You know well that Christ revealed himself to take 
away sins, and there is nothing sinful in him. Everyone who abides in him does not 
commit sin.' Connectedly, verse 9, now associating the challenge to sinlessness with 
being begotten by God, pronounces (again, in Brown's translation): 'Everyone 
begotten by God does not act sinfully because God's seed remains in him; and so he 
cannot be a sinner because he has been begotten by God.' Considering these verses 
Brown asks: 'If both the opponents and the author seem to claim a sinlessness and a 
perfectionism, what is the difference between them?'607 For this scholar, then, the 
question requiring solution in 1 John is not only that there is a perceived contradiction 
between our verses, but also that on one level they manifest a curious agreement 
Taking the phrases 'We are free from the guilt of sin' and 'We have not sinned' from 
the verses in chapter 1 and placing them alongside the two verses in chapter 3, Brown 
harmonises the fundamental ethical positions of the disputants. By this action he seeks 
to confirm that in the epistle we meet two forms of perfectionism that we must 
distinguish. On this level, then, there is no Iserian 'gap' or indeterminacy between 
these verses. The pair in chapter 3 merely represent the assertion of a competing model 
of perfectionism by the author. While maintaining that each disputant held perfectionist 
60S Ibid., p. 126. 
606 Ibid., p. 126. 
607 Ibid., p. 126. 
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credentials based on a 10hannine tradition of post-conversion sinlessness. Brown seeks 
to describe the difference between them. 
Although ostensibly the focus of his attention remains on the text. this scholar's 
explanation effectively turns on the matter of the assumptions held by the respective 
readers of the 10hannine tradition. Moreover. it depends on his own perception. I 
suggest that he gives latent acknowledgement of this in the following statement that he 
intends as a rationalisation of the different models of perfectionism: 
The author sees sinlessness as the proper implication of divine begetting 
and therefore as an obligation incumbent on a Christian. I understand 
his "cannot be a sinner" to mean cannot consistently be a sinner. for 
elsewhere he recognizes that Christians may fall short of the "should." 
In refutation of his opponents' perfectionism he says. "My little 
children. I am writing this to keep you from sin. But if anyone docs 
sin, we have Jesus Christ. who is righteous. as an intercessor before the 
Father" (2: 1). The opponents, on the other hand, in their perfectionism 
see sinlessness as a realized truth and not simply as an obhgation. For 
them the believer is sinless. and they cannot allow the possibility of the 
exception. "If anyone does sin."608 
Pursuing the idea of a latent admission of influential assumptions in Brown's 
account. we might ask why it is that the author and the secessionists each 'sec' different 
emphases in the perfectionist tradition that results in them taking up opposing positions. 
For the author sinlessness is an 'obligation.' However. we may note that this party 
concludes it so because of ajudgement that it is the 'proper implication' of God's 
spiritual procreation of believers. Yet it is an obligation that admits the possibility of 
human failure. Running in parallel to his explication ofthe author's position we may 
observe that this scholar announces the productiveness of his own comprehension in 
his treatment of3: 9. It is possible to argue that in addressing this verse Brown: a) 
mai ntai ns the perfectionist standing of the author (i n kccpi ng with his hypothesis of the 
existence of two forms of perfectionism within the 10hannine community); and. b) 
simultaneously ensures the accordant link with 2: 1 (and. by implication, with the 
element of refutation in 1: 8 and 10). The interpretive manoeuvre he employs to 
608 Ibid., pp. 1:!6 - 127. 
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achieve this is to declare that he 'understands' the clause in 3: 9, 'cannot be a sinner,' to 
mean 'cannot consistently be a sinner.' Though Brown ensures that sinlessness is still 
at the heart of the authorial stance he seeks to demonstrate that the author allows for 
occasional sin, thus maintaining the consistency of that party's theme. From our 
Fishian perspective we might take up the theologian's own term and aver that it is 
Brown's 'understanding' (or his perception born of his assumptions) that produces the 
harmonious text and that he does not simply demonstrate what is there. He wants us to 
see that what the author espouses is distinctive from that propounded by the 
secessionists due to its proviso, but that it is a form of sinlessness nonetheless. In 
contrast Brown portrays the opponents as those who retain no such proviso. So, we 
might ask: Why did the secessionists 'see' a different emphasis in the perfectionist 
tradition? In reply our perspective leads us to emphasise another of Brown's terms. 
They did so because 'in their perfectionism' (or, we might say, from the standpoint of 
their perfectionist assumptions) they 'saw' sinlessness as a 'realised truth,' a present 
reality that precludes error. 
If we take up Brown's words that the secessionists' claims 'show a mounting 
exaggeration of the implications drawn from the perfectionist principle' we may 
summarise the reasoning underlying this theologian's solution to our problem. Brown 
argues that the perfectionist principle existed in the traditional texts; he says that both 
the opponents and the author noted it in those texts; that they each drew implications 
from that principle regarding sinlessness; but that the secessionists went on to 
exaggerate those implications, whereas the author maintained an orthodox 10hannine 
position. 
Analysing Brown's reconstruction of the historical situation, from our Fishian 
perspective we may say that the versions of sinlessness that both of the parties 'saw' in 
the texts simply appeared to them as a result of their assumptions and interpreti ve 
strategies. In this case we may again apply Fish's maxim and state that they wrote the 
traditional texts rather than read them. However, from this viewpoint we must also 
acknowledge that we actually know nothing of the protagonists' assumptions or 
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interpretive strategies. The author's and opponents' positions are not available to us in 
the Fourth Gospel or the First Epistle. We construct their standpoints and, 
furthermore, their historical situation, from our own interpretive assumptions - an issue 
that we will remind ourselves of later. 
In terms of Brown's reconstruction, of course, the author and the s~cessionists 
possess texts that guide them to their opinions, albeit, as he adjudges, texts of 
somewhat 'neutral' (or, as Fish might say, indeterminate) nature. Moreover, in an 
advantage over the members of the Johannine Community, Brown believes that he has 
determinate texts - in his case the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles - from which he 
draws the material to demonstrate the historical situation. Thus, he is able to claim that 
the curious agreement that he finds between our verses in chapters one and three 
receives its explanation in his view that both disputants drew their positions from the 
same mutually honoured traditional source - one that itself contained perfectionist 
elements. Yet the incipient problem lay in the interpretation of that source: the particular 
emphases the parties fixed on facets of its teaching. For Brown the difficulty centred 
on the question of which party's version of perfectionism most accurately reflected the 
tradition, and which of the two factions demonstrated their fidelity to it by the quality of 
their life. Positioning the two types of perfectionism in this manner eventually enables 
Brown to trace (as he considers it) the development of each one. 
A Fishian standpoint would lead us to describe this scholar as one who has 
created the distinctive versions of perfectionism that each party reputedly espoused. He 
has created the traditional text that they read and formulated their supposed reaction to 
it. Moreover, he has done so from the assumptions he holds concerning the Fourth 
Gospel: that it contains discernible elements of the authentic Johannine Gospel 
tradition, and, furthermore, that it lends itself to a perfectionist thesis; and regarding the 
First Epistle: that it embodies the contentious statements of two models of 
perfectionism. 
Concluding his elucidation, Brown remarks on the work of John Bogart, with 
which he is 'partly in agreement and partly in disagreement.' He acknowledges that 
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both he and Bogart 'recognize the seeds of perfectionism in the Fourth Gospel itself, 
and a development of perfectionism in different ways in the author and in his 
opponents.'609 However, he has reservations about the trend in Bogart's argument 
that (as we have noted) dismisses the notion that 'heretical perfectionism' is inherent in 
the Gospel of John, that it 'developed naturally out of it.' Bogart rejects such an idea 
because he claims that the foundational theology, anthropology and soteriology of that 
Gospel 'are not gnostic.'610 In his account of this position Brown says that Bogart 
'makes explicit his assumption' that at the time of the composition of 1 John some 
10hannine Christians had become gnostic, perhaps because of an influx of pro-gnostic 
Gentiles. Brown seems to imply that few assumptions ground his own explications, 
however. Bogart's 'assumption is quite unprovable, and, in [Brown's] judgment, 
quite unnecessary.'611 For Brown, Bogart introduces into the period between the 
Gospel and the Epistles a development that Brown 'can document' only in the period 
subsequent to the Epistles. Indeed, Bogart is merely 'reading into the beginning of the 
schism the fate of the secessionists after the schism.' Moreover, Brown thinks that 
Bogart misses a middle road between the two alternatives the latter offers (these 
alternatives being: a Fourth Gospel that lead inherently and naturally to heretical 
perfectionism, or the influence of an outside body that lead to the same end).612 
Asserting this 'middle road,' Brown says: 
The real question is whether the incipient perfectionism in the Gospel 
could plausibly (even if wrongly) have been interpreted so as to produce 
the perfectionism of the secessionists. I have tried to show that it could; 
but it also could be read so as to produce the perfectionism of the 
author, and so I agree with Bogart that there IS no inherent direction 
toward secessionist thought in the Gospet.613 
609 Ibill., p. 127. 
610 Ibid .• p. J 27. 
611 Ibid .• p. 127. 
612 Ibid .• p. 127. 
613 Ibid .• p. 127. See also R.E. Brown. 1M Epi.tlles o/lohn. p. 72 note 158; 
pp. 402 - 403; 407 - ~; 430. 
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Thus, Brown guides us to the 'real question.' One must establish the 
plausibility of early readers interpreting the inaugural models of perfectionism in the 
10hannine Gospel tradition in such a way that it evolved into the secessionist version. 
Such has been Brown's purpose. Yet he has also endeavoured to demonstrate the 
prospect that those readers might also draw from the material the evidence to produce 
the reputed authorial stance. Though both men hold that a perfectionist strand exists in 
the 10hannine Gospel, their opinions diverge concerning the catalyst for the opponents' 
version of sinlessness. Bogart's interrelated dual error, according to Brown, lies in: a) 
his failure to note the emergence of the secessionist stance from the Gospel tradition; 
and, b) his mistiming ofthe Gnostic influence. The assumption that the Gnostic 
influence began before the Epistles had been written, coupled with a belief that such an 
influence could be the only source of the heretical perfectionism. results in an inaccurate 
reconstruction in this instance. In Brown's estimation Bogart correctly judges that 
there is no intrinsic 'direction' towards secessionist thought in the Gospel. However, 
Bogart does not seem to consider the possibility of readers interpreting the traditional 
texts in a manner different from their 'brothers' and so arriving at a variant 
perfectionism. Taking into account the 'real question' we may now properly 
understand the background to the intriguing agreement between the verses. 
This theologian goes on to discuss further contributions to the debate. Much 
'scholarly energy' goes into 'proving that no contradiction exists,' observes Brown. 
Scholars attempt to do this, he explains, either by arguing from a theory of in spiral ion 
that brooks no contradiction between passages of Scripture, or from the idea that we 
should never assume that ancient authors were stupid or illogical, failing to see 
discrepancies in their own writings.614 From our investigations it is possible to say 
that Brown seems to have affinities with the latter camp as he eliminates the premise of 
a contradiction by establishing his axiom of 3: 6 and 9 as the author's affirmation of a 
perfectionism sanctioned by the 10hannine Gospel tradition. Verses eight and ten of 
chapter one represent the refutation of a pefectionism based on a misunderstanding of 
614 R.E. Brown. The Epistles of Jolm. p. 413. 
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the tradition. There is no issue of authorial stupidity or illogicality to address when we 
view these sections of the text of 1 John as a defence of the legitimate form of 
sinlessness. 
It is interesting to highlight the language used by Brown. While he describes 
Bogart's reconstruction as one based on 'assumption' and a consequent 'reading into' 
the evidence, Brown claims that he 'can document' his own work and therefore arrive 
at an awareness of the 'real question.' We find similar dismissive language at the finale 
of his discussion of other scholarly answers. For instance, regarding a proposed 
lexicological explanation of the perfectionist benefit of the divine begetting, Brown 
states: 
A person thus begotten does not commit sin or act sinfully. (Galtier, 
Inman, and Stott615 are among those who argue thatpoieinharmarlian, 
"to do sin," refers to a practice of sin and therefore means more than 
Juumartanein, "to sin," so that one has a mounting series of claims in 3: 
6a, 9a, 9c - this is quite dubious).616 
For Brown the dubiety of explanations of our problem is an almost universal 
condition. In his Anchor Bible Commentary on the Epistles he lists seven 'general 
approaches' to our enigma: i) That there were two different writers involved. On the 
one hand the author advised confession of sin in 1: Sfr and intercession for the sinner in 
5: 14ff, on the other a redactor later added the profession of sinlessness that formed 3: 
9f and 5: 18; ii) That the author directs his statements to two different groups of 
adversaries. The first statement (1: 8 - 2: 2) against those who held that Christians 
possess 'gnosis' thus making them invulnerable to sin, the second (chapters 3 and 5) 
against 'indifferentists' who regarded themselves as above moral command and so 
treated their commission of sin as of no importance; iii) That the author is thinking of 
specific kinds of sin when he says that the Christian does not or cannot sin; iv) That the 
615 Brown's bibliography lists these authorities a'l: i) P. Gallier, 'Lc chretien impeccable (t Jean 3, 6 
ct 9).' Melanges de Sde"a Religieu.ft' 4 (1947) 137 - 1.54; ii) V.K. Inman 'Distinctive Johannine 
Vocabulary and the Interpretation of 1 John 3: 9,' WeJ/m;n..,'er TM%g/ca/ Journal 40 (1977) 136 
- 44; iii) J.R.W. Stott, The Epi.'illt's oj John (Tyndalc NT 19; Grand Rapids: Ecrdmans, 19(4) 
(no page numbers given). Ibid., pp. 134; 435. 
616 Ibid., p. 412. 
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author is thinking only of special or elite Christians when he says that those begotten of 
God do not or cannot sin; v) That the author means that Christians do not or cannot sin 
habitually even though there are occasional lapses; vi) That the author is thinking on 
two different levels, the real or pastoral level in chapter one and the ideal level in 
chapter three; vii) That the authoris speaking in two different literary contexts. In 1: 8, 
10 he is exhorting within a kerygmatic passage and reminding readers of the inaugural 
proclamation offorgiveness that they heard, while in 3: 6,9 and 5: 18 he is speaking in 
an apocalyptic context where 'impeccability is realizable because of the intimacy of 
God's indwelling.'617 
After cataloguing all of these approaches. Brown discounts the first because, at 
the time of writing. the theory of author and redactor had 'little following in 1 John 
scholarship' (or, to repeat the words of The Bible and Culture Collective, it has 
suffered rejection as: 'A meaning. or an acceptable range of meanings, is ... determined 
by a consensus among the various congregations of historical-critical readers'618); 
moreover, he declares that it is 'a confession to the irreconcilability of the I John 
statements,' something that Brown seemingly finds inadmissible. The second fails as 
'there is only one detectable set of adversaries.' Regarding the third and fifth, there is 
'nothing in the context of3: 6,9 to encourage acceptance' of such approaches that 
'confine the statements to particular sins or ways of sinning.'619 The fourth remains 
unacceptable as the Johannine idiom 'Everyone who' serves 'to include the whole good 
side of a dualistically divided world' and thus precludes any limitation of the statements 
to specific believers. Brown 'to some extent' accepts the overlapping sixth and seventh 
suggestions. He declares that the seventh is 'closer to the mentality of the author' 
(again. we note his assumption that this mentality remains available to us through the 
617 Ibid .• pp. 413 ·415. 
61 8 See note 236. 
619ft is noteworthy here that Brown does not elucidate the relationship between the fifth critical 
'gener..tl approach' that he rejects· the 'author means that Christians do nut or cannot sin 
habitually even though there are occasiona1lapses' • and his own earlier statement: 'I understand 
his "cannot be a sinner· to mean cannot consistently be a sinner. for elsewhere he recognizes that 
Christians may fall short of the ·should.·· Sec notes 618 and 609. 
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text and, moreover, that he has discerned it). However, even the latter founders under 
Brown's scrutiny as he judges: 
[Olne may wonder how the author could have phrased his kerygmatic 
and eschatological I apocalyptic statements with so little nuance that they 
emerge as almost contradictory. The Christians to whom he addresses 
the kerygmatic exhortation to acknowledge and confess sins - are they 
not living in the last hour? And why are the eschatological I apocalyptic 
statements in 3: 6,9 left without the distinction made in 3: 2 - a 
distinction (even in the last hour) between what we are and what we 
shall be? Undoubtedly there is a truth in suggestions (6) and (7) but 
serious difficulty remains.620 
He partly rejects approaches six and seven ostensibly because of their 
suggestion of two inharmonious statements running in parallel without clear 
explanation. It seems that he argues thus: Surely the author could not have failed to 
provide links, however tenuous, for the reader to understand the relationship between 
the two pairs of verses. Even so, here this scholar introduces a note of doubt 
concerning the cohesion of the author's theme. In confirmation of the existence of that 
doubt we find that elsewhere Brown comments: 'No matter what the author thought, 
the wording of his affirmations about sinlessness and impeccability is not sufficiently 
nuanced.'621 So, despite his apparent overall belief in: a) the accessibility of authorial 
intention and historical setting; and, b) the rhetorical congruity of 1 John, this 
theologian comes close to admitting that (what we would call) an Iserian gap remains. 
Therefore, we may say that there is a tension between his insistence on a determinate 
text and his perception of the need for interpretation. 
Remarking on the body of approaches offered by other scholars he comments: 
One may debate whether any of the ... suggestions really removes the 
seeming contradiction; and some of them while ingenious are scarcely 
diagnoses of the texts ... No matter how one modifies or relativizes the 1 
John claims to sinlessness and impeccability, the truth in those claims 
comes from the divine principle that begot Christians and that remains 
active in them.622 
620 R.E. Brown, The Epi.ftles 0/ John, p. 415. 
621 Ibid., p. 430. 
622 R.E. Brown, The Epistles 0/ John, pp. 415 - 416; 430. 
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Thus, casting doubt on the success of his colleagues' efforts to provide an explanation. 
Brown implies that the mere ingenuity that some display cannot replace diagnosis of the 
texts - texts to which he has returned to execute analysis in preference to submitting a 
product of his own artifice. Furthermore. he intimates that his compeers' attempts 
involve modification or relativisation of aspects of the text of the First Epistle to achieve 
their ends. In contrast. by going back to the texts he has established the 'perfectionist 
principle' present in the tradition and ascertained how the protagonists in the dispute 
treated that principle. Moreover. he has also illumined the 'truth' within the parties' 
claims - a truth springing from 'the divine principle' active in generating and 
maintaining the believers. secessionists and authorial followers alike. Dismissing the 
rival explications. Brown concludes 'None of them is really satisfactory.'623 
Though he would assert that he has from a historical-critical perspective 
demonstrated from the text that 'both sides of the Johannine schism would have been 
contending that Christians do not commit sin,' at the end of his explication this 
theologian must acknowledge that he is interpreting rather than simply presenting. 
Further to his statement that the wording of the author's affirmations 'is not sufficiently 
nuanced,' Brown cites four authorities in his quest to substantiate the sinlcssness 
expressed in 3: 6 and 9. Augustine. 'struggling to understand' the issue in 1 John. 
stressed: 'To the extent that the Christian remains in Christ. to that extent he does not 
si n. '624 The Greek Church fathers (specifically Severus of Antioch. Didymus the 
Blind and Maximus the Confessor625) regarded the 'seed' referred to in 3: 9 as (to use 
Brown's words) 'an interior force by which the soul, no longer oriented toward sin, 
allows itself to be led by a dynamism that makes it incapable of choosing evil.' H.K. 
La Rondelle states: 'John bases the impossibility of sinning not in the Christian as 
623 IIN/ .• p. 430. 
624 lhid .• p. 430. Cited by Brown from III Epi.\·tolmn 4.8; Sourccs Chretienncs 75, 234. 
625 lhid., p. 430. For the view of the Greek tradition Brown refers us to I. de la Poucrie, 'The 
Impeccability of the Christian according to 1 John 3. 6 - 9,' in 1k Christiall lives b.v IIIt'Spiril, 
by I. de la Potterie and S. Lyonnel (Staten Island, NY: Alba, 1971), pp. 175 - 1%. The Frcnch 
original we may read in r:Eva"gile dt' Jea,,: (.;tufle.f el prob/etm-.f (RechBib 3; Bruges: Dcscl6e de 
Brouwer. 1958), pp. J61 - 177. 
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such, but in the transforming and keeping presence of God's Seed, i.e. in the Christus 
praesens who is "greater than he who is in the world" (4: 4).'626 According to O. 
Prunet the author of I John believed that the new nature imparted by divine generation 
produces 'a new humanity incapable of sin.' Brown's report of Prunet's comment 
continues: 
To the extent that the principle oflife is active, but only to that extent, 
sin is impossible. One may debate about the precise way in which [the 
Gospel of John] has portrayed divine begetting as operative, but for 1 
John "having been begotten" means more than a terminated divine 
creati ve acti vity of the past. Whether the seed is the word of God or His 
Holy Spirit ... it remains active after it has brought the child of God into 
being. In John 6: 44 Jesus says: "No one can come to me unless the 
Father who sent me draws him"; the drawing toward Jesus continues 
after one has first come to him.627 
Having sketched the explanations of these four authorities this scholar 
concludes: 'One is forced, then, to understand the claims to sinlessness and 
impeccability in 1 John 3: 6,9 in the light of the statements on status in 3: 1,2. We are 
God's children already, and there is a freedom from sin attached to that state.'628 A 
pertinent question at this point is: Who or what is it that exercises 'force' upon Brown 
to come to such a conclusion? He claims that it is the text. Yet, in advance of his 
employment of3: ],2 he has assembled the interpretations of respected authorities to 
act as a conduit through which he presents his understanding. It is not the text that 
'forces' Brown to his conclusion about our verses in chapter three. Rather it is his own 
interpretive strategies born of the assumptions he holds. His consequent remarks are a 
strategic interpretive manoeuvre. He paraphrases and expands on what he says is the 
author's message: 
"You really are God's children, and so you must do works worthy of 
God, and not sin which is the work of the devil." But in this last hour 
he recognises that we are not yet all that we shall be, and so there is a 
6261bit1., p. 431. Brown's reference is: H.K. La Rondcllc, P~rleclim' alld PtrJectlotri.\11I (2nd cd.; 
Andrews UniversilY Monogmphs: Sludies in Religion 3; Berrien Springs, MI: Andrew!!, 1975), 
especially pp. 227 - 236 on 3: 9. 
627 Ibid., p. 431. 
628 Ibid., p. 431. 
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growth in God's children. The divine seed abides and continues to 
transfonn the child of God into the image of God's Son which is the 
image of God Himself, until at the final revelation we are like God 
Himself. The more this divine seed transfonns the Christian, the more 
impossible it is for the Christian to sin.629 
Behind this paraphrase and expansion lie four tensive points: a) a conception of 
3: 6 and 9 as a perfectionist declaration by the author analogous to that of the 
secessionists; b) an endorsement of the author's putative view of believers' 
vulnerability to sin that set this party apart from the opponents; c) an argument for the 
availability and clarity of each of the contenders' views from within the text; and, d) a 
concession regarding what he perceives as an authorial lack of nuance. In this 
statement Brown inserts a preservatory tensility into the text by introducing the idea of a 
progressive transformation of the Christian. She or he gradually achieves a state of 
divine holiness through the abiding presence of the 'seed,' and reaches perfection at the 
close of the age. Part of the design of the First Epistle is, according to Brown, an 
attack by the author on the 'static understanding of divine begetting' held by the 
secessionists, 'for whom divine childhood is a once-for-all gift and not a life that has to 
express itself in the behavior of the Christian.' A 'further corollary for the author is 
that this life not only expresses itself in action but also grows, and increasing 
sinlessness is a mark of that growth.'630 This notion of progressive sinlessness aids 
the construction of a text without stress-points within its structure. 
In an aside T. Wright has alluded to 'the elaborate ideas of Raymond Brown' 
and acknowledged, regarding the possibi Iity of historical reconstruction from the 
Fourth Gospel text, that 'there is no agreement on the malter' among scholars. Some 
scholars, Wright says, 'register doubt as to whether the material can be analysed in this 
way at all.'631 If theological savants of the historical-critical guild cast doubt on the 
viability of the reconstructive project, as we will remind ourselves in due course, Fish 
629 Ibid .• p. 431. 
630 R.E. Brown, The Epistles 0/ John, pp. 236; 430·431. 
631 S. Neill and T. Wright, The Inlerprttatioll oflh~ New TtSlammIIMI-19H6 (1964; 2nd enl. 
ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1(88). Additional material by Wright: Chapter IX 'History 
and Theology,' p. 432. 
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presses the matter to its conclusion. Before we discuss this point. however, we must 
discuss four elucidations from the past ten years. 
6. 4. J. lJeu 
J. Lieu in her work The Theology of the lohannine Epistles (1991) observes 
that while other claims to religious experience achieve validity when authenticated by 
the life of the believer. the claim in 1: 8 - 10 'not to possess sin or not to have sinned 
(with the emphasis on the subsequent state of being)' suffers a categorical rejection by 
the author of the epistle. She concurs that the affirmation of sinlessness in chapter 3 
verses 6, 8 and 9 represent a marked paradox with the earlier verses.632 Beginning to 
address this paradox. Lieu informs us that the 'history of such an affirmation is easy to 
trace.' Eschatological perspectives from within Judaism attribute a state of freedom 
from sin to those living in the final age. Such perspectives portray a final conflict 
between God and the devil or evil one accompanied by their respective acolytes. Lieu 
comments: 
Inevitably, where the sense of the imminence ofthat conflict is strong, 
there is no room for the wavering or uncommitted, even less for the 
renegade; no forgiveness for anyone who "goes over" to the other side. 
Such a mood is reflected elsewhere in the early Christian tradition and 
leads to difficulties in coping with the fact of sin.633 
A strongly realised eschatology of this order that incorporates a sense of the 
blessings of the new age available in the present leads to a claim of freedom from sin as 
one of those blessings. However, this is not totally realised eschatology and a future 
hope remains; thUS. 'freedom from sin may be mOOified by a "not yet" which allows 
for the reality of actual sin.' Applying these perspectives to the Johannine material, 
Lieu says that the 'not yet' outlook appears in 1 John 3: 2 ('it does not yet appear what 
we shall be'). The 'realised' standpoint emerges strongly in the epistle's 'tendency 
towards the irreversibility of images such as being born from Goo.' It is inevitable, 
632 J. Lieu. 7Mology O/IM Joh(lnnin~ I:piSII~.f. pp. 58·59, 
633 Ibid., p. 59. 
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says Lieu, that a New Testament or Christian writing should wrestle with the meaning 
of the assertion 'that in Jesus Christ sin and the powers of evil have in some way been 
defeated or negated, while those who make that victory their own continue to live 
"normal" lives in this world.'634 
For this scholar it is 'clear that the "perfectionist" assertions of chapter 3 must 
be set within the dualistic scheme' that operates throughout the Epistle: the 'Son of 
God' or 'God' set in opposition to 'the devil'; doing righteousness over against doing 
sin; the children of God versus the children of the devil. The identification of sin with 
lawlessness represents a realised eschatology and verse 3: 9b illustrates the potential 
determinism in the scheme.63S She comments: 'It is a dualism which could appear 
timeless and static, with two groups within humankind "from the beginning" (3: 8), 
those born of God who do not and cannot sin, and those born of the devil.' Indeed, it 
is 'highly possible' that that 1 John represents a 'reworking' of a source or tradition 
that exhibits such a fixed dualism. A series of couplets (2: 29b and 3: 4a; also, 3: 6; 3: 
7a and Sa; 3: 9a and 3: lOb) testify to the scheme. However, 'the sense of 
timelessness' disappears with the insertion of the declaration in 3: 8b: 'the Son of God 
was manifest for this purpose, in order to destroy the deeds of the devil.' This 
declaration implies the introduction of ' a new situation ... whcther the new situation 
breaks the deadlock between the two powers or in fact creates the dualism because prior 
to that time the devil held sway.'636 Any problems posed by the dualistic scheme and 
the author's adoption of it do not receive a solution, says Lieu. This is because the 
author intends 'not to develop its consequences but to affirm the assured position of the 
community and to point to the life-pattern which must ensue.' Whatever the authorial 
opinions on the meaning of sin, and if it signifies more than the absence of mutual love, 
Lieu declares that 'his concern with the inner life of the community and his use of a 
634 Ibid., p. 59. 
635 Ibid., p. 61. 
636 Ibid., pp. 61 - 62. 
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dualistic scheme possibly not of his own devising are the essential reference points for 
understanding what is said about sin in chapter 3.'637 
Lieu seeks to establish a link between our verses in chapters three and one thus. 
The denial of guilt of sinfulness, or the refusal to acknowledge misbehaviour as 'sin,' 
may have been 'a temptation for the community' (hence the antithetical style in 1: S-
10, 'If we say') - an understandable temptation, she thinks, given the tendencies to 
emphasise realised eschatology. However, the 'author's concern,' she tells us, 'is not 
simply the recognition of the presence of sin, but the necessity of confession and of 
seeking forgiveness (1: 9), which are essential parts of the acknowledgement of what 
God has done and of his demands.'638 So, the author's efforts to 'affirm the assured 
position of the community and to point to the life-pattern which must ensue' (efforts 
encapsulated in 3: 6 and 9) resulted in an unintended temptation to the members to 
disregard the need for forgiveness. To impede this temptation the author pronounces 
the repercussions of yielding to it (1: Sb and lOb). Following her effort to establish a 
link between the verses, this scholar declares: 'Certainly there remains a tension if not 
contradiction in what 1 John says about sin.' Passages in chapter five reinforce the 
impression of discrepancy. The author distinguishes between death inducing and non-
death inducing sins (5: 16 - 17), yet asserts without modification that the one born from 
God does not sin (5: IS); even if the deadly sin refers to 'the denial of belief or schism 
from the community' the 'unequivocal assertion of the inability of the one born from 
God to sin does not simply refer to this sin but returns to the dualist scheme of chapter 
3.' Lieu concludes: 'Thus the tension lies in 1 John's use, particularly in the second 
part of the letter, of a strongly dualist scheme which is not fully integrated with other 
aspects of his thought.'639 
Lieu advises that 'the suggestions of specific situation must be invcst.igated in 
order to put [the epistle's1 thought in context.'640 This search for the 'specific 
637 Ibid .• p. 62. 
638 Ibid .• p. 64. 
639 Ibid., pp. 64 - 65. 
640 Ibid .• p. 4. 
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situation' must take into account several factors. For instance, we should consider the 
extent to which we may understand the epistle in the light of the Fourth Gospel - a 
'highly significant [exercise] for interpreting the letter.' We may undertake this 
consideration 'in more than one way.' Moreover, the epistle's 'theology will appear 
differently when viewed within the acknowledged framework. of the Gospel than when 
taken in isolation from it.'641 
'Certainly,' declares Lieu, '1 John cannot be interpreted without a prior 
decision as to whether or not the Gospel is to be presupposed.' Her approach is to 
assume that 'the structural conformity between Gospel and Epistle is not at all evident.' 
We may explore 'the relationship of thought' only 'after first studying 1 John.' The 
considerable differences in emphasis that exist between the two writings 'mean that 
knowledge of one by the other cannot be taken for granted.' She seeks first to interpret 
the epistle 'in its own tenns,' and then later set it into a wider Johannine 
framework.642 
Significantly, we learn that it is 'impossible to understand the thought of 1 John 
(or any document) without a number of prior decisions, even if only implicit about its 
nature as a piece of writing.' Yet we may make such a decision only 'on the basis of 
the text itself.' This scholar declares that 'we are here not relying on early church 
tradition about the common apostolic authorshi p of 1 John and the Gospel or about the 
object of its polemic.' She states that: '1 John can be properly treated as a literary unity 
and so as theologically coherent It is also not an abstract tract but written to a specific 
situation, although its theology cannot be reduced to being determined entirely by that 
si tuation. '643 
Pursuing her avowal to interpret the epistle 'in its own tenns,' Lieu tells us that 
the 'imprecision of the letter has inevitably led to an imprecise and varied depiction of 
the schismatics.'644 The 'fact that the letter's literary nature is open to more than one 
641 Ibid., p. 6. 
642 Ibid., p. 7. 
643 Ibid., p. 8. 
644 Ibid., p. 14. 
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interpretation means a prior decision about it has to be made before the letter can be 
interpreted, even if we are trying to explore its internal theology as a single text.' The 
'prior decision' that this scholar makes is that ('however serious the schism') the 
'polemic against specific views and claims of opponents does not control the letter or its 
thought.' For Lieu, there is no explicit relation of the 'so-called "moral debate"' to the 
schismatics and therefore it 'should not be interpreted purely as a reaction against 
them.'645 Furthermore, she declares that 'to use the debate to reconstruct their beliefs 
and then to use their reconstructed beliefs to interpret the debate demands a circularity 
of argument which [one may] only justify if other approaches fail.' Moreover, we 
must not assume the connection of their reconstructed beliefs to the Fourth Gospel 
separate from 'a wider consideration of the relationship between the Epistle and the 
Gospel.' Lieu avers: 
The author's failure to spell out his opponents' views and to refute them 
must be taken seriously - they are not his chief concern. The structure 
and rhetoric of the letter suggest that while the fact and impact of the 
schism can hardly be denied - although it may be difficult to separate out 
fact from interpretation in 2: 18 - 22 and 4: 1 - 3 - its chief result has 
been to engender a debate within the framework of the author's or 
community's theology. The recognition that the "opponents'" views 
could have developed from the Fourth Gospel is due to the fact that they 
are potential elements within the author's own 'Johannine' theology. 
The antithetical, debating style is all part of the thought and theologIcal 
pattern of 1 John. Moreover, since on the basis of the christological 
debate alone little advance can be made as to the views of the opponents 
- and after all, we have only the author's own perspective -little is to be 
gained by the use of such labels as "gnostic" or, of 1 John, "anti-
gnostic." It is therefore possible and necessary to explore the theology 
of the Jetter without immediate and prior reference to the views of its 
opponents.646 
She adds an observation that terms emanating from both parties in the dispute critics 
have labelled 'gnostic' (such as 'anointing' (2: 20, 27J and 'seed' (3: 9J on the one 
side, and, despite the supposed anti-gnostic stance of the author, 'born from God' on 
645 Ibid., p. IS. 
646 Ibid., p. 16. 
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the other). Ueu declares: 'While These labels are used so loosely. without relation to a 
total structure ofthought that mightjustify them •... they serve little purpose.'647 
Thus, Lieu undermines a pillar on which Bogart and Brown base their entire 
reconstructive projects concerning 1 John - the authorial 'polemic against specific views 
and claims of opponents.' She argues that because the author has failed to 'spell out 
his opponents' views and to refute them' this serves as proof that 'they are not his chief 
concern.' Her deduction is that it is both 'possible' and 'necessary' for the theological 
exploration of the epistle to advance 'without immediate and prior reference to the 
views of its opponents.' Also, she avers that any reference to gnostic terminology has 
little relevance due to its indistinct usage and setting, so invalidating another stay of 
Bogart's work. However, Lieu implies that she has uncovered the circumstance of the 
authorial statements. It is 'a debate within the framework of the author's or 
community'S theology' rather than an attack on the adversaries' position. 
No external evidence exists to decide on the questions of relationshi p and 
priority between 1 John and the Gospel, 'although it may be that 1 John was accepted 
more easily and sooner than the Gospel by the wider church.' We learn that because 
the Fourth Gospel 'is a single text and not visibly layered ... any reconstruction can only 
appeal to the texts themselves and to the careful reader's sensitivity towards the 
texts.'648 Seemingly. an Iserian approach governs Lieu's analytical prescription: on 
the one hand, she wishes to give credence to the role of the reader (albeit, a reader who 
shows care and sensitivity to the text); on the other. she desires to safeguard an appeal 
to the text. Indeed, it is possible to describe this prescription using Iser's term 'dyadic 
interaction.' This scholar tells us that any decisions about sequence 'are inseparable 
from decisions about what is going on behind the Epistle and Gospel, and about the 
probable sequence of such events in the life of a community.' She recognises that 'in 
fact these decisions are far more complex than often realised.' In her study of the 
Epistles she acknowledges the wider Johannine setting and yet avoids using the Gospel 
647 Ibid., p. ]6 note 21. 
648 Ibid., p. 19. 
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'to elaborate or to settle uncertainties of interpretation.' Though Lieu states that: 'no 
particular sequence between Gospel and Epistles is being assumed, nor ... is any 
particular reconstruction of the linking historical events,' nevertheless, she finds it 
necessary to remark: 'It will be clear from what has already been said that this position 
is no more neutral than any other!'649 We might argue that a strain exists in Lieu's 
critique, whereby she aspires both to repudiate and to acknowledge the assumptions 
governing her reading. However, as we will now see, throughout the remainder of her 
work she returns to essentialist formulas. 
First-century believers from the Johannine community had access to Jewish and 
Hellenistic texts that encouraged a perfectionist expectation (as we observed earlier, 
Lieu says that the 'history of such an affirmation is easy to trace'). Using language 
reminiscent of reader-response examinations, Lieu asks: 'What images or framework 
did the authors or first readers bring with them which would colour their understanding 
of the texts?' Despite this awareness of readers' assumptions shaping perception of 
texts, Lieu continues to address the issue in an essentialist manner. She explains: 
'Again we have no other evidence than that provided by the Gospel and Epistles 
themselves and here there have been sharp swings in fashion.'650 So, according to 
this scholar, Johannine authors and readers brought 'images and frameworks' (or, to 
use our Fishian tenns, assumptions and interpretive strategies) to Jewish and 
Hellenistic texts. These factors affected their perception of them. Therefore, from this 
we might uphold the idea of the malleability of all texts. Yet, she then directs us to the 
Epistles and Gospel from which we may discover any resultant 'colouring' - texts that 
must have an inherent stability enabling the critic to observe within them indications of 
primitive readerly perception of earlier works. Furthennore, despite her candid 
admission that her own reading remains as situated as any other, Lieu implies that the 
critic may have an objective platfonn from where she or he may examine the shades of 
meaning imposed on the earlier texts by authors and revealed in their work. Moreover, 
649 Ibid., p. 19. 
650 Ibid., p. 20. 
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at this stage Lieu does not elaborate on why there are 'sharp swings in fashion' among 
biblical critics regarding the 'evidence.' However, we discover something of her 
thought on this matter during her discussion concerning 'water and blood' in 5: 6. She 
states: 'Yet here too, as the inability of the interpreters to agree shows, the language of 
1 John forbids such precision.'651 At variousjunctures it is the language used by the 
epistle's author that hinders critical efforts to establish meaning. 
Authorial imprecision, though, does not end the project to reconstruct the 
historical setting of the epistle, as we discover as this scholar moves towards the end of 
her work. We learn that it was inevitable that the 'already I not yet tension in early 
Christian thought' led to problems once communities faced the actual behaviour of 
converts. The problem became most marked where there was intense perception of 
having already entered into the new age or the final conflict. Lieu states that such a 
situation 'is the context for 1 John's own attempt to grapple with the problem of sin.' 
The 'unresolved tension' in the author's answer stems from placing sin into two 
settings. Sin, 'within the context of a sharply dualistic scheme,' pertains to the realm in 
opposition to God, a realm 'over which Jesus won a decisive victory'; yet, it remains 'a 
reality of human life, to deny whose ellistence is to deny the basis on which all people, 
including believers, stand before God.' The author of 1 John 10ins the majority of NT 
writers in affirming that in his life and death Jesus dealt with sin completely - once and 
for all' (and here she cites Rom. 3: 25; 1 Pet. 3: 18; Heb. 10: 12; 1 John 3: 5 as an 
ell3mple of this congruity of thought). Moreover, the author submits a solution for 'the 
dilemma posed by continuing sin' in presenting Jesus as one who continues to act on 
behalf of those who. though they ought not to, still fall into sin - but then confess their 
error.652 
Lieu confirms that 'The mark of modem study of the Epistles has been an 
awareness of their original setting and meaning.' However, this does not negate their 
contemporary significance; that significance, though, 'must be true to the original 
651 Ibid., p. 77. 
652 Ibid .• p. J(~. 
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meaning.' Part of that awareness has been a 'rehabilitation' of 2 and 3 John into the 
body of evidence contributing to historical reconstruction. This rehabilitation has 
occurred because: 
Their apparently specific references offer the possibility of giving a 
clearer picture of the circumstances of the Johannine tradition which, in 
the Gospel and First Epistle, is notoriously difficult to place; in practice 
this has proved hard to achieve, although ... a number of scholars have 
traced through them the later history of Johannine Christianity. More 
fruitfully, the tensions and conflict they imply offer a perspective from 
which Johannine thought and its potential can be evaluated. Since 
issues of authority. right belief and the boundaries of the community are 
at the centre of 2 and 3 John, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
distinctive Johannine approach to these can be explored.653 
Once we have thus gained 'a clearer picture of the circumstances of the 
Johannine tradition,' Lieu declares that 'a more precise picture follows' when we place 
1 John 'closely in relation to and subsequent to the Gospel.' She promotes the work of 
Raymond Brown as an example of how this type of linkage may operate. Viewing 
both pieces together in this way helps us to make discoveries (that unfold 'before our 
eyes') about community history, religious sociology, and theological development. 
She disagrees with Brown, however, on the issue that 1 John, 'at least in its original 
setting,' had the purpose of presenting the definitive way of reading the Gospel. 
Nevertheless, she concedes that 'it is how it has been used in the history of exegesis'; 
yet this 'begs the question whether 1 John should continue to act as a control on the 
interpretation of the Gospel- which is still as diverse in modem as in earlier times.'654 
What Lieu calls 'that difficult but important dualist passage in 3: 4 - 10,' is, we 
discover, a declaration 'that the coming of Jesus has brought about the destruction of 
the power of evil and enables those who believe to live free of that power.' Lieu 
concludes: 
This may sound like fantasy and invite the objection that nothing has 
changed, that 'an things have continued as they were from the beginning 
of creation' (2 Pet. 3: 4). The response of 1 John is to appeal to the 
653 Ibid., p. ] ]4. 
654 Ibid., pp. ]]4 - ] ]5. See also nute 9 on p. 115. 
242 
religious experience of believers and to point to the inner life of the 
community - thus offering a demand as well as assurance. The apparent 
exclusiveness of Johannine Christianity, which is less attractive to the 
modem reader than it was perhaps inevitable in its original setting, 
affinns that if Jesus' victory over sin is to be seen anywhere, it must be 
seen within the personal and even more the corporate life of those who 
believe.6SS 
6. 5. John R. Walters 
Next I wish to explore John R. Walters' work, Perfection in New Testament 
Theology - Ethics and Eschatology in Relational Dynamic (1995). In it he charges 
Bogart with the error of absolutism, and of consequently defining ancient perfectionism 
'in modem categories and then exploring its aberrations from that later model.' He 
summarily dismisses Bogart's work thus: 'The investigation of perfectionism in any 
document is only as cogent as the method employed ... A brief look at his method is in 
order. if only as a warning against certain unseen pitfalls, all of which certainly no one 
can avoid'; the 'assumptions' Bogart holds 'clearly affect [his) method lof analysis).' 
Despite Bogart's statements to the contrary, Walters insists that his fellow scholar has 
indeed distorted the understanding of the later age by conducting 'his .•. work with 
definitions of perfection, sin, and sinlessness based entirely on laJ ... Refonnation 
principle.' Bogart is as guilty as others in searching 1 John for the Lutheran idea that 
the believer remains simultaneously justified and a sinner (simuljw;tus et peccator).656 
The problem with Bogart's reconstruction is that the quest for the origin of the 
Johannine idea of perfectionism progresses 'all along with the problem of 1 John's 
"sinlessness contradiction" in mind,' says Walters. 'Perhaps,' he comments, 'it is only 
we who see the contradiction because of our modem theological heritage. Bogart never 
raises that possibility.' If we are to avoid the 'anachronistic trap' Walters informs us 
that 'it is best to begin with [the] theological context of the epistle as the 
author ... [provisionally named John] gives it.' Unlike Bogart, then. Walters will revert 
to the text without the encumbrences of 'our modem theological heritage.' The 
655 Ibid .• pp. 117 - 118. 
656 J.R. Walters, Perfection In New 1'esllllnenI11le%R.Y • I:·/hir.f a"d l:Schlllo/OR.V III Re/ll/iollal 
DYllamic (New York: Edwin Mellen, 19(5), pp. lStl· 157. 
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author's perspective is certainly accessible to us even if a reconstruction of the 
opponents' views remains elusive: 'John provides his own backdrop to the assertions 
he makes. He states certain hypothetical claims to which he wishes to address himself. 
Whether his opposition can be given any historical concreteness is a question unrelated 
to what John has to say about anyone who might hold such views.'657 Of the 
declarations made by the author he adds: 
We only exacerbate the problem by reading our own notions into them. 
John applies his own distinctive content to each of them, and loads all of 
them with significance derived from the schism in that 
situation .. .Instead of attempting to identify the adversaries and their 
position, something very difficult to do since I John is clearly biased 
and against them, all that can be attempted is to understand the nature of 
the dispute as John himself sees it To do that, the claims being made 
must be analyzed more closely.658 
Bogart's approach has hindered understanding by bringing his assumptions to bear 
upon the text. John has ensured that his declarations contain the nuances required for 
us to understand his view of the schism. By a more careful examination of the text we 
can discover that view. The attempted reconstruction of the opponents' position by 
Bogart is a fruitless exercise because of authorial partiality. However, we may 
apprehend the author's stance in the dispute. 
Walters explains why John allows the assertion of3: 6 and 9 and disallows that 
of I: 8 and 10. The assertion allowed is essentially behavioural: 'children of God do 
not give expression to sin.' The assertion disallowed is ontological: 'no one can claim 
never to have sinned, to be inherently sinless in nature.' Affirmation falls on the 
former because of 'the truth of Jesus' cleansing blood (1: 7 cr. 3: 5).' Opposition 
claims of constitutional sinlessness invalidate the issue at the centre or God's 
commission of Christ as the propitiation or expiation of the world's sin (2: 2), such 
claims turn Christ's teaching and mission and the apostolic tradition into a lie. 
However, we learn that 'to live sinless lives because of Christ's atoning mission is only 
657 Ibid., p. 157. 
658 Ibid., p. 159. 
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proper and accords with the truth, that is, the necessity that he be sent to remove the 
sins of the world.' On the one hand, John assumes that humanity remains 'inherently 
or constitutionally unable to avoid having sin(ned)' and thus requires Christ's 
'cleansing blood.' On the other, he also assumes that 'by virtue of Christ's blood those 
who belong to him do not sin.' It is simply their relationship with Christ that 
differentiates believers from the rest of humanity - a relationship that 'obliterates their 
sin.' Those who have 'a right relationship with God do not have to deal with the 
relational barrier that sin presents.' We learn that 'John is working from two 
assumptions which he regards as compatible but which modem interpreters have 
trouble holding together.'659 
It seems that Walters has no such trouble. Thus, because of this perception of 
concordancy he knows 'precisely Bogart's failing.' The explanation Bogart offers 
regarding 'the ethical already I not yet. .. makes no allowance for present moral 
attainment.'660 As we have seen, Bogart supports the idea that the believers ethical 
situation is such that she or he may occasionally lapse into sin, and that it is only in the 
eschaton that one may achieve the height of ethical attainment.661 Walters is 
unequivocal in his response: 'The problem with this is that John does not countenance a 
Christian lapsing back into sin (3: 6,9).' Taking up his colleague's emphasis on the 
relational nature of sinlessness (being born of God and abiding in Christ), Walters 
expounds that sin 'is a relational malady more powerful than humanity'S strength, not a 
temporary lapse surfacing from time to time in an unhappy act.' Those who practice 
sin 'are of the devil,' (3: 8) and the entire world lies under that evil one's power (5: 
19). Human strength is inferior to 'the power of Satan; consequently all have sinned 
(1: 8, 10; 2: 2).'662 Rather than a doctrine of original sin. this is 'an admission of 
constitutional limitation before a greater power ... a weakness in human ontology' 
Walters states: 
659 Ibid., p. 161. 
660 Ibid., p. 174. 
661 See nole .536. 
662 J.R. Walters. Perfection in N~w 1"estanu-nl Thl'%gy. p. 174. 
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Bogart's mistake is to regard the eschaton as the ultimate remedy for this 
continuing problem of human sin, making Christ's expiatory sacrifice 
amount to a holding action in the interim. This step logically equates 
sinlessness with no longer needing the atoning remedy of Christ's 
sacrifice. The human condition of weakness remains in spite of the 
grace of God that gives the children of God strength, the power to 
overcome the evil one (1: 14). Even if by God's grace Christians in fact 
never did sin after conversion, their constitutional weakness would still 
require the remedial strength Christ's atoning blood provides.663 
A believer may enjoy a sinless state, therefore, but one that, because of inherent frailty, 
perpetually depends upon the merits and remedies accruing from Christ's sacrifice. 
Bogart has erred in that he has elevated the eschaton above the expiation, and so failed 
to apprehend John's ability to hold the two assumptions in tension. According to the 
First Epistle, Christ's death is the sole means whereby the Christian may - even in the 
present life - enter into freedom from sin. 
Commenting on the section in Bogart's work that discloses 'the Real Conflict in 
1 John' (to wit. 'Expiation for sin and sinless perfection by abiding in Christ and being 
born of God are simply irreconcilable doctrines'664), Walters corrects him by arguing 
that perfection in the epistle 'is not an absolute state of being but a relational 
endowment.' Assuredly declaring that 'John's topic is the actualization of love in those 
who abide in Christ: Walters informs us that insofar as believers so abide they 
function according to God's design for humans and are 'actualizing the divine 
intention.' He quickly moves to qualify this assertion, however. by saying that this 
situation represents 'a relational growth dynamic rather than any absolute state of 
being.'665 This 'dynamic can grow even while at the same time accommodating and 
overcoming both impurity and immoraJity:666 We Jearn that 'perfection is divine love 
in its nascent fullness .. : 667 Abiding in Christ. then, provides the believer with an 
impetus for growth in divine love. In Christ the believer has access to the fullness of 
663 lhid., pp. 174· 175. 
664 See note 538. 
665 J.R. Walters, Perfection in New Testamellt 71"o!ogy, p. 175. 
666 lhid., p. 174. 
667 Ibid., p. 175. 
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that love, so producing the context for spiritual advancement. While remaining firmly 
reliant on the grace of God ('[ u lntil Christians are translated from this world to the next 
and eternally glorified'668), without which she or he 'inevitably succumbs to sin,'669 
the believer becomes 'morally pure through loving.'670 The message of 1: 8 and lOis 
that 'without exception everyone has sin ... everyone has sinned.' However, it is wrong 
of Bogart to conclude that the necessary expiationary emphasis in the epistle is in the 
least 'antiperfectionistic'; indeed, 'it is the only true basis for any espousal of Christian 
perfectionism or ... sinlessness.'671 
Walters declares that the declarations of 3: 6 and 5: 18 prove that 'John is 
perfectionistic and unqualifiedly so.' We learn that: 
To the author's mind uf1ap-tiav aU XOl.fL is equivalent to oUX 
uf1ap'tuVEL, and not doing sin or not sinning is attributed to 0 
YEVVl10e~ £t( 'tOO Oeoo keeping 0 YEYEVVI1,Jv~ h: 'tOO Of-OO. By 
definition, those who have been born of God do not sin. By definition, 
to sin is not to have been born of God. uJ1ap'tuvro is being used in a 
relational sense; it prevents one from seeing or knowing God and 
accepting the offer of God's love in Christ.672 
John certainly recognises the possibility of Christians sinning as evinced by 2: 
1. He adds that the proof of knowing God is keeping God's commands (2: 3). Should 
the believer fail to keep those commands, she or he is guilty of sin or lawlessness (3: 4) 
and has 'failed to abide by the author's definition of fellowship with God.' Moreover, 
he effectively defines sin as 'moving out of fellowship with God.' Hence. when the 
author 'says, aU 6Uva'taL Qp.ap'taVELv, he is speaking logically rather than 
ontologicatly of Christians.' Walters summarises the author's position thus: 'Nothing 
668 Ibid., p. 175. 
669 Ibid., p. 176. 
670 Ibid., p. 174. 
671 Ibid., p. 176. 
672 Ibid., p. 176. 
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in their being prevents them from sinning, but sinning is not possible in the fellowship 
of God.'673 
Objecting to Bogart's accusation that John makes use of casuistry in 5: 16 - 17 
and so reveals himself as a 'quasi-perfectionist' who compromises his ideals by 
differentiating between mortal and venial sins,674 Walters explains that 'the sin leading 
to death' is 'characteristic' of the one who does not have the Son of God and therefore 
does not have 'the life' (5: 12). The author admits both the existence of a category of 
sin that is not 'mortal' and that a brother might commit it. However, the author is not 
guilty of casuistry 'for one simple reason: the "brother" is not behaving as a Christian 
by definition behaves.'675 
According to this scholar, 'John recognises that people fail to meet up to the 
standard he sets but he has not thereby lowered his standard.' We may see this stance 
in the advice to the Christian (for so 'we must presume' him to be) who observes his 
brother sinning. The onlooker should pray to God, and the outcome will be that God 
will grant life to the offender. Only God can so bestow life to anyone, and the only one 
in this hypothetical situation who needs that life is the 'brother' observed in 'venial' 
sin. Walters states that Bogart has 'failed to notice that even "venial" sins can only be 
overcome by God granting life to the sinner a1\ over again, without which grace that 
one would surely die eternally.' We may tell that what the author hypothesises in this 
instance is a 'sin not leading to death' since 'by prayer life can be granted to the sinner' 
(through a renewed application of the blood of Christ).676 
John withholds any suggesion that the believer should similarly pray for one 
guilty of mortal sin. This 'is because mortal sin. sin which testifies that one does not 
have the Son of God, can only be overcome by the blood of Christ.' The issue of 
prayer is irrelevant regarding this case for 'the one in mortal sin has never come under 
673 Ibid., p. 176. 
674 See note 539. 
675 J.R. Walters, Perfection in New Testament Theology, p. 177. 
676 Ibid., p. 177. 
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Christ's blood in the first place and has not accepted the offer of life at all.' Walters 
comments: 
The distinction between venial and mortal sin in lohn's mind appears to 
be [the] standpoint ofthe cross. All sin is mortal sin to one who has 
never come under the blood of Christ; intercessory prayer alone cannot 
impart life to one who is not in Christ's fellowship. Sin thereafter is 
venial to the one who has claimed fellowship with Christ; intercessory 
prayer can restore life to a brother or sister in Christ. But all sin is 
deadly and contrary to being born of God, and it jeopardizes Iife.677 
It is interesting that this scholar forms his answer to Bogart around the idea that 
there is a purposeful distinction 'in John's mind' concerning the offender's 5.1lvific 
status: 5: 16 - 17 refers to the appropriate remedial action regarding a Christian who has 
fallen into sin. Her or his sin remains pardonable through prayerful intercession by 
another and recourse to the 'cross.' The wrongdoer may then re-enter a condition of 
pardon already known by her or him following conversion. Conversely, sin for the 
unbeliever has the 'mortal' element to it because the one committing it has yet to make 
the inaugural supplication for forgiveness and undergo conversion. Until this 
conversion has occurred no intercession by another will avail, so the author declines to 
advise it. Bogart is wrong to accuse the author of casuistry. John does not employ 
such a practice. Verses sixteen and seventeen of chapter five are not present in the lext 
because he felt 'forced' to construct a compromise as a result of the juxtaposition of the 
two mutually incompatible doctrines of expiation and perfection. Rather, we discover, 
these verses 'are stated by way of exemplifying (perhaps for the readers' specific 
benefit) God's ready response to requests that accord with the divine will.'678 Having 
noted Walters' correction of Bogart on this point, we may observe that to establish this 
reading he uses the language of insight into the author's mind - the langul1ge that Bogart 
also used but in support of an entirely different reading of the text. 
Though we have just discovered that sin 'is venial to the one who has claimed 
fellowship with Christ: we have also received exhortation to remember that 'al1 sin is 
677 Ibid., p. 177. 
678 Ibid., p. 177. 
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deadly and contrary to being born of God, and it jeopardizes life.' Yet, in drawing his 
critique of Bogart to a close Walters carefully seeks to qualify that exhortation. He 
avers that: 
John is able to view a fellow Christian in the paradoxical position of 
being in sin under the power of the evil one in some area while at the 
same time abiding in Christ and conquering the evil one in other areas. 
Perfection in love expresses itself dynamically in this paradox by the 
true light. the advocacy of Christ, overcoming and causing the darkness 
to pass away (2: 8, 13). Intercessory prayer aids this process. 
Perfection in love is living in the light Christ brings. A Christian 
harbouring ill will for another brings on darkness and blindness, but not 
necessarily totally (2: 9 - 11). One can actualize divine love toward 
many while harbouring hate toward the one. Light and darkness can 
coexist, though not without causing one to stumble. Perfection in love 
can coexist with sin. No one in the fellowship of Christ is completely in 
the dark, nor perhaps completely in the light; however, no one in the 
world outside of Christ's fellowship is in the light at all. 6 79 
From our exploration of his work we may deduce that Walters views 
perfectionism in 1 John as existing in the context of the believer's love relationship with 
Christ and with other Christians. An ebb and flow of sinlessness may occur during the 
course of that relationship as the Christian responds, or fails to respond. to the virtue of 
Christ's influence. For Walters. the normal Christian life in the epistle is one 
characterised by a freedom from sin. However. because of intrinsic human frailty all 
believers live in permanent reliance upon the expiation. Though they occasionally fail 
to preserve the sustaining relationship with Christ and thus fall into sin. the intercession 
of fellow Christians and the grace of God ensure the re-establishment of that 
relationship. 
Opposing Bogart's contention, Walters concludes that 'there is no reul conflict 
in the perfectionist thought of this epistle. only a nuance that we find foreign.' He 
reiterates that where Bogart 'strays' is in his definition of sin and perfection in absolute 
terms 'along the lines of modern theology.' This deviation 'causes him to 
misunderstand the relational nature of af.1ap'tuvw and sinlessness in the epistle and 
causes him to play havoc with both the eschatological and ethical tensions in 1 
679 Ibid., p. 17M. 
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John.'680 WaIters implies that he has 'analyzed' the text 'more closely' than his 
colleague and, furthermore, has, unlike him, approached it unencumbered by personal 
assumptions. He has successfully avoided 'reading [his] own notions into' the 
author's declarations, and therefore has been able to discern the true balance of the 
epistle. While Bogart has played 'havoc' with the text, Walters' approach has enabled 
a more accurate reconstruction of its essential message to emerge. 
Walters is as lavish in his praise of Raymond Brown as he is in his 
disapprobation of Bogart: '[He] is much more circumspect. In fact, his exegesis of the 
various perfection passages in 1 John is difficult to fault.'681 Once he has commended 
Brown for distinguishing accurately many ofthe emphases in the epistle, however, he 
goes on to remark that Brown 'has not fully grasped the import of his own words when 
it comes to understanding the dynamic of Love, or in other words, the epistle's ethics.' 
Regarding his treatment of the 'sinlessness contradiction,' on the one hand Brown 
reveals the secessionists as arguing that evils committed by Christians do not constitute 
sin, for Christians do not sin. On the other he says that the author is 'constrained' to 
recognise that Christians do indeed sin and continue to need the atoning blood of 
Christ.682 Walters comments: 
At this point Brown says, "the author is dealing with pastoral reality. 
Even if this is the last hour, there is a 'not yet' (2: 18,3: 2)." Here he is 
referring to the eschatological tension characteristic of the epistle and 
much of primitive Christianity as a whole. But in recognizing the 
Christian's ongoing need for the cross as a rationale for pointing 
forward to the "not yet" of sinlessness, he tacitly gives the cross only 
temporal efficacy. He deftly removes sinlessness to the eschatological 
"not yet" to underscore the reality of the sinful "now" ... Brown has 
missed altogether the logic of the author in supplying his own.683 
It seems that Brown's error is similar to that of Bogart's, who, we remember Walters 
asserts, makes the mistake of regarding 'the eschaton as the ultimate remedy for this 
680 Ibid., p. 17M. 
681 Ibid., p. 17M. 
682 Ibid., p. 179. 
683 Ibid., pp. 179 - IRQ. 
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continuing problem of human sin, making Christ's expiatory sacrifice amount to a 
holding action in the interim.'684 Like Bogart, Brown has effectively limited the scope 
of influence of the cross to the believer's lifetime. By projecting the occasion of 
sinlessness into the eschaton Brown has failed to follow the author's logic that remains 
evident in the text, and instead has imposed his own sequence. 
According to Walters, even though John admits that Christians do sin, the 
'reality under which he operates' is that those who enjoy fellowship with God cannot 
sin. The only circumstance in which the author envisions believers sinning is a failure 
to 'abide in God in some area, in which case they are not living up to the definition of 
Christianity he espouses.' Quoting chapter three verses 14b - 15 (without providing a 
linking explanation to his earlier treatment of 5: 16 and 17 where he declared 'one can 
actualize divine love toward many while harbouring hate toward the one') Walters tells 
us that for a Christian to harbour hate toward a fellow believer (the apparent situation 
behind community relations in the epistle) it would be necessary for a deviation from 
abiding in God's love and from divine birth to take place. 'The fellowship of the 
Father and of his Son Jesus Christ is one of perfection in love: a love that actively 
encompasses others. 'To John's mind,' declares Walters. this 'dcfinitionally' excludes 
anyone who harbours hate toward another (especially if the source of the rancour is a 
dispute concerning whether Jesus is the Christ).685 
6. 6. R. B. Edwards 
We tum now to Ruth B. Edwards' study, The Johannine Epi.'ifles (1996). 
Edwards' opens her account of the problem by remarking on the difficulties faced by 
authors in their efforts to explain ideological teaching: 
In defining any dogmatic belief it is difficult to ensure that one's 
statements are both logical and unambiguous - a point to which 
compilers of ecumenical "agreed statements" would readily assent - all 
too often what we say is misunderstood by someone who reads or hears 
it without sharing our presuppositions or immediate concerns. Such 
684 See nute 664. 
685 J.R. Walters, Perfection in New Testament Theology, p. IKO. 
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problems become even more acute with a hortatory text designed to 
inculcate certain attitudes or effect a particular form of conduct. What 
may seem perfectly clear and logical to the author(s) may not seem so to 
the readers. This is especially true if the reader is distanced from the 
original author(s) by time, space, or culture, as we are from the 
Johannine epistles.686 
These epistles 'contain theological tensions and ambiguities which pose difficulties for 
the modem reader eager to discover their true meaning.' After explaining the nature of 
our conundrum, Edwards asks: 'Is the author confused? Is he uncritically combining 
different sources? Can the words bear another meaning? Or is the apparent 
contradiction to be explained by the writer's rhetorical purpose'],687 
Contradicting both Bogart and Brown. this scholar explains that 'rather than 
attacking a specific group of "opponents" who claim to be sinless. the author is 
warning his own community that they must not make this claim.' She rejects the 
assumption that any distinctive vocabulary in the epistle originated from opponents: 
words absent from the Fourth Gospel and found in 1 John one may explain by the idea 
that the works had different authors; moreover, even if we assume single authorship, 
the scarcity of written material precludes a decision on whether certain vocabulary came 
from an outside source.688 Edwards deduces: 
The author nowhere attributes to opponentJ claims to have 
"community" or spiritual "anointing"; rather he reassures his readers that 
this is what they themselves have (cf. 1: 3: 2: 20, 26). The idea that I 
John, in its ethical teaching, is attacking a group of charismatic 
"pneumatics" who profess to be sinless is ill-founded. It is the author's 
own community for whom he claims special guidance from the Holy 
Spirit (cf. In. 16: 13).689 
Bogart's assumption that the author of 1 John is reacting against incipient 
Gnosticism represents a 'real difficulty' as aspects of his thought harmonise with 
Gnosticism. The following factors represent evidence of this harmony: a) the author's 
686 R.B. Edward ... }ohanni"i' r:pistit'.f. p. 16. 
687 Ibid .• p. 16. 
688 I/Jid .• p. 58. 
689 Ibid., pp. 58 - 59. 
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dualistic approach; b) his opinion of the kosmos as evil; c) his instruction to readers 
not to love the world or to belong to it; d) his ready use of Gnostic tenns such as 
sperma and chrisma; e) his stress on the importance of knowledge; and, 0 his own 
teaching of a type of perfectionism. Defenders of the author's orthodoxy claim that he 
meant something different by these tenns. Also, they affinn his belief in the 
incarnation. However, according to Edwards, the author 'is treading a tightrope,' and 
one cannot entirely allay the suspicion that he has gnostic leanings. She declares that 
'He cannot be attacking fully-fledged Gnosticism, for this does not yet exist: if he is 
attacking some kind of incipient Gnosticism, he goes about it in a strange way.'690 
We learn that 'the strength of Brown's thesis is that it uses the text itself to 
determine the views of the "opponents" rather than making them conform to groups 
known from outside sources.' Yet, Edwards also finds the 'weakness' in Brown's 
account: it 'lies in its over-ambitious reconstruction of their teaching.' She indicates 
that Brown wrongly takes 'every possible statement as polemica1.' Overall, his work is 
a 'very hypothetical reconstruction of the history of the Johannine community.' This 
scholar gives some approval to the chronological priority of the Gospel of John, on 
which Brown's theory also depends. However, she challenges the assumption that 1 
John is polemical ethically as well as christologically.691 
At this point we meet Edward's claim that she 'will seek to let 1 John speak in 
its own right, without any presupposition about "opponents," authorship or specific 
relationship to the Gospel of John.'692 Typical of the work of historical--critical 
scholars, here is the claim to return to the text unencumbered by any presupposition. 
Her unfettered encounter with the text is not without difficulty, however, as 
'obscurities' in the text 'mean that our assessment of the Epistles' theology must 
sometimes be provisional.'693 
690 Ibid., p. 63. Here, and in lhc rest of my anaJysi!! of her work, I have followed Edwards' custom of 
the AnglicilBtion ()f the Greek word!!. 
691 Ibid., p. 64. 
692 Ibid., p. 67. 
693 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Writing on issues such as future judgement, the parousia, and Jesus or God as 
the generative source ofthe righteous, Edwards discusses the considerable difficulty in 
understanding 1 John 2: 28 - 3: 3. Even small changes to what she regards as the 
'insecure punctuation' in this passage 'could alter the meaning radically.' By 
discussing this, she wishes 'to illustrate the difficulties in discovering 1 John's precise 
meaning.' We learn that 'Similar problems occur with many other passages .. .' 
Nevertheless, Edwards still uses phrases such as 'the main burden of 1 John's thought 
seems to be this .. .'694 
Notwithstanding any difficulties in discerning the 'precise meaning,' she tells 
us that 'In the first half of 1 John (1: 5 - 3: 3) the author's basic meani ng was fairly 
clear, though some details remained obscure. However, we learn that in 'the second 
part (3: 4 - 5: 12) things get more complicated.' The 'main purpose' of the second part 
'seems to be to stress the seriousness of sin.'695 Candidly, Edwards remarks that 
'Every commentator wrestles with the tension - not to say the downright contradiction -
between [the 1 strong statements about sinlessness and the author's earlier claims' of I: 
10 and 2: 1.696 
Exploring four critical approaches to the tension, this scholar dismisses the 
first, grammatical analysis, by stating that 'a study of Greek grammar alone is not 
enough to get out of this conundrum.'697 Regarding the second, polemical citation, 
she deliberates on an idea from H.C. Swadling that .'.perma in the sense of 'divine 
seed' is a 'gnostic commonplace,' and that 3: 6 and 9 are quotations from the slogans 
of 'gnostic' opponents that alternate in the text with the author's statements and replies 
(3: 5,3: 7,8; 3: 10). The passage becomes thus (in a paraphrase, with the proposed 
slogans in italics): 
(v.5) You know the role of Christ to remove sins - he committed no sin 
at all. 
694 Ibid., pp. 97 - 98. 
695 Ibid., p. 98. 
696 Ibid., p. 99. 
697 Ibid., p. HX>. 
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(v.6) Anyone who remains in him is sinless - and anyone who sins has 
not seen him and does not know him. 
(vv. 7 - 8) Little children, let no one mislead you. It is those who act 
righteously who are righteous, just as Christ is righteous (etc.) ... 
(v.9) All those who are born of God do not sin. because they are born 
of God. 
(v.lO) The way to distinguish the children of God and the children of 
the devil is this: those who do not act rightly are not of God, nor those 
who do not love their brother.698 
Setting the verses in this way presents 'the author as "demystifying" the concept of 
birth from divine seed because opponents had claimed it brought an automatic state of 
sinlessness.' Rather, the author's argument runs, the reborn must 'keep themselves 
safe' (a variant reading of 5: 18) and therefore shield themselves from 'habitual sin.' 
Edwards questions the effectiveness of this solution: 
There is no doubt that ancient authors did sometimes quote opponents' 
slogans without acknowledgement; but is this really what is happening 
here? The resultant sequence is jerky in thought; if recited orally a good 
speaker might indicate the meaning by tone of voice; in a written text 
one wonders whether readers could have grasped what was happening. 
It is ironical that the very verses which Swadling assigns to the 
"opponents" are attributed by both Bogart (1 fJ79) and Brown (1982) to 
the author himself. They see the claims of 3: 6 and 3: 9 as representing 
"orthodox." perfectionism, and in 1: 6, 8, 10 as directed against 
"heretical" perfectionism. A final problem for Swadling's view is 5: 18, 
where he has to slip in the word "habitual" to make his case work. If it 
can be supplied in 5: 18, why not in 3: 6 and 9? In fact 3: 4 - 10 hang 
together as a consistent unit, and vv. 7, 8 with their reference to those 
who "do righteousness" (a semitism), being righteous like God, and 
those who "do sin" being of the devil, far from countering 3: 6 and 3: 9, 
reinforce it. The whole passage hannonizes with our author's basic 
theology that righteousness and sin belong to two different "worlds" 
and just do not mix.699 
A third critical approach to the tension is the notion oftheological paradox.. 
Mutually incompatible concepts in biblical study are not uncommon (Edwards lists the 
following: the present but future kingdom; the statements of Jesus on those against or 
for him in Mt. 12: 30 and Mk. 9: 40; Christians justified by faith and yctjudged 
698 Ibid., p. 100. 
699 IIHd., pp. 100 - 102. Edwards follows H.C. Swadling. 'Sin and Sinles.o;ncs.o; in I John,' SIT 35 
(1982). pp. 205 - 21 J. 
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according to their deeds; the believer simultaneously righteous and a sinner - Luther's 
simul justus et peccator that we have alluded to earlier). Edwards states: 
So the tension in 1 John has been explained by the idea that the 
Christian as sinner lives under forgiveness, and precisely as one already 
sharing in salvation overcomes individual acts of sin ... But this is a 
desperate playing with words. Perhaps nearer the mark is the idea that 
the sinlessness of those who have become God's children is an ideal, as 
yet imperfectly realized.7OO 
The final critical approach centres on the author's rhetorical purpose. Such a 
purpose has gone unnoticed by scholars as they 'have taken 1 John too literally,' and 
that literalism has caused numerous problems. Edwards explains that 'Most people 
make extreme utterences occasionally in particular contexts, and it is not unusual to find 
logically inconsistent statements within the same political speech or religious address.' 
Taking the framework of 1 John's discourse as ethical dualism, we may note that in the 
first part of the epistle (1: 5 - 3: 3) 'the author sets out the need for consistency between 
what one claims and how one behaves, assuring readers that sins can be forgiven, but 
ex.horting them to "walk in the light" and not to "love the world" (equated with 
darkness).' The believers live in the turbulent last days. Sin and deceit reign as 
exemplified in the antichrists. However, the believers enjoy protection because of 'the 
chrisma' and their status as God's children.701 In the second part of the epistle (3: 4-
5: 12) the author 'heightens his contrast between God's children who do not sin, and 
sinners, the children of the devil' (for the destruction of that evil one's works the 
manifestation of Jesus took place 3: 8). From several works (Psa/m.'f of Solomon 17: 
32; J Enoch. 5: 8; Jubilees. 5: 12; cf. Jer. 31: 33 - 34) we learn of an ex.tensive 
expectation within Judaism: the cessation of sin among the Elect in the end time. The 
author sees his 'pupils' within the community as beloved and 'presumably Elect' 
children of God, living in the 1ast hour' (2: 11). Though they face the 'eschatological 
conflict they are already conquerors (4: 4). because the One that is with them (God) is 
700 Ibid., p. 101. Hcre: Edwards rollows H. Braun, 'Litcrar-Analysc und thcologische Schichtung im 
crstcn Johanncsbricr: ZTK 4R (1951): pp. 262·291. 
701 Ibid., pp. 101 - 102. 
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stronger than "the one who is in the world" (devil I antichrist) ... Surely they should be 
sinless, as befits the Elect.'702 
Edwards sums up this approach by commenting: 
Assertions like "nobody born of God sins," though grammatically 
statements offact in the indicative, serve the function of exhortation: 
"Nobody born of God ought to sin" (cf. our English usage "Nobody 
does that" to dissuade someone from what we believe to be wrong). In 
hyperbolic language the pastor seeks to promote right belief and right 
conduct: He does not believe that those under instruction are actually 
perfect; but sinlessness is what is expected of God's children; compare 
Deut. 18: 13, "You shall be perfect with the Lord your God"; Mt. 5: 48, 
"You shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. "703 
In her concluding comments this scholar remarks that '} John's teaching on sin 
and forgiveness has proved more difficult than a simple summary might suggest.' Sin 
remains incompatible with God's character and, moreover, with believers' status as 
God's children. Therefore, 'it is clear' from the text that the author regnrds sin with the 
greatest abhorrence. It is in 'the interests of paraenesis' that he has 'articulated his 
concern in the sharpest possible language, using Jewish categories of thought.' 
Furthermore, he asserts the forgiveness of sins through 'the atoning death of Jesus.' 
Any 'philosophical and theological problems raised by this belief lie beyond his 
scope.'704 
Edwards maintains that 1 John 'does contain peculiar features,' (nnd here she 
lists the terms chri.'ima, sperma and 'Antichrist,' the ideas of the impeccability - or 
sinlessness - of God's children, and the idea of 'sin unto death'). Nevertheless, she 
questions whether 'these distinctive ideas [are) more numerous or peculiar than those 
found uniquely in other New Testament documents' (for instance, she submits, 
baptism for the dead in 1 Corinthians). Even so, the 'ideal of eschatological 
702 Ibid., p. 102. 
703 Ibid., p. 102. 
704 Ibid., pp. 104· 105. 
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sinlessness ... [is] implied by many texts' (for example 1 Thess. 5: 23; Jude 24).705 
The First Epistle's teaching on sin and atonement 'causes difficulties for some readers.' 
Many 'have found hope and encouragement' in its assurances of forgiveness, while 
some suffer disturbance or puzzlement by its references to a 'sin unto death' (5: 16-
17), and 'the assertion that God's children cannot sin, which runs contrary to Christian 
experience as well as formally contradicting what was said earlier in this writing.'706 
Edwards sums up by declaring: 
Whatever our reading of the text, the Johannines speak to us of a God 
who is just and loving, and of a Saviour who gave his life for all 
humanity. They set before us ideals of righteousness,love and purity 
of conduct. They offer hope for the future and assure us of the 
possibility of forgiveness. However great the problems caused by their 
obscurity of expression or "mythological" modes of thought, they have 
a message for us today. "Trust in God's Son Jesus Christ and love one 
another" (1 John 3: 23). "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is 
of God" (4: 7).707 
6. 7. D. Rensberaer 
D. Rensberger hopes that the research that he undertook for his book / John 2 
John 3 John (1m) has allowed him to understand the reason for their composition 
'and what their author was trying to say, well enough, at any rate, to bring some clarity 
to others who study them.' He writes pensively of the obstacles to this task: 
For texts so brief, they contain a surprising number of puzzles -
linguistic, literary, historical, and theological. I found mysclf 
wondering more than once why "the elder" chose to express himself so 
obscurely, when clarity would have been just as ready to hand. I have 
not sought to conceal from the reader those places where it seems 
impossible to be certain exactly what the text means. I have tried to 
make a decision in every case, but I hope I have not left the impression 
that I am offering the definitive solutions to these problems. I hor 
also, however, that I have been able to offer more than a series 0 
problems and solutions.70S 
705 Ibid., pp. I~ - 110. 
706 IIJid., p. J 14. 
707 Ibid., p. 115. 
708 Rensberger. I Jolrn 2 John J John, p. II. 
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Rensberger works on the premise of the existence of the Fourth Gospel 'more 
or less as we know it' (barring, perhaps, chapter 21) prior to the epistles. Some 
passages in 1 John, he thinks, 'seem to be based on the Gospel of John,' though others 
'could be oral Johannine tradition.'709 Yet, we learn that: 
1 John presents a distinctively lohannine approach to tradition, a 
dynamic relationship between tradition and Spirit. The tradition is valid 
only because it is the testimony of the Spirit of truth. The author 
himself interprets, reformulates, and adapts the Johannine tradition in 
many ways, and submits his exhortation to abide in the tradition to the 
judgement of the anointed community.710 
The author and his opponents 'were interpreting Johannine tradition in a new 
situation.' Our passages may represent an appeal 'to the central confessional statements 
of that tradition' with the purpose of accusing the opponents of contradicting the 
statements. So, they may not report 'what the opponents themselves actually said.'7)) 
Interpreting either the written or oral tradition, the opponents may not only have 
believed that their faith in Christ and possession of the Spirit imbued them with 
'spiritual knowledge, an intimate relationship with God, and eternal life, but [also withl 
a divine nature incapable of sin, no matter what their actions.' 'Some such hypothesis 
seems necessary to explain the data in 1 John,' says Rensberger. However, he adds 
that 'ultimately our focus must be on the text itself and not on a hypothetical 
reconstruction.'712 
In 1 John the children of God and the children of the devil are 'irrevocably 
distinct from one another.' One may know those of either party 'absolutely by their 
conduct (3: 4 - 10; 5: 18).' Thus, we may judge that the epistle 'comes close to a 
deterministic concept of salvation.' A relief from this apparent determinism emerges in 
the contradictory statements concerning believers' vulnerability to sin (I: 5; 2: 2; 5: 16-
17), and the omission of any assertion that the children of the devil remain predestined 
709 Ibid., p. 20. 
71 0 lhid., p. 44. 
711 Ibid., p. 23. 
71 2 Ibid., p. 2S. 
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to sin. Indeed, there is scant infonnation regarding how people become offspring of 
either progenitor, and how a person might change from one category to the other(and 
here Rensberger notes 2: 19). We learn that the author has no interest in the nature of 
such origins but rather 'in the behaviors that make the origins plain.' The author may 
have 'borrowed the detenninistic language from his opponents.' However, the tight 
integration of this language into the epistle indicates 'that he apparently found it an 
acceptable means of expressing the sharp contrast he saw between the true way and that 
of the opponents.'713 
Beginning to address the remaining question of whether Christians can or 
cannot sin, this scholar sees that the 'author's overriding concern is that the readers, 
who had not yet gone over to the opponents, should not sin (2: 1 ).' To achieve this, he 
affinned: i) the possibility of sinlessness in acts oflove; and. ii) the possibility of 
failure, along with the certainty of divine forgiveness. Those whom he classes as 
God's true children evidently love one another - unlike the opponents. That which 
belongs to the old world, namely sin and death, has suffered defeat by Christ and is 
passing away (2: 8 - 9, 17; 3: 5,8; 5: 3 - 5). Yet, says Rensberger, 'this is not an 
automatic process'; the author exhorts his readers to continue living in love, and he 
assures them of forgiveness if they do sin. He adds that '(s)omething like this, at any 
rate, seems to be the point ofthe troublesome contradictions about sin in 1 John.'714 
The passage 1: 5 - 2: 2 encapsulates a series of six 'boasts' or claims 'probably 
based on statements made by the author's opponents, which the author regards as 
false.'71S We learn that 'the author generalizes the opponents' claims in order to refute 
them: it is not only the opponents, but anyone who might make such unfounded claims 
Who is in error.' This is a tactic, as in mounting a general refutation the author seeks to 
make it seem more self-evident. However, he may also have held a genuine concern 
that his readers were at 'risk of being caught up in these errors.' Furthermore, the 
-
713 IIJUI., p. 41. 
714 lhid., p. 41. 
., 1 S Ibid., p. 49. 
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author employs the 'use of "we" to identify them with himself.' This 'is part of a 
conscious strategy to draw them securely to his side of the conflict.'716 
Throughout the New Testament, the expression to 'have sin' appears only in 1: 
8 and in the Gospel of John (9: 41; 15:22,24; 19: 11). As found in the Gospel, it 
invariably refers to those hostile to Jesus. Consequently, the opponents may have 
deduced that those who believe in Jesus 'do not have sin' - they 'do not bear the stigma 
or the guilt of sinfulness, irrespective of their actions (similarly "we have not sinned" in 
1: 10).' It is possible to conceive that this group embraced the idea that the new nature 
imparted in Christ remained incapable of sin. 'For the author, such assertions are sheer 
delusion,' we discover. Hence, he judges that the adversaries lack 'the truth,' 'the 
word' or the revelation of God given in Jesus. Rensberger declares that the author's 
position is 'in accord with the broad biblical understanding that no one is without sin (1 
Kgs 8: 46; Ps 14; 143: 2; Eccl 7: 20; Mark 10: 18; Rom 3: 9 - 26).' Though 1 John is 
singular in its 'explicit treatment of whether, and in what way, Christians can sin,' this 
scholar observes that 'its statements are also uniquely contradictory, and present 
perhaps its most difficult problem.'717 
The author has a 'pastoral and parenetic purpose': the desire to see the believers 
'walking in the light' (synonymous with loving one another in Rensberger's analysis; 
indeed, we find that the 'entire discussion of sin and righteousness in 1 John 
is ... brought under the heading of love'), and to exhort them to holiness - a purpose 
'that allows (though it hardly resolves) the contradictory statements.' The conflict with 
3: 4 - 10; 5: 18 remains 'especially difficult.' Rensberger suggests that the validity of 
those passages 'may be that one should be sinless in fact, not only in principle.' 
Hence, there may not be complete incongruity with verses 1: 8,10 'if they mean' that 
when a Christian actually commits sin one 'cannot. .. [wish it] away by an appeal to 
principle.'718 To acknowledge 'what really is,' to confess, provides a contrast to self-
deceptive denial of sin (1: 9). We discover that the 'use of the plural "sins" (rather than 
716 Ibid., p. 53. 
717 Ibid., pp. 53 - 54. 
718 Ibid .• p. 54 
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"sin," as in 1: 8) represents a reminder that not just an abstract confession of sinfulness 
but the acknowledgement of specific acts is in mind.'719 
Integrity and self-deception is the overall theme of 1: 5 - 2: 2. The First Epistle 
stresses 'a kind of ethical realism,' as opposed to the denial of the reality of our own 
nature or that of Jesus. Any claim to sinlessness runs counter to the realities of human 
nature. Conversely, the transformation resulting from a 'relationship with God through 
Jesus Christ must not remain a matter of spiritual fantasy, but is meant to become 
concrete reality in the ethical character of daily life.' The adversaries' claim to be 
without sin demonstrates that they do not possess the truth or God's word.720 
Rensberger informs us that 'in the Johannine writings, "truth" means not simply human 
honesty, but reality, the reality of God.' A denial of our sinfulness, he says, 'makes 
even God untrue'; and this is 'not just because God has said (in some unspecified 
place) that people are sinful.' To deny our sinful nature is to lose our knowledge of 
God's nature also, even our knowledge of divine forgiveness. Those who claim 
sinlessness lack the aspect of the truth that God is love (4: 8, 16). Empty, 'self-
deifying claims to be without injustice already' prevent cleansing from that injustice, a 
cleansing only effected by a trust in 'God's loving faithfulness andjustice.' The epistle 
evinces a sense of differentiation between divine and human nature - a sense that 
appears fundamental to it. It reveals a paradox: we must admit our human nature (our 
sin) to share in the divine nature (the divine truth). However, we may so admit with 
complete confidence as 'it is God's nature to love, and to forgive, and ... this divine love 
is incarnate in the human Jesus, the Son of God.'721 
Rensberger explains that even if the epistle lacked an overtly eschatological 
reference, its 'sense' would be that the act of sinning reveals those who exist 'on the 
wrong side of the dualism defined by the distinction between children of God and of 
the devil.' A 'clear allusion' to John 8: 44 appears in 1 John 3: 8 (Cf. 3: 15). The 
'author understands' the Gospel as saying that sinners are offspring of the devil. 
719 Ibid .• p. 54. 
720 Ibid., p. 58 
721 Ibid .• p. 58. 
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However. he does not declare that they were 'born' of the devil. or comment on the 
time or manner of that birth. This scholar tells us that 'First John has no interest in a 
Gnostic-style myth detailing the origins of those who are saved and those who are not. 
Its concern is rather to delineate two groups. God's children and the devil's. on the 
basis of interlocking criteria of belief and action.'722 
Using an antithetical form. the author in 3: 6 establishes 'two mutually 
exclusive categories' - those who abide in Jesus and those who sin.723 In 3: 5 we find 
'two warrants' for the assertion of sinlessness: a) 'Christ came to take away sins (Le .• 
acts of sin)'; and, b) 'was without sin (as a general quality or principle) himself.' We 
learn that '[t]he phrase "'You know" probably indicates that the two warrants are drawn 
from Johannine tradition' (0. John 1: 29; 7: 18; 8: 46; chapter 9). Rensberger says 
that the 'opponents would no doubt have agreed with both of these warrants.' Yet. 
they may also have claimed their complete fulfilment in them and 'that they now "had 
no sin."' This scholar informs us that the 'dispute concerned the meaning of Johannine 
tradition: Did it mean that Christ had made believers automatically sinless. whatever 
their actions might be; or did it mean that they must pattern their actions after Jesus' 
sinlessness?' Alternatively. we might ask: '[I]s sinlessness a matter of principle or of 
practice?' Rensberger maintains that 'the author's interpretation would favour the 
latter, and would also include the means by which Jesus took away sins, namely his 
death (1: 7; 2: 2; 4: 10), which the opponents apparently considered to be without 
theological significance (5: 6 - 8).'724 
Discussing the 'assertion of sinlessness in 3: 9 raises serious difficulties,' says 
Rensberger: 'One is what the statement that "his sperma abides in him" means.' He 
comments: 
72 2 Ibid., p. 90. 
723 Ibid., p. 90. 
724 Ibid., p. 91. 
The obvious sense is that those who have been born of God possess in 
themselves a divine element or principle that shields them against any 
possibility of committing sin ... Considering 1: 10; 2: 14,24 (also John 
5: 38; 8: 31,37; 15: 7), the abiding sperma could be the logos, the 
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word of God (cf. Jas 1: 18; 1 Pet 1: 23). Most likely, however, the 
sperma, like the anointing in 2: 20,27, is the Spirit, which is the agent 
of divine birth (John 3: 5 - 8) and is connected with divine abiding 
(John 14: 16 - 17; 1 John 3: 24; 4: 13). It is of course possible that the 
author would not distinguish between these two, or meant to combine 
them. There may also be a reference to the covenant promise of God's 
law and Spirit being implanted in the people to enable their faithfulness 
(Jer 31: 31 - 34; Ezek 11: 19 - 20; 36: 26 - 27).72S 
Thus, we discover sinlessness as: 'not an ideal to be attained or a potential to be 
realized, but the inevitable working out of an implanted principle, something that 
Christians have apart from, or in spite of, their own wills.' Such an 'extreme form of 
the idea' Rensberger sees as 'remote from our author's thinking elsewhere' and serves 
to highlight 'the major difficulty' regarding 3: 6 and 9 and 'the consistency of their 
assertions of sinlessness with other statements in 1 John.'726 
Interestingly, he fails to see in the text some of the most important solutions 
advocated by other scholars we have studied: 
There is nothing to show that the contradictory passages are speaking of 
different kinds of sin ... or represent different kinds of 
perfectionism ... Nor do 3: 6,9 seem to speak of a possibility of not 
sinning that the believer must realize ... , or of a process of 
transformation towards sinlessness ... , or of a sinless community rather. 
than sinless individuals ... The inconsistency is also not really a 
prefiguring of Luther's concept of the Christian as simul justus et 
peccator, righteous and sinner at the same time ... the author does not 
bring the two opposing thoughts into this or any other clear 
relationship.727 
Moreover, he declares that 'Other approaches get us little further.' Apropos 
grammatical explanations, Rensberger judges that the present tense, as used in 3: 6, 9 
and 5: 18, 'does generally imply continuous action.' Consequently, he says, 'these 
verses could mean that Christians do not habitually sin'; 'whereas the aorist tense in 2: 
1 could refer to single acts of sin into which they might lapse.' However, we learn, 
'this does not account for the present tenses in 1: 8 and 5: 16, or the perfect in 1: 10.' 
72S Ibid., pp. 91 - 92. 
726 Tbid 92 II ., p. . 
727 Ibid., p. 92. 
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Resignedly, he remarks: 'In general, though few things are completely impossible for 
this writer, it seems unlikely that so significant a distinction would be expressed solely 
by this grammatical subtlety.' Another approach might seek to 'recall the author's 
practical purpose of encouraging the readers not to sin, a purpose that could make use 
of both of the conflicting kinds of statements.' Yet, he discounts this idea too on the 
grounds that 'even if 1: 5 - 2: 2; 5: 16 - 17 speak practically and 3: 6,9; 5: 18 speak 
idealistically ... , they still must interact with, and so contradict, each other.'728 
Rensberger's resigned tone continues: 'It is hard to say whether we have here a 
paradox that is not to be harmonized, a contradiction that represents the 
contradictoriness of Christian existence ... , or simply the work of an author less 
concerned with clarity and consistency than we might wish.' On some issues, though, 
this scholar seems to find in the epistle what he regards as clear and consistent thought. 
For instance, he maintains the certain importance that the 'continuing and indwelling 
effect of divine birth' remains the basis for the claim of sinlessness. He sees some 
possibility that such a claim 'derives ultimately from the opponents, since it so strongly 
resembles the position rejected in 1: 8, 10.' Should this be so, it represents an 
agreement by the author with his adversaries that Christians have become transformed 
people - yet it shows also that he drew 'a different implication from this truth.'729 
Rensberger notes that the author does not claim that there is any imperative on the 
children of the devil to sin. Rather it 'is the opponents for whom origins determine 
character or conduct.' We discover that the 'author's point is not to derive conduct 
from origins, but to demonstrate origins from conduct.' Continuing to underlie the 
ideas here is the thought of John 8: 39 - 47 (and 5: 19,30). Because a child imitates 
the parent, one can know someone's parent by the person's actions. This scholar 
informs us of 'the point' of this section: 
God's children are not merely free of sin in principle, irrespective of 
their actions (a concept similar to some found in Gnosticism: Adv. 
Haer. 1.6. 24). Rather, they must be so in practice. If indeed the 
728 Ibid., pp. 92 - 93. 
729 Ibid., p. 93. 
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divine "seed" abides in the believer, then it should manifest itself in 
freedom from actual deeds of sin. Because Jesus has "destroyed the 
works of the devil," those who believe in him are set free from those 
works.730 
According to Rensberger, the relevant question for the opponents was: 'Who is 
sinless?' For them the answer was: 'The children of God.' Conversely, the author 
thought it relevant to ask: 'Who are the children of God?' For him the answer was: 
'Those who do not sin' ('that is,' adds Rensberger, 'those who love one another'). 
John's Gospel always links sin with a refusal to believe in Jesus, and so it presents a 
situation 'where only those outside the community sin.' Therefore, the 'opponents, in 
claiming sinlessness for believers in principle, may be superuciaIly truer to that 
Gospel.' The author, however, provides for 'the other indispensable mark of 
Johannine Christianity, love for one another. In this way, of course, he also exposes 
the opponents as really being of the devil, despite their claim of perfection, and this 
seems to be his fundamental aim here.'731 
Although the recognition of the author's aim does not entirely remove the 
difficulty, this scholar tells us that 'at least it lets us see the contradictory statements 
within their proper frames of reference.' Now that we understand the 'proper frames 
of reference,' we may go on to observe that the author provides a dual encouragement 
to the readers to counter the adversaries' claim to be sinless children of God. This dual 
encouragement involves: a) an 'assurance of forgiveness to those who acknowledge 
their misdeeds within the framework of the community of love redeemed by the 
incarnate Christ (1: 5 - 2: 2; 5: 16 - 17)'; b) a recognition of 'God's true children as 
those who let the daily reality of their lives be transformed by this redemption in the 
concrete practice of righteousness, which is love (3: 10).' Moreover, Rensberger tells 
us, 'It is those who reject this visible transformation who reveal themselves to be 
deceivers and children of the devil.'732 
730 Ibid., p. 93. 
731/bid., pp. 93 - 94. 
732/bid., p. 94. 
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Three themes in the epistle remain linked: 'true eschatology, true Christology, 
and true ethics.' The elements of future eschatology do not displace 'the realized 
eschatology that is inherent in the Christian claim that Jesus is the Messiah.' We may 
see this, Rensberger says, 'in the continuity between the present nature of God's 
children and what will be revealed about them at the end': 
Theyare like Jesus, and will be like God (3: 2 -7; see also 2: 6 - 8; 4: 
17). Therefore, those who hope to be like God then must be like Jesus 
now - they must live out the eschatological commandment of love, 
which thus characterizes both present and future. The opponents seem 
to have focused their realized eschatology on possession of the Spirit; 
our author focuses his on righteousness, that is, on love.733 
Returning to his discussion concerning a deterministic concept of salvation, 734 
he analyses further the language about 'children of God' and 'children of the devil.' Is 
such language simply a metaphor for two opposed classes analogous to the 'children of 
light' and 'children of darkness' (Luke 16: 8; Eph 5: 8; 1 Thess 5; 5)? Alternatively, 
we might ask if the author regards the offspring of God and the devil in a more literal 
sense - 'as two groups whose different origins unalterably determine their destinies?' It 
seems that the author implies just that kind of determinism in 2: 19. Yet, we learn that 
in a deterministic theology conduct may bear no relevance to the issue of salvation, or 
'spiritual genesis' may predestine it. Rensberger declares that the epistle 'may not offer 
enough evidence for us to decide whether it is deterministic, but in any case it does not 
accept these conclusions. Rather, for 1 John it is precisely the opponents' deliberate 
lack of loving actions that reveals their identity as children of the devil.'735 
Conversely, the author's various exhortations to the imitation of Jesus and of 
God 'could suggest an attempt to justify oneself in God's sight by good works.' 
However, his claim that one may identify the children of God as those who do what is 
right is indeed the antithesis of saying that 'doing righteousness' is the means to 
become God's child. Furthermore, the imitation of Christ advocated by the author does 
733 Ibid .• p. 94. 
734 See note 714. 
735 Rensberger. J John 2 John 3 John. p. 95. 
268 
not mean an artificial mimicry, but rather 'a life and a way of living that flow from the 
same source as Jesus', namely, the God who is love.'736 
Nevertheless, we learn that 'it would be wrong to impose on 1 John a theory in 
which being God's child has nothing to do with being like God and Jesus.' A child of 
God is one who has received divine love (3: 1). God bestows this love so that its 
recipients may also love one another (4: 7 - 11). Christians are the offspring of God, 
therefore they 'resemble God and Jesus in their love.' Because of their status believers 
'deliberately seek to create this resemblance'; this explains the author's urging of 
readers to love one another. Rensberger excludes both a 'theory of meritorious action' 
and a 'theory of grace or predestination without reference to action' as inadequate to 
represent the author's position. He states that our 'author cannot imagine achieving the 
status of child of God by one's own effort; but he also cannot imagine children of God 
who do not carry out acts oflove toward one another.'737 Moreover: 
The author's preference for sinless practice over sinlessness in principle 
is part of the ethical realism noted earlier in connection with 1: 5 - 2: 2. 
Of course, most people will find that the claim that the children of God 
cannot sin conflicts with their own realistic experience. Yet the 
revelation and the example of Jesus and the abiding presence of God's 
Spirit do call forth a kind of sinlessness. To become a child of God is 
not an invisible or a theoretical transformation, nor are the identity and 
nature of God's children made known only at the end of time. They are 
present realities ... both revealed and maintained in daily conduct. This 
conduct, moreover, is not a purely personal and individual holiness. 
Without brothers and sisters to love and be loved by, the real life of the 
child of God evaporates. In 1 John the whole question of sin and 
righteousness, of being or not being a child of God, comes down to 
loving one another concretely within a community, the family of 
God.738 
For Rensberger, it is chapter 5 that contains 'perhaps the most difficult 
contradiction in 1 John.' Having already noted that 2: 28 - 3: 10 'seemed to disallow 
exactly what 1: 5 - 2: 2 presupposed, that Christians could sin,' he observes that 
chapter 5 verses 16 - 17 'echo 1: 5 - 2: 2; but verse 18a is virtually an exact repetition of 
736 Ibid .• p. 95. 
737 Ibid .• p. 95. 
738 Ibid .• pp. 95 - 96. 
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3: 9a.' Thus, the author 'draws together the whole thematic involving sin here, and 
thereby produces an inconsistency of which he cannot possibly have been unaware.' 
Regarding the meaning of sin, no indication exists of any difference between 5: 16 - 17 
and 5: 18 as the author uses 'the same tense of the same verb .. .in both.' So, 
Rensberger deduces, 5: 18 'cannot be taken to refer to the "sin that leads to death," as if 
only outsiders (including the opponents), but not those born of God, could commit 
it.'739 He concludes: 
As before, the difficulty may be addressed, if not overcome, by keeping 
in mind the author's concerns. In 1: 5 - 2: 2; 2: 28 - 3: 10, these 
included identifying the true children of God, promoting sinlessness in 
practice and not just in principle, and keeping the readers from sinning 
while assuring them that if they do sin all is not lost. All of these aims 
are present here. The way in which they are pursued may be considered 
nonlogical, "affective"; the result, unfortunately, is to seem simply 
illogical. The readers are encouraged to be confident that freedom from 
sin is part of their birthright as children of God. Yet if they do find sin 
in their midst, they must still stand by the sinner - so long as it is not the 
deadly sin of deliberately abandoning mutual love and true belief.740 
With this synopsis of David Rensberger's work, I have now completed my survey of 
late twentieth century solutions to the conundrum. Before I embark on my summary . 
conclusion, I wish to remark on the question of historical reconstruction. 
6. 8. Some Observations on Historical Reconstruction 
For our present purpose, one of the most interesting (and representative) 
remarks made by the scholars we have just studied is that of Ruth Edwards' when she 
writes that: 'What may seem perfectly clear and logical to the author(s) may not seem so 
to the readers. This is especially true if the reader is distanced from the original 
author(s) by time, space, or culture, as we are from the Johannine episties.'741 To aid 
our evaluation of the interpretive approach displayed by the scholars in this chapter-
739 Ibid., p. 141. 
740 Ibid., p. 141. 
741 See note 00. 
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and to discuss Edwards' remark - we will draw from some of our research featured in 
chapter two. 
We remember the assessment that many biblical critics treat the text as a stable 
entity with determinate meanings and a real sociohistorical reference point. This seems 
to receive confirmation in the work of Edwards and her colleagues. In chapter two, I 
stated that clearly such critics use the text of 1 John as a kind of tableau vivant from 
which to reassemble the 'actual' setting. The life work of Brown in his project to 
reconstruct the historic setting of so-called 'Johannine Christianity,' is the prime 
example of just such a use of the text To use a Fishian term, our survey confirms that 
for the biblical scholar, historical reconstruction of a first or early second century 
setting is the presently recognised interpretive strategy for producing the text. Our 
group of commentators appeal to a historical context that, they would argue, provides a 
constraint on biblical interpretation. Concerning the study of 1 John, one could argue 
in favour of the Bible and Culture Collective's delineation of the prevalent state of 
scholastic interpretive praxis: 'A meaning, or an acceptable range of meanings, 
is ... determined by a consensus among the various congregations of historical-critical 
readers.t742 
An outcome of our examination in this chapter has been the accentuation of 
some biblical scholars' (albeit, limited) acknowledgement ofthe readers' role in the 
apprehension of meaning. This acknowledgement may reflect the influence of reader-
centred inquiry within biblical studies, although none of the scholars we have cited 
refers to reader-response or its proponents. In chapter two we noted that it is not only 
scholars such as Brown who hold to historical principles when interpreting texts. We 
recall the Collective's remark that: 'The works of reader-response criticism that biblical 
scholars have produced surely must appear strange to secular literary critics because of 
the predominance of historical concerns.'743 For the Collecti ve much of the activity 
resulting from this adoption of reader-centred studies has emerged as the consequence 
742 See note 236. 
743 See note 237. 
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of a marriage between Iser's ideas and historical criticism. 744 From the examination 
we have conducted, we would concur that an admixture of this sort simultaneously tries 
to give some autonomy to the reader while she or he discovers historical meaning in the 
text. 745 Brown and his compeers assemble their accounts on the basis that, on the one 
hand, readers bring their own assumptions to a work; yet, on the other, they 
presuppose 'the efficacy of the biblical text to guide them to historically verifiable 
knowledge. t746 The challenge we discussed in our second chapter was that if we are 
to use a form of reader-response criticism that reflects present reading agendas, we 
must disengage the text from this quest to reconstruct original settings. Stanley E. 
Porter's words seem apposite following our inquiry: 'If the historical question as 
traditionally posed in Biblical studies is not bracketed, if only temporarily, reader-
response criticism will never have a genuine opportunity to contribute to New 
Testament studies, but will be reader-response criticism virtually in name onJy.'747 
Recollecting (with some irony, given his emphases) that it is Iser who provides 
the opportunity for biblical critics to effect just such a bracketing of the historical 
question, we highlight again that Iser writes of the 'unmask[ing] [of] the true nature of 
meaning, which is nothing but a substitute for reality. t7 48 We remember that (taking 
this statement to include the meaning produced by historians) the Bible and Culture 
Collective reassures us that 'Iser does not necessarily mean, of course, that nothing 
happened in the past; he only means that one's access to what happened [emerges] 
through language and through narrative constructs written by historians 
themselves.'749 The Collective emphasise that Iser's statement has significance for 
biblical critics in that it implies that the act of 'writing about historical events is like 
writing a fictional account.'750 At this stage it is appropriate to restate one of Iser's 
744 See note 238. 
745 See note 239. 
746 See note 240. 
747 See note 241. 
748 See note 242. 
749 See note 243. 
750 See note 244. 
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later and more explicit comments regarding some features of (empirical) philosophical 
discourse as it reinforces the significance of the first statement for those engaged in 
historical reconstruction. He points to the volatile fluctuation in critical attitudes to 
fiction. Periods when scholars regard fiction as mere invention become quickly 
superseded by intervals when they treat it as a necessity. Iser records that it became a 
burden for the discipline of epistemology, because of a difficulty in engaging 'with the 
dual nature of the fact that make-believe is indispensable for organising that which 
appears to be given.' He explains that which 'distinguishes fiction in philosophical 
discourse from fiction in literary discourse.' We learn that this distinguishing element 
is 'the fact that in the former it remains veiled whereas in the latter it discloses its own 
fictional nature.'75 1 From this the Collective drew the implication that biblical critics 
'cannot know the past on its own terms but only through their narrative constructs.'752 
Such an unveiling of the 'fictional nature' of philosophical discourse by Iser, 
we recorded, demonstrates a poststructuralist element in his theory that many biblical 
reader-response critics seem to ignore. Hayden White's exposure of the assumptions 
of historiography instigated this deduction from his work: 'What they have felt obliged 
to ignore or repress is the unsettling possibility that "the historical milieux," which 
really "exist" for historians, are themselves products of their own "fictive 
capability. "1]53 Our brief survey of late twentieth century solutions to our problem has 
demonstrated a pervasive assumption among lohannine scholars: that the historical 
circumstances surrounding the composition of 1 John remain available to us through 
the text. RecapitUlating the corollary I reached in chapter two: I think it is important to 
acknowledge that the work of biblical critics and historians alike can only account for 
past events by reference to their own reading strategies - strategies, moreover, that have 
both defined the relevant data and predetermined its interpretation. 7 S4 At this 
culmination of our study we may observe that these reading strategies govern 
751 See note 245. 
752 See note 246. 
753 See note 247. 
754 See note 248. 
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Iohannine scholars' account of the events surrounding the production of 1 John and the 
solutions brought to the conundrum. 
I contend that a direct correlation exists between Edwards' remark that opens 
this section and the historical-critical assumption targeted by Fish. In our second 
chapter we registered the following assertion: To say that readers cannot know the past 
on its own terms but only through their narrative constructs is to involve all readers in 
an act of construction. Again, it is lser who furnishes us with a stimulus to adopt this 
position when he asserts that a text represents a 'recodification of social and historical 
norms.' He explains that this recodification 'has a double function.' It enables: i) 
contemporary readers 'to see what they cannot normally see in the ordinary process of 
day-to-day living'; and, ii) 'subsequent generations of readers ... to grasp a reality that 
was never their own.'755 However, as we have seen, Iser fails to explore the 
implications of this observation, whereas, characteristically, Fish presses the issue to a 
further point. 
Fish, we recall, accuses Iser of avoiding the 'hard choice' between historical 
and ahistorical interpretation. He then makes this key statement that we recollect in full: 
The readers contemporary to an author are in no more a privileged 
position than the readers of later generations; for both sets of readers are 
provoked to an act of construction rather than an act of retrieval; and 
since the blue-print for construction is significantly incomplete - it 
displays gaps and blanks and indeterminacies - no instance of 
construction is more accurate, in the sense of being truer to an 
historically embodied meaning, than any other. Even the first reader of 
a work is called upon to complete the connections left unspecified in the 
text according to his "individual disposition."756 
Contrary, then, to one implication of Edwards' remark, chronological proximity to the 
origin of a text represents no advantage. Applying Fish's argument to Johannine 
studies, we might aver that 'acts of construction' rather than 'acts of retrieval' took 
place, and are taking place, during every act of reading; whether we propose any of the 
following: i) the reading by the author of the Johannine traditions (for the purpose of 
755 See note 249. 
756 See note 250. 
274 
highlighting their perfectionist passages and so warning his 'brothers' of the perceived 
deceptions of his adversaries); ii) the reading of the resultant communication by the 
'lohannine Community'; iii) the reading ofthe so-called First Epistle by eighteenth 
century believers; or, iv) the readings by biblical critics at the cusp of the twenty-first 
century - at every stage the respective readers create the meaning of the text rather than 
find it there. 
Edwards' statement seemingly acknowledges: a) the regard of an author for the 
clarity and logic of her or his own work; b) the possibility of authorial obscurity of 
expression; c) the reader's perceptual faculties as a possible occasion of different 
understandings of authorial meaning; and, d) the conceivable effects of geographical 
distance and culture. Nevertheless, she, along with the other scholars we have 
considered, repeatedly treats the text as the determinate repository of meaning. 
Furthermore, the close analysis of the text remains the sole means of solution to our 
problem. Concerning the expression of the author, we have witnessed differing critical 
attitudes: some claiming that his meaning is entirely clear in certain passages, and some 
that it is obscure. Yet, we note that whatever the critical attitude is regarding the 
transparency of the text, the drive to demonstrate its meaning to the reader continues 
unabated. The demand made by Othello to his 'Ancient' Iago, quoted at the head of 
this chapter, encapsulates the nature of the impulse of biblical historical-critical 
scholars. They too desire surety of 'the ocular proof,' but concerning the historical 
background and message of 1 John. Each one wishes to see it in the text, to 
corroborate it, to secure their 'probation' of it against any 'doubt.' As has been our 
constant theme, the challenge of Fish's observations is that whatever we 'see' in the 
text - in this instance its clarity or obscurity. the historical situation or the authorial 
message - emerges as a result of one's reading strategies and assumptions. We do not 
find them embedded in the text. Thus. all readers of First John - whether at the tum of 
the first century of the Christian era, or in the eighteenth century, or at the end of the 
twentieth century - stand in equal relation to that text, in that all 'create' it through their 




Dreamer of dreams, born out of my due time, 
Why should I strive to set the crooked straight? 
Let it suffice me that my murmuring rhyme 
Beats with light wing against the ivory gate, 
telling a tale not too importunate ... 757 
I have referred to this thesis as a 'story' of reader-response criticism and the 
interpretation of particular perfectionist texts.7 58 In using this word I have ceded that 
my observations are merely a construct, a brief abstraction of what is a complex and 
evolving ratiocination of the act of reading. That I should regard it so receives 
confirmation in that the Bible and Culture Collective allows that virtually all the 
theoretical approaches covered in their work we might class as versions of reader-
response criticism.759 Across three chapters that develop my story I have sought to 
refine an understanding of how people separated by over two centuries have read four 
verses of the New Testament associated with Christian perfection. A further chapter, 
an excursus, I have designed as an example of a secular form of perfectionism. The 
two opening chapters represent the substructure of the story as throughout them I have 
discussed the idea of the inescapability of interpretation. 
As a reader who enjoys a full conclusion to any narrative, I could understand if 
a sense of frustration arose in some readers of this work because I offer no solution to 
the 'sinlessness contradiction' in 1 John. However, as one may mark from my 
introduction and from my declaration at the beginning of chapter two, it was never my 
757 A. Briggs (ed.), William Morris. Newsfrom Nowhere and Selected Writings and Designs 
(Published in 1962 as William Morris: Selected Writings and Designs; repr., London: Penguin, 
1986), Envoi to The Earthly Paradise, 1868 - 1870, p. 67. 
758 See note 145. . 
759 See note 146. 
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intention to make an intervention of my own into the discussion with the purpose of 
settling the exegetical problem. Rather, my aim was to analyse the typical 
hermeneutical moves that interpreters make in such a debate. I wished to conduct that 
analysis by drawing methodologically on the interplay between the perspectives of the 
reader-response theorists Iser and Fish. This resulted in a trajectory away from Iser 
and towards an examination that emphasised Fishian perspectives on the commentators' 
treatment of the material. I trust that within the scope I have set for my work the reader 
will experience some sense of completion. 
When we consider the three strands of exegesis we have explored: a) that John 
Wesley gave his attention to the matter of this perceived contradiction as part of his 
defence of the doctrine of Christian perfection; b) that those whom he admired 
discussed the subject in their commentaries on 1 John; and, c) that modem scholars 
pursue a solution to it as part of their endeavour to reconstruct the history of the 
'Johannine community,' we may realise that the issue has held, and continues to hold, 
an importance for a number of those interested in biblical interpretation. Fortunately, 
we have been able to examine all the major explications of the problem published by 
Wesley and his luminaries. Regarding the studies proffered by modem scholars, as I 
stated in my inaugural remarks, I did not set out to give a complete account of twentieth 
century exegesis of 1 John. I deliberately limited myself to an assay of the annotations 
of six scholars who have made contributions to the discussion during the last thirty 
years. Regrettably, this has meant that I have had to exclude the valuable work of other 
commentators. However, the space and time required to include further significant 
annotations remains beyond the limits set for this thesis. Moreover, I suggest that the 
works of the scholars we have considered provide representative examples of the 
hermeneutical moves made by the guild of Johannine historical-critical scholars. 
My narrative began in chapter one with a proposal that we may view reading as 
a complex feat achieved by individuals who are subject to plural internal and external 
influences; that a delicate balance of many factors affects our perception of the written 
word. Following from that proposal, I took up the ideas of the consequent malleability 
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of words and our role in the production of meaning. From that point I introduced John 
Wesley as a reader and advocate of perfectionism Moreover, I announced the leitmotif 
of my research. Then I accented the existence of secular forms of perfectionism and 
acknowledged the factors that would contribute to my own bias in reading. A brief 
history of reader-response criticism ensued: from the reaction to New Critical strictures, 
to the establishment of a conceptually diverse critical position emphasising (to varying 
extents) that readers, rather than texts, make meaning. The ideas of, and contention 
between, Iser and Fish then became central to my account. 
My second chapter involved an attempt to re-evaluate and defend Fish's ideas, 
to prove their relevance to my task. I discussed subjects such as: how interpretations 
change; interpretive communities; the criteria for accepting interpretations; the critical 
effort to return to the text; our inability to avoid interpretation; the impossibility of 
detachment from beliefs and assumptions; and the model of persuasion against that of 
demonstration. Next, I explained and defended a Fishian form of reader-response 
analysis that had emerged from our study. Finally, I made a primary exhibition of our 
verses from the First Epistle and outlined an Iserian and Fishian approach to them. 
The third chapter displayed the seven main explications of the verses and 
Christian perfection by John Wesley. In this chapter, I appraised Wesley's work from 
a Fishian perspective. Likewise, in chapter four I repeated that process using the 
commentaries of five theologians that Wesley respected. Then I conducted a brief 
comparison between the Methodist's exegesis and that of his luminaries. I wrote 
chapter five as an excursus to argue that the secular philosophical concerns of William 
Godwin represent a widespread striving for perfection during the eighteenth century. I 
presented this as an aspiration analogous to that of Wesley's - so setting the Methodist 
leader's work in a wider interpretive context, placing both men within the same 
interpretive community. Reaching the culmination of my story. chapter six, I examined 
six scholars' solutions to the perceived contradiction; these analyses I intended as a 
depiction of late twentieth century historical-critical investigation in the field of biblical 
studies. 
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I think it is appropriate in this summary conclusion to highlight again several 
aspects of Fish's perspective: to restate the form of reader-response that I have applied 
to our subject, and reiterate and uphold Fish's estimate of the consequences of its 
application. As I maintained in chapter two, we must make a distinction between 
reader-response as a method of practical criticism, like the 'Affective Styli sties' of the 
early period, and the sort ofliterary-hermeneutical considerations of the later work by 
Fish. It is the latter aspect of his standpoint that I have incorporated into my thesis. As 
we have seen, Fish's account of reading is a self-revising project, and his ideas have 
evolved considerably over almost three decades. Although still thought of as under the 
umbrella of reader-response, one could now speak of his recent work as akin to 
hermeneutics. Fish's present observations apply to reading generally, without offering 
a method that applies only to particular types of text. The emphasis on the reader 
remains, but he has adopted a more generalised and abstract reflection on reading. 
Fish's account now centres upon perception and communication rather than specific 
word and sentence analysis. Such an account has aided my quest to illustrate how 
readers have solved the particular interpretive problem in 1 John. 
Now that we have applied his literary-hermeneutical observations to our specific 
case, we must remind ourselves of Fish's reassurance that, in appropriating his 
paradigm, we still retain 'texts, standards, norms, criteria of judgement, critical 
histories, and so on' - though not in the same form. He has stated that the acts of 
convincing others that they are 'wrong,' that one interpretation has merit over another, 
the citation of evidence for our preferred reading, all these acts continue as before; now, 
however, we operate with the knowledge that we complete them within a set of 
institutional assumptions that may themselves tum into disputed objects. The 
advantage emanating from this model is that we obtain a 'principled account of change' 
and an explanation, sufficient for ourselves and for others, for intractable interpretive 
problems. 
In defence of Fish, I commented in chapter one on his use of such language as 
'making' (as opposed to 'finding') meaning (expressions to the effect that the reader 
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does not find meaning in the text, she or he creates it out of the interpretive strategies 
employed in the act of reading). It is germane to remind ourselves that although he 
uses this kind language to undermine a naive interpretive 'realism' (and a prevalent 
critical rhetoric), he is not doing so on behalf of a personal belief in some sort of 
opposing epistemological or metaphysical 'idealism' (that holds as its essence that 
interpretation 'creates' everything our of nothing); rather, his argument stands outside 
the realism versus idealism debate. We recall that primarily Fish wishes to indicate that 
there is no space between 'interpretation' and the 'facts' such that the former could be 
weighed against the latter. 
Moreover, our defence of Fish's work in chapter 2 noted his observations on 
the typical critical claim not to be 'interpreting' but simply listening to the text without 
the imposition of an agenda. I posited that in giving voice to these observations Fish is 
not seeking to mount a covert expose of supposed hermeneutical incoherence. I 
suggested that while he undermines the 'back-to-the-text' claim on the basis that the text 
returned to is simply the one demanded by an interpretation that governs its production, 
Fish's work illustrates the common use of such hermeneutical rhetoric in interpretive 
practice. Also, in terms of that rhetoric, his work recognises that there is a degree of 
inevitability about using this type of language. However, I explained that his remarks 
on the scholars' claim of going 'back-to-the-text' have the purpose of revealing that 
claim as a 'move,' a style or gesture that we do not notice because of its seeming 
naturalness or obviousness. Fish's observations serve to unveil the rhetoric of 
objectivity or 'truth-telling.' He attends to what readers do in their effort to have their 
reading prevail, how they commend their work, the type of posture they adopt towards 
it I stated that his insights might well make one more guarded about such critical 
rhetoric, yet it remains doubtful that they could, or should, entirely remove that 
rhetoric. One cannot commend a reading to others by asserting its non-existence. 
Fish proposes a model that places persuasion - based on our beliefs and 
assumptions rather than on a text that is independent of interpretation - at the centre of 
interpretive praxis. Using this model, he has told us, serves to provide novel 
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perspectives on problems concerning the history ofliterary criticism; where we find 
attempts at explication previously regarded under the demonstration pattern as 
unsuccessful. we may now view them as developments born out of a literary culture 
holding assumptions different - and not inferior - to our own. When we set aside the 
essentialist notions that inform a demonstration pattern. it permits us to think about the 
evolution of the literary institution. and to lay bare the interpretive strategies that 
enabled the production and understanding of its canons.760 
Fish has answered two hypothetical questions from a poststructuralist 
standpoint regarding 'the status of [his] own discourse.' First, if all arguments 
continue within assumptions and presuppositions that are also subject to challenge and 
change, does not that make Fish's reasoning itself as vulnerable as the claims it seeks to 
replace? Fish, we remember, nonchalantly dismissed this question: of course his 
position shares the vulnerability of all argument, the question is irrelevant; no one can 
claim privilege for her or his standpoint, all must use persuasion. Thus, Fish's essays 
are themselves not merely presentations, but arguments - they also represent. he says, 
examples of how the model of persuasion works. It is essential always to contend. to 
establish our perspective, to anticipate objections regarding the consequences of our 
contention. Fish has maintained that he has tried to remove all sources of objection and 
to alleviate the fear of dire consequences. Really. it is only within his position that we 
can account for the phenomena his essentialist opponents wish to preserve. 
We have noted that Fish readily accepts the possibility that the reverse could 
happen: someone could persuade him that what he wishes to preserve depends upon a 
position other than his. If this befell he would share the other's belief and position. 
However. until such an event he would argue for his position with all the certitude that 
springs from belief - simultaneously acknowledging that under certain conditions in the 
future he might believe something else. This subjection to the same challenge as that 
put to his essentialist colleagues is not a weakness in his position but a restatement of it. 
Indeed. he has said. it is incoherent to conceive of a position that is invulnerable to 
760 See note 202. 
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challenge, unless one accepts the possibility of a position innocent of assumptions. 
Certainly, Fish does not accept the latter and, therefore, the fact that his assumptions 
remain subject to dislodgement does not overthrow his argument but confinns it, for it 
is an extension of it. 
In the second hypothetical question, Fish considered the practical consequences 
of his ideas in the realm ofliterary criticism. We may recall the terseness with which he 
stated that there are none whatsoever. As we know, Fish's proposition is that all that 
seems evident and unequivocal to us 'is only so within some institutional or 
conventional structure,' therefore, we can never work outside such a structure. Yet, he 
does not think that anyone could conduct their practical criticism by means of his 
position - it is purely a matter of theoretical reasoning about assumptions. Once we 
cease from this reasoning we inhabit our assumptions again and speak about literature 
from within whatever beliefs we held before. Any thought that Fish's ideas might 
prevent practical criticism has no basis because for this to happen one would have to 
have absolutely no belief about authors or texts; such a situation remains impossible as 
we cannot think of them independently of belief. Our ability to think about these 
matters safeguards our capacity to speak of them, and to have the confidence to do so. 
There is no potentiality of any practical consequences of Fish's work as it would 
involve a perpetual analysis of beliefs, without commitment to any, and that is not a 
stance anyone can take. Fish has declared, though, that we 'livre] out' the position he 
proposes as our firmly held beliefs yield to others, and bring with them a boundless 
consecution of 'practical activities that we are always able to perform.' 
A further question occurred to us surrounding the relevance of Fish's position 
as a result of his laconic statement. If there are no effects on the way we read and teach 
literature, why should we concern ourselves with Fish's work? Fish has responded 
that at the heart of this query is an assumption that to have any interest for us a matter 
must have a direct effect on our customary experience of literature; connected to this 
assumption is an anti-theoretical bias akin to the ideological core of New Criticism. 
Fish, we recall, thinks the question typifies the very parochial view he challenges, and 
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it damns his argument 'only from [that] point of view.' He further emphasises the 
importance of elaborating his position by highlighting that the issues he deals with have 
a pivotal place in the concerns of the literary institution.761 
Because I have recognised that the issues that Fish deals with indeed have such 
a pivotal place in the concerns of the guild of Johannine scholars, I have attempted to 
elaborate his position throughout my story. I will end that elaboration, and my entire 
thesis, using the quote with which we opened this chapter. William Morris poses a 
question apposite to our perceived contradiction in 1 John: 'Why should I strive to set 
the crooked straight?' From our Fishian perspective we answer: Because you must 
Interpretation is inevitable; it is impossible to withhold interpretation; no one can escape 
effecting it; moreover, whatever solution you offer, you do not demonstrate what is in 
the text; you always persuade others according to your assumptions. To you any 
percei ved line of meaning between our pairs of verses may appear tortuous, direct, or 
non-existent. Be sure that to others it may not appear thus. What is at stake in any 
ensuing dispute are the assumptions behind interpretation, rather than the supposed 
facts in the text. Every reading of a work - and therefore in this instance every solution 
offered for the 'sinlessness contradiction' - is a function of a reader's interpretive 
perspective. Similarly, regarding my thesis, to some it may appear as a mere 
'murmuring rhyme' that 'beats with light wing against the ivory gate [of lohannine 
studies], telling a tale not too importunate.' To others it may bear some significance. 
This situation must 'suffice me,' for, as Stanley Fish has remarked: 'you will agree 
with me (that is, understand) only if you already agree with me.'762 
James Howard Williams 
761 See note 206. 
762 See notes 169 and 129. 
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